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ABSTRACT I-l" 
For millennia battles were essentially affairs of linear encounter. From the 10 , Century to the 2& Century, artillery generally fired directly in the two dimensional 
plane, limiting potential effects. The development of indirect fire changed this , 
two-dimensional model. . Warfare became not so much a matter of linear encounter 
as one of engagements across and throughout an area; and artillery dominated land 
operations in both the First and Second World Wars as a result. 
Firepower was subsequently often applied in even greater weights, but its effects 
were frequently excessive, and high-value targets proved elusive. During the Cold 
War in Europe, the importance of field artillery waned relative to other arms. 
Artillery could only regain its utility by acquiring the highest-value targets and 
engaging them effectively with the appropriate degree of force in time and space - 
true precision, as opposed to mere accuracy at a point. Improvements in target 
acquisition and accuracy will enable land systems once more to engage targets 
effectively throughout the battlespace, with implications for warfitre analogous to 
those precipitated by the introduction of indirect fire a century ago. 
Land operations will become increasingly three-dimensional and Joint. The effects 
of fire will increasingly be applied in, not merely via, the third dimension, since 
targets themselves will increasingly be located, not just on the area of a battlefield, 
but in the volume of three-dimensional battlespace, with values ofien determined 
by considerations of the fourth dimension, time. Fire, lethal and non-lethal, will 
also be targeted in other less tangible dimensions such as cyber-space; and new 
types of 'virtual counterfire' will also emerge in the forms of legal and moral 
restraint. All will be viewed through the lens of perceptions. 
The burgeoning of firepower from all sources now becomes the spur for changes 
in the relationship between the land and air components, mindfid of those novel 
fitctors that will increasingly inhibit the application of that firepower. 
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GLOSSARY 
Adjust An observer adjusts fire onto a target by ordering corrections of aim to the 
guns. 
Air Interdiction Air operations designed to destroy, isolate, neutralize or delay the 
enemy's military potential, before it can be brought to bear effectively against 
friendly forces, conducted at such a distance from friendly forces that detailed 
integration of each air mission with their fire and movement is not required. 
(Contrast Close Air Support) - 
Ammunition A device charged with explosives, propellants, pyrotechnics, 
initiating compounds or nuclear/biological/chernical material, for use in connection 
with offence or defence, including demolitions. 
Assault Gun A form of tracked self-propelled gun, with a gun of larger calibre 
than normally found on a tank. The traverse of the gun is limited to a narrow 
forward arc, and the vehicle carries heavier frontal armour than found in a SP field 
gun designed primarily for indirect fire. The assault gun's role is usually to 
accompany tanks and infantry in the assault and to suppress the enemy's defences, 
usually with direct fire. 
Assembly Area An area in which a command is assembled, preparatory to fluther 
action. 
BattlefieldAir Interdiction (BAI) Air action against hostile surfitce targets, which 
are in a position directly to affect forces, and which requires joint planning and co- 
ordination. While BAI missions require co-ordination in joint planning, they may 
not require continuous co-ordination during the execution stage. 
Calibre The diameter of the inside of a barreL 
Cannon A term used formerly to describe a field or siege gun. Now commonly 
used to refer to any barrelled weapon other than a mortar or small anrL 
Close Air Support (CAS) Air action against hostile targets which are in close 
proximity to friendly forces, and which requires detailed integration of each air 
mission with the fire and movement of those forces. 
ix 
Close Support The action of the supporting force, against targets or objectives, 
which are sufficiently near the supported force to require detailed integration or 
co-ordination of the supporting action, with the fire, movement, or other actions, 
of the supported force. 
Command Authority granted a conmiander to assign missions or tasks to 
subordinates, to deploy units, to re-assign forces, and to retain or delegate 
operational and/or tactical control. 
Concentration Area An area where troops are brought together, briefed, 
rehearsed, administered, and prepared for battle. 
Control The detailed, and usually local, direction of the control of movement, 
manoeuvres or fire necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. 
Counter Attack Attack by part, or all of a defending force, on an enemy attacking 
force for specific purposes, such as gaining lost ground or cutting off and 
destroying enemy advancing units, and with the general objective of denying to the 
enemy the attahunent of his purpose in attacking. 
Counter Battery Fire Fire delivered for the purpose of destroying or neutralizing 
indirect fire weapons systems. 
Counter Mobility Denying the enemy mobility by obstacles or fire. 
Counter Penetration Action to counter enemy penetration of a defended area. 
Counter Stroke A counter-attack at formation level, with the specific aim of 
destroying enemy forces which are on the move or have temporarily halted. 
Dead Ground An area within the maximum range of a weapon, radar or observer, 
which cannot be covered by fire or observation from a particular position because 
of intervening obstacles, the nature of the ground, the characteristics of the 
trajectory, or the limitations of the pointing capability of the weapon. 
Deception Measures designed to mislead the enemy to induce him to react in a 
manner prejudicial to his interests. 
Defence 
x 
Active Defence SfinUar to Mobile Defence. 
Main DefensiveArea Area containing firnily held positions, obstacles and reserves 
designed to destroy the enemy's main attacking force. 
Positional Defence Strong, mainly static, defence where terrain can beheld by 
well-prepared and mutually supported positions, protected by obstacles and 
supported by reserves. 
Mobile Defence A means of defeating an attacking enemy as he forces his way 
into and through a framework of wen sited and prepared positions with mobile 
reserves operating between them First coined by the German Army in 1917, 
referring to enemy deep penetrations destroyed by counter-attack. More recently, 
emphasis has been placed on the defeat of enemy penetrations in prepared areas by 
mobile forces. 
Defence in Depth Siting of mutually supporting defensive positions designed so 
absorb and progressively weaken an attack, to prevent initial observation of the 
whole position by the enemy, and to allow the commander to manoeuvre his 
reserve. 
Defensive Fire (Dr') Fire delivered by supporting units to assist and protect a unit 
in a defensive action. 
Defilade To shield from enemy fire or observation by use of natural or artificial 
obstacles, usually with the purpose of engaging an enemy in the flank (with 
enfilade fire). 
Depth Fire The engagement of targets beyond the contact zone, for example 
headquarters, artillery, logistics and reserves. 
Desant A force placed in the enemy's rear. 
Direct Fire Fire directed at a target which is visible to the aimer. 
Direct Support (DS) British artilLery placý in direct support of a formation or unit 
provides an artMery commander, observers and communications to that formation 
or unit. 
xi 
Economy of Force The optimum use of type and quantity of arms to achieve an 
objective with the minimum casualties and wasted effort. 
Electronic Silence The deliberate prohibition of electronic radiation, normally 
applied for a stated period, to specific equipments or frequency bands. 
Electronic Warfare (Egg Military action involving the use of electromagnetic 
energy to determine, exploit, reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic 
spectrum; and action to retain its effective use by friendly forces. 
Encirclement Envelopment from both flanks simultaneously. 
Enfilade Fire Fire striking the flank of the target, usuaUy from a defiladed 
Position. 
Exploitation The taking of full advantage of success and following up of initial 
gains. 
Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) A line established by the ground force 
cominander to ensure coordination of fire which is not under his control, but which 
inay affect operations which are. 
Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) The foremost limits of a series of areas 
in which ground combat units are deployed, excluding the areas in which the 
covering or screening forces are operating, designed to co-ordinate fire support, 
the positioning of forces or the manoeuvre units. 
Fire Mobility The flexible switching of fire from one target to another across a 
front and in depth. 
Forward Line of Ovm Troops (FL07) A line which indicates the most forward 
position of f1dendly forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time. 
Final Protective Fire (FPfi) An immediately available pre-arranged barrier of fire 
designed to impede enemy movement across defended lines. 
Forming-Up Place (FUP) The last position occupied by the assaulting echelon 
before crossing the Start Line or Line of Departure. 
Forward Slope Any slope which descends towards the enemy. 
xii 
General Support Artillery British artillery controlled at divisional or corps levels. 
Gun Since the end of the I Vh Century, a weapon in which projectile and charge 
are loaded in one piece, and which fires at high muzzle-velocity in flat trajectories. 
The term is now commonly used to refier to any barrelled artillery equipment. 
Gun-Houfter An artillery weapon in which projectile and charge can be loaded 
separately, as with a howitzer, but which can also fire at high muzzle-velocities and 
with low trajectories. 
Harassing Fire Fire designed to distwb enemy troops, to curtail movement by 
threat of losses, to lower morale. 
H Hour The specific time on D-Day at which hostilities commence, or, in a 
planned operation, at which operations commence. In World War Two this was 
known as Zero Hour. 
Houltzer An artillery weapon in which the projectile and charge are loaded 
separately, allowing the size of the charge to be varied according to the range and 
type of the target, and which can be fired in the high angle. 
Indirect Fire Fire defivered at a target which cannot be seen by the aimer. 
Limber Originally a wheeled carriage which can be attached to the trail of a gun 
and is usually used for carrying ammunition or the gun detachment. In modem 
times the limber is usually a separate vehicle. 
Line ofDeparture The line at which an operation begin& 
Mil One mil is 116400th part of a circle used for aiming and survey. One mil 
subtends one nietre at one kilometre. 
Minimum Force The least force of any type required to acbieve an objective. 
Mortar Generally a smooth-bored weapon firing finned bombs in the high angle. 
Munitions Explosive ordnance, such as ammunition and bombs. 
xiii 
Mutual Support A condition which exists when positions are able to support each 
other by direct fire, thus preventing the enemy from mounting an attack against 
any one position without being subject to direct fire from one or more adjacent 
positions. 
M=Ie Brake A device fitted to the muzzle of a barrel, which deflects the 
propellant gases following the projectile to develop a forward thrust, countering 
the recoil. 
Neutralize To render the enemy's weapons temporarily ineffectuaL 
On-Call Target A planned target other than a scheduled target, on which fire is 
delivered when requested. 
Operational Level Operations are conducted at theatre or campaign level, and are 
tactical actions with strategic implications. 
Ordnance Originally a generic term for all military equipment and supplies, now 
usually restricted to artillery equipments. 
Piece Any barrelled weapon. The term is being increasingly applied to any 
artillery firing or launching system. 
Predicted Fire Indirect artillery fire without observation or adjustment. The firing 
data result from computations allowing for map co-ordinates of target and guns, 
meteorological conditions, the ballistic variables of the guns and other factors. 
Projectile Anything fired from a gun, howitzer or launcher. 
RAP See rocket-assisted projectile. 
Recoilless Producing gases on firing which escape to the rear of the gun so as to 
produce mininml recoil force. 
Rocket-Assisted Projectile (R, 4P) A projectile which increases its range by a 
rocket motor cutting in as it loses forward speed at the high point of its trajectory. 
Registration The determination of correct firing data by adjusting the faU of shot 
onto a target. 
xiv 
Reverse Slope Any slope that descends away from the enemy. 
Round A projectile, or a projectile and propelling charge. 
Scheduled Target A target engaged at a predetermined time. 
Shell A projectile with a hollow interior into which HE or some other cargo can 
be packed, and fired by a gun or howitzer. 
Shot A solid artillery projectile used prkwily against annour. 
Start Line A fine designated to co-ordinate the departure of an attack. 
Survey The calculation of the precise co-ordinates of a firing unit so that an 
accurate relationship may be established between the positioned guns, observer 
and target. 
Tank Destroyer A tracked SP anti-tank gun specificaUy designed to destroy tanks. 
Time on Target (TO7) In order to achieve the maximum shock effect, artillery fire 
from various sources is often synchronized to fall on a particular target at a 
particular time. To achieve this, firing units are given a TOT. Because of their 
different distances from the target, the time at which firing units open fire my vary 
in order to achieve a common TOT. 
Trail That part of a towed gun which extends from the axle to the ground to 
provide support and to counter the recoiL 
xv 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AD Air Defence 
ADP Automatic Data Processing 
AFATDS Army Field Artillery Tactical Data System 
AFOR Army Force 
AGRA Army Group Royal Artillery 
AH Attack Helicopter 
ANGLICO Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Company 
AO Area of Operation 
AP 1. Armour-piercing 2. Ammunition Point 
APFSDS Armour-Piercing Fin-Stabilized Discarding Sabot 
ARRC ACE (Allied Commander Europe) Rapid Reaction Force 
ASP Advanced Sound-Ranging Programme 
ATGW Anti-Tank Guided Weapon 
BAI Battlefield Air Interdiction 
BC Battery Commander 
BDA Battle Damage Assessment 
BEF British Expeditionary Force 
C2 Command and Control 
C3 Command, Control and Communications 
C4 Command, Control, Communications and Computation 
C41 Command, Control, Co! nmunications, Computation and 
Intelligence 
CAGRA Commander Army Group Royal Artillery 
CAS Close Air Support 
CB Counter-Battery (Fire) 
CCRA Commander Corps Royal Artillery 
CF Counterfire 
C/LU Container/Launcher Units 
CNAD Conference ofNATO Armaments Directors 
Co Commanding Officer 
COIN Counter-Insurgency 
COMAFOR Commander AFOR 
COMKFOR Commander KFOR 
COMSFOR Commander SFOR 
CP Command Post 
CRA Commander Royal Artillery 
DAER Daily Ammunition Expenditure Rate 
DASC Direct Air Support Center 
xvi 
DEW Directed Energy Weapon 
DF 1. Defensive Fire 2. Direct Fire 
DPICM Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munition 
DS Direct Support 
DSWS Divisional Support Weapon System 
DU Depleted Uranium 
DZ Drop Zone 
ECC Effects Control Center 
ET Emerging Technology 
EW Electronic Warfare 
FAC Forward Air Controller 
FASCAM Family of Scatterable Mines 
FB Firebase 
FCS Future Combat System 
FDC Fire Direction Center 
FEBA Forward Edge of the Battle Area 
FIBUA Fighting in Built-Up Areas 
FLOT Forward Line of Own Troops 
FOFA Follow-on Forces Attack 
FOO Forward Observation Officer 
FPF Final Protective Fire 
FSB Fire Support Base 
FSCC Fire Support Co-ordination Center 
FSCL Fire Support Co-ordination Line 
FSCM Fire Support Co-ordination Measure 
FSCOORD Fire Support Coordination 
FSE Fire Support Element 
FSR Field Service Regulations 
FSSB Fire Support Surveillance Base 
FUP Forming-Up Place 
GBAD Ground-Based Air Defence 
GPS Global Positioning System 
HE High Explosive 
HQ Headquarters 
1CM Improved Conventional Munitions 
IDF Israeli Defence Forces 
IFOR Implementation Force 
IPDS Improved Positioning Determining System 
is Internal Security 
ISTAR Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance 
xvii 
JASSM Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile 
JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition 
JSTARS Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System 
JTACMS Joint Tactical Missile System 
KFOR Kosovo Force 
KLA Kosovo Liberation Army 
LS Landing Site 
LOCASS Low-Cost Autonomous Attack System 
LZ Landing Zone 
MAD Mutual Assured Destruction 
MOUT Military Operations on Urban Terrain 
MBRL Multiple-Barrel Rocket Launcher 
MLRS Multiple-Launch Rocket System 
MRBM Medium-Range Ballistic Missile 
NITA Military Technical Agreement 
NMD National Missile Defense 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NFS Naval Fire Support 
NGS Naval Gunfire support 
NORTHAG Northern Army Group (NATO) 
NSFS Naval Surface Fire Support 
OAV Organic Air Vehicle 
OBUA Operations in Built-Up Area 
OMG Operational Manoeuvre Group 
OP Observation Post 
OPCOM Operational Command 
PGM Precision-Guided Munition 
RAC Royal Armoured Corps 
RAP Rocket-Assisted Propulsion 
RDF Radio Direction Finding 
RFA Royal Field Artillery 
RGA Royal Garrison Artillery 
RHA Royal Horse Artillery 
RISTA Reconnaissance Intelligence Surveillance and Target Acquisition 
ROE Rules of Engagement 
RPG Rounds Per Gun 
RPV Remotely-Piloted Vehicle 
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
SADARM Search and Destroy Armor 
xviii 
SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defence 
SFOR Stabilization Force 
SL Start Line 
SP Self-Propelled 
SRARM Short-Range Anti-Radiation Missile 
STA Surveillance and Target Acquisition 
TBM Theatre Ballistic Missile 
TMD Theatre Missile Defence 
TNW Tactical Nuclear Weapon 
TOC Tactical Operations Center 
TOT Time on Target 
TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command 
UAV 1. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 2. Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle 
UCAV Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle 
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force 
UV 1. Unmanned Vehicle 2. Uninhabited Vehicle 
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 
WP Warsaw Pact 
WTC World Trade Center 
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ARTILLERY AND WARFARE 1945 - 2025 
The thesis will not consider events after 3 1" December 2002. 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
"rhe object of artillery construction is the projection of a missile over long range, at a 
given target, to strike with powerful impact... " 
"... When men concern themselves with the artillery... they will remain tranquil in their 
consciousness of security, while potential aggressors, observing their study of the subject 
will not attack. But every act of aggression, even the most feeble, will overwhelm the 
neglectful since preparations in their cities will not exist. " 
Heron of Alexandria, Belopoeica. ' 
1.1 THE CONTENTION 
Pyrotechnic artillery was first deployed on the battlefield in the mid-10 Century, but its 
greatest impact over the next 300 years was in siege warfare. Its influence in the latter 
caused the drastic redesign of fortifications, and until the 18'h Century, siege operations 
remained generally the most important factor in European warfare. The European gun 
fort, and the artillery that underwrote its firepower, also made possible the establishment 
of European global empires. 2 
By the early 18'h Century, technological advances matched with tactical innovation and 
increasing professionalism had made artillery an important factor in field operations. By 
the end of the 18'h Century, artillery had become an arm of equal standing to that of 
cavalry and the infantry. Artillery pieces could achieve greater range than infantry 
weapons, but like them their fire was direct, and in essence fired in a two-dimensional 
plane. If artillery had exploited its ability to fire further, by using a higher trajectory into 
the third dimension, its effects would have been drastically reduced. The combat range of 
artillery was thus severely restricted by the need to fire parallel to the ground. Short range 
limited the ability to concentrate fire. This could generally only be achieved by 
concentrating equipment itself, which was extremely difficult in mobile operations and 
rapidly changing circumstances. Ball was the most lethal projectile, although canister was 
highly effective at shorter ranges. Munitions such as shrapnel were of technical and 
conceptual merit, but of relatively little effect. 
By the end of the 19'h Century, ftirther technological innovation had greatly enhanced 
artillery firepower. The introduction of sophisticated shells permitted effects to be 
achieved at greater ranges than could be achieved with solid shot; but while fire remained 
direct, the advantage of artillery in mobile battles of linear encounter was in doubt. This 
was largely because there were also major improvements to the firepower of the infantry, 
which by the 1870s could often overmatch the range and effectiveness of field guns on a 
battlefield, and render the latter highly vulnerable. 
Indirect firing techniques offered the tactical means to shelter artillery pieces from infantry 
fire; but came to have much greater significance. The development of indirect fire at the 
end of the 19'h Century, and its practice in the early 20'4 Century, also promised to change 
the 'two-dimensional' model of warfare, characterized by linear encounter, which had 
prevailed for millennia. Not only could the effects of fire be applied and concentrated at 
long range, by firing in higher trajectories through the third dimension, but targets in range 
could be engaged simultaneously throughout the enemy's battlespace. Deep battle and its 
synchronization with the close battle became a crucial part of all military planning. This 
revolutionary change in warfare was only fully revealed in the First World War. Artillery 
became the dominant arm in warfare, and contrary to popular impression, probably played 
the dominant role in combat in the Second World War as well as the First, increasingly in 
concert with airpower. 
Following the Second World War, firepower was applied in even greater weights in the 
Korean War and in the Vietnam War. It became apparent, however, that such firepower 
could have tactical, Operational and strategic penalties, especially if perceived to be 
disproportionate and too costly in collateral damage. The need for the more sophisticated 
application of fire became apparent. 
In the Cold War confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, both sides planned 
for a battle between massive land and air forces in Northern Europe. These forces 
incorporated large quantities of artillery. The Soviets still believed that their vast artillery 
arm would play a critical role should war come, but it was clear on NATO's side at least 
that field artillery would not be the critical factor in success. This was largely because it 
lacked the ability to acquire moving armoured targets at long range and to engage them 
effectively even if it could. As a result, artillery became a relatively smaller part of 
NATO's land force, while the relative importance of tanks and fixed- and rotary-wing 
aircraft grew. Meanwhile in smaller wars, the effects of artillery firepower were seen to 
lack utility, often because the collateral damage proved unacceptable, and because high- 
value targets proved elusive. 
In the past, deficiencies such as those suffered by NATO artillery had sometimes been 
overcome by increasing the weight of fire, rather as the Soviets still intended; but this was 
logistically dubious, and in NATO armies out of the question. The ability to prosecute 
deep attacks was therefore in doubt, and artillery could only regain its utility if it could 
acquire the highest-value targets and engage them effectively, which would mean with the 
appropriate degree of force in time and space - precision. This would depend upon 
improvements in target acquisition throughout battlespace, and munition accuracy, either 
with target designation or 'fire and forget' technology. Accuracy will cease, necessarily, 
to be a function of range when such technical advances have been achieved. The ability of 
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land systems to engage targets effectively throughout the battlespace will then be restored, 
with consequences for warfare analogous to those precipitated by the introduction of 
indirect fire one hundred years ago. 
The need for precise, Joint fire to execute long-range precision attacks has been 
recognized, and investments in the systems to achieve this are maturing fast. Just as 
airpower joined with artillery in the 2& Century to provide fire at long range, so it will 
itself increasingly employ indirect systems, using unmanned platforms and stand-off 
munitions. As Joint effects merge or complement each other, so the arms and Services 
will themselves need to be restructured to accommodate these new requirements. 
Artillery is increasingly seen as but a component of Joint fire and a contributor to Joint 
effects; and its success in this relationship will be the test of its continuing utility after 650 
years. 
These developments will not be significant merely because they restore the effectiveness of 
fire in current models of warfare and its utility in an increasingly sensitive international 
environment. The effects of fire will increasingly be applied in, as well as through, the 
third dimension, as land operations themselves become more three-dimensional, no longer 
grounded in the two-dimensional plane. Fire, lethal and non-lethal, will also be targeted in 
other less tangible dimensions such as cyber-space. It will be judged not merely by its 
primary physical effects and the secondary cumulative and synergistic military effects that 
these may have. It will be applied increasingly for its 'third order' effects on the minds 
and will of commanders and political leaders, sometimes through leverage exerted on 
political opinion. The ability to apply such effects precisely in time and space will be 
expressions of the highest Operational art. Just as indirect fire began as a tactical means 
of protecting a gun itself, yet changed warfare at the Operational level, so the technical 
advances in target acquisition and accuracy in the 21" Century will have other and more 
important Operational and strategic consequences. 
1.2 TBE ORGANIZATION AND METHODOLOGY OF THIS TIHESIS 
This thesis will start by laying out the elements of the 'artillery conundrum', most of which 
have been recurring, conscious or unconscious themes throughout the development of 
artillery over 650 years. It is the permutations of these themes which have given shape to 
the development of artillery theory and practice; and they remain the key to understanding 
their fiiture. The thesis will then outline the development of artillery, from its use of direct 
fire in the two-dimensional plane in the 'age of the smoothbore', to its dominance of 
warfare in the first half of the 20'h Century with indirect fire, applied throughout the 
battlespace via the third dimension. These arguments have been elaborated more fully 
elsewhere', but will serve here to lay the foundations for the major part of this work. 
The main body of the thesis begins with a study of artillery in the Cold War, when its 
power waned in relative terms, but without which the developments of artillery in the early 
21" Century would probably not have been funded. The Cold War is divided into periods, 
analysing the Warsaw Pact (WP) and NATO in turn. This enables a better understanding 
of how each was engaged in action and reaction to the other, and developments in artillery 
were a part of that process. This symbiotic relationship is also displayed in matrix form to 
aid clarity. The technical, tactical, organizational and doctrinal dynamics of the Cold War 
were the foundation of the artillery practice which followed, even though the strategic 
scenario was very different. 
The thesis will then examine the operations since 1945 which ran concurrently with the 
Cold War. These highlighted the problems of applying firepower on a massive scale in the 
traditional manner. These operations encouraged the evolution of new approaches to new 
problems in a changing strategic, legal md ethical environment,, and demonstrated the 
need to make the application of fire more sensitive to the complexity of international 
relations, and showed the opportunities that exist to apply artillery in more sophisticated 
ways in intangible dimensions. The thesis will then assess the future of the fire system in 
its Joint context and the emerging strategic environment. 
1.3 SOURCES 
It is hard to find works which present the principles of field artillery operations, tracing the 
continuities in theory and practice across the centuries, while relating these to emerging 
technology and future doctrine. On the other hand, the sum of this material is available, 
scattered in fragments across the literature, in books, journals and in cyberspace. 
There are histories tracing the development of a particular nation's artillery over time; and 
there are books that examine the role of artillery in particular periods or wars. 
Unfortunately the few general studies tend to skimp on detail and analysis. For example, 
J. Norris's Artillei)ý devotes only thirty or so pages to artillery since 1900. Very few have 
examined the role of artillery in the context of its relations to other arms - the artillery's 
'ying' to their 'yang', in the totality of action in battlespace. Equally, there is little about 
the evolution of that battlespace and war in general seen from the perspective of the 
development of artillery, even though the latter could be judged to constitute the major 
innovation in land warfare since the 14'h Century. R. E. Simpkin's works3 see the 
battlefield in terms of space and motion, with wirfare as. a kind of military 'physics'. This 
thesis is sympathetic to that view, but there are few who have shared it. 
There are many books appealing to those interested in the development of artillery 
equipment and munitions, but these are generally technical reference books. Pre-eminent 
among these works are those of IN. Hogg6 . 
There is, however, very little that relates the 
technology to the practice of field artillery, describing the tactics that drove this 
technology or which resulted from its availability, in what has always been a symbiotic 
relationship. 
There are surprisingly few works on the origins of guns and gunpowder, and those which 
mention them seem almost relieved to repeat the orthodox view of the day, if only one 
suspects because fresh investigation of the original material would require a daunting 
familiarity with numerous ancient languages. Thus for nearly ninety years H. W. L. Hime's 
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Ae Origin qfArtillei)ýJ seemed to be the definitive word on the chemistry and physics of 
early gunnery. His conclusions have now been challenged by the likes of B. S. Hall's 
Weapons and Wwfare in Renaissance Europe% and J. R- Partington's studies of primary 
sources in A History of Greek Fire and Gunpowde? have caused a fundamental revision 
of the subject and, at least for now, seem to offer the definitive assessment. Technology 
aside, there is little on early tactics, of which we still know relatively little. I Norris's 
recent Early Gunpowder Artillery" focuses more on technology and historiography than 
the essentials of tactics; and even K. Chase's Firearms. A Global History to 17001, offers 
no thorough analysis of how artillery was handled in battle. 
The author's lack of languages has hindered wider exploration of foreign artillery. To 
compensate for this, extensive use has been made of the work of those such as C. H. 
Donnelly, CI Dick and C. D. Bellamy with their Russian expertise, D. T. Zabecki with his 
German and G. Parker with his Spanish. The many articles in American and British 
journals prior to 1945 that were routinely translated from European journals have also 
been useful. There is, however, relatively little available on Asian artillery, despite its 
undoubted size and importance in various periods of history. The development of artillery 
technology and practice in Asia has been bfiefly described by Parker 12 , but in the context 
of Europe's imperial expansion, and there remains little comprehensive material that 
describes the development of Oriental artillery technology, but above all practice. 
Ifistories of warfare tend to be written from the point of view of the manoeuvre arms, 
with artillery seen predominantly as a supporting adjunct. This is puzzlingrven that 
artillery grew to become the dominant system in both world wars of the 20' Century. 
Memoirs have tended to be written by those who, despite being the primary victims of 
artillery, did not see it to be the major player in their drama. That said, many memoirs and 
biographies contain valuable insights into the practice of artillery at particular points in 
time, for example: R-P. Davis's biography of William Phillips in H%ere a Man Can Go 13 
describing his role as the British artillery commander in the American War of 
Independence; the thoughts of A- S. Frazer in, Letters of Colonel Sir Augustus Frazer 14 
relating to British artillery of the Napoleonic period; N. Fraser-Tytler's account of fife in a 
filed battery in France in the First World War in Field Guns in France"; H. Pabst's diary 
of his time as an artillery observer on Germany's Eastern Front in the Second World War, 
Yhe Outermost Frontier 16 ; and A Gillespie's Desert Fire 17 covering the Gulf war of 1991. 
Most nations produce general histories of their artillery arms, usually written by those 
arms themselves. Some provide a general narrative history for heritage purposes, but 
many are short on analysis, lacking exploration of the big themes and projections about the 
future. Britain's Royal Artillery Institution produced a number of volumes of history in 
the late 10 and early 2& Century, and more recently it has produced the first six volumes 
of its history of the First and Second World Wars". These are generally exceptions to the 
above criticism, as is D. L. Dastrup's King of Battle: A Branch History of the US Army's 
FieldArfillery'9. 
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C. Duffy has produced numerous works, especially on the Russian, Prussian and Austro- 
Hungarian armies, which deal with field artillery in passine. However, there are very few 
works which seek primarily to explain how artillery tactics have evolved in the context of 
other developments in warfare. A number offer historical 'snap-shots' of artillery tactics 
over a limited period. B. P. Hughes's Open Fire2l and Fjrepowerý'2 have considered how 
artillery was handled in battle in the Ie and 19 Ih Centuries. The two rather dated, 
standard works on the role played by artillery in the US Civil War are VanLoan 
Naisawald's Grape and Canister" and J. C. Wise's 7he Long Arm qfLee, which take 
Federal and Confederate viewpoints respectively. Books such as C. Johnson and R. C. 
Anderson's Artillery HeIP5 describe specific battles, in this case Antietam. There are also 
many booklets available, normally from the US Park Service shops, on more esoteric 
aspects of these battles, for example R-L. Murray's monographs on artillery at 
GettysbUrg26. 
Bruce Gudmundsson's On Artillee provides a brief history of European and American 
artillery since the late 1860s and is unusual for following this history with a look at 
artillery's future development. The most admirable analysis of British artillery tactics 
during the First World War must be the series of articles written by A. F. Brooke between 
1924 and 1927, not only for the concision of their expression but also for their original 
analysis - not surprisingly Alan Brooke went on to greater things2s. D. T. Zabecki's 
Steel 
WfniP offers unique insight into the development of German artillery during the First 
World War, based on his unrivalled knowledge of the German archives at Freiburg. M. 
Grotelueschen's Doctrine under Fire: American Artillery Employment in World War 
One3o, fills a much neglected void on the American side. Shelford Bidwell and Dominick 
Graham's Fire-Power and 7heories of War-31 is an excellent treatise on British artillery 
before and during the Second World War; but the most rigorous analysis of the latter is 
offered by A-L. Pemberton in The Development ofArtillery Tactics and Equipmen ? 2. 
The best survey of the employment of American artillery in the Vietnam War lies in D. E. 
Ott's series of articles in the Field Artillery Journa P3. Christopher Bellamy has written 
many articles on Soviet artillery during the Cold War; but it is his Red God of War: Soviet 
Artillery and RoCket ForCe? 4 that stands out and is unusual in its approach. He has 
provided a unique examination of Russian/Soviet artillery across time, an analysis 
matching technology, tactics and culture. In 1990 Robert Scales produced the excellent 
Firepower in Limited War?. He is one of the few authors to link the tactics and 
technology of the past to the future. In the 1970s he wrote a thesis on British artillery 
1860-191436 and his book of 1990 continued this story. He has complemented these 
works with numerous articles in journals relating artillery practice to the broader debates 
in defence today. He also wrote the acclaimed Certain VictorvP which gives due credit to 
the role of field artillery in a broader analysis of the Gulf War of 1991. 
Very few books have offered original contributions to the debate. That is probably 
because the physical size of those contributions have not warranted books, and because 
books can lack the immediacy of the journal and the short 'action-reaction cycle' of the 
doctrinal debate. Hence publications such as the UK's Journal of the Royal Artillery and 
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the Journal of the Royal United Service Institute, and the US Army's Field Artillery 
Journal and Mililmy Review, have been the 'forum for debate' on military history, 
innovation, and lessons learned. Essay competitions have often provided the medium for 
innovative thinking, allowing officers of all ranks to join the debate. 
The trade and defence journals such as Jane's International Defense Review, Jane's 
Defence Weekly, Defense News and Armed Forces Journal International have led the way 
in describing technical innovation and offering a rapid digest of lessons learned in 
contemporary conflicts. R-B. Pengelley and C. F. Foss have been unrivalled in the value of 
their work reporting and recording current technology and tactics. Of late, the internet 
has become a valuable source of detail on current events and topical comment on, for 
example, conflict in the Middle East. The Jerusalem Post, Ae Washington Post and Ae 
New York Times, all on-fine, have been important sources. Equally, the Albawaba site has 
been of interest, but along with the many, perhaps most, sites dealing with Middle Eastern 
or Balkan politics it is not always easy to assess the reliability of the information offered. 
The cutting edge of ideas in the practice of artillery has seldom been found in official 
documents. These documents generally reflect decisions taken after the debate has been 
settled elsewhere, either in the field during operations, or in the professional or trade 
journals. Refreshingly, over the last hundred years the debate has often been led by 
relatively junior officers, perhaps because they have the inclination to embrace change, or 
because they have the first-hand practical experience of recent operations that many of 
their superiors have lacked. For this reason, those publications are of necessity the 
primary sources for this thesis, and long may this argument prove valid. It is the absence 
of general and key texts covering the subject that in part prompted this thesis. 
1.4 TIHE CRITICAL ISSUES 
The height of achievement in the application of firepower throughout history has been to 
create a chosen effect, on a selected target, at the decisive time and place, at optimal cost 
- factors which collectively constitute 'precision' in its broadest sense. This effect should 
be directly related to the overall intention of the commander, and is most likely to require 
the close integration of the effects of fire with manoeuvre. The technical means of 
achieving this have improved greatly over the centuries, but the intellectual and practical 
challenges in delivering such an outcome remains essentially unaltered. Thirty years of 
experience have caused the author to conclude that there are certain key themes evident 
over the 650-year evolution of artillery. These are the enduring building-blocks of artillery 
theory and practice and their changing values and permutations have shaped the 
development of artillery. They constitute the agenda of the ongoing debate on the future 
of fires and their effects in military operations., 
Reconciling Centralized Command with Decentralized Control 
If fire is to support the commander"s intent, men, equipment and ammunition must be 
positioned, cognizant of his assessment of the enemy and his own scheme of manoeuvre. 
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The chain of authority to fire, and to what purpose, must also be made clear. This can 
usually best be achieved if the command of artillery assets is held at high level. 
Circumstances in war change rapidly and decisions made at high level are unlikely to 
remain appropriate at lower levels for very long. The problem of how to reconcile the 
decentrakation of tactical decision making and the control of fire at low level, with 
centraked command at high level, has remained an enduring challenge. " 
Delivering Communications to Match Command and Control (C2) 
The demands on communications to mesh the imperatives for C2 at all levels are daunting. 
They have been especially acute for those wishing to practise indirect fire. The 
introduction of the radio had a profound effect on the solutions to this problem, but the 
provision of adequate, reliable and secure communications remains a critical concerm 
Protecting terrestrial and space-based communications from counterfire (CF) is a major 
challenge for the future. Designing communications architectures which balance 
autonomous operation with the imperative for human judgement in complex situations will 
be the key to speeding up decision making in the application of fire and its effects. 
Concentrating Equipment to Concentrate Effects 
Early artillery fire may have surprised those who had not encountered it before, but its 
physical effects were relatively minor. These could be increased by massing fire on 
particular targets, but limited range meant that this could only be done by massing the 
guns themselves in close proximity to the target. Massing equipment in order to 
concentrate effects can simultaneously create points of potential vulnerability. Devising 
the means to obviate this logic has been a constant theme over the centuries and remains 
topical. 
Breaking the Connection Between the Massing of Guns, Their Proximity to a Target and 
Their Effects Upon It 
When guns could only engage what could be seen from their own location, range and the 
ability to mass effects were limited by human sight on battlefields where visibility in any 
case tended to be poor. The development of indirect firing techniques at the end of the 
I SP Century permitted the engagement of unseen targets at whatever range was 
technically feasible; and it overturned the necessity to mass equipment geographically 
close to a target to achieve concentrations of effect upon it. Guns could be dispersed 
anywhere within range of their target. 
Achieving the Mobility to be at the Right Place at the Right Time 
Massing equipment carries high risks, not merely by making it a lucrative target; but 
because the mal-location of that mass might deprive manoeuvre arm of their symbiotic 
partner. Some tried to disperse equipment more widely to cover multiple eventualities, 
but they often paid a high price for dissipating their combat power. Others tried to 
a 
establish mobile reserves to 'hedge the bet' made in the original deployment. Sometimes 
this reserve was vital, but sometimes merely a waste of resources. The issue of how to 
provide coverage by fire throughout a battlefield, and whether this should be achieved by a 
discrete reserve, improved mobility about the battlefield or technical improvements in 
delivering fire itselt has remained a constant challenge. Fire mobility, the ability to switch 
fire rapidly around the battlefield, has often been able to compensate for equipment 
immobility, but the tactical mobility of artillery about the battlefield remains vital in 39 
achieving 'reach'. Such debates will determine whether armies decide to buy traditional 
heavy, self-propelled (SP) equipment, lighter systems or develop entirely new solutions. 
The Balance between Weight, Effects, Logistic Burdens and Timeliness 
Timely effects could only be achieved if artillery could be moved about the battlefield in 
tactical concert with other arms, and share the latter's Operational and strategic mobility. 
Greater mobility usually requires less weight, and in the case of artillery, smaller guns with 
less range and ammunition and consequently less powerful effects at the end of a 
munition's journey. Greater physical effects have usually required larger or more 
sophisticated munitions, or greater range which offers the potential to concentrate more 
fire. This has usually reduced mobility and imposed a logistic penalty, unless accuracy has 
been improved at the same time, for greater accuracy often reduces the need for heavier 
munitions. The technical struggle to achieve greater range and timely terminal effects 
without adding to the logistic burden has therefore also been a constant theme in the 
development of artillery. 
Matclfing Logistic Capability to the Combat Requirement 
Artillery logistics includes the industrial capacity to produce the materiel of the system, 
and the ability to deliver this to the theatre, and to the field and the point of firing, for use 
in sufficient quantity, and in time, to achieve the desired effects. A poor logistic system 
may either not have the capacity to deliver this, or have excess stocks mal-deployed, at 
great economic cost, creating 'logistic drag' and other military penalties. Improvements in 
a supply system can reduce capital costs and deliver precisely what is required when it is 
required. Ideally, the marginal cost of each unit of supply actually consumed would be 
cheaper as a result; but even if this were not so, the total cost should be, or rather the total 
cost of achieving a given effect. The question remains, however: How much of what 
resources is required to achieve what effect? This answer can only ever be known with 
hindsight, and even then imperfectly. It has remained a lethal variable in the artillery 
equation and in normative military judgement. Should the quantity of resources required 
be a consequence of a doctrinal premise, or is a prevailing doctrine the consequence of a 
pragmatic logistic reality? Can an optimal operational synthesis ever be achieved when 
military assessments encounter political and economic pressures? 
Increasing the Rate of Fire, Effects and Survivability 
Increasing the rate of fire of artillery pieces has been a constant theme in the development 
of artillery technology, from Gustavus Adolphus' 'fixed ammunition' to the automatic 
loading of today. Effects on a target, or the same effects on more targets, can be 
increased by attacking with more weapon platforms; but effects can also be increased by a 
higher rate of fire from fewer equipments. An increased rate of fire using the same 
quantity of ammunition permits more rounds to be fired in a shorter time. This greater 
concentration in time may in itself increase the effects on a target and enhance the 
survivability of the firer. 
Mass Can Compensate for Inaccuracy 
A large object travelling at high speed which hits its target accurately is more likely to be 
effective than a small, slower, less accurate one. If the accuracy of the system is poor, or 
there are many targets to engage and they are closer, many smaller, slower objects fired in 
the general direction of the target may prove more effective. A single, well-aimed, 
accurate shot may 'overkill' what it hits, leaving others unscathed by this inefficient 
concentration of resources. If the location of a target is uncertain, or accuracy is 
inherently poor, one way of increasing the chances of a lit is to fire many rounds at the 
area in which the target is thought to be; but this massing of fire will probably require 
larger quantities of equipment and manpower. Even so, it may still be a relatively 
economic undertaking in terms of effects achieved. Fielding large quantities of equipment 
to generate sufficient fire to compensate for uncertain target location, or inherent system 
inaccuracy, has been an enduring theme in the history of artillery, as has the development 
of C2 to command and control its operation. Obviating this logic is an enduring 
aspiration. 
Accuracy Can Compensate for Lack of Mass 
It follows that a reduction in the quantity of equipment, and hence its logistic costs, and 
the more efficient use of what remains, can be achieved by improvements in target location 
and the accuracy of the overall system. Reducing the quantity of equipment, however, 
diminishes the redundancy that can absorb casualties. More accurate fire requires more 
precise and timely target data, uncorrupted communications and a delivery system that 
sends a munition close enough to the target to achieve its intended effect. In response, the 
enemy can try to disperse, or generate more targets than the fewer weapons firing fewer 
munitions can hit. 
Accuracy as a Function of Range 
The longer the range of a ballistic weapon, the greater its inherent inaccuracy. The 
consequences of this can be overcome by using a more. powerful munition to increase its 
effects, but this greater weight results in otber penalties. if a munition can be made more 
precise through terminal or other guidance, not only can the quantity of equipment and 
numbers of munitions be reduced to achieve a comparable effect, but so also can the 
weight of the munition itself . The precision nranitions of the Information Age have 
to 
broken the necessary ballistic connection between accuracy and range, but perfecting and 
exploiting these remain a challenge. 
Target Acquisition 
Where is the target? Can it be located and tracked for timely engagement? Once 
attacked, should it be attacked again? How can the value of targets and their priority for 
the expenditure of resources be assessed comparatively? Staff branches and whole fields 
of technology have been developed to assist in making these judgements and are integral 
to the system of fires. 
Identifying and Assessing the Effects of Artillery Fire 
Artillery has always achieved both psychological and physical effects. The controversy 
about the relative efficacy of different munitions and the manner in which they should best 
be applied has been at the heart of artillery doctrine and technology throughout its 
development. Even where the effects are themselves evident, the military value of these in 
any given situation may be unclear. It is difficult to assign comparative values to 
destructive, suppressive and neutralizing effects, and to quantify which elements of the last 
two are physical and which psychological. Attempts to identify those effects which are 
militarily significant, to design munitions that achieve them and to assess whether after a 
given action they have indeed been achieved, have been the preoccupations of artillerymen 
for centuries. The judgement as to whether these effects are best achieved by artillery fire 
or by some other force lies at the heart of any Joint plan. Today, the effects created on 
perceptions are of unprecedented importance, but are even harder to assess. 
Survival on the Battlefield: Force Protection 
Artillery has always been vulnerable to the combat power of other arms and its enemy 
counterpart. As artillery became more important, so did its operations against the latter. 
Protecting artillery has called for active measures such as the cooperation of other arms 
and ensuring that artillery has sufficient range and effects to overmatch the threats against 
it. It has also required passive measures such as deception, armour, camouflage and 
advantageous siting, the latter being greatly facilitated by the development of indirect 
firing techniques. 
Maming the System 
Artillery developed from being a minor participant in hostilities to being the arm around 
which all others operated. At times, the manpower requirement was massive, in keeping 
with the masses of assets deployed. At others it diminished, either as the importance of 
artillery was deemed to have waned, or as fewer artillerymen became more productive 
through improved technology or techniques. 
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EmployabUity in all Condifions 
The power of artillery has such utility that there are few environments in whiCh 
commanders would not wish to use it. It has therefore had to develop the techniques 
applicable to operations in hot deserts, extreme cold, the jungle, mountainous country, on 
the littoral, in amphibious operations and in the ever-expanding urban areas of the world. 
The inherent problems have been salved but seldom solved. 
Relevance in all Forms of Conflict 
Artillery has always had to adapt itself to changes in the character of warfare and lesser 
forms of conflict. It achieved the transition from siege system to an arm capable of mobile 
operations in the field. It shifted from its primary focus on the close battle to an emphasis 
on the deep battle. It moved from a purely direct fire role to one based on indirect fire, 
yet with the advent of the tank, found itself once more the prime anti-tank direct fire 
system. It played its dominant role in high intensity world wars, and yet was also vital in 
smaller conflicts. More recently, it has proved its worth in operations short of war, whose 
intellectual complexity now defies terminological consensus. 
The Maturing of Fire as a Function in Warfare 
As artillery became more powerful, it came to be recognized as an arm of equal standing 
with those which manoeuvred, rather than merely existing as some tactical appendage to 
them. 40 The necessity for close cooperation between all arms to optimize fire and 
manoeuvre in accomplishing the commander's intent became axiomatic. Sometimes 
manoeuvre would play the major part in this, and sometimes fire. Until the end of the 19'h 
Century, and except in siege warfare, manoeuvre was generally the more important. 
Throughout the 20'b Century, the effects of fire were the dominant feature of the 
battlefield. It also came to be recognized that the effects of fire could be decisive in their 
own right. Today, the debate has too often been premised on the false assumption that the 
application of fire is an inherently attritional activity, while manoeuvre is somehow not. 
I-Iistorically, manoeuvre has often been highly attritional, while fire has exerted 'leverage -7 
and usually inflicted desirable attrition on the enemy and protected friendly forces. It is 
also unfortunate that the debate has often been cast in terms of the two functions being at 
odds with each other. Where this has been so in the past, the military failures have often 
been spectacular. The challenge today is to optimize the synergy between them. 
Delineations of Joint Fire 
Airpower has contributed to Joint fire for nearly a century, but the 'division of labour' 
between the air and land components over which should produce what effects where and 
when, has often been contentious. The air component may wish to reinvent traditional 
activities such as Close Air Support (CAS) by manned aircraft, by flying at higher 
altitudes; but equally, novel types of aircraft such as U"s may usurp such activities at all 
altitudes; and some surface-to-surface systems may prove more effective in roles 
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previously the preserve of aircraft. It will become increasingly hard to distinguish between 
air component platforms and munitions, and those of the land component. Equally, it will 
be harder to distinguish between what is a munition and what is a firing platform. 
BlurTing of Roles in Expanding Battlespace 
The introduction of indirect fire vastly expanded the battlespace in which field artillery 
could achieve effects, at about the same time that its direct role against tanks became 
enhanced. Shortly after that, with the rise of air warfare, the need for direct firing artillery 
in an AD role created a new arm operating in the previously undisputed third dimension of 
battlespace. It seems likely that the distinction between remote platforms firing directly, 
and other platforms firing indirectly, will become bluffed; and all will seek effects in the 
three physical dimensions of battlespace. This phenomenon will become as important in 
the land component's considerations of fire and manoeuvre as it was formerly in two 
dimensions. Targets will He in three dimensions and many will themselves be lethal 
munitions. CB/CF will increasingly be against the munition in flight. The distinction 
between AD and CB/CF will become bluffed, and both will be seen as critical forms of 
active force protection. 
New Effects and Forms of Counterfire 
At the same time, new forms of lethal and non-lethal fire will be used to create effects in 
other dimensions of battlespace, in the electro-magnetic spectrum, in cyberspace, and in 
the human mind - the realm of perceptions. It is not just perceptions in the mind of those 
on the battlefield and in command that are important. The most important perceptions 
may be those of an increasingly globalized international opinion, in an environment where 
legal, political and moral factors are not constants. In turn, these effects win be matched 
by CF of the same Uk. The evolution of novel forms of fire in these uncharted dimensions 
will echo the transformations of earlier times. 
Will Artillery Survive as a Distinguishable Arm? 
Such developments may question the notion of surface-to-surface artillery as a distinct 
arm. Why should it require a specially trained arm to fire indirect weapons, when others 
may also use stand-off weapons, and target acquisition may be achieved and fire ordered 
by a centralized command? If Gunners are merely weapon platform servers, what 
distinguishes them from other arms serving sophisticated weapons? A remotely fired 
'box' of precise indirect munitions may require the same sldlls to operate as a 'box' of 
directly fired munitions. All arms may be equipped with short-range direct fire as well as 
longer-range indirect fire munitions. The debate over how and at what level these night 
be commanded, and their fire coordinated, will very likely mirror the debates over the C2 
of artillery fire over the last three hundred years. 
Will Fire from the Air Replace Surface-to-Surface Fire? 
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If in future, the effects of fire can be better delivered from the air, is the role of artillery's 2 
surface-to-surface fire a declining one? Is there a fundamental change taking place in the 
way that wars will be fought, or are such thoughts the product of limited experiences that 
do not adequately reflect the broader trends that will endure? 
A Doctrine for Fires 
As the complexity of the artillery system within the Joint system of fires has grown, so 
understanding its precepts and mastering its practice has been vital to success. The need 
to develop these conceptually, to write a doctrine, to establish a method for the systematic 
introduction of new equipment, to create a training regime for personnel and to educate 
leaders has caused the artillery of many armies to take the lead in the fields of 
professionalism and the education of officers. 
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CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
2.1 THE AGE OF THE SMOOTHBORE 
Introduction 
The Age of the Smoothbore, from the mid- Ie to the late 19* Century was the age of 
two-dimensional linearity in warfare. It saw artillery develop from being a military novelty 
of limited effect, to becoming the key system in siege warfare, the most important 
operation of the day. It soon became an effective battlefield system and eventually 
emerged as an arm of equal status to the infantry andcavalry. 
The Principles of Gunnery and Command and Control 
. 
Artillery was most likely to be effective in the early stages of battle, because once battle 
was joined and the situation had changed, it was generally too heavy to be repositioned. 
An overall commander, or the artillery commander, could select initial positions and state 
the priority of targets, but after that he would usually be unable to control events except 
by messenger. Subsequent movement and fire control in the heat of battle would, by 
default, generally fall to the commanders of individual guns or groups of them. 
Lack of foresight in the initial deployment of guns could mean that they might play little 
part in events, while luck, or the prescience of a great commander in placing them within 
his scheme of battle, might make them decisive. When a commander was able to intervene 
to reposition his field artillery at a crucial moment in a battle, the consequences could be 
profound. Commanders such as the Dukes of Marlborough and Wellington, and 
Napoleon Bonaparte had an uncanny ability to anticipate the flow of a battle and position 
their artillery advantageously from the outset; but this was a rare skill noted by 
contemporaries as a key element in generalship. Skill in positioning guns was not merely a 
question of space, timing was also critical; and some of the blame for Napoleon's defeat at 
Waterloo (18'hJune 1815) lay in his delays in positioning his artillery. ' 
Well-placed artillery could inflict terrible damage. At the Battle of Gross-Jaegersdorf (306 
July 1757), the well-sited and resolute battery of the Russian Major Tyutchev turned the 
battle. At the Battle of Minden (I' August 1759), Ferdinand of Brunswick commanding 
the Anglo-Hanoverian Army ordered Macbean's battery of heavy l2pdrs forward to 
concealed positions on his right flank, enfilading the French cavalry which it engaged for 
twenty minutes at pistol range, causing carnage and the French Army to withdraw in 
confusion. It has been estimated that the battery fired 40,000 bullets in case-shot at the 
FrencIL2 On St Lucia in 1778, well-positioned British artillery was able to hit French 
columns in the flank as they formed for the attack, advanced and then retreated. At 
Malvern ffill (I" July 1862), the most significant determinant of the Union's victory was 
the accomplished siting of its artillery and the poor positioning of the Confederacy's. 
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To obviate the risk of mal-deployment before battle had even begun, there was a strong 
case for decentralizing the deployment of artillery, dispersing individual or pairs of guns 
amongst the infantry, to ensure that the latter would always have some artillery support, 
albeit forfeiting the possibility of concentrating fire in the process. 
Artillery occupied a comparatively large space on the battlefield, usually a line of about 
one hundred metres for six guns, with space behind that for their logistic support of horses 
and ammunition. 3 Guns were best positioned on commanding ground, permitting them to 
maximize their range, but range was not the most important consideration in positioning. " 
Optimal fire was usually of flat trajectory. Frederick the Great frequently cautioned 
against placing artfliery on hills. If guns were positioned too high above the target, failing 
rounds would plough into the ground, particularly in wet conditions, hitting merely that 
particular point with excessive 'overkill'. It was also difficult for guns on hills to engage 
infantry advancing towards them across both convex and concave terrain. The ideal was a 
position on a hill with a height of between five and six percent of the engagement range, 
or a gradient of two to three degrees. If a steeper position had to be defended, it was best 
done by infantry, unless guns could be so positioned as to rake the ranks of infantry from a 
flank as they ascended the slope. If guns were sited too far below the target, their range 
would be reduced, and it was likely that many rounds would pass harmlessly over the 
enemy's head. Welfington was noted for the trouble he took in defence to position his 
infantry, wherever possible, on a reverse slope above enemy artillery, ensuring that as 
many balls as possible flew over them. 
The greatest advantage of a flat trajectory was that rounds could be made to bounce off 
the ground in a series of ricochets. Such fire was especially effective against an infantry 
phalanx, although it did not become common practice in field operations until the late Is"' 
Century. ' Once the enemy had closed to about 100 paces they would switch to canister 
fire. 6 Another advantage of ricochet fire was that infantry were more unsettled by it than 
by direct fire. At the end of the I e' Century, the Prussian reformer Scharnhorst tested the 
effectiveness of ricochet versus direct fire and found that, in the cases of 6pdrs and 
12pdrs, at least three times as many hits were scored by ricochet at 1,000m, and at greater 
ranges its advantages were even more pronounced. ' 
Because shots fired at anything but zero elevation, were less likely to ricochet, but rather 
to plough into the ground instead, artillery seldom fired over the heads of friendly troops, 
who would also have been in danger from erratic fire. Howitzers could overcome uneven 
terrain by firing in the high angle, and thus threaten troops in reserve, but their shells, 
exploding above a point, were relatively ineffective compared to flat-trajectory roundshot 
or a modem detonating shell. They were consequently seldom deployed in large numbers. 
It was not merely the 'geometry' of the trajectory of each piece that was important, but 
the way that the fire of groups of guns was coordinated and directed, relative to the shape 
and position of the enemy. Commanders such as Frederick the Great tried to place their 
guns to fire obliquely, covering enemy approaches by crossing fire, rather than merely 
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massing them at a single location in the path of the enemy. In the linear warfare of the 
day, this was the means by which direct fire could be concentrated, whilst maintaining a 
wide distribution of guns across a front. ' 
Most smoothbore ammunition was roundshot and not explosive, and the area of its 
greatest lethality was therefore not at the point of termination, but along the narrow flight 
path to it. Canister represented an attempt to widen that lethal flight path at the expense 
of range; and shrapnel and shells were an attempt to increase the effect at the final point of 
the trajectory, accepting the loss of effect along the path to it. Nevertheless, roundshot 
remained the most commonly fired munition of the smoothbore era because it was the 
most damaging, especially when delivered along a heavily populated virtual 'tunnel' of 
probable destruction. The 'tunnel, ' was the space through which a ball might be expected 
to fly, given its inherent inaccuracy. 
A number of guns firing in the same direction would create another wider 'tunnel' of fire. 
The more balls flying down the same 'tunnel', the greater the concentration of fire, but this 
would only be effective if the target also lay along the line of that 'tunnel'. A ball could 
scythe down many men in its path through this 'tunnel'; and when artillery was massed to 
achieve such destructive geometry, the effects could be gruesome. If the enemy infantry 
fine were at right angles to the 'tunnel', then fire would be inefficiently applied, achieving 
overkill on a section of the target, rather like repeatedly hitting but one point on an area 
target with indirect fire. 
The skill in concentrating flat-trajectory fire lay in deploying artillery so that the 'tunnel' 
ran parallel to, and inside, an enemy phalanx. Hence crossfire, raking lines of infantry 
from their flanks, was the height of achievement; but that achievement depended upon the 
commander's tactical skill in the initial deployment of his guns, and the ability of the 
artillery to integrate its operations with the scheme of manoeuvre of the infantry on whom 
it refied for mutual support. 9 
Ideally, guns would not be deployed in the path of the manoeuvre of other arms in their 
own force. Neither would they be placed directly behind bodies of fhendly troops on level 
ground, since these would be at hazard from their flat trajectory direct fire and mask the 
guns themselves. On the other hand, artillery was sometimes deliberately masked by a 
body of cavalry, which would move out of the way just before firing in order to surprise 
the enemy. If placed out of sight, behind the front line, guns might be safe except from 
howitzers or guns firing at extreme range; but this would very likely also place them out of 
range of their own targets. The forward deployment of guns was the norm although space 
for this was usually limited, and opportunities to mass a large battery infrequent. Guns 
were consequently often squeezed into spaces between the infantry, or deployed out in 
front of them. 
Once the infantry advanced, the guns would have either to cease firing or to redeploy; and 
such difficulties were an argument for dispersing the deployment of artillery from the 
outset. Consequently, by the middle of the I 8th Century, most armies had light guns 
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assigned to each infantry battalion to ensure that they did not become detached from at 
least some fire support. Against this, there was the case for concentrating the guns in 
large batteries for maximum and decisive effect, rather than dissipating them amongst 
troops who might be employed sequentially, and from an artillery point of view 
inefficiently, or perhaps never come into action at all. These arguments were hard to 
reconcile and the debate over the merits of 'infantry guns', the centralization or 
decentralization of artillery, and the command and control arrangements to meet these 
options remained the core controversies of artillery tactics into the 2& Century. 
The pros and cons in the debate over artillery command have altered over the years as 
each of the factors, the components of the overall artillery 'system', have evolved: The 
mobility of artillery relative to the pace of other actors in battle; the ability of commanders 
to control the movement and fire of guns, given the communications of the day, and the 
improvements in target acquisition, range, accuracy, rate of fire, survivability, types of 
munitions and their terminal effect. Each one of these elements of the system has 
constituted but a single shiffing tile in the disrupted kaleidoscope of evolving militaxy 
philosophy and doctrine; and any 'turn, or change in the value of a single 'tile' has 
resulted in a new calculus and pattern. 
2.2 WARFARE OF THE EARLY'MUSTRLALL AGE' 1866-1914 
By 1866, the effectiveness of field artillery relative to other arms on the two-dimensional, 
linear battlefield was in decline. It was not able to achieve greater effects at greater ranges 
than the arms it supported. Glimpses of new methods of concentrating effects using the 
third dimension were soon in evidence and these became the foundation of artillery's 
dominance in two world wars. 
The half century before the First World War witnessed two impressive achievements in the 
development of artillery, one technical and the other essentially conceptual. Together they 
changed the way of war. The first was the marked increase in the rate of fire and in the 
range of artillery. This was made possible by the maturing of the technologies of rifling, 
breeches and recoil mechanisms, integrated in reliable field artillery systems. The second 
was the notion that the effects of that fire could be delivered in an entirely different way, 
indirectly, enhancing the survivability of the guns and concentrating the effects of fire on 
targets which previously could not have been engaged. 
These two developments ran parallel but, surprisingly, remained doctrinally unconnected 
for most of the period . The increased rate of fire was used, according to the 
doctrine of 
the day, to improve the close support of infantry in the assault, engaging the enemy at 
close quarters with direct fire, albeit at huge risk. The price of such tactics was revealed 
early in the Russo-Japanese War; and as a result, by its end the practice of indirect fire had 
become routine for both sides. The importance of this fundamental shift in military 
practice was well documented at the time, but the lessons proved unacceptable to 
Europe's annies; and as the First World War approached, direct fire at close range was the 
prevailing practice, whatever the manuals mio. t recommend. 
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The Evolution of Indirect Fire 
Indirect fire had been used in siege warfare for centuries; but its use on the battlefield was 
the most important innovation in artillery practice for over 500 years. Experiments with 
indirect fire on the battlefield were made by the Russians using howitzers as early as the 
1750s, but major technical development was not undertaken until the last decades of the 
19'hCentury. Although the principles of the system were by then already well understood, 
it was not until the First World War that its potential was realized and the products of the 
Industrial Revolution unleashed on the battlefield. Without indirect fire, the great artillery 
concentrations of the First World War, and of the Eastern Front in the Second World 
War, would not have been possible. The ability of the artillery to provide close support 
would have diminished in the face of growing infantry and armoured firepower, and the 
importance of artillery would have continued the decline which began with the 
introduction of powerful infantry rifles in the 1840s. 
Prior to 1914, direct fire was generally concentrated by using Napoleonic masses of guns. 
Had the range of guns been greater, this massing would not have been so necessary; but 
the value of any increase in range was limited because, even with a telescopic sight, guns 
could not engage accurately beyond the range of an observer's, eye. This optical range 
was also that which applied to the firing of the conoidal bullet and machine gun, which 
were introduced at a time when the new smokeless powder was exposing gunners to the 
enemy's view. If guns could be positioned in cover, smokeless powder would assist their 
concealment rather than compromise their position. A means was required to enable 
artillery to move back into cover, while producing accurate concentrations of fire. 
The Russian siege of Plevna in 1878 proved extremely costly, and there seemed little way 
to attack troops in entrenched positions if supported only by direct-firing artillery. This 
stimulated the debate about the use of howitzers, shells and the indirect firing techniques 
they would require. These were fully described as early as 1882 by a Russian officer, G. 
Guk, in his Ae CoveredFire ofFieldArfillery. This discussed the role of the compass, 
aiming points, crest clearance and the passage of observers' corrections to guns. 10 
General von Ifindersin, whose views on the lessons of the Franco-Prussian War were 
regarded as authoritative, held strong views against the technical developments that made 
indirect fire possible. He cautioned against the approach of the 'scientific caste' who 
wanted artillery to adopt hidden positions. Nevertheless, the Germans developed the 
concept of indirect fire; and in 1892 they were the first to produce an indirect laying 
instrument, the 'Richtflaeche, which was issued to all fight guns along with a new 
regulation for its use. This noted that bold 'Napoleonic' tactics had been made obsolete 
by infantry firepower, and by 1894 indirect fire had become the preferred method rather 
than the exception in the German Army. It was subsequently adopted by the Russians. " 
In 1889, Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen advocated the crest of a hill as the most 
suitable position for field artillery, but he went on to describe the benefits of cover if it 
could be found. 12 
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The practice of indirect fire was widely discussed at the turn of the Century. In 1897 
General Major Moritz Elder von Reichold noted the need to remain concealed to avoid 
CB fire and the consequent requirement to fire indirectly. 13 General von Sauer was a 
pioneer of indirect fire. He identified howitzers and heavy guns as the means by which 
artillery could overcome the defensive power of the rifle, "To shake the enemy's infantry 
upon the point where the commander-in-chief has decided to breakthrough. "14 The case 
for indirect fire found increasing support, and in 1900 the German artillery was issued with 
the 'goniometric, sight. 
The British were aware of these devices and debated the methods and merits of indirect 
fire, but generally viewed it as an unsatisfactory German technique. The majority regarded 
a clear sight of the target as essential. 15 Nevertheless, on 16'h August 189 1, Lord 
Wolseley observed an exercise of the British Army and noted the need for artillery to be 
concealed from its enemy, and the advantages of laying guns indirectly. Experiments were 
carried out on low-level exercises, but turning these into accepted general practice was 
more difficult in the face of fierce cultural opposition. 16 Some British officers were 
therefore surprised to find that in the German Army, by whose experience in 1870 they 
believed their opposition to be vindicated, close, direct fire was rapidly losing favour. 
Nevertheless, despite the evidence of the Russo-Japanese War, and a brief enthusiasm for 
indirect fire in its immediate aftermath, by 1914 it was far from general practice. The 
Italian observer, San Marzano, noted in 1907 that the Austro-Hungarian artillery 
habitually adopted mass-deployments in suicidally exposed positions. By 1908, with the 
introduction of the new QF 80mm gun, all its firing was from 'modem' defiladed 
positions; but this did not amount to the adoption of indirect fire as the primary method. 
Scepticism about new-fangled gunnery techniques was widespread, even within the 
artillery itself, which often remained ignorantly conservative. 
The British realized during the Second Boer War that the ability to fire indirectly was 
often essential but probably unachievable. Rudimentary indirect fire systems were devised, 
whereby gunsights would be aligned with markers on crests in line with the target, and 
observers on the crest would then send instructions to adjust the fire. 17 The home-made 
'Gunners's Arc' of 1904 was later replaced by the German Goerz goniometric sight, 
which was issued in 1913 as the 'Number 7' dial sight. 
In the British Army, the Royal Field Artillery (RFA) was renowned for its unscientific 
approach to gunnery, admiring intuition and subjective judgement, not calculation, when 
opening fire. The RFA did not practise temperature corrections, map shooting was 
virtually unknown, and communications were by visual signal, sometimes by short 
telephone line, but more usually by megaphone. By comparison, the Royal Garrison 
Artillery"s (RGA) approach was relatively scientific. By 1914 it was firing from cover and 
laying guns on line with instruments on calculated data. It shot from maps and corrected 
for weather before firing. In May 1914, in a lecture at the Royal Artillery Institution 
(RAI), Captain IEII of the RGA was met with hoots of laughter by a largely RFA audience 
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when he said that the RFA would be making meteorological corrections within two 
months of the start of a war. " 
In 1913, Major General Knox attacked the Secretary of State for War over the 
predicament of Britain's artillery: "... outranged by hostile gun and rifle, untrained to 
recognize fiiend from foe, innocent of the tactical requirement of a combined fire fight, 
does not the result spell murderT'19 The rhetorical question would be answered in less 
than a year. In the event, all European armies were broadly guilty in 1914 of neglecting 
the potential of indirect fire. It would largely be ignored until armies were shocked into 
using it by the harsh realities of 'Industrial' warfare. 
The First World War witnessed a 'Nfilitary Revolution' in which the dominance of indirect 
artillery fire and deep battle were established. 20 This became the conscious orthodoxy of 
all major armies by 1917. That Revolution should have been the immediate consequence 
of the experience of the Russo-Japanese War, but although the basic components of that 
revolution were evident by 1905, and their implications noted by observers, there seemed 
to be little institutional awareness of them, of the scale or significance of their sum, let 
alone appropriate reforms. For military doctrine, 1905 was the false dawn of the 'Nfilitary 
Revolution" of 1917, as much as it was for the political and social revolutions in Russia 
that year. 
2.3 THE FIRST WORLD WAR 1914-1918 
By 1914, indirect fire, the means of engaging the enemy from the relative safety of 
covered ground, was understood but scarcely practised despite experience in Manchuria. 
What was not appreciated was that this method of tactical self-protection would also 
transform the effects that artillery could create and give it dominance over the battlefield. 
Neither was it envisaged that such artillery practice would be intimately linked with that of 
airpower in a three-dimensional network. 
The pressures of combat during the First World War brought about the radical revision of 
artillery tactics and counter-measures, resulting in a fundamental and revolutionary change 
in the manner in which warfare was conducted. Preoccupation with rifle fire and the 
manoeuvre of infantry, gave way to a fixation on the firepower of artillery, machine guns, 
tanks and aircraft; but it was developments in indirect fire in particular that gave artillery 
its ascendancy over the infantryman and his rifle. The art of C2 was soon seen to lie in the 
way a commander marshalled and applied the effects of firepower, rather than in the way 
he deployed foot soldiers. 
Warfare in 1914 was a linear affair, with prevailing doctrines emphasizing flanks, 
envelopments and annihilations. Its essence was the contact battle between masses of 
infantry and cavalry, supported by artillery firing directly, generally at short range, with 
guns deployed in the open. While the few aircraft could carry out reconnaissance, there 
were no means of locating targets in depth; and only the relatively few howitzers in service 
were capable of engaging targets in covered ground. Counter Battery (CB) fire was 
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advocated but was generally impractical; harassing fire, let alone continuous fire, was 
seldom used; and artillery played little part in battlefield deception. Adjustment of fire was 
primitive and generally estimated on the gun position itself Communication with 
observers was by means of limited numbers of telephones, semaphore or megaphone. In 
the case of the British field army, all artillery ammunition was shrapnel. There was no 
means of supplying large quantities of artillery ammunition to manoeuvre forces in the 
field, and partly in recognition of this fact there was very little ammunition. Artillery 
planning did not exist at the Operational level, except in siege warfare. 
By 1917-8 the new paradigm exploited an expanded battlespace and had a psychological 
aspect. The object was not so much mere flanking envelopment and annihilation as achieving a 
breakthrough, paralysing the defence by applying sYnChrOMzed effiects throughout the 
battlefield, leading to the enemy's collapse. Indirect firepower was the key to it. This 'modem 
style of warfare' is familiar one hundred years later, but it was radically Merent to the 
style of warfare practised in 1914 and for previous millennia. 
This transformation was common in varying degrees to all the belligerents and experienced 
four phases: the realization in 1914 that existing artillery practice was inadequate, the 
consequent testing of new methods of indirect fire and the build-up of materiel in 1915, 
the tactics of 'mass destruction' by artillery fire from 1916-17, and finally the adoption of 
'neutralization' from 1917-18, based on predicted indirect fireplanning. The lessons 
learned from these experiences shaped the foundations of modem artillery operations. 
By 1918, predicted indirect fire was the norm. This enabled artillery once more to create 
Napoleonic concentrations of fire; but now through 'fire mobility' rather than the massing 
of equipment close to the target; and fire could be applied simultaneously in close and 
deep operations. The application of firepower was measured to achieve a variety of 
specific effects, and not merely attrition to the enemy's forward units. Fireplanning was 
designed to create shock and maximum dislocation, presenting the enemy with so many 
problems at once that his C3 system was unable to react effectively. It was synchronized 
with air operations and the scheme of manoeuvre to achieve synergies of effect. 
Intelligence and targeting were the key to the success of this new style of operations, and 
data about enemy dispositions were gathered by aerial, electronic, acoustic and optical 
means. Using this data, the predicted fireplan attacked enemy headquarters, 
communications systems, artillery, logistics, bridges and depots simultaneously. It blinded 
enemy observers and destroyed strong points and field defences. It attacked enemy 
positions in depth, especially the enemy reserve before it could join the contact battle, 
sealing off the battlefield. At the same time it provided close support to the manoeuvre 
force as it advanced on its objectives. All of this was accompanied by ruses and 
deceptions, including a complete dummy fireplan if necessary. The planning for 
operations was conducted at high level under new centralized command, but measures 
were taken to make the plan responsive to the unexpected that inevitably occurred. 21 
The deep battle was the creation of the First World War, made possible by the practice of 
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indirect fire, target acquisition and the greater range of guns. Eventually the greater part 
of the artillery was dedicated to the deep battle, in particular to CB fire. The need for ever- 
greater accuracy, range and less collateral damage became characteristic of the technical 
advances which have continued to the present day. Although artillery fought the deep battle 
without infantry assistance, it was fought with the intention of directly influencing the 
close battle, in particular of reducing friendly casualties; and artillery achieved still greater 
importance as an offensive arm in its own right. By March 1918, artillery deep operations 
even included surface-to-sinface strategic attack, a conceptual precedent set by the German 
'Paris Gkiri", or 'Kaiser Wilhelm Geschuetz. 22 
Von Clausewitz: asked, "How much artillery can one have without inconvenience? An 
excess of artillery is bound to cause operations to partake more and more of a defensive 
and passive character. A shortage of artillery will on the contrary enable us to let the 
offensive, mobility and manoeuvring predominate'. 23 11is view was a precursor of the 
disastrous sentiments of 1914 and the 'Cult of the Offensive'. The experience of artillery 
in the First World War challenged von Clausewitz's assertion. Artillery was not 
responsible for the onset of static trench warfare in 1914. That was a consequence of the 
prevailing delusion that infantry could successfiffly manoeuvre in the face of unsuppressed 
infantry firepower. The trench warfare that resulted brought about a burgeoning of 
artillery in an attempt to break out of the suppurating infantry stalemate, using massive 
'destructive' and later 'neutralizing' firepower. 
This firepower was generated in many ways, most directly by increasing the size of 
artillery in relation to other arms. In the British and German Armies the number of guns 
per 1,000 riflemen doubled, and in the French Army it trebled. Not only were there more 
guns, but they became heavier and more destructive. 24 The First World War demolished 
the prejudice against 'Siege' and 'Foot' artillery, which were seen to have similar tactical 
mobility and considerably more effect than the traditional 'Field' Branch. Indeed the 
distinction between branches became blurred as medium and heavy guns were handled as 
field pieces. 
By 1918, all British pieces were calibrated for variations in muzzle velocity, 
meteorological corrections were applied and ammunition was issued by uniform weight 
and batch of manufacture, principles which have lasted for over eighty years. In 1918 an 
18pdr was expected to achieve an accuracy of 80m at a range of 41an through prediction, 
a similar performance, in terms of accuracy if not range, to modem guns firing ordinary 
ammunition. The days when a battery commander was judged to have used underhand 
methods by measuring distances off a map were long gone. 
Throughout the War, C2 had become increasingly centralized; but with poor 
communications it was difficult to effect modifications to fireplans as the battle 
progressed. Despite technical experiments and the use of FOOs accompanying advancing 
troops, control remained poor unless pieces themselves moved forward into vulnerable 
forward areas, where they were likely to suffer the same fate as artillery deployed in open 
positions in 1914. Experiments with wireless proved disappointing, and telephones 
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remained the primary means of communication, although liaison officers were regarded as 
the most reliable medium. 25 
Firepower was reliant on the provision of ammunition, which made unprecedented 
demands on logistic services. Industrial societies were galvanized to deliver not merely vast 
amounts of manpower but to transform themselves into armament economies. It was initially 
the demands of logistics rather than combat per se that eventually made annies reliant on 
the internal combustion engine. 
The type of ammunition required also changed. British field guns had started with 
shrapnel, which proved highly successful; but trench warfare and a shortage of heavier 
pieces hurried the development of HE rounds, which arrived in 1915. Artillery also became 
the means by which the horrors of chemical warfare were delivered. The development of the 
instantaneous fuse enabled artillery to create similar effects to those of shrapnel, but 
without the skill required to fire it effectively. It made it possible to cut wire in depth by 
indirect fire, sparing the close deployment of field guns in the direct fire role. The 
instantaneous fuse marked a qualitative improvement not matched until the introduction of 
the radar, Variable Time (VT), fuse in the Second World War. 
Artillery developed other new roles. Ironically, no sooner had indirect fire and deep battle 
become the new orthodoxy, than the importance of direct anti-tank fire became evident, 
leading to the possibility of new self-propelled (SP) assault, and anti-tank branches of 
artillery. A German order at the end of the War declared that, "The first duty of the field 
artillery is to keep off the enemy tanks. All other duties must give way to this". 26 The 
tank was seen by many as a means of providing protected artillery firepower in close 
support of infantry, as well as a means of breaching obstacles; and yet the tank itself 
required fire support. The debate over the role of the tank and its relationship with 
artillery in armoured warfare had begun. Should artillery accompany tanks to protect their 
flanks; should it hold back and destroy anti-tank weapons with indirect fire, or was it no 
longer required in the close armoured battle at all, because of an over-riding concern for 
the deep battle? The value of indirect fire against tanks was questionable, while the 
advantages of direct fire systems were clear; but these would need to be deployed 
forward, and whether they should be manned by the infantry or artillery was again open to 
debate. 
Similarly the advent of air warfare brought not only air-to-air combat, strategic bombing and 
aerial reconnaissance, but also the creation of a new Air Defence (AD) branch of artillery, 
firing directly into the third dimension. Before 1914 aircraft played little part in artillery 
operations. By 1918, they were the primary source of the battlefield intelligence needed 
for fire-planning, and they were an important means of controlling artillery fire. More than 
that, aircraft had themselves become combat platforms delivering integrated effects as part 
of a sophisticated Operational and tactical Joint fireplan. 
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The War had caused rapid developments in all areas of technology, tactics and Operational 
thinidng, but after five years it had spawned at least as many fresh issues as it had 
resolved, and these received intense study in the years which followed. 
Primitive it may have been, but in essence the artillery C3 system established during the 
First World War was conceptually robust, and it retains its validity as a network of 
sensors, deciders and shooters to this day. In that sense, the First World War was the 
defining period in modem artillery practice and one of astonishing innovation in the most 
demanding circumstances. By 1918 warfare was no longer linear, despite the deceptive 
appearance of fronts defined by lines of trenches. It entailed engagements throughout the 
two-dimensional area of the battlefield, and the third dimension was the medium through 
which this was effected. 
2.4 1918-1939 
The artillery networks which enabled the new model of warfare had been developed in 
relatively static conditions. The challenge in the years that followed was how to adapt this 
to concepts of manoeuvre. 
After the Armistice of 1918, the possibility of another Continental war seemed remote; 
moreover, political and economic constraints militated against major re-equipment and 
reorganization. Yet it was also a time of intellectual vigour in many armies. The recent war 
had brought changes, stimulated ideas that would not be quickly forgotten, and posed 
questions it had not answered. The &ctors of success in 1917-18 were analysed by the 
participants: the relationship between firepower and mobility; the relationship between speed, 
surprise, momentum and the mass of a defence in term of its depth and the reaction time of 
reserves; and the agility of forces in executing the decisions promulgated through new C31 
systems. 
German military planners realized that in changing circumstances these relationships should be 
resolved with urgency, and General von Seeckt set up fifty-seven committees to analyse every 
aspect ofthe phenomenon of the last War. There could be no repeat of the 
KAISERSaHLACHT of Spring 1918 which, while brilliant in many waysý was also a 
catastrophic Operational defeat in the Materialschlacht to which Germany became irrevocably 
committed. Even the British mechanized model of 1918 was too expensive in men and 
materiel, particularly artillery armnunition, to constitute an acceptable one for future war, but 
technical elements in it had the potential to accelerate tactical change, encouraging Ruther 
technical developments in a virtuous technical/tactical spiral 
The Germans concluded that they needed a new model, with tactics based on offensive 
mobility, speed and precise, flemible firepower, with manoeuvre compensating for the weakness 
of the latter in absolute terms. This was essentially the same concept of the breakthrough and 
exploitation to which planners of 1917-18 aspired, but with technological upgrades facilitated 
by radio, improved armoured vehicles and aircraft. Many wrote of such visions and 
operimented in a limited way, but the Germans built a force which proved capable of fighting 
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on these temis. 27 
Artillery had emerged as the dominant arm on the First World War battlefields, ending the 
pre-war pre-eminence of manoeuvre over firepower; but the future role of artillery and its 
relationship to other arms was unclear. Was it still the role of artillery to breach obstacles 
through which infantry and armour might pass? Was artillery still to neutralize enemy 
infantry in covered defensive positions? Should artillery 'neutralize" or 'destroy" enemy 
firepower? Was artillery to provide close support for tanks in the mobile operations that 
were anticipated, and was artillery responsible for anti-tank defence? If artillery was to 
carry out any of these tasks, what types of equipment should be provided, and should 
these constitute discrete branches? Artillery had proved its worth in the deep battle, but 
where lay the division of responsibility with air forces for harassing and CB operations; 
and how far could artillery rely on airpower for target acquisition? Great improvements 
had been made in gunnery techniques, but these had been developed in relatively static 
operations. Could artillery deliver accurate observed, let alone predicted, fire in mobile 
operations? If artillery moved forward to keep in touch with the battle, was it too 
vulnerable; and if so, was it possible instead to use wireless as an electronic means of 
bridging the greater distances between gun and observer? Would manoeuvre re-assert 
itself over firepower? 
The First World War demonstrated the importance of firepower and fire mobility, but 
revealed the difficulty of providing these in close support during mobile operations. After 
the war, political and economic constraints thwarted the realization of the ideas of 
armoured warfare that were widely discussed. By the late 1920's, experimental annoured 
formations existed with integral, and in some cases SP and anti-tank, artillery. These 
formations and their tactics were the logical consequence of the experience of the First 
World War, and were artillery's attempt to maintain close fire support by equipment 
mobility rather than fire mobility. 
By the early 1930s imagination had outstripped experience. Both armour and infantry 
sought independence from artillery firepower, either by enhancing their own, or by 
substituting it with aircraft. The SP gun was abandoned, and wheeled artillery left 
vulnerable in the forward combat zone, assuming it could keep up with the battle. Having 
lost equipment mobility, artillerymen tried to compensate by improving fire mobility. 
In mobile operations fire mobility could be achieved only through improvements in radio 
communications, survey and accuracy; but these were hard to perfect. The shortcomings 
of armour and airpower operating alone would be revealed in the Second World War; and 
the mobility of artillery equipment was soon restored to improve support for armoured 
forces. The return of equipment mobility coincided with the development of improved 
techniques of gunnery, and was to revive artillery's influence on the battlefield in a way 
that few would have predicted ten years earlier. 
2.5 THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-1945 
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By 1939, most armies had created networks incorporating airpower and artillery in mobile 
operations, with varying degrees of success. Nevertheless, the perception that artillery 
would be at a disadvantage in such operations persisted, and this ensured that it was once 
again relegated to a subordinate role. This perception proved short-lived. 
In 1939 artillery was a much neglected arm, whose proven value in the First World War 
had been questioned in peace, often because its firepower had seemed to characterize the 
unacceptable horrors of that War. The theories of armour and mobility that flourished in 
the 1930s were seen to offer attractive alternatives to the tyranny of firepower, and with 
the exception of the USSR, the armies of the major powers were organized and equipped 
to fight accordingly. The hard-won lessons of the First World War were thus discarded 
for more appealing options, most notably in Germany, where intensive study of that War 
produced 'militarily glamorous' yet ultimately flawed conclusions, with catastrophic 
consequences in a war in which firepower was to prove as dominant as it had been in 
1914-18 . The 
delusion was similar to that after 1905, when the unattractive lessons of 
the Russo-Japanese War had been rejected, with dire consequences in 1914. 
In the Second World War artillery planners had to re-learn those lessons and make the 
necessary changes in tactics, organization and equipment. Soviet artillery had the least 
adjustment to make, because of its adherence to much of the doctrines of the First World 
War, while the American and British artillery had to undergo complete transformations 
once war had broken out. The Germans also realized their error, but their transformation 
was the more painful, in view of the early success of Blitzkrieg tactics; and they never 
mustered the resources to reform as they might have wished. The Japanese found 
themselves in an even worse predicament, having adopted the principles of Blitzkrieg from 
the Germans, and adapted them to the Far East theatre. By the time firepower had re- 
asserted its dominance on the battlefield in the hands of the Allies, it was too late for the 
Japanese to respond effectively. 
The lessons re-learned in all theatres were similar, but the experience which taught them, 
and the practice which resulted, varied considerably. The issues at stake were: the ability 
of artillery to give fire support in mobile operations; the ability of artillery to counter 
mobility with anti-tank fire; the ability to apply the effects of fire through the generation of 
masses of artillery-, their enhancement by fire mobility and co-ordination through optimized 
command and control; and above all the ability to apply the effects of fire throughout the 
battlespace. 
The War in the West 
The War in the West began in 1940 with the triumph of superior German offensive 
technique in the operation of combined arms, and the apparent avoidance of a crippling 
war of attrition through mobility of armour. It ended with the victory of superior Allied 
firepower, which was achieved by applying artillery effects according to traditional 
principles, and enhancing these by advances in technology and organization. 28 It resulted 
in fundamental changes in the relationship between different arms and their responsibility 
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for providing fire support. 
In 1940 the Wehnnacht paralysed its opponents by the shock of armoured mobility and 
CAS in an innovative and highly effective Joint network. German mobility created 
concentrations of force, which the Allies were unable to meet with adequate 
concentrations of firepower. Victory was as much psychological, political and moral as 
military - and chance was a significant factor in it. Artillery played a useful but minor part 
in the drama. 
In North Affica, the dominance of armoured mobility proved short-lived as artillery guns 
asserted their superiority, so much so that from 1940-42 anti-tank fire became the primary 
role of anti-tank and field artillery alike. 29 The Germans were the first to appreciate the 
tactical revolution which was taking place, and used their armoured mobility to exploit 
superior anti-tank artillery firepower. The re-equipment of the British Army after its 
losses in 1940 enabled it to master attacking German armour with anti-tank guns, 
releasing the growing strength of field artillery to take up its indirect fire role once more. 
The British reverted to the precedent of the First World War organizations and tactics to 
achieve this, after a period of disastrous experiment with mobility and decentralization. It 
was recognized that infantry could not assault without thorough-going artillery support, 
and that armour could not act successfully on its own. 
The fireplanning techniques adopted in the desert were even more apposite to the Italian 
theatre, where terrain handicapped annoured manoeuvre and favoured static defence. The 
Germans abandoned manoeuvre and adopted fortified lines which became ever more 
formidable. The firepower originally developed to counter the mobility of Blitzkrieg was 
redirected to blasting a way through these positions, re-creating opportunities for Allied 
mobility. The massed indirect fire which became indispensable could be generated by 
concentrating artillery and multiplying its effect through centralized C2, made responsive 
to low-level requirements through comprehensive communications. Its effect was further 
improved by developments in target acquisition and technical accuracy. 
The Germans appreciated the advantages the Allies enjoyed through reviving and 
expanding the role of artillery; but by 1944 as Allied strength swelled, the Germans' 
material inadequacy left them unable to compete effectively, or to take full advantage of 
the benefits of the centralized C2 which had been demonstrated by others since 1942.30 
They were instead forced to adopt lesser tactical expedients, rather as the British had had 
to do in North Affica in 194042, and to seek on equivalent to mass by enhancing 
survivability on all fronts with huge fortifications. Ironically, once they in turn were 
thrown onto the strategic defensive, the exponents of Blitzkrieg ended up as the 
constructors of the largest fixed fortifications that the world has ever seen, dwarfing the 
Maginot Line and its relatively puny firepower. 
The Eastern Front 
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Germany was intent on war with the USSR, and despite many misgivings, applied a 
military formula in 1941 that had been fatally endorsed by the victories of 1940, although 
these had probably been as much the product of 'Risiko und Wagnis' and extreme good 
fortune as of any new insight into military technique. The underlying fundamental, the 
ascendancy of firepower relative to the area of the battlespace, became evident soon after, 
over-ruling wishful thinldng and hopes of further so-called Blitzkrieg. The Germans were 
fated to refight their military anathema on the Eastern Front, while woefully ill-equipped 
and configured to succeed. The Second World War was to be even more costly for 
Germany than the First and its campaigns more attritional; but because they involved, at 
least initially, dramatic and 'glamorous' ground manoeuvre, the human catastrophe that 
this entailed at the hands of well-orchestrated Soviet and Allied firepower is seldom laid at 
the feet of their fatal and flawed offensive armoured doctrine - another 'Cult of the 
Offensive'. 
Operation BARBAROSSA sought a quick victory through political and military shock 
before the USSR could mobilize its potentially much greater materiel resources. The 
Wehrmacht could not contemplate a slow, deliberate advance across the steppe, 
recognizing Germany's inability to win a war fought on terms of comparative mass. 
Enhanced mobility seemed to offer the only means of circumventing this unacceptable 
conclusion. The Germans therefore relied on armoured mobility to achieve early victories, 
paralysing the opposition; and sought through mobility to concentrate what relatively 
scant firepower was available against selected points in a vast terrain. 
This concept of operations would have found some support in much German historical 
thought, which tended to disparage the value of artillery. Von Clausewitz warned that 
with "An excess of artillery ... One will seek salvation 
in strong positions, in formidable 
features of the terrain, and even in mountain positions, in order to shift the burden of 
defence and of protecting the numerous artillery on to the obstacles presented by the 
ground, so that hostile forces need only advance to be annihilated. War will be waged at a 
stately, formal pace, a la minuet. A shortage of artillery will, on the contrary, enable us to 
let the offensive, mobility and manoeuvring predominate. Marches, hardships, exertions, 
will become peculiar weapons for us; war will become more diversified, more lively, more 
ruffled: great battles will be gained quid pro quo"'. " Operation BARBAROSSA reflected 
that spirit. By contrast, the USSR sought salvation, in the 'strong positions', 'formidable 
features of terrain', and 'numerous artillery' which Clausewitz described and decried. 
It was in the Soviets' interest to create a Materialschlacht, given their superior resources. 
Unlike the Germans, the Soviets championed the decisive power of the gun. In 1945 
Lieutenant General 1. S. Prochko, describing these developments, wrote, 'Mfitary doctrine 
fought against theories which tried to belittle the importance of the role of artillery in 
modem warfare. Neither tanks nor aviation, no matter how great their importance may 
be, can replace artillery. Artillery was and still is the most powerful weapon of the Red 
., kmy. "'32 
The Gemians, unlike the British, actuaUy provided annour with the air support that the 
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theorists of the 1930s had advocated. The Soviets, though eager to exploit air-power 
whenever possible, regarded tanks and aircraft primarily as a means of enhancing the role 
of artillery. The Soviets believed that, given the strength of field defences combined with 
artillery, the balance of advantage still lay with defence. Yet they accepted that a war 
could only be won through offensive action. The belief that the gun was supreme in 
defence led to the conclusion that the gun and fire superiority over enemy guns would also 
be supreme in the attack. The essential problem was to provide mobile offensive forces 
with that firepower, and to give them protection in the absence of field defences. The 
belief that tanks and infantry should not attack until the enemy in their path had been 
destroyed by artillery created a greater need for field artillery support, as well as for anti- 
tank artillery in defence. 
The term 'Blitzkrieg' was invented after the fall of France, but it was now 'put about' by 
the Nazi propaganda machine as some 'magic formula', and many found it attractive. " 
The force that invaded the USSR seemed to be modelled on the assumption that this 
formula would indeed prevail. It comprised three million men, 600,000 vehicles, 3,580 
panzers, 7,184 guns and 1,830 aircraft. However impressive these figures may sound, 
they were comparable to those engaged in earlier campaigns in much smaller theatres. 
Hitler intended his war, let alone the campaign in Russia, to be complete by December 
1941 - he did not plan for, or anticipate, prolonged attrition. 
In reality, Operation BARBAROSSA was not founded on sober military analysis yet, 
persuaded by the propaganda images of the day, it retains its allure as a military 'success', 
and a high point in the practice of Operational armoured manoeuvre. In reality it was a 
model of chaotic, flawed military planning, justifiable only in terms of political dogma 
bordering on the metaphysical. 34 The operation was led by a small panzer elite, while 
seventy-eight percent of the force was predominantly infantry, relying on caravans of 
hundreds of thousands of horses and carts plodding east . 
3' The war against Poland had 
convinced the Wehrmacht that air-power could bring a quick victory, avoiding a 
protracted war. However, the Luftwaffe which was to support the armour comprised a 
rapidly ageing fleet of models, unable to conduct decisive operations at the strategic or 
Operational levels. 
While German operations in France in 1940 had obvious parallels with the 
KAISERSCHLACHT in terms of conceptual planning, a more horrendous parallel soon 
emerged between the Western Front of 1918 and the Eastern Front 1941-45,, for 
BARBAROSSA was to follow a similar pattern to the KAISERSCIHLACHT. It was also 
intended to be a quick operation completed before the enemy's superior logistic strength 
could be brought to bear. It employed innovative techniques, refined from those 
demonstrated months earlier on another front, and it was led by an elite manoeuvre force. 
Shock and consequent psychological collapse were to be weapons as much as firepower 
itself. After dazzling early tactical success, inflicting huge losses on an apparently 
demoralized and complacent defender, the 'velocity' of the blow was absorbed in depth, 
blunted by superior defensive firepower, logistics and the reaction time of reserves. 
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Defences could not be breached consistently at the Operational level, and the enemy's 
strategic collapse never occurred. 
As one soldier on the Eastern Front observed, 'Ve were spoiled by the preceding 
Bfitzkriege'. m In Russia, the scale of the battlespace negated most of the advantages the 
Germans had contrived for themselves in France. 'Mass', not the achievable 'velocity', 
would tell. No consideration was given to the series of campaigns that would be required 
in the East, and 'Sverything was staked on the Schlieffenian belief in a quick campaigrf v. 37 
BARBAROSSA was intended to succeed within three months, outshining the success of 
SICHELSCHNITT, a term invented by Winston Churchill and subsequently adopted by 
the Nazis, which had justified the operation. When it did not, the fundamentals which the 
'Blitz' had sought to 'short-circuit' reasserted themselves. 
Planning had been based not on military calculation, rather upon Ifitler's ideological 
conviction that, if he could strike a devastating early blow, the Soviet regime would 
collapse; and German manoeuvre doctrine had been an accomplice to this error. Like 
Rome after the Battle of Cannae (2dAugust 216 BQ, the Soviet regime did not Collapse - 
the most important lesson of Cannae. The reaction of General Halder to the problems on 
the Eastern Front was merely to observe that, '7he tough and spirited German soldier 
shames the staff which meticulously tots up numben? '38 It was rather the devotion to the 
unbalanced doctrine of lightning armoured warfare that was ultimately the undoing of the 
Wehrmacht. 
The failure after 1941 was ironic since superficially the Wehrmacht appeared to be a 
highly mobile 'modem" force, with an integrated land/air concept. The Germans had 
hoped that airpower would provide the firepower required; but in the USSR it could not, 
and relative to the Red Army, the Wehrmacht had neglected its artillery arm, both 
materially and in its doctrine. The Germans underestimated the effects of firepower that 
were required throughout the battlespace. From late 1940 the Wehnnacht was stripped of 
much of its firepower in the belief that rapid armoured manoeuvre would win the war by 
the end of 1941, an article of political faith rather than dispassionate Operational analysis. 
Once the campaign was underway, it was too late to rectify the problem. 
From May-September 1940 in the Battles of France and Britain, the Luftwaffe lost 3,064 
aircraft, sixty-five percent of its force. In September 1940, the month that Germany lost 
more planes than it produced, Hitler ordered that planned aircraft production be cut; and 
that year British aircraft production outstripped Germany's. Between July and December 
1941, the USSR produced 5,173 fighters and the Germans 1,619. Such setbacks and 
chaotic Luftwaffe procurement programmes ensured that Germany fought the last four 
years of the War with inferior CAS, and without a fully-fledged strategic airforce . 
39 What 
resources there were, continued to be directed towards projects which did not deliver 
successful military outcomes. For example, the resources devoted to 'revenge weapons' 
amounted to the equivalent of 24,000 fighter aircraft. 40 
Changes in artillery production and deployment illustrate the same point. In Summer 
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1941, the Soviets and the Germans had roughly the same number of field guns at 6,000 
and 7,000 respectively. The Germans broke up their corps artillery and devolved it to 
divisions, believing quite reasonably that given the huge space of the USSR and the speed 
of operations, corps artillery would not be able to keep up. The Operational design 
accepted that the speed of manoeuvre would outstrip fire support above the divisional 
level. This proved to be the case, but without self-propulsion, even divisional artillery was 
often left behind. Airpower proved an inadequate substitute, and rapid territorial gains 
could not be sustained without appropriate firepower. The French are often criticized for 
dispersing their armour in 1940, but criticism is seldom heard of the Germans for failing to 
concentrate their artillery and airpower decisively in 1941 and thereafter. 
Industrial priority was given to tank production over artillery, because the tank was 
deemed to be the campaign winner, as it had been in France, and artillery merely a 
subsidiary factor. In July 1941, as Operation BARBAROSSA was launched, a seventy 
percent cut in planned artillery production was ordered, and between April and December 
194 1, funding for artillery ammunition was reduccd from 69.1 m Reichsmarks, to 15.7m 
Reichsmarks. 4' By December 1941 artillery ammunition production was falling fast, and 
that month Germany produced 9,000 light howitzer shells but consumed 1,260,000.42 By 
1942 it was clear that Germany's imperative for a quick victory would not be achieved. 
She scoured the arsenals of occupied Europe in search of equipment to match Soviet 
firepower. By Winter 1940-41, eighty-eight German divisions, forty percent of the total 
were equipped with captured French material. ' 
War on the Eastern Front was characterized by the Wehrmacht's demonstration of how 
tactical mobility could sometimes concentrate firepower at the decisive time and place; by 
the realization on both sides that the tank could be mastered by the gun and by the 
eventual understanding that massed artillery, handled in the manner developed in the First 
World War, was still decisive in defence and offence. It also showed that unless Blitzkrieg 
achieved an immediate knock-out blow, as the term implied, an army which necessarily 
relied upon mobility rather than firepower could not prevail at the Operational level in a 
war of attrition, against one with an opposite priority and the means to support it. 
The Far East 
The factor that most shaped the war in the Far East was terrain. The Pacific campaign 
witnessed a series of battles for islands, in which ground forces were wholly dependent on 
naval and air forces for movement and re-supply. The South East Asian land campaign 
offered opportunities for tactical mobility, though under arduous conditions of terrain and 
climate. The difficulty in achieving equipment mobility in the mainland campaign inhibited 
the concentration of firepower, and on occasions naval and airpower became the most 
important sources of fire. Strategic mobility made it possible to concentrate field artillery; 
but terrain often restricted the size of the batflefield, concentrating violent action in a small 
and isolated area. 
The defender of an island could seldom expect relief, had little to gain from tactical 
33 
manoeuvre, and in the face of a set-piece attack with tri-service fire support had 
everything to gain by sacrificing mobility in favour of camouflage and massive physical 
protection. Offensive operations were therefore usually characterized by efforts to defeat 
such positions. 
In the Pacific, where concentrations of forces were widely separated, amphibious 
operations were the equivalent to the encirclement operations of the Eastern Front; and 
island defence resembled the German 'hedgehogs' of the steppe. These themselves became 
attractive targets and concentrations of vulnerability, running the risk of isolation at the 
hands of superior attacking forces that commanded the sea and air. The seizure and 
defence of small areas of vital ground was more important than the breaching of defences 
to win mobility for other arms. Artillery was therefore seldom required to neutralize the 
enemy, whose refusal to surrender ensured that his destruction was usually the object of 
operations in itself, but the need for firepower coincided with exceptional difficulties in 
providing it. 
By contrast with the Soviet theatre, it was often impossible to find sufficient space in 
which to deploy field artiffery. 44 Apart from the problem of space, the difficulty of moving 
masses of guns and ammunition by land was appalling. In New Guinea, British 
ammunition had to be carried by porters through miles oflungle where it took a porter one 
day to carry a single round four miles. A road-bound army could not mass without roads; 
and these had often to be built, or abandoned for amphibious or air transport. 
The physical difficulties in massing artillery were matched by those of achieving fire 
mobility through good target acquisition and accuracy. The jungle hampered observation 
and made flash-spotting and sound-ranging almost impossible. All artillery support tended 
to be close support, and fired at very short range . 
45 Air ON often proved effective, but 
these required landing strips or aircraft carriers. Survey was as difficult as target 
acquisition, and accuracy was further hampered by climatic effects on munitions. The one 
outstanding advantage that artillery did enjoy was the opportunity to conceal and protect 
itself with abundant materials for camouflage and the construction of field defences. 
The Japanese neglected to build up artillery materiel and an organization that could 
generate concentrated firepower. They were content to use artillery as mere 'infantry 
guns'. Rather than overcome disadvantageous conditions, they sought to maximize what 
advantages were available to enhance their scant resources. They placed high priority on 
survivability through camouflage, physical protection, and local defence. They also 
believed that careful siting of individual guns produced better results than the fire mobility 
gained by the co-ordination of a number of guns. 
The Allies strove to overcome the problems of the theatre and to create conditions where 
the principles of artillery tactics learned elsewhere could be achieved; but field artillery's 
prime role in attack was the destruction of fortified enemy positions, often by direct fire, 
and neutralization seemed an inadequate tactic. In defence, there was greater scope for 
the Allies to concentrate indirect fire, since the Japanese had little armour and they 
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presented massed and vulnerable targets if artillery could co-ordinate and deliver timely 
and accurate fire. 
It was appropriate that in a theatre where artillery was so relatively weak, an aircraft 
should deliver the most powerfid destructive blow, whose secondary effect was so great 
that it ended resistance on far removed battlefields. This ultimate source of concentrated 
firepower was soon to be harnessed by artillery, changing the face of battlefields and 
tactics around the world. 
Conclusion 
In the Second World War, artillery stiff played a decisive role and it was founded on an 
ever-more sophisticated network finking sensors, decision-makers and shooters. The most 
important targets were armoured, and these were eventually mastered by new direct-firing 
artillery guns. Indirect artillery, however, lost its relative potency against armour, but had 
a crucial role against all other targets, especially anti-tank guns. This continuing 
importance can be seen in the resources allocated to it. In the British Army, artillery, 
including AD, accounted for forty percent of manpower. In the Soviet Army, the number 
of guns increased fivefold between 1941 and 1945, and thirty-three percent of its men 
were field artillerymen. Artillery was rightly seen as the Soviet Army's primary means of 
destruction. 
The Second World War confirmed the importance of artillery support, but it was uncertain 
whether firepower was best obtained by mass on the Soviet model, or by the more 
efficient use of resources and complex networks favoured in the West. The seeds of 
doubt were being sown, and more problems were posed than resolved. As in 1918, the 
areas of uncertainty lay around new and undeveloped weapon systems that would 
transform the role of artillery and its relationship with other arms. 
The rocket had been both a means by which the infantry could lessen its dependence on 
scarce artillery resources, and for the artillery a method of combining greater shock with a 
heavy weight of fire. It had the potential to reduce the role of artillery in the close anti- 
tank battle, which had been the former's primary role in the Second World War, and at the 
same time it offered artillery the possibility of achieving a new and deeper role on the 
battlefield at all levels of warfare. Dr. W. Dornberger of the V2 programme rightly 
suggested that in decades to come it would be the vehicle for the delivery of high- 
technology munitions. 
The decisive role of firepower on the battlefield which had been neglected in the 1930s 
was re-asserted in the Second World War, changing the relationship between arms in the 
process, and in some cases the perception of which arm was responsible for its provision. 
Theorists in the 1930s had assigned responsibility for the deep battle to aircraft, even 
though little provision was made for it outside Germany. The shortage of medium and 
heavy artillery and the growing availability of aircraft and naval gunfire brought such ideas 
to fruition for the Allies by 1943. Field artiflery was thus able to devote its energy almost 
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entirely to the close battle, or at least to targets which, on a battlefield of greater depth 
than in the First World War, were of closer relative proximity. Targets, which on the scale 
of a the First World War battlefield would have been for engagement by artillery, were 
now allocated to aircraft, whose lack of accuracy made them suitable to carry out tasks 
analogous to the predicted, unobserved area saturation missions of many artillery 
bombardments in the First World War. Artillery's role in deep attack after 1945 would 
depend upon improving its own performance relative to aircraft capabilities, and the 
ordering of ground attack in air force priorities. 
What aircraft could not produce was a heavy weight and variety of accurate fire, at short 
notice, at any time, in any weather, at any range up to about I Slan. This was artillery's 
unchallenged preserve. Artillery's role through history has been to provide fire effects of a 
weight, severity or range beyond that of other arms; and it was this which had clearly re- 
emerged again by 1945 after the confusion and mistakes of the 1930s. 
The means by which artillery rediscovered its role was not so much improved ordnance, as 
C3 networks which optimized its effects throughout the area of the two-dimensional 
battlefield. The introduction of the radio was in its own way as important as that of the 
petrol engine. It permitted a centralized system of C2, which synthesised the authority and 
priorities of high command with the fresh intelligence and immediate requirements of the 
smallest sub-unit. Together these could create the swift concentrations of fire which 
artillery has always striven to produce. 
Above all, the nuclear warhead created grave uncertainty at a time when it had seemed 
that tactical orthodoxy had been restored to the delivery of fire. Nuclear weapons could 
generate such mass destruction that it was thought by some that conventional war, let 
alone conventional artillery support, had become obsolete. If a conventional war were 
indeed out of the question, perhaps artillery would regress, and be used only in limited 
wars in inhospitable regions of the world, where few lessons of the Second World War 
would be considered relevant. 
1 On Ie June 18 15, he accepted the advice of his senior artillery commander, Druot, that the water- 
logpd ground would dry out sufficiently for his cannon to be positioned by noon. They were not, and this 
gave Wellington and Bluechcr a precious extra three hours. Chandler (1992), p. 24. 
2 Hughes (1983), p. 46. 
3 This frontage was simila to that of a conventional six-gun battery deployment in the latter half of the 
20'h Century. 
4 The maximum effective range of a light gun or howitzer firing roundshot was about 1,000m, and for 
heavier pieces about 1,500m. Canister was perhaps effective out to about 600m, but it was best fired at 
less than 300ra. 
5 Ricochet fire was originally used only in siege operations. The first reference to ricochet fire was by the 
Venetian engineer Thomas Nkretti in 1672. The French engineer Vauban experimented with ricochet fire 
at the siege of Ath in 1697. The intention in such cases was to bounce rounds over the walls of 
fortifications to strike defending artillery behind the parapet. Nosworthy (1997), pp. 387-8. 
6A shot from a typical 8pdr or 9pdr cannon fired at zero elevation, would probably strike the ground at 
400m, ricochet and bounce again at 600m and again at 700m. It would then roll another 50m. This 
lethal journey would all be below head height A 4pdr or 6pdr would first strike the ground at about 
300m, and& 12pdrat6OOm. Increased range couldbe achieved, but at a price. Wcreangpdror9pdr 
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elevated by just one deem. the first bounce would be at 700m, having previously travelled most of its 
journey above head height. It would bounce again at IOWm, but probably not again At two degrees of 
I -was un' 'Al lo ri I-o Ls guns eleyaliOiki, the first strike would be 9100-in, and the round wk yi cochel. 17o, Chese reas r, 
were seldom elevated. These distances were affected by the state of the Lzround. Wise (1979). pp. 27-9. 
7 In Instructions of FieldMarshal Bluecherfor the Chief of Brigades, issued at the start of the campaign 
of 1815, ricochet fire was held to be more accurate than other modes of fire at long range. Nosworthy 
(1997). p. p. 389-90. 
a Concentrating fire does not necessarily imply a heavy weight of fire overall. Greater accuracy may 
permit effects to be concentrated economically with fewer munitions. Today, when indirect fire is the 
norm. concentration of fire is seen in terms of converging fire at a point or area from abom rather than 
along the whole length of converging lines of traJectory. In future, the concentration of fire will be 
assessed increasingly in terms of the terminal effect of a precision munition at a critical point, rather than 
the volume of pieces and fire necessary to create that effect and the implications of this will be as radical 
as those consequent from the dominance of indirect fire after 1914. Precision of effect will thus assume 
the importance previously assigned to the mcre concentration of fire. 
9 It has been estimated that 1.000 of the 3.000 French casualties at the Battle of Albuera (1601 May 1811) 
were caused by British field guns, yet this destruction was probably caused by just four well-sited pieces. 
Hughes (1997), pp. 121-2. Similar siting of Lawson's guns at the Battle of Talavera on 280' June 1809 had 
dire consequences for French columns. Ibid. p. 136. 
10 Bellamy (1982a), p. 215. 
,I Some British officers recommended the adoption of the 'Richtflacche'; but others who studied German 
experience in 1870. used the latter as evidence not to adopt the more modem German techniques. "I only 
trust that the English field artillery will never consider their role is to sit behind a hill a mile and a half in 
the rear while the assault is taking place. - Headlam (1897), p. 395. Headlam's views were subsequently 
to carry a heavy price. 12 Kraft zuHoiieýlohe-lngelfingen (1899), p. 890. In later years he became increasingly critical of indirect 
fire, believing it to be impractical in mobile field operations. 
13 Dastruv(1992). lD. 129. His ideas were thoroughly vindicated eariv in the Russo-Japanese War and 
almost cýrtainly iniluenced Japanese practice. 
14 Scales (1976), p. 146 
15 There were frequent lectures and articles written at the turn of the Century about the ballistics of 
indirect fire. In a lecture in 1897, Major J. L. Keir stated the case for indirect fire most clearly Keir 
(1897a). He warned that through the practice of direct fire, "... we may run the risk of suffering great 
losses at the outset of a campaign... ". He made afurther atterniAto win support inKcir(1897b). noting 
ominously that "time alone can decide who is right. " 
Captain C. D. Guincss shared some of these fears and described his vision of a future war, where British 
guns deployed in the open. firing directly against concealed German guns firing indirectly. He concluded. 
"I make bold to assert that the odds are we ihall get the worst of it in -the first ten minutes of the artillery 
duel. " His article outlined the debate between advocates of forward and concealed deployments, and the 
ballistics and terminal effects of shells fired on indirect trajectories. Guincss (1897). Strangely he 
concluded that direct fire was usually the preferred option, and that artillery should merely avoid skylines. 
It transpired that his objection to indirect fire was that it ran contrary to the sporting nature of the Royal 
Regiment. Lord Wolselev - no great friend of artillery - who was present when Guiness presented his idýas, disagreed, urging that guns be fired from behiný cover. lbiý p. 84. 16 The opposition to the development of indirect firing techniques in the British Army was led most 
vociferously by Brigadier General C. H. Spragge Colonel G. H. Marshall. Maior J. Headlam and Colonel 
E. S. May. Mýy in particular believed in the moral aspect of close engagement and that firing behind 
cover "... will destroy the whole spirit of the arm. - Ironically, one of the leading advocates of indirect fire 
was an infantry officer, T. D PilcheT. His unfortunate treatment at the hands of the Royal Artillery is 
described in Scales (1976), pp. 174-7. Headlam argued that the general employment of indirect fire in the 
field was "... absolutely out of the question. " On 26 th August 1914, Brigadier General Headlam, 
commanding the artillery of 5h Division. deploved five brigades of guns in exposed positions at Le 
Cateau, betýeen 50m. and 200m. from the infantry front fine. Two battery commanders who believed their 
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positions were untenable, moved their guns to covered positions, but Headlarn ordered them to return to 
their forward position. Headlam was unable to engage his opponent's pieces which were in concealed 
positions, 3,500-5,000m away. After eight hours of bombardment, the battle was lost and twenty-seven of 
his forty-two guns were captured. This engagement has Vocally been seen as a gallant action, focusing 
on attempts to retrieve the guns. It should more aptly be seen as a striking example of the lethal 
consequences of technical and doctrinal conservatism. The authorized history of the Royal Artillery 
covering the prc-War period failed to analyse the debates about the introduction of indirect fire. Its author 
was 1ýbj Gen J. Headlam. who had done so much to oppose it 
17 The shortcomings of British artillery in the Boer War were examined by the Brackcriberry Study which 
recommended a major re-equipment of the Royal Artillery with the Ehrhardt 15pdr. This piece had a full 
recoil and could equal the rate of fire of the French '75'. It was replaced in the Regular Army before the 
First World War. 
18 Kirke (1974). 
19 Knox (1913), p. 41. 
20 JJ3. A. Bailey in Knox and Murray (200 1), pp. 132-153. 
21 This was the blueprint for battle as tested by the British Amy at Cambrai in November 1917, but seen 
in more complete form in the German offensives of Spring 1918, the KAISERSCIRLACHT, and the 
Allied offensives later that year. Eighty-five years later this style of warfare remains familiar, but in 1914, 
a mere three years earlier, it would have seemed entirely bizarre. This model of 1917-18, a new 
orthodoxy in fireplatining, was evident in the doctrine of NATO and Warsaw Pact armies of the Cold 
War. It was also evident in the Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal in 1973, and Coalition planning for 
the Gulf War of 1990-9 1. 
22 It had a range of 125km and remained the longest-ranged gun until the introduction of rocket-assisted 
projectiles. Aside from aircraft, it was the only means of strategic attack, in its case against Paris. It had 
major shortcomings, notably a light projectile, a slow rate of fire and a short tube life. The life of a barrel 
was judged to be sixly rounds, and these were issued in graduated sizes, to account for the expanded 
calibre of the barrel. The first was of 2 10mm and the last of 222mm. The gun fired 303 shells in forty- 
four days killing 256 people. It was intended to strike a paralysing blow at French national morale but lacked 
the desired acmiracy It was an astonishing achievement in technical terms, but the means and tactic of the day 
groved inadequate for the revolutionary strategic objective. 
Quoted in Balck (1914), p. 24 1. 
24 By 1917 the ratio of gunners to infantrymen in many battles had risen to 8: 10. The Royal Artillery 
became larger than the Royal Navy. In 1914 the British Army possessed only six heavy batteries 
compared to sevcnty-two field batteries. By November 1918 it had 440 heavy batteries and 568 field 
batteries. In 1914 the Russian Army had 797 heavy guns, but by 1917 it had 2,550. Simpkin(1987), 
p. 109. Whereas in April 1917 the US Army had nine field regiments, by the Armistice it had 234. 
Dastrup (1992), p. 163. 
25 In 1919 the French had 50,000 telegraph engineers. There were up to 200 signallers in every artillery 
reginicrit, and many French houses had been stripped of wiring to provide communications. 
26 Quoted in Hay (1920), p. 112. 
27 Reccitt interpretations have diswunted the idea that the German offensive in France in 1940 was 
planned and carried out as a Blitzkrieg per se. While the components of success had indeed been put in 
place, the idea that it all along followed a conceptual masterplan was a notion put about by Nazi 
propaganda, and popularized by some German generals after the War. SeeFrieser(1993). Frieserquotes 
Haldcr, who was not such a propagandist, speaking after the campaign, "Das ganz Ausland ist auf der 
Suche nach den neuen Methoden der Deutschen - diem waren es gar nicht - Krieg ist immer ein System 
von Aushilfen7. Ibid, p. 1. This echoes some of the notion in Crown Prince Rupprecht's remark on 
German doctrine after the First World War: "There is no panacea. A formula is harmful. Everything 
must be applied according to the situation. " Quoted in Lupfer (1981), p. 58. Prior to 1939, the Germans 
did not so much design a force with a premeditated 'magic formula', as come to believe after 1940 that 
that is what they had done. Operation BARBAROSSA was the catastrophic consequence of that delusion. 23 Pemberton (1950). 
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29 The story of the tank versus anti-tank gun is discussed in Avmndix 8 to History qf1he Second World 
War: 7he Me&terranean andMiddle F; st, Vol. 111 OMO, 14ý0). 
-V Wilks, (1978). 
31 Von Clausewitz (1976). pp. 287-8. Also cpiotedinBalck(1914). p. 241. 
32 Prochko (1945), p. 20. 
13 See Bellamy (1990), p. 91 and Fricscr (1995). 
34 Early planning had assumed that the campaign would last five months. Its planned duration was 
eventually basedon the availability of enouih jasolme for just three months, at rates of consumption 
experienced in France in 1940, even though scvcnty-fivc percent of motors used diesel., and there was only 
of enough of that for one month. In the event much movement in the USSR would be off-road. fuel 
consurnption would be three times higher than in France, and most captured Soviet fuel would be 
unusable because of its low octane rating. Divisions were expected to carry their own stocks and there 
was a reserve supply for just twenty divisions. Planning was based on the assumption that one fi-ain would 
support each army, but in the event the Germans could manage only one train behind each army group. 
The Germans' most optimistic forecast acknowledged that the Soviets could not be defeated within the: 
first 300km of their frontier. Beyond that once divisional docks had been used up. army and army group 
transport would have to make long round trips to resupply the front If the elite rýechanized divisioýs 
were to be given their full requirement, there would be no transport available at all to supply the 
remaining III divisions. Almost nothing was done to plan for cold weather. and eighty percent of 
German railway engines had burst their main waterpipes by November. Ellis (1990), pp. 39-79, relying 
heavily on the work of Martin van CrcvclcL 
35 The notion of Schwcrpunkt in German doctrine acknowledges that relative weakness must be accepted 
in some areas to achieve a decisive strength elsewhere. A siniffar unbalance is often noticeable in German 
force structures, creating a wcll-fumishcd elite to lever a decisive advantage, albeit at the material expense 
of the majority of the force. The same German preference for an elite with its consequent imbalances can 
be seen both in the stormtroop forces of the First World War, and in the creation of a relatively small 
panzer force to lead the larger, horse-drawn army into the USSR in 194 1. The consequences once that 
elite had been shattered were similar. This phenomenon was also evident in the disastrous decision to 
build the Panzerschiffe elite at the cost of the potentially war-winning U-boat programme. See Herwig in 
Murray (1996), pp. 231-24 1. 36 Quoted in Bartov (1992). p. 2 1. 37 Wallach (1986), p. 271. 
"8 Ellis (1990), p. 78. 
39 Irving (1973). 
40 Murray and Millett (2000), p. 333. 
41 Ellis (1990), p. 48. 
42 See Engelmann (1995). p. 112. 43 van - 
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Creveld (1977), p. 145. 
Nothing Atoll, for example, saw possibly the most unorthodox deployment of a 155mm howitzer 
battalion of the war. It went into action on a beach-head only 300-400m deep. with two batteries trad to 
trail. Another battalion on the Atoll occupied an area just 200m square, whereas the nom in the Italian 
Campaign was 800m by 800m. US forces often overcame this shortage of space by landing artillery on an 
island close to the one defended bv the jaDanese. from which thcv could bombard the crienry with 
impunity. This was successful at Tarawa in November 1943, and at Kwajalein in January 1944. 45 Because an OP's view was limited, the British in Burma often found it necessary to have up to eight 
OPs for a battery. but were often handicapped by poor radio communications,. caused by the rugged terrain 
andjungle. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE COLD WAR 1945-1990 
3.1 EMODUCTION 
By 1945, artillery and airpower had been joined in a potent network. This evolved 
throughout the Cold War, but in very different ways on either side of the Iron Curtain in a 
symbiotic relationship of action and counter-action. This is illustrated in Table 1, whose 
chronological format replicates the structure for this chapter. 
Table 1. The Development of Artillery during the Cold War. 
[-WARSAWPACT I NATO I 
1945-1962: 
Minimal tactical reaction to the introduction 
of atomic weapons. 
Maintained concept of mass, but involving 
little manoeuvre. 
Predominantly towed equipment. 
Eventually acquired atomic weapons. 
1962-1982: 
Cuban Crisis and growing intensity of the 
Cold War led to large build-up of forces. 
Lessons of Yom Kippur War led to 
programme of mechanization and 
modemization. 
Threat from NATO ATGW led to thinking 
about surprise and development of 
Operational Manoeuvre Groups (OMG). 
1982-1990: 
WP doctrine sought to avoid nuclear 
warfare and to win rapidly by conventional 
means. 
Huge build-up, of artillery, and development 
of OMG concept. 
WP weapons, especially annour and 
ATGW, remained at forefront of 
technology. 
Growing awareness of future Western 
1945-1965: 
Atomic weapons seen as justifying 
reduction in conventional forces. 
Deterrence through Mutually Assured 
Destruction (MAD). 
Dispersal seen to be necessary on atomic 
battlefield. 
Armoured SP artillery required for 
manoeuvre. 
1965-1982: 
MAD increasingly seen to lack credibility. 
Fle7dble Response replaced MAD. 
Attritional model replaced by Active 
Defence. 
ATGW introduced to counter WP 
armoured threat. 
Artillery made more efficient by improved 
C2 and computers. 
Rocket artillery introduced to increase long- 
range firepower, along with artillery mines. 
Massive WP superiority in firepower still 
seemed overwhelming, and nuclear 
weapons underwrote NATO doctrine. 
1982-1990: 
Forward Defence offered little space for 
manoeuvre. New ideas created space for 
lateral manoeuvre and in the MT's depth. 
AirLand Battle and Follow on Forces 
Attack (FOFA)indicated new NATO 
confidence and a willingness to take 
offensive action. 
Achievable only through greater air-land 
40 
technological superiority, and WP inability Introduction of key high-tech systems: 
to keep up in the long-term. JSTARS, ATACMS. 
Precision munitions seen to be best means 
of countering WP mass. 
1990+: 1990+: 
WP reliance on mass and manoeuvre seen Development continued of advanced 
to be vulnerable to new NATO doctrine, military technology in C41STAR and 
and doomed in the longer-term to succumb precision. 
to Western technological superiority. Doctrine of AirLand Battle, deep battle and 
Legacy of WP advanced weaponry advanced technologies gave NATO nations 
remained around the world after the Cold advantages in warfare after the Cold War. 
War. II 
3.2 THE SOVIET BLOC 1945-1962 
After 1945 the power of conventional field artillery was overshadowed by that of the 
atomic warhead, but the USSR's accommodation with this new factor differed from that 
of the West. The Soviets' aim was to secure the territories they had gained in the Second 
World War against a background of American atomic superiority; but their military 
strategy remained largely unchanged. Soviet forces deployed and trained in the style of 
the Second World War. They were echeloned and practised fire and manoeuvre with the 
emphasis on fire. This was predominantly pre-plannedý massed artillery fire; and the C3 of 
all arms was highly centralized, with the division being the lowest level of decision- 
making. 
During the 1950s, fifle and mechanized formations were converted to motor rifle and tank 
formations, maldng combined-arms operations more practicable; but there were few 
innovations in conventional Soviet field artillery. On the other hand, the Soviets 
conducted their first atomic test in August 1949, and this was followed four years later by 
their production of a hydrogen bomb. Tactical systems were soon developed to deliver 
these weapons. ' 
Although the Soviets accelerated research during this period, Stalin himself remained 
curiously unmoved by the power of nuclear weapons; and the Soviet Army continued to 
train and organize for conventional war. Soviet conventional numbers remained constant, 
in contrast to those of Western armies, and little account was taken of the need for greater 
battlefield dispersion. By the mid 1950s, the consequences of the atomic threat on the 
battlefield were more clearly perceived, and a fourth arm was created, armed with the 
strategic nuclear missile. Between 1957 and 1962 the emphasis on nuclear forces grew, in 
response to NATO's strategy of 'Massive Retaliation. Theatre nuclear weapons (TNW) 
came to be regarded as a form of heavy field artillery and an integral part of any offensive; 
but Soviet field manuals persisted in teaching operations by other arms in the style of the 
Second World War. 
NATO's approach to artillery differed to that of the Wersaw Pact (WP). In NATO, 
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artillery strength was greatly reduced in lieu of increasing nuclear firepower. In the WP, 2 
on the other hand, it was maintained, albeit with a re-ordered priority of resources. The 
number of field guns did not grow, but there was a steady modernization and improvement 
in the range of field artillery as older pieces were replaced. 
Self-propulsion had been increasingly favoured by Soviet artillery in the Second World 
War to accompany deep annoured thrusts; but in the following decades this trend was 
reversed because the Soviets saw little prospect of executing such manoeuvres on the 
atomic battlefield? High mobility was envisaged only in airborne operations, and in 1956 
two SP anti-tank guns were produced for airborne forces; but there was no place for these 
equipments in other formations. 
The introduction of atomic warheads did not cause the strength of Soviet artillery to be 
reduced, rather it changed the course of its development. This involved not just the 
decline of the SP gun, but also a lack of innovation in the handling of conventional 
artillery. On the other hand, development of the MBRL quickened, partly because of 
&spin-ofr from the high priority accorded to strategic rocket and missile programmes. It 
was also partly because the MIBRL concept had a place on a battlefield in which close 
support of annour was not a major task, but where heavy 'shock' firepower was required 
against targets which did not merit, or were technically unsuited to, atomic attack. 4 
3.3 THE WEST 1945-1965 
Strategy 
After 1945, nuclear warheads combined with more accurate ICBM[s, derived from the V2, 
provided the technology to match the strategic concept of the Paris Gun of 1918. Like the V2 
programme itselt this was essentially a technical enhancement to an older concept - deep, 
stra*c, indirect fire; and Karl Becker and Wemer von Braun were the human links in the 
chain. 5 This new combination proved so effective that the equivalent of shock and paralysis in 
war was achieved in the Cold War in the form of deten-ence. The proliferation of missiles and 
chemical weapons, introduced but unused during the Cold War, constitutes a serious threat in 
the coming decades. 
As early as 1947 Major General Homer of the US Guided Missile Center foresaw that 
missiles would soon be able to strike anywhere on earth, and that the USA would lose its 6 
strategic insularity. Atomic weapons made this threat uniquely lethal. NATO armies 
were designed to fight "the last war, and the realization that they would have to operate 
on an atomic battlefield, not just of their own making, upset fundamental assumptions. At 
the same time there was continuing domestic pressure to reduce the size of the West's 
standing armies. 
In its early years, NATO planned to defend from west of the Rhine. The NATO Military 
Committee Report 14/1 of 1952 called for light active forces of twenty to thirty divisions 
to screen an attack, prior to aton-fic interdiction by the US Strategic Air Command. There 
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would then be a ground offensive to recover -NATO territory and liberate Eastern Europe, 
using a further seventy divisions from the US and European reserves. That year General I 
Lawton Collins predicted that the employment of atomic weapons would reduce the 
requirement for conventional forces; but General Omar Bradley observed that, 'Vhen they 
get a bomb to neutralize ours, we better have an army to neutralize their army. "7 Despite 
this caution, by the mid-1950s NATO had reduced its estimate of the number of divisions 
it required to twenty-six, with nuclear weapons compensating for any conventional 
deficiency. 
In 1953, the US Amy published Atomic Weapons in Land Combat. ' This and similar 
papers maintained that the firepower of atomic weapons enhanced the power of the 
offence over the defence. Frontal assault was now preferable to flanldng and enveloping 
manoeuvres, since nuclear weapons could blow a hole through even the strongest defence. 
Defence would therefore have to be fluid, avoiding continuous lines, and be deployed in 
depth to avoid amiMation. Forces would have to be more self-contained. 
By 1957, NATO's planning had become more ambitious, seeking to exploit its lead in the 
emerging technology of tactical nuclear weapons. The MC 14/2 'Sword and Shield' 
concept entailed a defence with conventional weapons as a shield, behind which tactical 
nuclear weapons could be prepared and deployed. These would then attack targets as far 
east as the Urals. There was no plan for a ground counter attack into the East since little 
of worth would remain. This was often termed the 'Trip-Wire. If the Soviets launched a 
nuclear attack, NATO would respond in kind, a policy of 'Massive Retaliation'. By the 
early 1960s, the ability of each side to destroy the other, or Mutually Assured Destruction 
(MAD), had been accepted as the reality of the strategic stalemate. 
Artillery and the Atomic Battlefield 
In 1948, the US field artillery considered a role for artillery firing guided conventional 
munitions; and in 1950 it was agreed that missiles should be regarded as an extension of 
tube artillery. The Soviet detonation of a nuclear device in 1950 spurred the USA to 
develop tactical atomic warheads for the rocket system that would become Honest John, 
and between 1953-55 the US Army fielded the Corporal missile with a nuclear warhead 
and a range of over 140km. 9 In July 1950, following the invasion of South Korea, the US 
Army developed a 240mm nuclear cannon. 'O 
NATO also had to consider how its armies would survive and fight on the atomic 
battlefield. Firepower had been the decisive factor in the two World Wars; but with 
atomic munitions exceeding all previous norms, the need for masses of guns supported by 
huge logistic organizations seemed to some to have evaporated. " Many forecast that the 
missile, not the gun, would prove decisive 12 , and some doubted that conventional weapons 
were required at all. 
Such radical ideas did not prevail, and there was caution about 'science fiction' warfare. 
This ensured that US forces retained their conventional capability, and new equipment 
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programmes continued. One advantage of atomic weapons, however, was that they 
allowed the steady reduction of conventional forces from their levels of 1945, without 
apparently endangering the defence of Western Europe against undiminished Soviet 
forces. 
The most notable consequence of atomic munitions was the ending of the physical 
concentrations of men and equipment which had characterized the Second World War. 
These were seen to be attractive targets for atomic fire, and in any case the resources to 
sustain them in peacetime were lacking. It was concluded that reduced conventional 
forces should disperse and be made more self-sufficient. It was estimated that with the 
advent of atomic warheads the depth required in defence had doubled. " The generation 
of firepower and speed of movement had increased in an apparently constant relationship, 
and greater dispersion was their product. It was believed that, given the known effects of 
atomic yields and mobility on both sides, desirable patterns of deployment could be 
mathematically determined. 
NATO's conventional defence in its early years was therefore based on a series of widely 
dispersed strong points in forward areas, with more battle positions in depth, and a mobile 
strildng force held in reserve. Artillery was often their only means of support; but 
providing this for widely separated battalion positions was problematic. Dispersion 
encouraged the renewal of artillery affiliations, particularly at battalion level, although an 
infantry battalion could often expect the support of but one battery. The guns themselves 
were in the 'front line', which was in effect no longer linear but a series of dispersed 
strong points. These became extremely vulnerable, since they could no longer rely upon 
other arms to provide adequate local defence. 
The US Army's Atomic Weapons in Land Combat of 1953 was a consequence of these 
ideas and encouraged the decentralization of artillery so that firepower could be better 
distributed throughout this dispersed force, which would probably be out of range of any 
centrally commanded, higher-level force of artillery. 14 Conventional artillery was no 
longer expected to produce heavy bombardments to break a defence or halt a major 
offensive. Its tasks were humbler and tactical, if only because equipment could no longer 
be massed to undertake any others. 
The increasing centralization of C2 had been the process over centuries by means of which 
greater concentrations of fire had been made possible. In this case, the decentralization of 
C2 after 1945 stemmed from the need to increase coverage by fire with fewer resources, 
and above all to mass limited quantities of fire quickly and accurately. The quality of fire 
support, rather than its volume, was the prime consideration. This new thinking was 
permissible after 1945 because massive firepower could be summoned instantly, in the 
form of atomic weapons; and conventional field artillery could rid itself of the burdens 
associated with concentrating sheer weight of fire. 
With fewer assets, the arguments for centralizing their command, if not their control, 
retained their force, yet effective centralization was dependent upon good 
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communications, the problems of which were exacerbated by the dispersion of resources. 
The US Army acknowledged that its artillery communications were poor, because land- 
line was unreliable over long distances, and the threat of WP radio interference was 
becoming evident. In a large dispersed divisional area, fire could only be massed by 
relying upon the physical allocation of guns from the corps, as opposed to the fire mobility 
of reinforcing fire. This was normal practice in 1945, and the lessons of the Second World 
War were formally recorded by the US Army in training circulars, which established the 
principles, responsibilities and procedures for the C2 of fire support; but even in 1952 
there were no detailed operational procedures or standardized organizations at corps level, 
"Yet corps is the most important level". " 
Attempts continued in the US Army to create a yet more centralized command, with 
control exercised in command posts relatively distant from the guns, but based on broader 
intelligence. The so-called 'Pentornic Organization' of the n-dd-1950s in effect did away 
with the artillery battalion headquarters in the fire support organization; and divisional Fire 
Support Elements (FSE) were tasked to co-ordinate requests for fire and apportion 
resources to answer them; but this failed, as the FSE could not cope with the size of the 
task. "' By 1956 the US Army believed that its communications were greatly improved 17 
and by 1960, the FSCC chain had been fiffly integrated from corps to battalion levels. 
Reforms of the early 1960s in the US Army ended the role of the artillery commander as 
the automatic co-ordinator of all forms of fire support. The Tactical Operations Center 
(TOC) was formed at corps and army, and later at divisional level. The artillery FSE 
became an integral part of the TOC at all levels; but in effect the authority of the fire 
support co-ordinator was limited to surface-to-surface systems, with no authority over 
aircraft or atomic demolitions, which were regarded as specializations. 
The difficulty in providing adequate close and mutual support encouraged attempts to 
enhance the firepower of the fewer guns available by improving their mobility. Mobility 
could have disadvantages, and NATO armies recognized the vulnerability of mobile forces 
to WP air attack and enemy penetrations, let alone the logistic problems posed when units 
made frequent moves. Nevertheless, the US Army also saw greater mobility as an aid to 
survivability, and believed that it gave conventional field artillery a role on the atomic 
battlefield, indeed one on which atomic tactics would come to rely. Its policy was to 
'shoot, move and communicate'", displacing more often, faster, and with security. If 
guns were to move in forward areas of the battlefield without the close protection of other 
arms, they needed greater protection; and so in NATO armies at least the SP gun 
remained in service, eventually becoming standard for close support artillery. 
By the end of the 1950s most artillerymen believed that close support artillery required a 
piece of about 150mm, on an SP mount, with a range of 251=19; and similar equipments, 
but with lesser ranges, came into service in the 1960s, most notably the ubiquitous US 
M109. The British nevertheless also produced the 105mm Abbot SP gun. 20 Although 
improvements were made in NATO am-des to equipment mobility and firepower, the 
Soviets retained a substantial numerical advantage; and ultimately this could only be 
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matched by a nuclear response. 
The role of field artillery on the atomic battlefield became more distinct. Despite reliance 
on atomic munitions, there were still reservations about their use. They were 
acknowledged to be clumsy battlefield weapons, creating excessive destruction, termed 
'overkill'; and their response time could be slow, given the need for their political release. 
The uncertainty surrounding the latter ensured that conventional artillery would still be 
required, if only until nuclear release was given. 
NATO saw conventional artillery as a means of holding an attack, forcing the enemy to 
21 concentrate his forces to break in, and in so doing to present a suitable atomic target. 
Atomic weapons provided the massive firepower which in the World Wars had broken 
defences, allowing supported arms to manoeuvre. Firepower of all types, more than ever, 
became the means of defeating the enemy so that others could manoeuvre to seize and 
hold ground at less risk. "The ultimate objective is to destroy, or so to neutralize the 
enemy that the manoeuvre force can take and hold its objective without casualties. 'm 
Conventional artillery tended to concentrate more on close support than depth fire, since 
high-value deep targets such as C31 installations were ideal for atomic attack. Atomic 
warheads were also considered the best means of conducting CB operations, which 
required heavy concentrations of fire on positions that could not be identified with great 
precision. A single atomic round over enemy divisional artillery was judged to be more 
effective than the fire of hundreds of guns. It was, however, unlikely that the enemy 
would always present ideal high-value atomic targets. It would not be technically possible 
to hit some, and others would not merit atomic attack, being more economically and 
efficiently hit with BE. 
There were two generally accepted scenarios for the use of conventional artillery in the 
attack. It could be used to defeat forward enemy positions, ma3dmizing surprise with a 
high density of fire for short periods. There would be no conventional battle of attrition, 
but rather the enemy's forces would be encircled at speed and then annihilated by atomic 
coups de grace. Alternatively, atomic weapons could be used in a form of 'Blitzkrieg, 
whereby the defence was shattered by their destructive firepower, after which supported 
arms could advance. Atomic firepower would thus become the equivalent of 'carpet 
bombing" in the Second World War, or artillery 'area saturation' in the First. 
It was noted that where similar conventional techniques had been applied in the Second 
World War, operations had often foundered on enemy positions in unexpected depth. In 
an atomic 'Blitzkrieg' operation, intelligence of deeper enemy positions was likely to be 
poor, and given the slower response-time of atomic fire, manoeuvre forces would need the 
support of quicker conventional field artillery. Once the attackers had entered enemy 
territory, these forces would require the support of conventional artillery to protect their 
flanks. In the advance after a breakthrough, small enemy rearguards were bound to be 
encountered. These would not merit atomic attack, but would be suitable targets for 
conventional missions. In this scenario conventional artillery's role therefore became one 
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of 'accompanying artillery', with atomic forces responsible for providing a destructive 
preliminary bombardment. 
3.4 THE WARSAW PACT 1962-1982 
The effects of the Cuban n-fissile crisis of 1962 on the development of Soviet nuclear and 
conventional forces were profound. Strategic aims remained unchanged, but the Soviets 
deemed it necessary to build up both their nuclear and conventional forces to match or 
surpass American strength. The new thinking required greater mechanization and 
modernization of conventional forces, and a change to more mobile and flexible 
operations, capable of conducting a lightning war of 'bold thrusts. 
The Soviets judged that NATO would delay using nuclear weapons for as long as 
possible, and that while the delay lasted there would be the chance that swift and 
numerically superior WP forces could defeat their opponents. The Soviets themselves 
drew no marked distinction between their own NBC weapons and conventional forces, 
and never ruled out the possible use of NBC weapons to open an offensive. The Soviet 
concept of operations continued to require concentration in great strength to smash 
through NATO's defences, in echelon, on a broad front. Surprise, speed and firepower 
would achieve deep penetration of NATO territory, paralysing the political decision-taking 
and CM structure, and knocking out nuclear delivery systems. 
The two major tasks for Soviet artillery in the Second World War had been anti-tank fire 
and massive area attack. Sokolovskiy maintained in Mifitxy Strategy, first published in 
1962v that these tasks were now better performed by missiles than guns. "As far as 
conventional means of fire support are concerned, the ground forces require weapons 
which can at the same time provide massive fire, both to counter enemy missiles and 
nuclear weapons, and to overcome small pockets of resistance, and also destroy enemy 
tanks. Only rockets and anti-tank missiles can truly satisfy this requirement, and it is 
therefore imperative that these developments be pursued. "2' The Soviet commitment to 
guns did not waver, but Sokolovskiy's work set the scene for the build-up of missile 
artillery over the next five years, when overall Soviet strength increased from 136 to 170 
divisions. 
Soviet strategic aims changed after 1970, with the achievement of nuclear parity. The 
Soviets adopted an independent nuclear policy to match the USAs independent NMM 
capability in Europe. They also developed an independent conventional posture in 
Europe, and balanced this with the creation of world-wide intervention forces with naval 
and air support. 
The Soviets were attracted by Fuller's idea that mobility could bring victory, not by 
destroying the enemy, but by disrupting him and creating total confusion. The theory of 
'bold thrusts' was implemented, and their short war scenario developed eventually to incorporate the Operational Manoeuvre Group (OMG). 24 These developments demanded 
that Soviet artifferymen give closer consideration to the changing threat; develop new 
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equipment and tactics; and make a re-appraisal of the relationship between artillery and 
air-power. 
The Threat and its Consequences 
The Soviets believed that NATO's field artillery would not be e&ctive against their tanks, 
but would be a danger to their infantry when it dismounted to assault a position. By the 
late 1960s, infantry anti-armour weapons were becoming more lethal, and posing a serious 
threat not only to APCs but also to tanks. 25 
It became clear to the Soviets that ATGW defences would have to be suppressed, as anti- 
tank guns had been in the Second World War. The answer then had been to destroy them 
with massive artillery fire, and this remained the preferred solution; but the Soviet Marshal 
of Artillery G. Peredelsldy observed that, "In a modem war it is particularly topical and 
pertinent to question the effectiveness of artillery fire against enemy and-tank defences, 
which present a formidable obstacle to our attacking tanks and APCs"'. 26 The difficulty 
was that Soviet strategy required a quick victory, and it was unlikely that towed artillery, 
favoured after 1945, could provide adequate support on such a scale for highly mobile 
armoured formations. Marshal Grechko remarked that, "The continuing process of 
perfecting anti-tank weapons has placed before science and technology a serious task in 
the business of tangibly raising the viability of tank troops, and developing more effective 
means of reliably suppressing anti-tank defencee'. 27 
In the Second World War, SP assault and field guns were used to accompany mechanized 
formations, and to provide close support against contingency targets as the battle 
developed. The Soviets noted the ineffective use of masses of towed artillery by the Arabs 
in the 'Six Day War' of June 1967, when it had been deployed wheel-to-wheel, firing 
inflexible fireplans in support of mobile annour. Even though the Israelis were 
outnumbered and outranged, their armour was given far better, albeit inadequate, support 
by their SP equipment; and the latter proved much less vulnerable to CB fire. 28 
Soviet operational concepts were based on surprise, speed, mobility and maintaining the 
initiative. The evidence of the Yom Kippur War of October 1973 convinced the Soviets 
that they needed SP artillery to accompany their armoured formations to provide close fire 
support. 29 The rise of the ATGM was not seen by the Soviets to reduce the importance of 
artillery, which had formerly provided direct anti-tank fire; rather it made artillery indirect 
fire even more important, for the suppressing power of artillery was now to preserve the 
mobility of the tank 
The success of a combined-arms assault was seen to depend upon the suppression of anti- 
armour defences by artillery; but with improved means of target acquisition, NATO 
artillery posed a threat to Soviet artillery carrying out that task. Suppression of enemy 
artillery thus became as important as it had been in the Second World War. In October 
1976 Lieutenant General Anashkin, the Chief of Soviet Artillery, went so far as to say that 
CB operations were the foremost task for artillery to master. 30 The Soviets met the threat 
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from NATO artillery by deploying mobile long-range pieces; and since NATO artillery 
was generally armoured and SP, Soviet guns had to be capable of firing short intense 
bursts to catch them before they moved after a mission. Their guns therefore needed a 
high rate of fire, and to be supported by improved means of target acquisition, all linked 
by a new CIS system. , 
Re-equipment 
The Soviets did not discount the use of nuclear weapons to provide massive firepower, 
but by the late 1960s realized that they might need more conventional artillery as a short- 
term conventional substitute. They traditionally improved fire support by increasing both 
quality and quantity; and this method held true in the 1970s, as the number of pieces at all 
levels of command rose sharply. It reflected not just the Soviets' liking for mass, but also 
their commitment to the integration of artillery in all formations for combined-arms 
operations. 
The Soviets believed that an artillery superiority of 8: 1 on critical sectors was required in 
the attack-3'; and during the 1970s the quantity of equipment rose in keeping with tbiS. 32 
This approach contrasted with that of Western annies, which tended to solve problems by 
changing procedures or improving technology. The Soviets typically tried to avoid 
changes in procedure, and instead to increase the numbers and quality of equipment. 
In the 1970s the Soviets embarked on a major re-equipment of their artillery, producing 
new MBRL, SP and long-range gun s33 ; but the new equipment had much in common with 
the old, in keeping with the Soviet policy of commonality and interoperability. 34 
The first major new piece was a 152mm SP howitzer, the M1973 (M), which replaced 
the towed D-1 M1943 at divisional level, and some of the 152mm D-20s, above divisional 
IeVel. 35 A 122mm, SP howitzer, the M-1974 (2SI), followed soon after, replacing the 
towed 122mm D-30 at regimental level . 
36 The 240mm M-1975 SP mortar and the 203mm 
M-1975 (2S7) SP gun were introduced in 1979 to replace the 203mm M1931 howitzer 
and the 240mm M1953 mortar-, and the turretless, 152mm SP (2S5) replaced the 130mm 
M46.37 The purpose of the 2S5 was to achieve greater range for CB tasks and to operate 
from greater depth. To protect an already heavy piece with armour would have made it 
too cumbersome, and so its survivability was enhanced instead by greater mobility through 
self-propulsion, like the US M107. 
Consistent progress in MBRL design resulted in the BM-21 in 1964, which had a range of 
20kn? 8; and by 1978 the BM-21 had been supplemented by the 220mm BM-27 in the 
brigades of front-level divisional artillery. " Wheeled MBRL systems were deemed 
unsuited to operations in forward areas, but were designed to provide massive shock by 
fire on pre-planned targets. 
The need for high rates of fire and heavy concentrations at short notice encouraged the 
Soviets to streamline fire-planning procedures and the calculation of data by computer. 
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Such improvements in the West were usually made to increase the output of limited assets; 
but in the WP they were part of an overall expansion of capabilities. Improvements were 
certainly required, for Soviet artillery communications in particular were-primitive by. 
Western standards. Throughout the 1960s, organic artillery communications were very 
limited; and observers usually relied upon the supported arm to send requests for fire. 
These observers were tied to particular batteries and it was hard to send commands from 
one battery's observers to another's. The Soviets also introduced a range of new C2, 
reconnaissance, OP and radar vehicles, such as the BMIP-1975 and the MIT-LB. 
The production of improved artillery equipment in the 1970s enabled the Soviets to 
increase artillery support at all levels; but control was often decentralized to increase 
flexibility at divisional levels. 40 New heavy artillery brigades were created which could be 
conunitted to a front, artillery regiments at army level were expanded to brigade strength, 
and at divisional level the BM-21 battalion was integrated into the divisional artillery 
regiment; but the most significant changes occurred at regimental level. In the early 1970s 
the motor rifle regiment had an organic battery of 122mm. howitzers, and the tank 
regiment had none, but in the mid-1970s the motor rifle regimental artillery was increased 
to a battalion of eighteen 122mm 2S I howitzers, and soon after that the tank regiment 
received an organic battalion of D-30 and then 2S I howitzers. This distribution of SPs 
reflected the Soviets' wish to provide greater firepower among manoeuvre units at the 
lowest level to suppress enemy anti-armour defences. 
The Operational Dimension 
In 1977 Marshal N. V. Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, asked for a report on 
progress made in achieving the goals set by Mililmy Strategy, which had caused the 
massive re-equipment of the Soviet Army. He concluded from this report that the re- 
equipment programme was satisfactory, but that its tactical application had received 
insufficient attention. A re-appraisal of Soviet tactics followed, which confirmed long- 
established principles, and introduced innovative techniques. 
Soviet military thinking began with a strategic aim, an analysis of the opposition, and 
finally the development of tactical counter-measures, what was called the 'negation of 
negation'. The Soviets traditionally favoured mass and combined-arms operations to 
accomplish their aims; and their intention in the 1970s was to harness these in an 
overwhelming force which could, if required, deal a knock-out blow at the outset of 
hostilities, from which an enemy could not recover. "' 
The first 'negative' was NATO's anti-armour defence. Soviet tactics required its negation 
by artillery close support, followed by the negation of the NATO artillery which 
threatened this operation. The Soviets relied upon the speed of their annour for victory, 
but recognized the essential role of artillery in it, as they had done in the Second World 
War. In Soviet eyes, firepower and manoeuvre were inextricably linked. A force 
manoeuvred to apply firepower, and firepower enabled manoeuvre. Artillery remained the 
supreme source of firepower, even though the capability of other arms continued to 
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increase. Marshal of Artillery G. E. Peredelsidy declared that, "Artillery has become the 
basis of firepower of the ground forces. It has the decisive role of creating the 
preponderance of power over the enemy, which frequently determines the outcome of 
battle". 42 
The problem was how to apply this firepower in the rapid mobile operations envisaged. 
The requirement was stated in Voyenny Vestnik in November 198 1, which called upon 
artillery in a fast-moving battle to provide "accurate, shattering fire, day and night, and in 
any terrain and in any weather. Thus the growing importance of artillery fire in combat 
operations has become one of the most critical trends in the development of military art!. 43 
As in the Second World War, artillery was seen not merely as a supporting arm but as 
"one of the principal means of destroying the enemy decisively". The relative importance 
of artillery had increased. In October 1976 Lieutenant General Anashkin, the Chief of 
Soviet Artillery, claimed that while artillery accounted for less than thirty percent of Soviet 
ground forces, it had become responsible for eighty percent of missions to destroy an 
enemy by fire, compared to seventy percent in 1945. " 
Soviet artillery doctrine in the 1970s was preoccupied, as it had been thirty years earlier, 
with the questions: How could a continuous effective weight of fire be provided 
throughout the area of operations? How much would achieve the desired effects; and how 
could this best be applied in mobile operations? 
The Soviets could deploy 1,300 barrels per 41an on a breakthrough sector, in keepingwith 
norms in the Second World War; but the firepower these could generate was greater since 
calibres, munitions and rates of fire had increased and improved. Concentrations of 
equipment were achieved by means of their highly fle)dble organization, in which artillery 
held at high levels was apportioned to lower, so that at each level a formation was 4 
supported by its own organic artillery and assets from higher formations. 5 The 
distribution was worked out mathematically, according to the importance of the sector for 
attack, the effect required, and thus the number of barrels necessary for its realization. 
On the other hand, in highly mobile operations guns would frequently have to displace and 
hence be out of action, reducing the volume of fire; and that fire would certainly be less 
effective if there were no time for thorough survey. Thus in mobile warfare the Soviets 
deemed it desirable to increase the ratio of artillery support to other arms. 
The Soviets described the effects of artillery fire under three headings, which were not 
identical to similar terminology often used in the West: neutralization, suppression, and 
destruction. Neutralization created minimal damage but temporarily paralysed the 
defence; suppression of a position was achieved by killing twenty to twenty-five percent of 
the enemy holding it; and destruction meant destroying sixty percent of the men and 
equipment. Soviet gunners worked from tables which laid down the quantity of fire per 
hectare needed to achieve these effects against different types of target; and these assumed 
that no registration or adjustment would be fired. The type of fire required was 
apportioned to phases of battle, but there was debate in the 1970s over whether the 
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traditional preliminary bombardment, barrage leading the assault, and exploitation phases 
were still valid under modem conditions. In the thirty years after 1945, operations had 
speeded up and targets had become more mobile. Firing the traditional bombardment and 
barrage would have expended large quantities of ammunition ineffectually and slowed 
down operations. " 
In the early stages of a campaign it would have been relatively easy to fire pre-planned 
concentrations and barrages, but in the encounter battles which would have been expected 
subsequently, this would not have been the case. The Soviets had seen the dangers of 
armour operating without proper artillery support during the Yom Kippur War, and the 
task of supporting armour by engaging unexpected enemy positions was given to the SP 
field gun, as it had been in the Second World War. It was intended that SP guns would 
bombard the enemy from concealed positions 1,000m-3,000m from the FEBA, in support 
of a 'hasty attack. Such fire would last for ten to twenty minutes and be followed up 
quickly by an assault. SP guns would not be expected to join the assault, but rather to 
position themselves to fire directly at strong points. In the exploitation phase, SP guns 
would act as 'accompanying artillery', 5 OOm- 1,000m, behind leading vehicles, to 
consolidate captured positions and to give direct fire if necessary to break up counter- 
attaCkS. 47 
It was recognized that the support of an assault against modem anti-tank weapons posed 43 
complex problems. It was calculated, however, that if speed were sufficient and fire 
support available, attackers stood a good chance of rushing and overwhelming the 
defence. This also explained the introduction of the flechette round which could be fired 
in the final stages of an assault without endangering fiiendly vehicles. The new tactic 
encouraged reliance on smoke screens from artillery and generators, which the Soviets 
considered might reduce their own casualties by sixty to eighty percent by blinding enemy 
defences. 49 
The expansion of Soviet artillery and the adoption of mobile operations supported by 
shorter but more intense fireplans created new logistic problems and solved others. The 
very increase in the quantities of equipment at all levels required a re-organization of 
logistics; and it was clear that so many guns could not hope to be supplied with 
ammunition according to the norms of the Second World War. There was the danger, 
familiar to many armies in history, of having numerous guns operated inefficiently for lack 
of ammunition. In Soviet history, however, inefficiency had more often been caused by 
the ill-directed firing of masses of ammunition than by the under-employment of guns. 
The Soviet Army of the 1970s tried to correct this by having more, but better-placed guns, 
firing less ammunition more productively. 
Although ammunition might be used more efficiently, mobile operations created 
inefficiencies in the ammunition re-supply system. It was harder to predict where 
ammunition would be required in a series of encounter battles; and if a large amount of 
ammunition were brought forward and dumped, it was likely to be abandoned and lost, 
once the advance resumed. On the other hand, the very speed of the advance reduced the 
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enemy's ability to resist, and hence the weight of fire required to breach his defences. It 
was estimated that a Soviet tank army of 194445, advancing at 1645km per day, used 
only one-sixth of the ammunition and one-third of the fuel of an army advancing at 4.5- 
13km per day. 'O Similar advantages were expected in the 1970s by maintaining the 
momentum of an advance. Not only would enemy resistance weaken, but mobile guns 
would actually have less time to fire. Should the advance be held up by stiffer resistance, 
this delay would itself allow the massing of more ammunition to achieve a breakthrough 
and restore mobility. 
The Soviet ammunition re-supply system was more responsive to artillery requirements 
than that of many other armies, since Soviet artillery was responsible for its own re- 
supply. 11igher artillery formations allocated ammunition to lower, according to tasks, just 
as they decided the distribution of guns. In 1980 this organization was reinforced to 
reduce the strain on units to which others were attached, and an armoured Umber, the MT- 
LB, was introduced ahead of similar equipment in NATO. 5' 
Mobile operations created a new balance of logistic advantage and disadvantage, with 
which the Soviets believed they could cope. On the other hand, the overall logistic 
advantage was likely to lie with NATO forces in defence, who could dump ammunition for 
use even for mobile operations. As long as realistic ammunition expenditure rates were 
approved and provided for, and this was far from certain, NATO guns should always have 
had more ammunition available to them than those of the WP. This advantage would have 
been even greater if commonality in shells and logistic assets could have been achieved. 
Artillery and Air Power 
During the Second World War, airpower was used to provide long-range destructive 
firepower as well as close support. The degree to which it could be developed and relied 
upon depended on air superiority, which eventually lay with the Allies. While the British 
and Americans came to depend almost exclusively on aircraft rather than artillery for deep 
attack, the Soviets never allowed aircraft to supplant artillery in this role. 
In the 1970s, the Soviets faced the problem of how to provide fire support to fast-moving 
armoured formations, and how to deliver fire deep into enemy territory, either in support 
of a deep armoured penetration, or in order to knock out the vital C3 and nuclear delivery 
systems lying beyond artillery range. With the prospect of air superiority, it seemed likely 
that aircraft could meet this requirement. 
The Soviets were impressed by the versatility shown by US helicopters in the Vietnam 
52 War, and saw this confirmed in the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Marshal Ogarkovs 
review of 1977 called for the re-organization of air support in combination with that of 
artillery, taking into account both helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. Airpower was 
viewed like artillery as an indispensable part of 'Integrated Fire Destruction'. 5' As a result 
carmy aviation', including twenty HIP and forty IM%TD helicopters, was created at army level; and a squadron of six HIP and six IHOINID helicopters was allocated to divisions, as 
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an organic unit, to provide medium lift and a suppressive fire capability. 
The particular value of Soviet attack helicopters was seen to be their ability to move, yet 
remain in close communication with mobile ground formations over long periods of time. 
They could acquire targets more easily than fixed-wing aircraft, and choose their moment 
and target for attack with greater flexibility. The Soviet HEP and HIND, and later the Mi- 
28 HAVOC'54 helicopters had a role comparable to that of the Stuka in the 1940s; or, by 
another analogy, the role of the helicopter in three-dimensional battlespace was regarded 
as similar to that of the assault gun of the Second World War on a two-dimensional 
battlefield. In the Second World War, field artillery had suppressed enemy defences to 
allow the advance of armour. In the Soviet concept for the 1970s and 1980s, field artillery 
was also to suppress enemy AD weapons in order to assist the mobility and operation of 
helicopters. Soviet troops identified their own positions with red smoke, and helicopter 
aerial artillery put in swift attacks on targets beyond the sight or range of field artillery. 55 
Soviet airpower in ground support was regarded as but another means of delivering the 
effects of firepower, and was therefore subordinated to the ground commander. 
Helicopters served as a branch of artillery, playing a full part in the preliminary, assault and 
exploitation phases of the battle. 56 Western helicopters at that time were, by contrast, 
generally used like tanks, emphasizing mobility and shock action against enemy armour, 
rather than close fire support on the artillery model. 
The suitability of the helicopter for the close battle allowed Su-25 'Frogfoot' and other 
fixed-wing aircraft to concentrate on deeper targets. 57 Until the n-dd-1970s this had not 
been wise, since the available MG-21, Su-7 and Yak-28 aircraft had limited range, and 
their massive deployment forward to East Germany n-dght have compromised surprise. 
The introduction of longer-range aircraft such as the Su- 17, Su-24 and Su-25 overcame 
this problem. 
Summary 
Soviet strategy in the 1970s required that conventional forces be capable of fighting and 
defeating NATO forces before a nuclear release. The tactics adopted to achieve this 
emphasized speed and mobility, maldng it harder to provide the traditional levels of fire 
support required by the Soviets. Their solution was to re-introduce the SP gun, and to 
deploy large numbers of helicopters, providing flexible close support for combined-arms 
formations in encounter battles. 
Mobility was not regarded as a substitute for firepower, as it had been at other times in 
history; and the Soviets introduced qualitative and quantitative improvements in a new 
range of artillery equipments at all levels to overcome disadvantages inherent in such fluid 
tactics. 
Despite the resources and thought devoted to the reforms of the 1970s, the Soviets 
themselves were not convinced that their tactics would succeed. NATO's positions 
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became deeper within agreed forward deployment areas; and its method of operating 
became more fle)dble,, as proliferating ATGW released armour for mobile tasks. It was far 
from certain that Soviet artillery would defeat the former, and so enable successive 
echelons of armour to penetrate swiftly into rear areas, achieving the Operational paralysis 
which strategic aims required. By the early 1980s the Soviets were considering new ways 
of increasing the element of surprise and speed of penetration, and the new demands this 
would make for fire support. 
3.5 NATO 1965-1982 
In the mid 1960s, assumptions about the conduct of nuclear war came to be questioned in 
some NATO countries. Deterrence based on 'Massive Retaliation', for even a minor act 
of aggression by the WP, lacked political credibility. In a sense, the potential 
destructiveness of this firepower was so excessive that it proved counter-productive. US 
strategy moved away from 'Massive Retaliation' to one of 'Flexible Response', which 
became accepted NATO doctrine in 1967 with MC 14/3.53 
A 'Flexible Response" commensurate with the threat was also underwritten by nuclear 
deterrence, but it envisaged the likelihood of a conventional phase of war preceding a 
nuclear exchange. 'Flexible Response' thus required the capability to fight across the 
whole spectrum of operations. For 'Flexible Response' to succeed, NATO forces had to 
demonstrate that their conventional forces could avert defeat for at least a matter of days. 
It was reasoned that an early resort to nuclear weapons would severely limit opportunities 
for negotiation, and would invite escalation to a strategic nuclear exchange. 
The US Anny produced its Reorganization Objective Army Divisions (ROAD) in the 
1960s to enable it to fight across the spectrum of operations, ending its reliance on nuclear 
warfare. Those who feared that organizations for nuclear war weakened the US Army's 
ability to conduct conventional warfare with concentrated artillery fire were reassured. 
'Fle)dble Response' necessitated a re-assessment of relative strengths, the tasks required 
to match the threat, the equipment and munitions to perform these tasks, and the C31 to 
operate it effectively. 
Relative Strengths 
The change in doctrine required NATO to pay closer attention to the conventional balance 
of forces in Europe. In the late 1960s there was a serious imbalance in favour of the WP 
in armour, artillery and aircraft, if not in manpower, yet the assumptions of most NATO 
artnies were based on the lessons they had leamed in the latter half of the Second World 
War, when the Allies had enjoyed numerical superiority on land and especially in the air. 
The character of the battlefield now envisaged would be very different from that of 1945. 
Throughout the period, the primary threat to NATO was one of fast-moving WP 
armoured formations advancing in echelon, possibly at short notice, close behind a nuclear 
or chemical bombardment. Battles would be a series of short engagements in which the 
WP would have greater artillery support and air superiority, and would practise extensive 
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electronic wwfarc. 
NATO had already forfeited conventional fire superiority. Cuts imposed on artillery in the 
West after 1945 were not made good, while in the 1970s Soviet artillery had expanded. " 
This was particularly unwelcome for the US Army, which had traditionally taken fire 
superiority for granted. " The prospects of the US Army in Europe beating the enemy 
conventionally and winning an artillery duel looked remote. In 1977, Brigadier B. W. 
Davis of the British Army feared that, "within the division of the future we will not have 
the capacity to carry out any sort of attack above battle group lever i. 61 
In 1982, artillery comprised twenty-eight percent of the Soviet Third Shock Army, 
roughly the same percentage as it did in the British Army in 1918 and 1945. By contrast, 
in 1982 artillery comprised just sixteen percent of the French Army and the Bundeswehr, 
eleven percent of the US Army, and nine percent of the British Army. The British I" 
Corps in NATO's Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) could muster only about 200 guns 
across a front on which its WP counterpart could field 100 per Ian on main axes. 62 
The British Army had become structured for and accustomed to counter insurgency 
(COIN) and intenW security (IS) operations, tending to neglect considerations of fire 
support, reducing artillery missions to what often amounted to mere harassing fire. "' 
Despite the political importance attached to NATO operations, artillery in the British 
Army remained at levels more appropriate to light operations in limited wars. 
Conventional defence was a task for which artillery was poorly equipped and prepared; 
but this in itself lowered the nuclear threshold, and so perhaps reinforced deterrence, even 
though the intention of Fleýdble Response was to raise it. NATO artillery had to devise a 
means of meeting the threat from Soviet artillery, and the 40,000 AFVs fielded by the WP. 
With relatively little conventional firepower, and the desire to avoid the costly use of 
nuclear weapons, NATO was attracted by forms of 'Mobile Defence'; but these entailed 
little depth, given the political imperative for forward defence. " 
US 'Active Defence' amounted to a battle of attrition based on the generation of 
firepower, but with infbrior resources in absolute terms. The Germans favoured 'Position 
Defence', intending to hold ground well forward using manoeuvre to create the conditions 
for the surprise and shock of a counter-attack or counter-stroke. The British, on the other 
hand, lacked both firepower and mobility, and planned 'Positional Defence'. 6' Whatever 
the nuances of these national approaches, in essence NATO defended forward in a shallow 
defensive belt, with minimal Operational manoeuvre, supported ultimately by nuclear 
weapons. 
Tasks 
The primary task in defence was the close, anti-armour, counter-mobility battle, as it had 
been in the early years of the Second World War; but this became more important with the 
steady introduction of APCs for Soviet infantry after 1945. The second was the 
56 
suppression of WP firepower both on the ground and in the air. The resurgence of field 
artillery in the Second World War began with the realization that artillery, whether 
specifically anti-tank or field, was the arm best-suited to destroy armour, and it developed 
with the realization that only massed artillery firepower could effectively neutralize or 
destroy enemy fixed defences. 
By the 1960s the tank, armed with an improved gun, had assumed prime responsibility for 
anti-armour operations; and although field artillery retained a direct fire capability for use 
in extremis, indirect fire became increasingly ineffective against better-protected WP 
armoured vehicles. " The US FM6-20 of 1977 might describe artillery's fire support 
rnission as, "To suppress, neutralize or destroy surface targets with indirect fires7-A7 , but 
the most important of these were armoured and difficult for artillery to tackle. Since the 
Soviets planned for mobile offensive armoured operations, there was little prospect of 
artillery proving its worth against WP defensive positions. NATO's artillery therefore 
struggled throughout the period to regain an effective anti-armour role; but it failed in 
competition against the improved capabilities of tanks, armed helicopters, and infantry 
ATGW. 
The armed helicopter had demonstrated its value in the Vietnam WO, and was seen to 
have potential against armour as, "An extension of artillery, as close air support for deep 
armoured raids or to kill tanke. 69 In 1972 US Army-Bundeswehr trials at Ansbach 
showed that ATGW could kill eighteen armoured vehicles for the loss of one helicopter 
platform. Helicopters were armed for such tasks with weapons comparable in 
sophistication to those used by the infantry. 70 
These weapons were more effective in this role than indirect artillery fire. It was 
suggested by some that artillery should abandon its indirect role altogether and 
concentrate on the direct fire anti-armour battle', although this would have been at the 
expense not only of indirect anti-armour fire but also, and more importantly, of CB 
operations. It was doubtful, however, whether artillery would have proved more cost- 
effective than ATGW, or as survivable in that role. 
The lack of an effective indirect fire, anti-armour capability to hit enemy armour at long 
range meant that the latter could reach NATO's main, but relatively dispersed and shallow 
positions undisrupted. It allowed the enemy to advance more quickly, it reduced the time 
available for preparing defensive positions, and so increased the likelihood that these 
positions would be swamped. 
Matters were made worse by the introduction of Soviet SP close support 'accompanying 
artillery', which in effect multiplied the number of AFVs in leading WP echelons, and 
placed an even greater strain on NATO artillery's CH and logistic systems. It was 
estimated in 1977 that the WP could achieve a 6: 1 superiority over its NATO opponents 
Exercises held in the 1970s often showed that defences could be overwhelmed by an 
attacker's first echelon, and events move so quickly, and with such confusion, that it could 
take seven minutes to concentrate the fire of a British division, whereas in Korea it had 
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taken the Commonwealth Division just seventy seconds. 73 
The British found that they lacked not just an effective indirect artillery anti-tank 
capability, but for a time in the 1970s even an effictive infantry ATGW. They attempted 
to make good this deficiency by using tanks in what amounted to the static close support 
of infantry positions, rather as the Germans had done with tanks and SP guns in Italy in 
the Second World War. This was an expensive means of providing what amounted to an 
'infantry gun'; and deprived commanders of their primary means of fire and mobility, and 
soofcounter-attack. By the mid- I 970s infantry anti-tank weapons had proved their 
worth and were available, and the British released their tanks for counter-attacks or 
counter-strokes. The role of artillery in these major re-organizations was minor, reflecting 
its relative decline at that time. 
The efficacy of infantry ATGW was demonstrated in the Yom Kippur War of 1973.74 
There were examples of tanks, such as those of the Israeli 190'hAnnoured Brigade, being 
stopped or diverted by heavy artillery bombardment"; but these were most notable for 
being unusual, and for the inefficient use of such heavy firepower to achieve an end which 
ATGW might have achieved more readily. At ranges of up to 41an from the observer, 
artillery indirect fire was not only expensive and relatively ineffective, it also became a 
positive disadvantage because its smoke and dust obscured targets for direct fire weapons. 
Yet few OPs could see beyond 41an in a North-West European landscape. Artillery was 
faced with the dilemma of concentrating ever more resources on relatively inefficient close 
support, or reducing that support for affiliated units, and concentrating on deeper, 
primarily CB tasks. 
In peacetime, supported arms had grown used to the 'direct support' of affiliated artillery 
down to battalion level. In the British Army this was partly the fault of unrealistic small- 
scale training, and of experience of limited operations. It was hard to convince supported 
arms that they would receive better support by giving up guaranteed, but limited, local 
support in order to create larger concentrations of fire, possibly beyond their own 
observation. " 
Close support became less attractive, but NATO's ability to wage effective CB operations 
was doubtfid. In the First World War the focus of attention had shifted to depth fire as 
the war progressed; but during the Second World War this had returned to close support 
with the expansion of air power. There were many advocates of reviving deep, and in 
particular CB, operations by artillery. Brigadier B. W. Davis saw the deep battle as a 
separate battle, "unrelated to other arms except in the aie. n Targets in the close battle 
tended to be hard, while those in depth were softer and offered artillery a unique 
opportunity to find a worthwhile role, provided they could be located. 
The success of ATGW in taking over what had formerly been an artillery close task 
increased the importance of artillery in deep attack, for suppressing those ATGW became 
the top priority for WP artillery. In turn it became important that NATO forces conduct 
effective CB to pre-empt this suppression, and so become an indirect means of imposing 
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counter-mobiRty. 
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The US Army went some way towards improving its CB operations, renamed Tounter- 
Fire' (CF), by moving target acquisition batteries from corps to division. It had been 
found that corps could not cope with the scale of the problem on a battlefield of greater 
frontage and depth. It was hoped that divisions could manage matters better, and that 
divisional artillery would respond more quickly to intelligence. The problem was that 
most divisional artillery assets were committed to brigades; and the divisional commands 
had usually to call on the support of the artille-. y brigade at corps, so in a sense there was 
little change. " The Bundeswehr had few resources for depth fire at corps, favouring the 
divisional level of command, as the Wehrmacht had done in the Second World War; but 
the British were even worse off at all levels; and relied on C3 as a force multiplier to 
increase the number of guns available to fire at any one time, and a higher speed of 
response. 
Overall, NATO artillery lacked the means to acquire sufficient WP targets in depth. It 
also lacked the firepower to defeat WP artillery, which deployed in such strength that it 
could conduct its close support tasks and still devote more assets to CB than its opponent 
had guns altogether. NATO guns had the advantage of being largely SP and armoured, 
but there was little likelihood that NATO might win an artillery duel. The best hope of 
correcting this imbalance seemed to he in achieving a 'first-round capability' through 
sophisticated target acquisition and greater accuracy. 
By the mid 1970s, NATO's artillery was in an unhappy situation. In the close battle it was 
relatively ineffective against armoured targets, and at longer range it was still less 
effective, even if targets could be acquired. Poor target acquisition, compounded by 
numerical weakness, made artillery incapable of conducting the effective CB operations 
which circumstances required. Air support provided the bulk of depth fire in the Second 
World War in place of artillery; and it was widely and wrongly assumed that somehow 
large numbers of close support aircraft would continue to be available for such tasks; but 
the proliferation of WP AD weapons in combined-arms formations made this unlikely, in 
view of the high risk and expense. Artillery needed to develop its own indirect anti-tank 
capability, and to improve its CD operations. Both required better target acquisition, and 
if not more guns, then at least the means of generating more firepower from fewer guns on 
a dispersed battlefield. That firepower could be increased by improving ordnance and 
munitions, and multiplied by advances in C31. 
Ordnance 
NATO deployed many varieties of field gun, but the US 155mm M109 howitzer was the 
predominant source of close fire support. It was a highly regarded piece, designed in the 
1950s and introduced into service in the mid 1960s. Numerous modifications improved its 
performance, and it remained in service in many armies into the 21A Century. Even in its 
original form it was markedly superior to the British 105mm Abbot, whose calibre as a 
field gun in armoured operations was shown to be obsolete in the Yom Kippur War. 80 
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Despite improvements, the M109 of the mid 1980s had serious deficiencies, which 
prevented major increases in firepower by close support tube artillery. " It lacked the 
mobility of the new generations of tanks such as the M- I Abrams, and infantry AFVs such 
as the M-2 Bradley. Its range was relatively short at 18kin, and its accuracy did not meet 
requirements. Its standard shell was less effective than more modem 155mm munitions; 
its rate of fire was relatively slow and it had no burstfire capability. It had neither an 
automated ammunition system nor, in most armies, the support of an armoured limber. It 
lacked NBC protection and its armour was too thin. 
It was appreciated in the early 1970s that a replacement would be needed by the early 
1980s, if not earlier. The USA opted for a series of major improvements to its fleet of 
M109s; but a number of European countries set about developing their own close support 
SP guns. 82 The UY, West Germany and Italy began a collaborative project named SP70 
to overcome many of the M109's deficiencies; but the project was dogged by delays, and 
was abandoned in January 1987.13 The US Army rejected the SP70 on the grounds of its 
development problems, low ammunition-carrying capacity, limited rate of fire and lack of 
on-board fire control and survey equipment. One consequence of the delay in producing 
SP70 was the spawning of commercial turret designs to replace or modernize the M 109. 
One of these was ultimately incorporated in the AS90 which entered service in the British 
, &MY in the early 1990S. 34 
NATO armies were slow to recognize the potential of NORL, except for the Bundeswehrý 
which fielded the I 10mm LARS in the late 19600', remembering German experience on 
the Eastern Front twenty years earlier. By the late 1970s, 
6a 
collaborative project was 
underway in Europe to produce a higher calibre launche? ; but this failed and the 
participants joined the USA in its MLRS project. 
Munitions 
Improvements in ordnance alone could not bridge the capability gap that existed in NATO 
artillery. If field artillery were to dominate armour as it had forty years earlier, it would 
need improved munitions as well. There were several potential methods of improving 
munitions. Range could be increased by 'base-bleed' devices, or RAP87 . The value of 
these rounds against armour could be enhanced by increasing terminal accuracy and by 
maldng the terminal effect more lethal. 
Throughout the period, the tank became a less attractive investment. The power of the 
ATGW increased at a faster and more cost-effective rate; and as so often in the past, the 
demise of the tank was prematurely predicted. Although the tank certainly lost relative 
power, artillery fell even further behind. Infantry and helicopters developed anti-armour 
capabilities of their own, and were able to deploy that firepower at speeds greater than, or 
equal to that of the tank, but ATGW lacked the combination of weight, range, flodbility 
and all-weather, 24-hour availability offered by artillery. The challenge was to create an 
artillery anti-armour weapon, equalling ATGW in effect, without forfeiting the qualities of 
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artiHery. 
The best method of attacking tanks of traditional design is from above or below. 
Technical possibilities for both were widely discussed in the early 1970s. 38 The 
fundamental problem with a traditional HE shell is that it produces 'overkill' at the point 
of burst, has a wasteful and often ineffectual fragmentation, and an uncontrolled direction 
of burst. One alternative was seen to be the Improved Conventional Munition (ICM), a 
carrier of sub-munitions, which spread their effect, preventing 'overkill' at a point, the 
original rationale behind the HE shell and earlier shrapnel round. These sub-munitions 
would incorporate terminal guidance and a warhead appropriate to the target, such as a 
shaped charge. The penalty for this dispersion of the sub-munitions was the loss of 
concentrated power against a hard target. 
A standard 155mm shell stands a better chance than ICM of killing a hard target with a 
single strike against top armour, but it requires greater accuracy than a spread of sub- 
munitions, and thus some form of terminal guidance. Without such guidance, 155mm 
rounds might force tanks to close down, damage ancillary equipment, weaken crew 
morale and prevent logistic re-supply and maintenance; but they are not likely to be cost- 
effective tank-killers. A major effort was therefore made to develop terminallyý-guided 
munitions, exploiting the emerging electronic technologies of the 1970s. 
Such concepts were developed, but none of these advanced munitions had entered service 
by 1982, except for the US family of scatterable mines (FASCAK, and the German 
LARS anti-tank mine-carrying rocket, both of which were held at divisional level. 89 This 
was one area where artillery expanded its role, in what had formerly been an engineer 
preserve. 90 
Scatterable mines may be required when engineers' minefields are not ready in time, or 
when engineers do not wish enemy reconnaissance to see them laying minefields. They 
allow a quick response to unexpected enemy manoeuvre, can close defiles or gaps in 
existing minefields, and help to achieve a clean break during a withdrawal. They can be 
used to separate enemy leading echelons from those behind, and from their logistic 
support. They are well-suited for harassing tasks on headquarters, forming up places 
(FUP), bridges and airfields; and they can interfere with enemy obstacle-breaching and 
D7ALSs. They can also be laid in terrain unsuited to mechanical laying. 
Scatterable mines may often be more cost-effective than ATGW or tanks, since they allow 
the bottom-attack of tanks while the firer remains unseen. They can be delivered by 
helicopter, fixed-wing aircraft, or artillery. The artillery rocket has the advantage of stand- 
off delivery, reliability and flexibility, but aircraft have the advantage in range. They give 
the commander the ability to control movement on the battlefield within the range of the 
gun and rocket, creating dynamic reinforcing obstacles which can be used in response to 
the flow of battle. Anti-tank screens were used in the Second World War to channel the 
enemy, force him onto unsuitable routes, or halt him. Scatterable mines achieve similar 
results; and their introduction in the 1970s marked artillery's return to a major anti-armour 
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role since its eclipse in the 1950s and 1960s. Further than that, they were the first means 
by which artillery could attack armour effectively in depth, and this was achieved not by 
weight of fire, but by its equivalent through terminal accuracy and attack against a 
vulnerable part of a tank - precise effects. 
The delivery of FASCAM by 155mm artillery highlighted the problem that arises when 
close support artiffery is employed in deep attack, and the arguments would 
have sounded familiar seventy years ago. How can artillery provide close support, when it 
is engaged on deep missions? On the Cold War battlefield, attacks on deep armoured 
targets were in effect a form of counter-preparation fire, and their planning required good 
intelligence and an appreciation of the time factor in a commander's mind. The decision 
when and where to attack, and when mines should destroy themselves, had to be taken at 
a relatively high level; and this ran counter to the desire to control them lower down. 
LARS was designated a divisional weapon, and FASCAM were also controlled by US 
Army divisions; but this complicated matters for guns intended primarily to support 
brigades with standard varieties of ammunition. 
The need to keep mobile guns supplied with a large number of special munitions tended to 
reduce that mobility, and placed strain on the logistic system. It might have forced guns to 
stay close to a logistic base, and so reduced tactical flexibility. The alternative was to 
dedicate guns specifically to FASCAM missions, and to hold them apart from those in 
close support; but this made the 'opportunity cost' of employing FASCAM high. Another 
option was to increase the number of guns; but this carried the penalty that those firing 
FASCAM would probably be under-employed for much of the time. The best 
compromise was probably to combine FASCAM with other ammunition types, relying on 
better Command Control and Communications (0) to optimize their use and logistic 
support. 
Command Control Communications and Intelligence (CM) 
Ammunition, rather than guns, is generally artillery's true reserve, and barring over-riding 
concerns for concealment or conservation of ammunition, guns should be in action as 
often as possible. The pressure to keep guns in action is felt most by those with fewest 
guns, and they traditionally satisfy this demand by improving C31. For this reason the 
major advances in CM during the Cold War were made in the West; but it was only from 
the mid-1960s that major progress was made, in the knowledge that field artillery had to 
improve its 'productivity' if it was to compete with more numerous WP forces. For the 
same reason it was the British Army, with relatively the smallest force of artillery, that led 
the way in the co-ordination of fire control as an alternative to the high cost of massed 
manpower and equipment. 
The US Army introduced FADAC in 1959, but the first major advance in artillery 
computation was the British Field Artillery Computing Equipment (FACE) in 1968. It 
replaced slide rules and firing tables, but did not affect the delivery of fire orders to guns 
or target engagements. 91 It took into account numerous ballistic factors, and produced 
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firing data for guns more quickly than older graphical or plotting techniques. It was 
enhanced in the 1970s by the introduction of the ANETS' meteorological system, of 
AWDATS, which transmitted data directly from command post to gun, and of the position 
and azimuth determining system (PADS), which the USA and the UK introduced to 
improve survey. These systems improved accuracy, response times and consequently the 
first-time hit capability, which was judged an essential factor in effective firepower. 
Despite the dispersion of fire units, it once again became practical to concentrate the fire 
of guns, as had been common in the Second World War; although it would have been 
unusual to fire the 172-gun battery' of 1943, since it was unlikely that that number of guns 
would be in range of a given target. This lack of density remained the major problem; but 
its consequence on the ground was compensated for by the ability to engage series of 
targets in even more rapid succession by whatever guns were in range. 
Other NATO annies introduced comparable systems, such as the US TACFHte and the 
German FALKE. 94 These were often upgraded, but during the 1970s they were primarily 
concerned with the calculation of firing data and target storage. The outstanding 
problems were the secure communication and processing of the data, which had 
proliferated. Solving these was the priority for C3 in the 1980s. 95 The more efficient use 
of guns, as a result of improved C3, also increased the logistic burden and work-load on 
each fire unit, assuming that ammunition for higher expenditure rates was available. " 
Improved C3 made it possible for guns to engage more targets more often, but the value 
of that fire was only as good as its targeting. Attempts were made to improve artillery 
intelligence by means of sound-ranging and aerial reconnaissance97; but intelligence 
remained a weak link, and without comprehensive 'real time' systems it was not possible 
to acquire and attack the larger number of targets which improvements in C3 had been 
developed to handle. 
The need to coordinate tactical fires better became apparent in the US Army in the late 
1970s. In 1975 the mechanized infantry company had three separate observer elements, 
one for the 81 mm mortars, another for the 107mm mortars and one for field artillery. The 
result was that a company commander could not reidily coordinate these indirect fires. 
The US Army's Close Support Study Group I had the task, 'Oro optimize observed fire 
support for maneuver forces on the modem battlefield". it resulted in the creation of 
FISTs, combining infantry mortar forward observers with field artillery observers. 
Most targets were still located by such ground observers, who were assisted by a variety 
of new devices such as radars, image intensifiers, and laser range finders. Despite these, 
an OP was unlikely to acquire targets beyond 4km from the FLOT; and so the majority of 
artillery remained tied to the close battle, for which its HE munition was ill-suited. The 
anti-armour battle could not be prosecuted by artillery in depth; and what deep tasks there 
were, were primarily CB/CF or against headquarters, since these could often be engaged 
without 'real time' intelligence. Even the Bundeswehr's LARS lacked a target acquisition 
capability commensurate with its firepower. These faults were recognized, and a number 
of remotely controlled surveillance projects were initiated, of which several foundered; but 
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by the early 1980s most NATO annies had firm plans to produce RPVs to support their 
plans for MLRS. 
Conclusion 
In the early 1960s, NATO realized that for political and military reasons it must offer a 
more credible conventional deterrent in order to raise the nuclear threshold. The WP 
threat had become primarily an armoured one, and artillery had neither the mass, 
ordnance, munitions, nor C3 to deal with it adequately. 
The tank remained the primary anti-armour weapon system until the early 1970s, when 
advances in ATGW gave the infantry a power and independence it had not held since 
1914. It was also found that the helicopter'could give ATGW unrivalled mobility. The 
PGM revolution of the 1970s offered NATO an equivalent to massed firepower through 
relatively fight, but accurate, weapons. Their disadvantage was that their range was 
generafly limited to 2-3krn, and their survivability was questionable in the face of 
enormous Soviet suppressing artillery fire. The challenge was to increase their range by 
means of artillery delivery systems. Artillery's problem had been that longer range 
decreased accuracy, but the PGM meant that accuracy was no longer necessarily a strong 
function of range. Long-range fire became potentially as accurate as close fire. 
Deficiencies in artiUery were recognized and projects initiated to increase firepower and its 
terminal effect on armour, but these were disappointingly slow to enter service, and 
throughout the period artillery's importance on the battlefield declined as others were 
quicker to deploy more effective weapons to tackle enemy armour. 
It was a period in which tactics emphasised the need for firepower and attrition in defence, 
but artillery firepower was lacIdng and unable to provide it. The potential for annoured 
manoeuvre by NATO forces was recognised, but it was limited by political considerations 
to a shallow defensive belt close to the IGB. NATO forces therefore practised little 
manoeuvre, yet were unable to generate adequate conventional firepower instead. 
3.6 THE WARSAW PACT 1982-1990 
In July 1982, the Soviet Minister of Defence, Dmitrii Ustinov, declared that, "In the 
preparation of the armed forces even more attention will be devoted to the task of 
preventing the development of a military conflict into a nuclear one". 98 WP policy was 
guided by the need to avoid NATO's first use of, or retaliation with, TNW; and if possible 
to decouple US strategic nuclear weapons from NATO's TNW. 
In the 1970s, WP doctrine envisaged the use of fast-moving armoured assaults and these 
became narrower and deeper in planning iterations over the years. 99 NATO's response 
was to field masses of infantry anti-tank weapons, deployed in as much depth as the policy 
of 'Forward Defence' allowed, and to make increasing use of mobile armour in the 
counter-attack. 
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These developments alanned the Soviets, who remembered vividly the costly delaying 
battles of the Eastern Front in the Second World War, and their concern was confirmed by 
study of the lessons of the Yom Yjppur War conducted at the Frunze Military Academy in 
1974-75. In that War the Egyptians had achieved surprise and mobility, yet failed to 
overwhelm the Israelis quickly enough to prevent their recovery. The Egyptians had also 
demonstrated the power of infantry anti-tank weapons in defence against Israeli armour 
lacking adequate fire support. 
The Soviets improved the firepower of the tank, to the eydent that many tanks were able 
to undertake the role of the assault gun of the Second World War. Soviet tanks were 
issued with a large stock of HE ammunition to suppress enemy anti-tank defences, but 
many also carried the AT-8 anti-tank missile, enabling them to stand off and hit defending 
tanks beyond the range of direct fning tank guns. In addition, the Soviets tried to devise a 
tactic that would enable them to retain the initiative in a war, and to break NATO before 
its conventional forces could organize a defence, and so buy time to fire its nuclear 
weapons. Drawing lessons from their own history and that of Middle Eastern wars, the 
Soviets came to favour a doctrine of pre-emptive deep strike, a kind of Blitzkrieg 
operation that might itself be nuclear, but which was intended to avoid a war of nuclear 
attrition. 
Deep penetration by cavalry had been a feature of Tsarist military tactics in the late 19* 
Century. 'Do Tukhachevsky advocated high mobility in the 193 Os, but his ideas were lost in 
the purges of that time. 101 During the Second World War the Soviets employed armour- 
heavy 'mobile groups' to provide combined-arms mobility and firepower. "' Atthesame 
time, Soviet fire support doctrine called for all targets throughout an Operational area to 
be hit simultaneously. These precedents of fire and manoeuvre in depth became the 
conceptual basis for the OMG and its fire support. 103 The OMG was first considered in 
the early 1970s, coinciding with the appearance of the 2S I and 2S3 SP guns and armed 
helicopters, and it became an established element of doctrine in the early 1980s. 
OMGs were intended to destroy NATO's will to resist and to achieve victory before it 
could fire nuclear weapons. They would operate against NATO's decision-making 
headquarters, knock out nuclear delivery systems, and make NATO commit its forward 
troops and reserves as early as possible; but the Soviets believed that a victory on these 
terms could be gained only if the WP achieved strategic surprise. The OMG was designed 
to exploit that surprise at the Operational level, and to engage NATO forces before they 
could establish a coherent defence with engineer support, and deploy an effective reserve. 
In such a campaign, OMGs would have expected to fight a series of meeting engagements. 
The Soviets believed that in such close-quarter battles their mass of equipment, firepower, 
battle drills and momentum would be decisive. 104 
The Soviets always put the highest priority on numerical and fire superiority. Major 
General I. Vorobyov maintained that there was a need for Soviet forces to co-ordinate all 
sources of firepower to deliver a series of blows, breaching enemy positions, enabling 
manoeuvre forces to outflank defences. 105 This manoeuvre would spoil enemy 
65 
deployments and prevent defences from opening fire and from launching counter-attacks; 
but these advantages would obtain only if firepower created the opportunity. 
By increasing their speed, the Soviets reduced the time available to NATO to prepare 
defences, and so speed became as important as firepower, and a factor in its effects. The 
difficulty in providing high levels of fire support was therefore not as serious as it would 
have been in slower operations; and it reduced still further as the technology of artillery 
munitions developed. 
Soviet OMGs differed from the forces which US corps might have deployed forward to 
disrupt Soviet second-echelon forces in the AirLand Battle concept. The former were 
larger, designed to go deeper, and would not necessarily have avoided major 
engagements. They were consequently 'harder', and expected the support of 
accompanying artillery as well as that held behind. '06 
Soviet artillery was given a preliminary task to support the OMG as it moved forward 
from its assembly area. It was to attack NATO's long-range fire support systems, which 
threatened the manoeuvre, a mission called 'support of the manoeuvre element advancing 
from depths'. 107 The Soviets stressed that conventional fire support should be 
'integrated', and allow for the coordination and tin-dng of air support, air defence and 
long-range missile attacks. Once an OMG was advancing in enemy terrain, a rolling 
barrage would be impracticable, and it would have to rely on series of concentrations and 
the swift reactions of support helicopters and SP guns. 
Each of the OMG 'divisions" was larger than an ordinary division, and deployed more 
vehicles and firepower. 108 An OMG was dependent upon its fire support. This in turn 
was threatened by NATO artillery, and in the case of helicopters by AD weapons. In 
terms of relative mobility and firepower, the armed helicopter had assumed some of the 
characteristics of the tank of the Second World War, and WP artillery's task was just as 
surely to destroy the ground systems which threatened it. 
The Soviets were increasingly worried by NATO's improved means of target acquisition, 
and the enhanced survivability of its guns through mobility. They consequently planned to 
devote about half of their artillery assets to CB fire, and to devise tactics which would 
catch fast-moving targets. They favoured firing CB missions in short, intense bursts by 
battalion or larger units, rather than batteries; and improved CIS enabled them to 
concentrate weapons more effectively than before. 109 
Soviet doctrine of the 1980s was based on the achievement of surprise by mobility, made 
possible through fire superiority, and it thus differed fundamentally from NATO's, which 
came to see mobile deep attack as an antidote to the WP's superior numbers and 
firepower. Unless NATO could manage to achieve at least parity of firepower, in 
circumstances where the WP held the initiative, it seemed likely that NATO would have to 
continue to rely on nuclear deterrence. Yet, Soviet confidence showed signs of cracking. 
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By the mid-1980s, the Soviets were beginning to expose apprehension about the future. 
In 1982, the Chief of the Soviet General Sta Marshal N. V. Ogarkov supported the role 
of nuclear weapons in theatre operations; but three years later he judged that the combat 
characteristics and effectiveness of conventional weapons were approximating nuclear 
weapons. He accepted the possibility of fighting a purely conventional war, but saw the 
balance of technology tilting in favour of NATO. - Ogarkov recognized the power of 
weapons using emerging technology, which"make it possible immediately to extend active 
combat operations, not just in border regions, but to the whole country's territory, which 
was not possible in past ware'. "0 
By 1984, Colonel General MA Gareyev, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, could claim 
that the Soviets had worked out a precise system of preparing and executing offensive 
operations. " However, he also admitted to some unresolved problems: How to suppress 
enemy positions in depth if these contained precision-guided, anti-tank devices and long- 
range search and destroy weapons? How to envelop and destroy these forces? How to 
create dispersal in depth and across an advancing force's front? 
Soviet fear of NATO's precision-guided weapons was expressed by Gareyev in April 
1985. He spoke of the need for action by the USSR before the perceived aggressive 
threat from NATO's new approach could mature. He believed that this 'high-tech" style 
of warfare had, "... shifted the centre of gravity to a struggle in the field of military science 
and military technique. ""' This concern of the Soviet military was expressed in political 
action by President Gorbachev who tried to reduce conventional arms levels in Europe. 
That same month, Ogarkov published, History Teaches Vigilance, which called for 
changes in Soviet doctrine in view of changes in the technology and the character of 
Combat. 112 Gareyev, supported Ogarkov, maintaining that Military StrateV, based on 
nuclear weapons, was obsolete because of mutually assured destruction. On 91h October 
1985, Major General I. Vorobiev wrote a column in Red Star claiming that NATO's 
precision-guided weapons now had the effects of tactical nuclear weapons, and could be 
fired by automated systems like TACFIRE-ten to fifteen times faster than by old methods. 
Battle was thus so speeded up as to make previous Soviet norms obsolete and these 113 
must no longer orientate you. " 
In August 1988, the Soviet General D. Yazov noted that the accumulation of military 
might had become an outdated concept. He maintained that the USSR should instead 
seek to maintain its forces at a level that precluded superiority over the US, yet guaranteed 
a reliable defence. The Soviet emphaAs had moved away from a short nuclear holocaust 
to the likelihood of a conventional war, in which the advantage seemed to be moving in 
NATO's favour. 114 The stream of Soviet military hardware continued to flow. That year, 
the Fire Support Board of the US Defense Science Board noted that Soviet artillery 
systems had increased in number from 23,000 in 1978 to 37,000 in 1988. Over the same 
period US systems increased from 4,800 to 5,200. 
By 1990, NATO's capability to deliver conventional deep fire was expanding and the 
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Soviets had to consider their response. They could have increased the strength of their 
first echelon of twenty to twenty-five divisions in the Central Region to thirty, and 
replaced East European by Soviet divisions. "s The disadvantage of this would have been 
that these concentrations would have been exposed and in range of NATO guns. They 
could have deployed their depth echelons in smaller groups to present harder targets, but 
this would have created C3 problems, which the Soviets were generally less able to solve 
than their opponents. Logistic problems would also have increased, and they would have 
had to completely revise their plans. They could also have opted for an even faster 
assault, leaving NATO's deep attacks with fewer targets, rather as assaulting formations 
learned to do in the First World War, leaving enemy counter-preparation fire to fall behind 
them. 
The Soviets recognized the rapid pace of technological change and that they would have 
to be at its fore6ont, or face stark strategic choices in the future. Any such race would 
also be at a punishing cost. The Soviets were already estimated to have been spending 
twice as much as the USA on military research and development in the mid-1980s. Itis 
clear that the Soviets themselves believed that they could not afford a new high- 
technology arms race and for this and other reasons, the USSR and the WP collapsed. At 
the time of its demise, however, the USSR possessed an array of excellent equipment, 
much of it superior to that of NATO; and this remained a formidable legacy around the 
world after the Cold War. 
Conclusion 
Soviet operations in the 1970s were characterized by the wish to achieve massive 
superiority at pre-determined points, and to fight a pre-planned battle with inflexible 
echeloned formations. In the 1980s, the Soviet aim was to achieve independent 
combined-arms combat in particular at divisionaL but down to regimental level, exploiting 
changes in situations and favouring flanking rather than frontal assaults. Deep thrusts 
were intended to dislocate enemy C3 as a form of indirect approach. The first echelon 
battle was pre-planned, but those of the OMG and reserves were likely to remain flexible, 
while the second echelon became less important. 
OMGs required more flexible fire support provided by greater numbers of SP artillery and 
helicopters. The move away from set-piece massive fire-planning, which started in the 
1970s, continued; and although the Soviets retained a preference for masses of guns at all 
levels, they relied on improved fire control to create a better effect, with less ammunition, 
over a shorter period of time. 
In the event, these developments in Operational planning proved irrelevant as the USSR 
lost the strategic struggle in economic, technological and political terms. 
3.7 NATO 1982-1990 
Concepts 
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In the early 1980s major changes occurred in NATO's conventional posture. These 
reflected the political spirit of the time and the realization that accelerating technological 
advances offered unprecedented opportunities for change. In both respects, US views 
predominated and led NATO. 
The US doctrine of Active Defence, described in FM 100-5 Operations of 1976, was the 
work of the first commander of the US Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 
General William E. DePuy. It was perhaps a reaction to the perceived weakening of the 
USA in relation to the USSR, while attention had been concentrated on the Metnarn War; 
and an attempt to generate the firepower perceived to be lacking in the light of lessons 
from the Yom Kippur War. The doctrine was firepower-oriented, with manoeuvre 
essentially lateral and limited. "' 
By the late 1970s, Active Defence was already judged unsatisfactory by many, on the 
grounds that it was too reactive and failed to attack enemy vulnerabilities. It concentrated 
firepower at the point of the enemy's greatest firepower; and although this had 
advantages, it would be hard for NATO to shift and concentrate defence laterally, once a 
WP attack had begun. It was also thought unlikely that NATO's defensive concentrations 
would be able to beat off a sudden attack, in which its exhausted troops would face 
successive, fresh WP echelons. Defences would be overwhelmed before they could inffict 
decisive damage. NATO was planning for a war of attrition in which the attacker held the 
advantage and initiative. Enemy mobility and firepower needed to be matched by 
dispersion in depth, or early first use of nuclear weapons; but the former was prohibited 
for political reasons, and the latter looked increasingly unattractive. 117 
On a political level, the USA was no longer prepared to accept a strategy in Europe that 
aimed merely to avert conventional defeat before a nuclear exchange. The USA 
advocated instead a strategy that could win a conventional war by conventional means, 
while maintaining nuclear deterrence. The intention was to create a new situation where a 
political settlement would be reached 'on new terms'. '" 
The model advocated by the USA in the 1970s required defence in greater depth than the 
Federal Republic of Germany could countenance, since it jeopardized the flank security of 
neighbouring German formations, deployed finther forward. Equally, the USA was not 
prepared to accept a defence based on attrition in a mobile battle without depth: "It is 
precisely because of the structure, size and weight of the Soviet attacker that interdiction 
limited only to fire support cannot be expected to accumulate to decisive defeat; it must 
include manoeuvre to the Operational depth of the attacking army". 119 In 1979, in keeping 
with this idea, General Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), 
tasked his headquarters to develop a means of deep conventional attack against Soviet 
follow-on forces. 
The WP retained at least nuclear parity, and held massive overall superiority in 
conventional weapons. It had developed a new offensive tactic in the OMG, and aimed to 
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achieve victory, if possible without resorting to nuclear war. '20 It was estimated that 
NATO had just 400-600 aircraft available for interdiction rnissions; but they would need 
to attack 2,000 fixed targets up to 300km beyond the FEBA, as well as a multitude of 
armoured, vehicles. NATO studies showed that these aircraft would need to fly 2,200 121 
sorties to destroy just sixty percent of a single armoured division with iron bombs. 
Successful interdiction based on this existing technology was unlikely, and first use of 
nuclear weapons could be expected within seven days. 
A new doctrine would have to compensate for this numerical in&riority through improved 
firepower, mobility, and superior technique and technology. If defensive positions in 
depth were forbidden, the equivalent could be created by stretching forward into the 
enemy's depth to the East. The former would have had to rely heavily on close fire 
support, but the latter would require heavy fire in depth. At the same time, US national 
studies were also concentrating on deep attack, and resulted in a new US Army doctrine 
known as AirLand Battle, which was described in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 Military 
Operations: 0 perational Conceptsfor the AirLandBattle and Corps Operations. Itwas 
published on 25hMarch 1981 under the supervision of the new TRADOC commander, 
General Donn Starry. This concept became accepted doctrine in FM 100-5 Operations, 
1982.122 
AirLand Battle had three basic tenets. The first was the close battle, a manoeuvre battle 
involving armour, and following the doctrine of Forward Defence, which aimed to deny 
penetration of defensive positions in a belt 190km-deep along a frontier. The second was 
the rear battle, and the third was the deep battle, engaging the enemy's rear with air- and 
ground-launched weapons, destroying and disrupting follow-on forces. 
The concept extended the battlefield in depth, as well as forward in time; with greater 
emphasis on higher levels of command, whose target acquisition and weapon systems 
would play a major role. If enemy follow-on echelons were not defeated, or severely 
weakened, before reaching friendly forward defensive positions, the latter would be likely 
to fall after a severe mauling by the first-echelon attack. The value of a deep target was 
seen to be not merely its physical strength, but its position in space, and the time that 
would elapse before it could bring that strength to bear. It followed that a disruption of 
enemy plans and timetables might prove as effective in reducing enemy combat power as 
physical damage to equipment. Target priorities therefore took greater account of 
sequencing in time and space. 
Time was held to be important in as much as it affected the ability of an attacker to 
concentrate forces in the close battle against friendly forward positions. It was the link 
between the deep, close and rear battles, integrating the three - 441t is all one battle". 123 
Success in the deep battle was seen to make success in the close more likely as time went 
on. FM 100-5 Operafions of 1982 stressed that mwoeuvre was inseparable from 
firepower, 'The enabling, violent, destructive force essential to successful manoeuvre. 24 
AirLand Battle attempted to draw together Clausewitz's emphasis on violent 'effect' and 
Liddell Hart's 'indirect approach'. A study at the US Army Field Artillery School showed 
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that where an enemy suffered deep attack and a thwarted timetable, intervals of friendlY 
superiority were created. These intervals were opportunities for manoeuvre, attack, 
counter-attack, or reconstituting the defence. " The goal of deep indirect attack was to 
create such opportunities well forward in the battle area. '26 
Fire support for this deep attack was provided by artillery and aircraft; and historical 
precedent played a part in the evolution of these ideas. 127 AirLand Battle required the 
deep attack of critical targets in enemy rear areas, using both equipment and fire mobility. 
This encouraged the use of combined-arms operations and resources held at high level, 
continuing the dominant trends of 2& Century military doctrine. 
Increased mobility offered a psychological boost, irrespective of tactical merit. 
128 Manoeuvre was justified on the grounds that positional warfare had become obsolete. 
It was argued that increased weapons lethality would destroy static positions, that the 
increased range and performance of armoured vehicles and helicopters offered outstanding 
advantages, and that the greater ranges of guns increased the ability to concentrate fire in 
support of deep mobile operations. 
Armoured vehicles offered protection and enabled troops to disperse and re-group more 
quickly. Mobility created a need for yet more mobility, for forces deploying forward 
would deplete defensive positions, and make it even more important that reserves be 
highly mobile in order to move laterally to deal with WP penetrations. The new doctrine 
was oriented to force, not terrain, and was thus significantly dfferent to Active Defence, 
in which offensive action was essentially limited to counter-attack and counter-stroke. 
Active Defence had magnified the importance of divisional and brigade operations at the 
expense of the corps'29, and there was little scope for major Operational mobility. Under 
AirLand Battle, the balance tipped in favour of the corps, as it had in the Second World 
War and during the 1950s. It envisaged a brigade fighting first-echelon assaulting 
regiments, and a division engaging first-echelon assaulting divisions. Divisional artillery 
fire would be co-ordinated with the plan of the manoeuvre commander. The corps' task 
would be to fight first-echelon armies and to disrupt the advance of second-echelon armies 
before they could enter the close battle. It was estimated that enemy target arrays would 
be at their highest on D-Day, out to 100km, and D+36 hours out to 50km. The corps was 
therefore required to play the major role in deep attack by ground forces, and in particular 
to destroy or at least disrupt second-echelon divisions as they moved to or from final 
regimental assembly areas. In terms of time and space, a brigade was responsible for a 
distance of 301an beyond the FEBA, for enemy forces within twelve hours travelling; a 
division for 60km or twenty-four hours travelling, and a corps for operations out to 
150km against an enemy seventy-two hours away. The combined effect was that, 'Tor the 
first time ground commanders will have the capability simultaneously to engage forces in 
contact as well as follow-on echelons! '. 130 
US corps would dispatch units to penetratte. up to 6011-an deep into enemy territory, and 
attack relatively soft, but valuable, targets in the rear of their first-echelon divisions, or 
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against leading elements of second-echelon forces. 131 These operations would not in 
themselves be decisive, and battles of attrition were to be avoided, since fight mobile 
forces could not match the major enemy forces they were tasked to disrupt. 
The renewed importance of high-level operations was formally stated in fiM 100-15 Corps 
Operations and. FM 100-16 Echelons Above Corps, reinforcing the principles of AirLand 
Battle, which were the foundations for FM 100-5 Operations of 1982. A more ambitious 
view of how this doctrine nfight develop in a European scenario by the year 2000 was 
produced by TRADOC in Air LandBattle 2000 of I& August 1982, which envisaged 
operations against Soviet theatre of operations (TVD) echelons. There was an important 
distinction between the then US doctrine of AirLand Battle, and the more futuristic 
AirLand Battle 2000, planning for which was subsequently called 'Army 21' and dealt 
with the period 1995-2030.132 The former relied substantially on manned manoeuvre and 
aircraft to apply firepower, and relied on e7dsting or improved equipment. The latter was 
a concept which relied on emerging technology, and the enhancement of firepower on a 
grander scale. 
AirLand Battle was US Army, not NATO, doctrine. It marked as much as anything else a 
shift in American national mood, that made the defensive attitudes of Active Defence 
unacceptable. It stressed that, 'Vars cannot be won without a national Williv. 133 The US 
Army wanted the ability to attack Soviet vulnerabilities and regain the initiative. These 
new concepts inevitably stirred up great controversy within NATO. Although NATO did 
not adopted US AirLand Battle, it acc! gted the need for deep attack with the doctrine of 
Follow On Forces Attack (FOFA) on 9 November 1984, which amounted to the full 
implementation of Flemble Response. 134 FOFA was a task to be carried out by air forces 
and the Pershing H missile at army group level, at ranges between 40krn and 350km. It 
was not concerned with corps tactics, but there was an area of overlap with corps interests 
in deep attack between 401an and 1501an. 
Matters were further complicated by AirLand Battle's not being USAF doctrine either, 
although in April 1983 the USAF agreed to co-operate with the US Army in its 
application through training. The role of deep air attack or Interdiction was to delay the 
entry of enemy forces into battle, to prevent their interference in ffiendly operations, to act 
in conjunction with mobile forces deploying forward, and to hit specific high-payoff 
targets such as nuclear weapons. 135 
NATO did not adopt AirLand Battle, and US corps in Europe were not able to act in 
accordance with this world-wide US doctrine as described in the US FM 100-5 
Operations of 1982, although the 1986 edition offiM 100-5 Operations had apparently 
reconciled the differences between the AirLand Battle and FOFA. The US national 
concept for corps operations differed greatly from that favoured by, for example, the 
British, who did not accept the idea of deep penetration of enemy territory by corps 
forces, although the importance of corps operations was reinforced by the introduction of 
corps standing operating procedures in 1982, which might have been taken for granted 
fifty years earlier. The British corps retained the ability to withdraw and relocate 
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divisional artillery, unlike the Bundeswehr, which regarded divisional assets as sacrosanct. 
The British practice stemmed, however, not so much from the conviction that centralized 
high-level C2 was best, as from the realization that it was the only option when equipment 
was so limited. Neither did the British proclaim the idea of winning a conventional war in 
Europe. In 1982, General Sir Edwin Brarnall said that the aim of Britain's armed forces 
was to present the WP with the Hobson's choice, Which denied it the opportunity of 
winning a conventional Blitzkrieg before the West could use nuclear weapons. 136 This 
sounded like the mere "averting of conventional defeaV, rýected by the advocates of 
AirLand Battle, who wished to "win" a conventional war. 
British tWnldng developed along less radical fines than the Americans. The British 
commander of Northern Army Group (NORTHAQ) in 1984 criticized an "over-fiteral 
interpretatiorf' of Forward Defence; and r6ected, "a battle of attrition which can only end 
in ultimate if not early disastee 9137 ; but, instead of dispatching troops forward, as in 
AirLand Battle, he advocated the maintenance of a strong reserve to deal with the enemy 
on chosen ffiendly terrain. The enemy would be engaged in depth only by aircraft. Either 
way, NORMAG tactics and AirLand Battle both relied on mobility, whether forward, or 
laterally from depth positions, to offset larger enemy forces. Both approaches were well- 
tried, but mobility has seldom achieved a decisive outcome in modem war unless it has 
been used to exploit superior firepower, rather than to compensate for its lack. 
ISTAR and C4 
NATO annies may have disagreed on tactics in the early 1980s and on the best use of 
resources, but the equipments which entered service in the 1980s shared many 
characteristics, and some were collaborative ventures. There was general agreement that 
NATO needed improved surveillance and target acquisition devices, and a system of C41 
to integrate intelligence and target information with decision-making and the scheme of 
manoeuvre. Such a system would better exploit the increased range, accuracy and 
lethality of new ordnance and munitions. 
If echeloned targets were to be engaged in greater depth effectively, they would have to 
be attacked in order of priority at corps and divisional leveIS13'; but in the early 1980s 
NATO had little real-time intelligence and scant IT resources to handle it, had it been 
available. NATO was slow to exploit the advantages of RPVs as transmitters of real time 
intelligence, a field in which the Israelis had established an early lead with their Mastiff 
series. 139 NATO projects were dogged by cancellations, cost over-runs and development 
problems, but these were being solved by the mid 1980s. In most cases, land forces rather 
than air forces led the development of tactical unmanned systems. 
The British RPV Phoenix'40 was due to enter service in the late 1980s, but only did so ten 
years later. It was primarily intended to act as the sighting system for NIM and to 
operate in conjunction with the new digitized C3 and computation system, BATES. 141 
The latter created a fink from the FOO to corpS142 , and consisted of up to 800 cells, each 
with a VDU linked by Ptarmigan secure communications. The long-term aim was to give 
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every FOO and RPV a direct connection to guns and launchers, while imposing automatic 
intelligence and logistic controls from above. 143 The Bundeswehr also planned to increase 
its C41 capability in the 1990s with a range of new systems. '44 The US Army 
synchronized its re-equipment to occur in the late 1980s, to achieve 24-hour target 
acquisition, surveillance and improved C4I. 145 
These systems produced better information, but categorizing targets was harder. The US 
Army concentrated on computer simulations for target-value analysis. For example, if 
attrition were achieved of x percent over y hours at z distance from the FLOT, how much 
delay would be imposed on an attacker, how much would his effectiveness be impaired, 
and how much fire should be imposed before the attacker's own analysis of his situation 
caused him to change his plan? "6 Planned C41 systems such as the US Army Data 
Distribution System (ADDS) and the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System 
(AFATDS), the replacement for TACFIRE, were to take such factors into account and 
ensure the more effective application of fire. 147 
Ordnance 
The ability to attack deep targets usually forces an enemy to deploy even deeper, and so 
protects fiiendly forces from their fire. Longer range also allows the concentration of fire 
across a front. 149 In 1984 the US Army Chief of Staff declared that the US Army would 
not allow itself to be out-ranged by the threat. Longer-range artillery ordnance or aircraft 
would be required to engage targets in depth, along with the means to acquire them. 
The SP 155mm M109 was NATO's primary close support system, and was due to be 
replaced in many European armies by the Anglo-German-Italian SP70, but this project 
failed. The M109 was replaced in some armies in the early 1990s, but in other cases was 
still in service more than ten years later. The SP70 was to have had an unassisted range of 
24km, or 301an with a RAP, a burst fire capability of three rounds in ten seconds, and 
mobility comparable to that of contemporary tanks. 149 Following its demise, European 
armies copied US improvements to the M109, or, in the case of the Bundeswehr, fitted 
FH 70 barrels, giving the re-designated M109A3G a range of 24km. "o 
US long-term plans had been based on the divisional support weapon system (DSWS), an 
entirely new equipment with improved survivability, responsiveness, terminal effects, 
reliability, availability, and maintainability. "' In the meantime there would be an interim 
upgrade for the M109, the Howitzer Extended Life Program (HELP), and the Howitzer 
Improvement Program (HIP). It was intended that approximately two thirds of the US 
MI 09s would be upgraded by HIP by 1995; and that the remaining third would be 
replaced by the Advanced Field Artillery System (AFAS) after 1997. AFAS would be a 
new gun, but despite the increased survivability and efficiency envisaged for it, funding for 
such a sophisticated system remained uncertain for much of this period. 152 
NATO deployed towed pieces, but in relatively small numbers. The Anglo-German-Italian 
FH 70 had a range of over 241an'53 , and was used primarily by Bundeswehr 
divisions to 
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fire into likely enemy deployment zones. The French 155-TR and the US M198 had 
similar capabilities, but like all towed equipments were highly vulnerable, and might have 
been forced to use their range to deploy in, rather than to fire into, depth. They also 
lacked an advanced munition. 154 
Greater effects have often been achieved by adopting a higher-calibre gun; but the 
emphasis in the 1980s was primarily on range, rate of fire, accuracy and terminal effect. 
Pieces such as the US Army's 380mm piece of the Second World War were long-gone, 
and although most of the relatively inaccurate 175mm M107s were converted to the 
203mm MI IOA155, and later by the MI IOA2"6, the 203mm soon disappeared, once it was 
clear that the 15 5mm calibre could also accommodate ICM and 'smart' technologies. 157 
Munitions 
The value of the firepower of artillery relative to other arms declined between 1945-85. 
The range, power and accuracy of tank guns improved greatly, and the anti-tank bazooka 
with a range ofjust 300m, was transformed into weapons such as Wan and TOW, with 
many times the range and terminal effect. The hitting power of the HE shell remained 
almost unchanged, and yet armoured targets became harder and faster and more difficult 
to attack successfully. 158 Nevertheless, the need and opportunity for artillery to acquire an 
anti-tank capability in the 1980s coincided with a trend against the ATGW, whose success 
in the 1970s had encouraged the development of counter-measures. The ATGWs 
relatively long time of flight allowed the target time to manoeuvre and risked identification 
of its firing point; while smoke dispensers, hardened compound armour, and the close 
support of infantry and helicopters reduced the vulnerability of AFVs to short-range 
AGTW. 
Close support in the mid- I 980s, amounted to the engagement of targets at short range by 
observed indirect fire, however, the HE fragmentation round was largely ineffective in 
indirect fire against tanks. If the 155mm round could acquire a tank-killing capability, it 
could engage not only hard targets close to the FEBA, but, better still, it could engage 
them at a range beyond that of the supported arm, which was traditionally artillery's 
primary responsibility. Technology offered an array of options and raised controversies 
over the best means of guidance, whether scatterable mines were more effective than anti- 
tank projectiles, and whether these should be single rounds or ones containing sub- 
munitions. 
The US Amy's Copperhead, which entered service in Europe in October 1984, was the 
result of attempts to make a 155mm anti-tank artillery shell. It manoeuvred in flight to hit 
a target designated by a laser-beam directed by an observer or RPV; and it could knock 
out any WP armoured vehicle by attack from above with a shaped charge. This gave an 
observer greater flexibility, and the ability to single out high-value targets, such as bridging 
equipment and headquarters, or even to attack the rear of a column before its front. "9 
There were strong arguments against Copperhead 160 , but whatever its faults, it was 
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revolutionary, for it offered tube artillery the possibility of attacldng annoured targets in 
depth accurately. It was hoped that Copperhead might in future develop a more 
specialized role, for example against AD weapons, if given an anti-radiation homing 
head. 161 
Greater benefits, however, would result from anti-armour munitions which did not rely on 
laser-designation, and which were 'fire and forget, using millimetric wave radar to seek 
out targets, striking them directly or with terminally-guided sub-munitions. Such 162 
munitions were already being developed for 203mm and 155mm calibres , the most 
notable being SADARM. Developments such as these promised to increase the power 
and cost-effectiveness of artillery, giving it a genuine indirect anti-tank capability, which 
infantry, armour and helicopters could not rival. The limits of aerodynamics and 
metallurgy seemed likely to limit the range of the conventional HE steel shell to about 
50km; but on the extended battlefield this range had become a relatively short one. These 
developments promised merely to enable the 155mm piece to become effective once more 
in the engagement of targets beyond the acquisition or range of the supported arm; but 
still as part of their close battle. Deep battle probably lay at ranges beyond that. 
There were clearly great possibilities, but by the mid- I 980s only Copperhead had been 
introduced, and other munitions were slow to enter service. The standard 155mm HE 
shell remained the principal source of close support in the division, despite its poor 
performance against armour-, but greater progress had been made in munitions to combat 
Soviet artillery. 
In 1978 Dr W. J. Perry, the US Under-Secretary of Defense for Research and 
Development, wrote, "The USSR and Warsaw Pact in general place great emphasis on the 
use of artillery and free-flight rockets. NATO artillery is outnumbered by a factor of three 
to one". This WP capability could rapidly have diminished the effectiveness of NATO's 
anti-armour weapons and artillery, yet limited resources prevented NATO from "off- 
setting this artillery superiority with howitzere'. 163 NATO needed a system to hit the 
masses of Soviet artillery up to 15km from the FEBA, which at that time could be reached 
only by aircraft. NATO's answer to inadequacy in tube artillery was the collaborative, but 
primarily US-designed, MLRS, which entered US service in Europe in October 1983, and 
was fielded by other members by 1990. It provided not just greater range, but also added 
firepower and the element of shock. '64 
1, &RS capability expanded with the development of increasingly sophisticated munitions. 
Phase One was an HE munition which enabled one launcher with twelve rockets to lay 
down the destructive power of twenty-eight howitzers in one minute. Each warhead 
contained 644 M77 bomblets, each of which had a shaped charge capable of penetrating 
40mm of armour. It was therefore not primarily an anti-tank system, but one designed to 
attack artillery, headquarters, AD equipment, rnissiles, and infantry vehicles. It was 
estimated that a salvo from two launchers could destroy a Soviet battery. The shock of 
such an attack would have been increased by each launcher's firing six rockets at a time, 
rather than in a longer 'ripple'. "55 Lieutenant General D. R. Keith described MLRS as, 
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"primarily for counter-fire, that is to be able to fire back at artillery delivery systems so 
they do not wreak havoc on our manoeuvre units". 166 Subsequent phases of ammunition 
were planned to give MLRS a genuine anti-tank role, enabling divisions to start inflicting 
attrition early on, before an attacker came within range of forward defensive positions. 
The Germans led the development of the Phase Two munition, the Dynamit Nobel AT2, 
which was also adopted by a number of other annies. It was a scatterable mine system 
with a range of 30-40km. In one minute, one launcher could scatter 336 mines in an area 
of 1,000m x 400m. Each mine could penetrate up to 140mm of armour, and the system 
gave MILRS and LARS, which already had the AT2, an area-denial as well as anti-tank 
capability. 
In April 1984 the Conference of NATO Armaments Directors (CNAD) agreed to consider 
eleven new programmes that would meet the coming need to stop WP first echelon forces 
with indirect fire, using RPVs for reconnaissance and target acquisition, and for FOFA 
from stand-off ranges. 167 These included the JSTARS surveillance system, the MLRS 
Phase Three terminally-guided munition system, and various management information 
systems. The Phase 3 MILRS munition was to contain terminally-guided sub-munitions, 
which would glide horizontally, searching for targets with active millimetric-wave sensors. 
Each would discriminate between targets, and attack those of highest priority from above, 
using a shaped charge. 168 They promised to acquire and attack soft targets up to 150km 
beyond the FLOT, and it was hoped that emerging technology would make it possible to 
attack hard targets at over I OOkm beyond the FLOT. The Phase Three munition was due 
to start production in the early 1990s; but its funding was cancelled with the end of the 
Cold War. 
Concepts of MLRS employment varied, particularly between the US Army and the 
Bundeswehr, both of which planned to deploy about 200 launchers. The US Army did not 
intend to use MLRS primarily as an anti-tank weapon, and so did not plan to adopt the 
Phase Two munition. It believed that FASCAK helicopters, Copperhead, Lance, AIO 
and F16 aircraft, and in the future mortars, would provide a potentially confusing variety 
of options, even without IýILRS. American MLRS were essentially for CF against 
artillery, its headquarters and co-inmunications. The Bundeswehr, by contrast, planned to 
issue each of its eleven divisions with one battalion of sixteen launchers, reinforced by one 
battalion of LARS, also of sixteen launchers. The Phase Two munition gave these a 
primary counter-mobility, anti-tank role. "9 The combination of advanced target 
acquisition, Phase Two 2 and Phase Three MLRS munitions would have been formidable. 
An enemy formation could have been identified, blocked by a barrier of mines, and then 
engaged by terminally-guided munitions. The damage could have been assessed and the 
target engaged again if necessary. 
Improvements in other sources of firepower were also made. The attack helicopter had a 
primarily anti-armour role in most NATO annies, as a highly mobile reserve to intercept 
Soviet tanks breaking through defensive positions, and as an escort for assaults into enemy 
rear areas. The division of responsibilities became increasingly complex. Copperhead and 
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NERS Phase Two munitions encroached on anti-tank tasks that night otherwise have 
fallen to aimed helicopters; but artillery relied on swift reaction to precise intelligence, 
which was less important for helicopters, and the latter night have proved more suitable 
for some tasks. It seemed doubtful, however, that vulnerable armed helicopters would 
have been able to operate as successfully as MILRS Phase Three munitions against deep 
armoured targets, heavily protected by low-level air defences. 
Plans for a successor to MLRS Phase Three munitions were initiated in 1985 under the 
name Joint Tactical Missile System (JTACMS). The idea was born in June 1982, at a time 
when the US Army favoured a ballistic weapon with a range of I OOkm, and target priority 
in the order: C3 1, AD and manoeuvre forces, while the USAF favoured a cruise missile 
with a longer range and a target priority of SEAD, anti-arMour and C3 1. On 22 d May 
1984, it was agreed that the USAF would develop a JTACMS cruise missile, and that the 
US Army would develop Army-TACMS (ATACMS), a ground-launched weapon with a 
range of 70km based on MLRS. 170 The six-tube pods of MLRS would be replaced by 
two-tube pods accommodating heavier rockets. 171 On Ie November 1984 it was 
confirmed that the task of JTACMS would be to attack combat forces not engaged, and to 
destroy enemy capabilities which affected the close battle, but which were beyond the 
range of existing cannon and the Lance rocket systems. " 
In the mid-1980s it seemed reasonable to assume that future so-called 'brilliant munitions' 
would soon be able to discriminate between fHend and foe, and be fired from autonomous 
launch-platforms, and perhaps even robotic turrets. '73 They would give artillery an 
offensive capability to engage armour effectively with indirect fire, in an area of the 
battlefield which other arms could not engage, and which it was too dangerous, and thus 
inefficient, for aircraft to attack. In the past, the advantages of using aircraft in deep 
attack had encouraged artillery to concentrate on closer targets, even though the other 
arms could sometimes tackle these as effectively. The new systems would allow artillery 
to reach out into an extended, deeper, Operational area. If artillery could engage deeper 
areas of the battlefield, aircraft could in turn concentrate on even deeper, high-value 
targets, with their own advanced stand-off munitions, and at less risk to themselves. 
The application of emerging technology by artillery thus promised to constitute a major 
development in fire support, analogous to that one hundred years earlier, brought about by 
the development of indirect fire. It would extend the battlespace, permit simultaneous 
engagement throughout it, restore the lethality of artillery relative to other arms and 
increase the scope for artillery to expand its roles beyond the mere support of manoeuvre 
arms. 
Organization 
The introduction of so much new artillery equipment necessitated considerable re- 
organization in most NATO annies. The most radical changes took place in the US Army, 
which introduced the 'Army 86' organization in the early 1980s, "To develop the most 
combat-effective organization for the Army's heavy divisions in 1986, to facilitate 
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integration of new and advanced systems, concepts and resourcee'. Besides 
accommodating MLRS, the re-organization shifted the focus of attention to corps leveL 
and improved target acquisition at all levels. It had been traditional to integrate assets, 
such as infantry, mortars, artillery and AD, at low levels; but since the 1950s such 
integration had been wanting at higher levels. The 'Army 86' concept sought to correct 
this. It also tried to satisfy the need for greater artillery support in rear combat operations, 
which AirLand Battle acknowledged would become more likely. 17' Not all the desired 
enhancements were easily achieved; and in 1984 the 'Army of Excellence" programme 
succeeded 'Army 86', designed to increase the ratio of 'teeth to tail'. 
The Bundeswehr's 'Kampfwagen 90' concept envisaged the doubling of artillery stocks 
and the fielding of 200 NLRS, and 3 00 of the soon to be defunct SP70, for which a 
substitute would have had to be found. It entailed a radical re-organization, 
'Artilleriestruktur 85% which covered artillery organization for the period 1985-95, 
accommodating new weapons and tactics. The Bundeswehr corps artillery, equipped only 
with nuclear Lance, was made responsible for engaging the WP second echelon. The 
MII Os, which were formerly corps assets, were allocated to German divisions, in a 
formidable increase in autonomous firepower, unparalleled in a German army since 1899, 
and the Wehnnacht's re-organization of Summer 1941. The eighteen FH70, eighteen 
MI 10, sixteen MLRS and sixteen LARS which made up the divisional artillery were 
primarily for CF and counter-mobility, and were thus supported by a locating battalion. 
Each of the Bundeswehr's thirty-three brigades was supported by a battalion of SP guns 
to give close fire support in mobile armoured operations; but the timing of these plans 
depended upon the schedule for the replacement of SP70. 
The most important aspect of this German re-organization was not equipment, but ideas 
and manning. It was a halfway stage to an organization which was intended to 
accommodate MLRS Phase Three munitions; but firepower was already enhanced by the 
provision of an observer to each company. Fire support was no longer to be co-ordinated 
by the battery commander (BC). This task fell to a more junior officer, while the BC 
became responsible for the survival of his battery and its logistic support. 
The British also examined their organization in the 'Lean Look' study established to 
identify savings to set against increased manning of new equipment such as NERS. They 
retained an organization markedly different from those of their major allies. Field guns 
were commanded at corps level, but in practice most fire was controlled at divisional and 
brigade levels. Guns over 155mm and rockets were held at corps, but might have been 
sub-allocated in so-called 'General Support Groups'. The British therefore lacked a whole 
level of artillery support which the US Army and Bundeswehr possessed, and they sought 
to compensate for this by greater organizational flwibility, from necessity rather than by 
choice. 
Artfilery in Deep Attack 
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AirLand Battle marked a major turning-point in US and NATO doctrine, envisaging 
offensive action and high mobility of all arms on an integrated and extended battlefield. 
The new doctrine required not just equipment mobility, but also fire mobility to support it. 
Further, artillery was tasked to act as an offensive arm in its own right, albeit in synchrony 
with the manoeuvre battle. Artillery had progressed beyond the mere close support of 
other arms. Its new long-range missiles could disrupt enemy forces so that they could be 
defeated at shorter range where guns were now freed to concentrate. 
AirLand Battle was criticized for relying too heavily on achieving equipment mobility deep 
in enemy territory, where it would have been too vulnerable. Such sorties, if applied in the 
European Theatre could have weakened defences by concentrating attacks on the enemy's 
second echelon, when his first might have been the most important. It assumed that 
artillery had adequate means of target acquisition to engage the right targets at the right 
times successfully, that the battlefield could be 'managed', and that because NATO 
planned to fight a mobile war, a future war would necessarily be mobile. Finally, some 
argued that nuclear deterrence and strategic nuclear linkage might be weakened by the 
improving of conventional defence. 
The units sent forward by US corps to disrupt WP forces in depth might have had 
velocity, but they would have lacked mass. There was a danger that, although mobile, 
they would have had slender means of concentrating significant firepower. 176 By choosing 
mobility in the most dangerous area of the battlefield, NATO forces might have 
surrendered the inherent advantages of defence, yet gained few of the advantages of an 
attacker, since strategic surprise would still, in all probability, have lain with the WP. For 
this reason the NORTHAG concept of the late 1980s envisaged mobility at army group 
level by reserves after a defensive phase. AirLand Battle improved firepower, but not to 
the point where it could match that of the WP. MLRS was a major enhancement, and 
although advanced munitions such as Copperhead and FASCAM were more effective than 
conventional munitions, they amounted to no more than four to ten percent of US gun 
battery ammunition by the late 1980s. It was accepted that battlefield air interdiction, 
rather than ground-based weapons, was the key to the deep battle; but NATO's air forces 
also lacked the appropriate weapons. AirLand Battle was designed to operate with 
e2dsting equipment, but it could not achieve the important aims of deep attack without 
major increases in firepower, not just to attack the enemy but to defend its own mobile 
units. 
By calling on artillery to support units attacking beyond the FEBA, AirLand Battle might 
actually have weakened supporting fire overall. Equipment deployed forward would have 
needed at least as much firepower as that held back in defence; but this would have been 
harder for artillery to provide, and was likely to be less effective. The quality of WP 
artillery fire against manoeuvre units was likely to have been high, since WP artillery 
would have been operating from fiiendly terrain, and would not have experienced the 
complications of movement and logistics that exist in the attack. Although techniques of 
survivability and CF capabilities were improving, the WP still had a significant advantage 
in the balance of artillery forces. By starting attrition of WP manoeuvre forces as early as 
so 
possible, NATO artillery would have compromised its own positions correspondingly 
early, multiplying in consequence the effects of that imbalance. '" The concept was sound, 
but the material means did not exist to support it. The introduction of MLRS to fight the 
long-range battle offered the possibility that guns might remain masked to fight the close 
battle; and future artillery systems incorporating emerging technology promised to correct 
the imbalance further. 
Some advocates of AirLand Battle seemed to assume that NATO defences and the WP 
first echelon were evenly matched, and made the valid deduction that the credibility of 
defence would be enhanced if the WP's second echelon were removed early. The 
opposing forces, however, were not evenly matched and NATO forces deploying forward 
early to attack the WP second echelon would have had to come either from main defensive 
positions or the reserves. Since the intention would have been to tip the balance in favour 
of forces defending main positions, it was the reserves which would most likely have been 
sacrificed prematurely. 
It was not certain that fast-moving WP armour could have been identified, 'prioritized' 
and engaged at corps, much less army group level, before spreading into divisional areas 
of influence. These arguments favoured either the German divisional deployment of 
NLRS, and yet greater holdings of MLRS at divisional level in the US Army, or the 
granting of much greater independence to 1VLRS units from corps, allowing the former to 
respond directly to dedicated radar, with improved 'sensor-to-shooter' links. If the 
problems of target acquisition could have been overcome, there were great advantages in 
employing MLRS at army group level for this Operational battle. 
It was estimated that a well-sited defence could increase its effectiveness as much as 
tenfold by advantageous use of ground. 17' The strength of Active Defence was that it 
forced an attacker to advance through a series of strong defensive positions. By 
committing reserves early to offensive tasks, that advantage would probably have been 
sacrificed. 
Had the WP attacked in traditional echelonment, the diversion of troops to attack the 
second echelon might have served the WP's purposes, by deflecting attention from the 
primary task, the defeat of first-echelon forces. It would matter little to the WP that the 
second echelon had suffered disruption if the first were victorious. The priority for NATO 
in the late 1980s was to make up the deficit in target acquisition and firepower which 
hobbled the implementation of any new approach. As the Cold War ended, it was 
intended that emerging technology should achieve this. 
If, as now seems likely, the Soviets had themselves strengthened their deep attack 
capability together with their first echelon, the second had indeed become less important. 
If the Soviets had achieved strategic surprise, NATO's deep strike forces, whether 
practising FOFA, AirLand Battle or a reconciliation of the two doctrines, might in any 
case have found themselves, of necessity, being used as a reserve to fill gaps in a ragged 
defence. Success in AirLand Battle., like success in all forms of forward defence, would 
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also have relied upon early mobilization which was hard to achieve. " Nevertheless, the 
value of AirLand Battle was that it broke the mould of rigid Cold War attritional thinking, 
and it can now be seen to lie at the root of most Western doctrinal thinking since. 
Managing the Battlefield 
As mobility and firepower increased, the 'management' of the battlefield became more 
complex. Conflicts of interest arose between air and ground forces, and different levels of 
command. For example, the fire support co-ordination fine (FSCL) of the 1980s was 
typically about 25km forward of the FLOT. Beyond that, it was difficult to divide 
responsibilities between air and corps interests. "o The difficulties of co-ordinating action 
on the battlefield were alleviated by the increasing sophistication of C2; and in the case of 
NATO commands and the US Army by centralization of both at a high level. AirLand 
Battle continued this trend, attempting to solve the problems of battlefield management by 
better information technology. The practicality of fighting a war in this manner was 
untested, and many were doubtfid because they believed that wars were likely to be 
unpredictable, and needed to be fought, not 'managed'. 
AirLand Battle contained potential contradictions. It led the USA towards a high- 
technology battlefield necessarily managed by computers, and yet it recognized the 
likelihood that communications might collapse. It was the influence of General G. K. Otis, 
who took over as commander of TRADOC from General Starry, that ensured the 
emphasis on low-level leadership in RM 100-5 Operations 1982. AirLand Battle was said 
to be founded on the German principles of Auftragstaktik, Schwerpunkt and Aufrollen, 
which relied upon individual initiative at all levels in a mobile battle, yet the US Army was 
trying at the same time to create a battlefield in which the control of firepower and other 
resources were managed automatically and at a higher level. There was an uneasy duality 
of management and leadership. Either would certainly be needed if the other failed, but it 
was not certain how successfully the two would be able to act in concert. These issues 
remain as important today. 
Mobility 
AirLand Battle assumed that engagements would take place in an extended three- 
dimensional battlefield between highly mobile f6rces on both sides. AirLand Battle was 
said to restore the balance between firepower and mobility, with mobility used to attack 
enemy vulnerabilities and to gain a position of advantage where massed fire could be 
concentrated. The experience of history suggests that such expectations might have been 
exaggerated. Before the outbreak of hostilities in 1914 and 1939 there was a general 
consensus that coming wars would be fought in short, highly mobile campaigns. In the 
event, while battlefield manoeuvre speeded up, campaigns were generally conducted at the 
same pace as they had been in earlier centuries. See Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Comparison of Rates of Advance 
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Campaign/Battle Date Distance (km) per Day Remarks 
Um 1805 22 
Moscow 1812 14 
Marne 1914 20 
Megiddo 1918 56 General Allenby's 
Cavalry 
Flanders 1940 31 
Moscow 1941 10 
Normandy Breakout 1944 28 
Korea UK Offensive 1951 19 
Sinai 1967 55 Gen Tal's Armour 
Gulf War 1991 195 
Source: Dupuy (1985) and others 
NATO's conventional re-equipment in the 1980s partially off-set Soviet developments of 
the 1970s. If it had not done so sufficiently, a future war might well have amounted to a 
WP Blitzkrieg across Europe, which could perhaps have been met only by a NATO 
nuclear response, imposing counter-mobility with massive firepower, and probably 
resulting in an early nuclear stalemate. If NATO had in fact succeeded in restoring the 
conventional balance, operations would very likely have slowed down rapidly, in a war of 
relative immobility, but high attrition. This would, however, have been of short duration, 
since materiel would have lasted for only a few days, and it would probably have been 
followed by a final highly mobile phase before being halted again by nuclear weapons. "' 
The victory would probably have been a logistic one, or nuclear, and thereby a failure in 
terms of deterrence. 
The power of modem weapons and target acquisition systems seemed likely to make 
manoeuvre a more, not less, vulnerable operation. The sheer congestion of equipment on 
both sides, bad weather, urban terrain, EW, chemical weapons, and ultimately nuclear 
weapons tended to compound the difficulty of manoeuvre, especially for the WP. "2 
Where mobility was successfully achieved in short wars in the Middle East and the Indian 
sub-continent, it was against an enemy either numerically inferior, lacking in political 
cohesion, or taken by surprise. 183 NATO appeared to enjoy none of these advantages over 
the WP in the 1980s, or foreseeably into the 1990s. On the contrary, many lay with the 
WP- US plans for manoeuvre in the 1980s and 1990s were a reaction to superior WP 
numbers and firepower, rather than a means of exploiting US fire superiority. More often 
than not, such manoeuvre against a first-rate enemy may win dazzling but limited battles, 
delaying defeat, but it seldom wins wars. Against a lesser opponent, it may be successful 
and at acceptable cost, but largely by levering superior firepower synchronized with 
movement. Doctrine since the 1950s had emphasized the importance of manoeuvre 
supported by fire; but from the mid-1980s it seemed more likely that future concepts 
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would rely more upon fire-mobility from artillery and airpower, and its subsequent 
exploitation by manoeuvre. 
There had, however, been many premature predictions of the demise of the tank. Its 
declining role was forecast in the 1970s by critics who, for example, believed that 
resources would be better spent on enhancing defensive positions and firepower. 184 The 
tank was an expensive source of firepower, but if anything, its relative advantages grew 
with the introduction of improved designs in the early 1980s, such as Chobham-type 
armour; APFSDS (armour-piercing fin-stabilized discarding sabot) ammunition, improved 
power-to-weight ratios and suspension. As the Cold War ended, many further 
improvements were scheduled, but most forecast the long-term decline of the heavy main 
battle tank. 
Sir Ronald Mason, former Chief Scientific Adviser to the British Ministry of Defence, 
believed that the tank was already no longer the best anti-tank weapon. "' C. D. Bradley, 
former chief of the Exploratory Development Division of the US Tank Automotive 
Concepts Laboratory, noted that, "The technology contributing to methods of killing the 
tank is advancing at a much faster rate than the technology contributing to the 
survivability of that tank. The Abrams may be the end of the fine'. 196 Twenty years later, 
his analysis holds good. 
The mobility of the tank was already poor, compared to the helicopter's, and would 
become relatively worse as all-weather flying capabilities improved. The helicopter would 
be used both as a highly mobile weapon platform, and as a transporter for other sources of 
firepower, including fight armour and artillery. On balance, tanks also seemed likely to 
become increasingly vulnerable. It seemed, for example, unlikely that devices such as 
reactive armour could provide continuous protection during a 2001an approach march to 
the IGB from the East. Field Marshal Sir Edwin Bramall predicted that the balance of 
advantage would shift away from the mobility and protection of the tank, to systems better 
able to conceal themselves and to concentrate fire at longer range. 187 
Nuclear Linkage 
It might be argued that the Third World War could only have been a short one, since 
neither side had the resources to fight a long conventional war-, and that the 'first off the 
blocks' would therefore win. The effect of such an imbalance could have been to have 
precipitated a nuclear response, provided the linkage between conventional and nuclear 
weapons had been retained; and this was an area of major controversy among NATO 
allies, which at the time seemed set to blight debates on collective defence for decades to 
come. 
Flexible Response, the strategy authorized by NATO MC 14/3, relied upon large-scale and 
possibly early use of nuclear weapons'88, yet the former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, Lieutenant General J. E. Hollingsworth, described AirLand Battle as a 
'conventional umbrella', whose purpose was to negate WP numerical superiority. He saw 
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it replacing the deterrent of TNW which he and many others felt had lost credibility, if 
only because one, 'cannot envision the point of NATO destroying itself.. by the resort to 
the use TNW'. 139 In 1983 an influential group of former NATO officials published their 
European Security Study which advocated the better use of modem technology to reduce 
drastically the dependence on, and early use ot nuclear weapons. 190 
Despite this, NATO's doctrine in the 1980s and I 990s, was firmly underwritten by the 
power of nuclear weapons, and the understanding that these were not merely to deter WP 
nuclear weapons, but to be used to avert conventional defeat. 19' 
General Bernard Rogers, as SACEUR, asserted that FOFA was designed only to raise the 
nuclear threshold, and to provide the means of achieving forward defence; but others in 
Europe, particularly in West Germany, feared that it was an expression of a growing US 
desire to escape from the strategic nuclear linkage implicit in Fle)dble Response. If 'de- 
coupling' had occurred, it was feared that a war, thus limited to Europe, would be less 
risky for the USSR, and so more likely. General Rogers and others therefore stressed that 
nuclear weapons were a necessary part of a deep attack doctrine, which enhanced Flexible 
Response. '92 The only event which European critics feared more than a conventional war 
limited to Europe was a nuclear war limited to Europe; and AirLand Battle or FOFA did 
not appear to enhance strategic linkage. Suspicions about the broad intentions of deep 
attack doctrines seemed unlikely to be allayed until they were seen to raise the threshold of 
TNW, but lower the strategic nuclear threshold, and strengthen the credibility of the link 
between the two. 
AirLand Battle tried to offer the possibility of a NATO conventional victory and a credible 
nuclear deterrent to WP nuclear weapons; but plans for a possible first use of TNW were 
an admission of inferiority in conventional firepower. A reduced likelihood of 
conventional defeat and renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons, with its 
accompanying political advantages, could be achieved only if high-technology could 
produce weapons with much more effective firepower. It seemed that TNW could 
perhaps be greatly reduced in number, or even eventually removed from Europe as a result 
of negotiation; but that this would probably happen only if new technology could succeed 
in restoring the conventional balance of forces. 
The Need for Greater Firepower 
US and NATO deep attack doctrine for the 1980s and that proposed for the 1990s was 
not supported by sufficient firepower to make it fully effective. The imbalance between 
the artillery strengths of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces is illustrated in Figure 2. Future 
plans tacitly admitted this, and sought to make good the shortcomings, by introducing 
conventional weapons with equivalent effects to nuclear warheads. They would replace 
vulnerable equipment mobility, with tha fire mobility made possible by emerging 
technology. Doctrine for the 1980s and 1990s was an unsatisfactory halfway stage to this, 
pending the development of these new capabilities; and meanwhile vulnerable manned 
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vehicles and aircraft were called upon to carry out tasks that in future would be 
undertaken by high-technology munitions. 
Sir Ronald Mason, said that force multiplication by science was the right "response to the 
overwhelming advantage of conventional weapons systems fielded by the Wp". 19' 
Democracies find it hard to field large masses of men and equipments permanently, and 
reliance on nuclear weapons became increasingly difficult to accept, particularly in West 
Germany'94 , although many West 
Germans also feared that reliance on conventional 
weapons alone would make war and its collateral damage more likely than a nuclear war. 
Figure 2. Approximate Number of Artillery Barrels per 1,000 men in 1986 
Barrels per 1,000 men 
USSR 16.7 
Canada 10.0 
USA 6.7 
Netherlands 6.7 
West Germany 4.0 
Italy 4.0 
Belgium 3.3 
UK 2.8 
France 2.5 
Plans for future conventional deep attack amounted to a counter-preparation 
bombardment, fire on an enemy preparing to attack, using sophisticated air- and ground- 
launched weapons. The potential for advanced munitions was recognised in the early 
1970s, when US 'smart" bombs demonstrated their advantage over iron bombs against 
targets in North Vietnam. 195 Dr Manfred Woemer, NATO's Secretary General at the 
time, believed that the pace of such advances should be maintained. Whereas in the 1960s 
it might have taken 5,500 sorties and 33,000 tons of bombs to destroy a Soviet army 
group, it was estimated that in the 1980s it could be done with 600 sorties and 3,000 tons 
of improved munitions. He maintained that the next generation of warheads with sub- 
munitions could do the same with 50-100 sorties and just 500 tons. Emerging technology 
was seen to be capable of creating the equivalent to concentrated firepower, enabling 
NATO to "reduce significantly the number of short-range nuclear systems". The 
advantages of emerging technology were clear; and in 1981 General Starry, the inventor 
of AirLand Battle, looked ahead to what might follow and urged that, "We must begin 
transitioning to these concepts now". 
The role of mass destruction on the battlefield, held by artillery until the end of the Second 
World War, was taken up by nuclear weapons. It seemed likely that by the end of the 2& 
Century it would be filled by weapons of emerging technology; but, as Lieutenant General 
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Ott pointed out, 'Vinning the funds to assure progress is the biggest battle to be faced by 
artillerymen of the future'. '96 
AirLand Battle relied upon depth and agility, synchronizzation and initiative to defeat the 
enemy in depth; but it seemed likely that the US would lack sufficient standing forces to 
implement it in the way intended. By the late 1980s there was discussion of an alternative 
'Multi Dimensional Concept' (MDC) 197 , employing robotic and unmanned systems to 
achieve economy of force. These would include robotic ground vehicles and UAVs, high 
intensity flash munitions and directed energy weapons (DEW). It was held to be cheap, 
sustainable and available by 2004. Elements of this can be seen today in the Future 
Combat System (FCS) and concepts of 'networked' battlespace, which could become a 
reality a decade after the date proposed for MDC. 
In the late 1980s, General C. Vuono articulated the US Army's vision of future war with a 
greatly expanded battle space, and fewer troops with more sophisticated weapons fighting 
large but relatively short engagements, 'AirLand Battle Future'. '" This was an evolution 
of, not a replacement for AirLand Battle of 1982, adding endurance to its characteristics. 
This encompassed more than mere logistic sustainability, and involved the notion of 
sustaining a high tempo of operations over a period of time relative to an opponent. 
In the event, none of these concepts proved relevant to the European Theatre of the 
future, for the Cold War ended more quickly, and in a manner that few of note had 
predicted. Whatever the failings of NATO's doctfinal iterations over the years, in a 
strategic sense they had proved successful. It was in part the relentless self-criticism and 
search for relevant new ideas and technologies that ensured an historic, if unusual, form of 
'victory' by NATO over its opponents. 
These efforts bore other fiuit. After large wars most societies demobilize. This was only 
partially true of annies after the Second World War-, while at the same time military 
research, development and readiness continued at great expense for over forty years. 
Some who now claim that the WP was in truth always an insubstantial threat, see this as a 
tragic diversion of resources. On the contrary, this cost or 'insurance premium' may now 
be seen as a bargain, given the peace, stability and prosperity it secured for much of the 
world. It also gave the West a significant lead in military affairs which proved decisive in 
the years that followed, most immediately in the Gulf War of 1990-91, but surely also into 
the future. 
3.8 THE LEGACY OF THE COLD WAR 
Memory of the perceived threat during the Cold War is in danger of fading, and its 
intensity and immediacy even seeming unreal in retrospect. NATO and the WP 
maintained high levels of defence spending raid an intense military focus of a duration 
probably unparalleled in peacetime. The '%".. cld War produced large, wen-equipped and 
trained forces at high states of readiness. Societies generally accepted this as 'normal', 
and an acceptable price to pay in view of the apparent alternative. In the mid 1980s, the 
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demise of the USSR and its WP seemed highly unlikely. It seemed almost unimaginable 
that the concepts, tactics and equipment of the Cold War, templated on the North German 
Plain would be validated on the desert plains of Kuwait and Iraq in less than a decade. 
The legacy of the Cold War was both doctrinal and technological; but as it drew to an 
unforeseen close, its participants were earnestly considering how to gain military 
advantage in what they assumed would otherwise be a continuing strategic impasse. 
Although the strategic stalemate in Central Europe was forty years old, it was a time of 
innovative military thinidng, as both sides tried to avoid intellectual stagnation and 
complacency. The OMG and AirLand Battle were the products of this, and there was 
much speculation about the military requirements and the promise of new technology. 
T]HE SOVIET LEGACY 
Looking ahead, the Soviet strategic problem after 1990 was how to achieve results in the 
minimum time, without provoking a nuclear response. The answer seemed to be either a 
full assault by WP forces, or the 'national option' of a purely Soviet assault to achieve 
limited objectives, and a negotiated withdrawal of both Soviet and American forces from 
certain areas of Europe. In either case, surprise would be essential. "9 
The Soviet Operational problem was how to break through defences which would 
probably become more complex thanks to NATO's employment of emerging technology 
in terminallyý-guided munitions and scatterable mines. The Soviets would have to find a 
way to maintain the momentum of an advance and co-ordinate and supply it. Artillery 
would still be required to provide massive support to the first echelon; but it would have 
to develop improved techniques of CB fire against MLRS, and improve defence against 
helicopters. The task of co-ordinating fire support for dispersed BMIP regiments and 
OMGs from artillery, helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft would be highly complex. The 
Soviets also realized that they would have to re-assess the survivability of their artillery 
against 'fire and forget' weapons by means of mobility, protection, counter-measures and 
combinations of these. 
Above all, the Soviets had to decide whether the creation of firepower reliant on high 
technology constituted too high a risk, and whether they could afford to reduce the 
quantity of equipment to pay for it. The alternative was to accept technical inferiority to 
the West in the belief that mass would achieve a better result. 
An important legacy of the Cold War was the large quantity of high-grade equipment of 
WP origin that resided in the inventories of many unstable states and others antagonistic to 
the West. Many of these states planned to employ this equipment in accordance with a 
doctrine which they could not live up to, or which did not suit their circumstances. ffighly 
capable artillery of WP design continued to be effective in tactical engagements around the 
world, but for the most part it was readily countered, and often constituted a vulnerable 
target array for Western airpower and artillery which had been devised to defeat it in the 
hands of more competent Soviet opponents. The spiral of aciion and reaction witnessed 
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during the Cold War thus lived on in thesucceeding decades. In that sense, ironically, 
perhaps the greatest consequence of Soviet military rniott after 1945 was that it 
precipitated defence spending, and cerebra and technological innovation in the West on 
such a scale that it forged an opposing rnilitary able to execute its will long after 'victory' 
in the Cold War. 
NATO IN 1990 
Nevertheless, in 1990 NATO also appeared to face challenges. The future of its FOFA 
doctrine, which called for attacks on targets between 25km and 350krn beyond the FLOT, 
would be influenced by the development of more dynamic and offensive concepts in the 
US Army. Whereas AirLand Battle intended to neutralize second echelon forces, AirLand 
Battle 2000 and 'Army 21' doctrines intended to destroy them, "occupying WP territory 
by firepower". 
Notions of non-linear battle developed. Emerging US concepts were based on the 
assumption that a future battlefield would be fast-moving and fluid, with battles fought by 
combat cells of perhaps 2,0004,000 men, manoeuvring without any clearly defined FEBA 
or FLOT. Targets would be more easily acquired, and the weapon systems to attack them 
would have greater range and lethality, and be better co-ordinated on the ground and in 
the air. All arms would be better integrated, EW would be intense and operations 
conducted twenty-four hours per day, with NBC taken into account throughout. The 
essential difference between this and AirLand Battle was that mobility would be 
underwritten by a substantial increase in effective conventional firepower, and with greater 
emphasis on conventional deterrence. The use of nuclear weapons might ultimately be 
necessary, but "a deterrent based primarily on a nuclear response has disappeared and 
probably cannot be realized again7'. "O 
If NATO were to replace ground-launched nuclear weapons with conventional artillery, 
the high mobility of the conventional forces would gain greater credibility through the 
inhibition of Soviet firepower and mobility. The Soviets could, however, be expected to 
develop similar weapons to those of the West, thereby increasing the problems of 
equipment survivability, and possibly giving rise to a stalemate. This could be broken by a 
nuclear exchange, which both sides would surely make every effort to avoid. NATO's 
remaining nuclear weapons would therefore become deterrents to Soviet nuclear weapons, 
not conventional forces, and so would be less likely to be used in a conflict. Conventional 
war would not necessarily become more likely, because the WP could not expect to win 
that war, without its own first use of nuclear weapons leading to nuclear retaliation. 
Enhancing conventional firepower to an appropriate level might therefore enhance 
deterrence at all levels. 
Developing NATO's Firepower 
Firepower and fire-mobility were seen to be the keys to success in any future battle in 
Central Europe. The scope for exploiting mobility may have looked attractive, but priority 
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was more likely to be given to developing firepower rather than to achieving vehicle parity 
with the WP. 201 In 1988, one third of all new US Army systems planned to enter service 
by 1995 were for the field artillery. 
The responsibility for providing future fire support Was ýcen in three parts: deep attack by 
aircraft, artillery, and the fire of the manoeuvre arms themselves. Aircraft would rely on 
stand-off missiles bearing high-technology sub-munitions of the Assault Breaker variety, 
which would attack targets over 1001an beyond the FEBA. Artillery deep attacks would 
be made by rockets such as NERS, its successors, and Lance with similar sub-munitions, 
at up to I OOkm from the FEBA. These would be augmented at closer range by tube- 
artillery based on SP 155mm or 203mm pieces, capable of firing Copperhead, SADARM 
or their more advanced successors. 
In the close battle, the infantry seemed likely to acquire an effective indirect fire capability 
of its own, based on a fight rocket system202, an advanced mortar, or a gun with a 
revolutionary propellant. Guns have a longer range and a direct fire capability, and shells 
a shorter time of flight, than the mortar and its bomb; but these advantages were seen to 
be at the expense of simplicity and cheapness. Given improvements in munitions, it 
seemed that mortars might take over some tasks performed by divisional close support 
artillery. 
p "203, Some mortars already had a range of Plan with . and future heavy mortars could 
well dispense minelets or terminally-guided submunitions. Development of an 
autonomous tern-dnally-guided anti-tank bomb was well advanced in many countries in the 
mid 1980s. 204 Mortars have a high rate of fire, but this is usually reduced as calibres 
increase in size because loading becomes more cumbersome . 
2" This was likely to limit the 
size, and hence the range, of mortars, or encourage the development of automatic breech- 
loading weapons. Even if mortars failed to reach the ranges of guns, it was quite possible 
for NLRS and comparable systems to engage targets down to I Olan. It was thought that 
improved mortars would enable artillery to concentrate still more on deep targets. 206 
It seemed that liquid propellant would probably replace traditional charge systems; and 
that electro-magnetic propulsion systems, firkig terminally-guided munitions could 
revolutionize not only artillery but also infantry weapons. If guns became much smaller 
and easier to operate and support, the infantry could perhaps provide its own low-angle, 
indirect fire, anti-armour close support. 
It was accepted that NATO's close support artillery would face a severe test in the 1990s. 
Targets would move faster and have a shorter exposure time, making them harder to hit 
after the first round without terminally-guided munitions; and WP artillery might be able to 
return fire before the first NATO round had even landed. The threat from WP artillery 
meant that NATO would have to practice 'shoot and scoot' tactics, with missions of no 
more than six to eight rounds, fired in bursts lasting perhaps two minutes by random 
groups of guns. 207 
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NATO did not have a unified approach to the development of a new gun capable of 
meeting this requirement. The British and Germans had separate programmes for SP 
155mm pieces, as did the French. The US Army also began work on an entirely new and 
more ambitious piece, the DSWS and later the AFAS. 208 In much modified concept and 
form, this had still not entered service nearly twenty years later under the name Crusader. 
In the late 1980s there was intense debate about whether such a system could be justified, 
and this continued throughout the ill-fated Crusader programme, which was eventually 
cancelled in 2002. 
The firepower of supported manoeuvre arms was increasing, and the calls for artillery to 
concentrate on deeper attack were growing. A highly sophisticated close-support gun was 
seen to be very expensive. Such a system would also be vulnerable to the advanced anti- 
armour munitions which the WP was expected to develop at the same time as NATO. In 
view of this, close support seemed likely to become the 'poor relation' of artillery by the 
year 2000; and although the US Army" s 'Legal Mix VI' study recommended a nib=e of 
cannon and rockets for its artillery in Europe in 1995, based on the 155mm and 203mm 
cannon and NIRS, it was the latter which seemed to hold the greater potential, unless 
close support could be revitalized with the introduction of some revolutionary system such 
as liquid propellant or electro-magnetic propulsion. 29 
NLRS and its successors seemed destined to become the mainstay of NATO artillery. Its 
Phase Three munition was designed specifically for the precision attack of moving armour, 
principally second line and second echelon forces, realizing the intent of AirLand Battle 
and 'Army 2V doctrines. In the event, funding for Phase Three munitions was terminated 
with the end of the Cold War; but the technologies survived, and their derivatives will 
appear in future Western systems. 
In the Second World War, effects of fire similar to those of the First were often created by 
using less ammunition with greater target discrimination. Even so, it was estimated in the 
early 1980s that one US close support battalion would fire at 300 rpg per day in a 
European war, constituting a volume twice that consumed by an entire divisional artillery 
per day in the Second World War. 210 This would be partly because, as in the Korean War, 
fewer guns would have to fire more ammunition over a larger area, but chiefly because 
action would be highly concentrated in a short period of time. The increase in firepower 
that would be created by the Year 2000 would not be the result of greatly increased 
numbers, or weight of gun or launcher, but of the greater sophistication and lethality of 
fewer munitions. The resulting reduction in the logistic 'tail' was also seen to increase the 
opportunities for mobility, dispersion, camouflage, and hence survivability. 
The Merits of NATO's Emerging Technology 
NATO's concepts for deep attack in the 1990s seemed likely to develop along the fines 
pioneered in the late 1980s. These relied upon weapon systems which did not yet e)dst, 
yet there seemed little alternative to such faith in technology. One option was the use of 
large numbers of 'mini-nuclear' weapons, with effects more like those of concentrated 
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conventional fire. These very low-yield weapons were widely advocated in the 1970s; but 
the idea was politically unacceptable. Another option wag to maintain NATO's existing 
force levels but deploy them in great depth, as in the 1950s and early 1960s, to offset the 
WP's numerical superiority and strategic initiative. Such redeployment was also politically 
impossible. NATO could construct physical barriers based on terrain features, reinforced 
by fortifications and supported by mobile reserves, but this option was also politically 
unacceptable. NATO could raise masses of relatively low-technology forces to balance 
those of the WP, but democracies find it hard to Eve in an indefinite state of mobilization, 
as the Israelis discovered in 1973. This option was neither economically, politically nor 
Operationally acceptable as a solution. 
NATO was therefore left with the pursuit of a high-technology solution, a course which 
held outstanding advantages. "The chip is the technological key to the new doctrine, the 
counterpart to the Blitzkrieg's use of the gasoline engine". 211 It was an option which 
reflected and exploited the most dynamic aspect of Western society, and promised to 
match and contribute to advances that would be made in any case in civil technology. 
Despite the traditional excellence of their artillery equipment, the Soviets were ill-placed 
to make best use of it because of their weakness in C41 and the technologies that 
underpinned it. The Soviets did not reject high-technology for its own sake, on the 
contrary, they followed the Western lead wherever they could. Their moderate successes 
in the late 1980s encouraged them to modify their concept of mass firepower, to fire less 
ammunition per gun, but more selectively. As advances in C41 continued, it seemed 
inevitable that the quantity of Soviet artillery would fall, but its firepower become even 
more effective. However, as in the West, the constraining factor was likely to be not so 
much technology as economics. 
Arguments that it would be futile to follow the high-technology route because the Soviets 
would follow and develop counters to it seemed flawed. The Soviets were already 
following that route, and NATO had the option of keeping ahead or falling behind. On the 
contrary, it seemed clear that in any 'arms race', the West would have a comparative 
advantage in the decisive technologies of future battle; so much so that precipitating such 
a 'race" could fundamentally alter the strategic balance. Few imagined that the collapse of 
the USSR would be so sudden, and the widening of the technological gap between the 
NATO and the WP was almost certainly a factor in this. 
The success of deep attack in the future was seen to depend upon the ability of emerging 
technology to generate the equivalent of the massive conventional fire characteristic of the 
two World Wars and contemporary TNW. In both cases there were doubts whether it 
would produce the same result, even though the result it would produce might be equally 
effective. 212 
The former Soviet Chief of Staff, Marshal N. V. Ogarkov, claimed that conventional 
weapons now "approach in effectiveness weapons of mass destruction and can become 
v213ý involved immediately in active combat actions , and it was thought possible that one of NATO's MLRS rockets, by dispersing its warhead in the form of sub-munitions, could be 
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as effective as a one-kiloton enhanced radiation, or standard 10-kiloton, nuclear device. It 
was argued that such conventional munitions would be no substitute for a 50-Hoton 
device. 214 On the other hand, numerous such attacks could be a substitute, and would be a 
preferable form of attack to a 50-Hoton blast, with its extensive collateral damage. A 
stronger argument was that the tactical effect on the battlefield might be equivalent to that 
of nuclear weapons, but at the same time lack their strategic deterrent effect. Munitions 
incorporating emerging technology would not carry the same momentous risks and 
psychological weight as nuclear weapons, and to would have less impact on Soviet 
perceptions, On the other hand, the problem with nuclear weapons had been that they had 
grown to lack credibility, and so weakened deterrence. It was precisely this credibility gap 
that it was hoped emerging technology would bridge in the 1990s and early 21" Century. 
Some Europeans feared that if emerging technology could produce conventional effects 
equivalent to those of tactical or theatre nuclear weapons, this would weaken the linkage 
to strategic nuclear systems. But if NATO had genuinely been offered the probability of a 
victory over a hypothetical WP attack without resort to nuclear defence, this would have 
been attractive, for it would have left the Soviets with only the alternatives of peace or of 
a nuclear war, which they would have had to start, and which would have yielded them 
little benefit. 
The area of greatest doubt was technical feasibility, not just in the capability of the 
munitions but in target acquisition, a problem which equally affected nuclear weapons. It 
had been calculated that NATO faced 5,000 company-sized targets in central Europe, 215 
requiring 5,000 VLRS salvoes and 5,000 ballistic missile attacks. It was not certain 
that NATO would be able to acquire so many targets, moving at once over 200,000sq km, 
against counter-measures and terrain clutter. If technology should faiL however, or be too 
vulnerable, NATO would be in difficulty, and have very limited reserves of traditional 
conventional firepower on which to fall back. Equally, if the Soviets achieved a deep 
penetration of NATO positions, before dcep --ttack could be effective, even brilliant 
munitions might find it difficult to discriminate between friend and foe, in what would in 
relative terms have become a close-quarters inelee. 
The pace of technological change was rapid, and it was acLnowledged that such 
reservations might soon have seemed excessively cautious. The pace of negotiations on 
nuclear arms reductions had also been swift, and if these proved successful the whole 
debate might be rendered obsolete. This proved to be the case; and the whole 'theology' 
of nuclear deterrence in Europe now seems curiously archaic, just as threats elsewhere 
now seem more menacing. 
1 The 203mm M1955 was the first Soviet gtm which could fire nuclear shells. 2An analogous situation obtained in the 1930s when novel theories of mobility were introduced in the 
West to justify a reduction in artillery strength, while in the USSR the importance, if not primacy, of field 
artillery remained unchallenged. 3 The last Soviet SP field gun of the Second World War was the ISU-1521ML-20S of 1944, and the 
Soviets did not produce another until the 122mm M-1974 (2SI) in 1974; but in the interval they produced 
ten new towed equipments. Hofinann (1978). 
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4 As a result, between 1953 and 1957 the Soviets produced five different models of MBRL and increased 
their range from 191an to 30km The result of this development was the BM-21 which appeared in 1964 
and remained in common use in various forms into the 2 1' Century. 
5 Becker's interest in military rockets originated in the belief that they could be used to deliver chmnical 
weapons. Neufeld (1996), p. 6. 
6 Strategic vulnerability to missile attack remained the USA's primary defence controversy over fifty years 
later, only to be superseded by that of terrorism. 
Quoted in Meehan, p. 18. 
Department of Defense, Washington DC, 1953. 
9 NASA was formed from the US Army's rocket forces, whose roots lay in Peeneraunde, the self-styled birth- 
place of space travel, built by the artillery technicians of the Paris Gun of 1918. 
10 On 25h May 1953, 'Atomic Annie'fired an 8001b atomic warhead at a target 101an away. It weighed 
85 tons, required two tractors to move it and proved an unstable platform. It was taken out of service 
within the decade. 
11 Conventional artillery had also been deprived of resources in the 1920s, but that proved to be a time 
when considerable thought was given to the theory of fire support by those with recent wartime 
experience. A simila trend was evident in the 1950s when, despite reduced assets, artillerymen continued 
to pursue issues left unresolved in 1945, and adapted them to the novel conditions of the battlefield. 12 FL grson (1949). 
Sallenbach (1958). 
14 The tendency to disperse guns amongst the supported arms rather than concentrate them to generate 
decisive fire had returned. In effect, the field artillery had become the equivalent of the 19'h Century's 
battalion guns, with SP guns like mobile horse artillery, and atomic systems in the role of the 'grande 
battcric' or artillery of the park 
15 Robinson (1952). 
16 The British Army's experiment in the late 1970s with a Task Force, capable of 'grouping' all artWery 
in a division under one command post, failed for a similar practical reason. One command post, without 
adequate CIS, could not handle the volume of information and calls for fire; and without that such 
centralized C2 had few advantages. Its demands on communications were twenty years ahead of what was 
available. 
17 Wood (1956). 
's Wood (1956). 
19 Sallenbach (1958) and Oswald (1958). 
20 The British Army maintained a mix of Abbot and M109 until the early 1990s, when both were replaced 
by the 155mm AS90. 
21 Oswald (1958). 
22 Robinson (1952), p. g. 
23 Quoted in Hofmann (1978). Military Strategy is analysed in McConnell (1985). See original text in 
Sokolovskiy (1984). 
24 Greater flexibflity was introduced down to the tactical level of command, and firepower and mobility 
increased with the introduction of new helicopters. The -*iability of mobile operations using BMP 
personnel carriers, M-24 HIND helicopters and tanks was proven in 1976 on Exercises KAWAS and 
SEWER. 
I Khrushchev witnessed a demonstration of ATGW against a tank in 1964 and observed with concern 
that, "These tanks will burst into flames cven before they mach the battle line. Quoted in Karber (1976), 
p. 11. In 1972, Anfi-Tank Warfare by Major General G. Biryukov and Colonel G. Melnikov gave ATGW 
a 4: 1 IdU ratio over the tank, and 8: 1 over the APC. Quoted in Stokes (1980a). 
26 Quoted in Hofmann (1978). 
27 Donnelly (1979a), p. 19. 22 Eshel (1984). 
29 In some respects this was a reversion to the tactics of the Second World War, with the difference that 
the tank now acted as an assault gun and the new SPs, while firing directly during an assault, did not lead 
the attack. 
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30 Quoted in Donnelly (1979a). 
31 Donnelly (1975). 
" Between 1973 and 1983 the artillery of a tank division increased from seventy-eight howitzers and 
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Kulcshov, quoted in Bellamy (1983a), p. 786, the weight of artillery and mortar fire delivered by a motor 
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of the increased size of the supported arms. A motor rifle division of the early 1980s, for example, had 
sixteen times as many tanks, and thirty-seven times as many APCs as a mechanized division had had in 
the Second World War. It was also necessary because the anticipated depth of enemy defence had roughly 
doubled 
113 Foskcy (1984). 
34 Bellamy (1983a). 
35 The 2S3 had a range of 17,300m and could fire five rounds per minute. It was an indirect fire weapon 
with an overall covering oflust 15-20mm of armour, giving it protection only against splinters. 
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General A. Saposhnikov explained that, "Experience shows us that assault guns can counter enemy targets 
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Crews manning Soviet SPs of the 1970s and 1980s worc the black uniform of armoured troops, but 
belonged to the artillery. The role of the true assault gun had been taken over by the tank. 
37 See Madill (1982), Bellamy (1985a) and'More Self-Propelled Gun Designations, Jane's Defence 
Weekly, Vol. 5, No. 22 (7th June 1986), pp. 1033-1034. 
38 The BM-21 had four times the salvo-weight and eight tims the destructive capacity of the BM-13; but 
while the accuracy of NSRL systems improved, targets also became harder, and it became more cost- 
effective to fire heavier missiles. 
39 BM-27 had a range of 35-40km, delivering 720 rounds on one square kilomctre in thirty seconds, and 
was able to fire chemical weapons and mines. 
40 Foskey (1984). 
41 Hansen (1984). 
42 Quoted in Bevilacqua (1984), pp. 48-49. 
43 Quoted in Bellamy (1983), p. 269. 
44 Donnelly (1979a). 
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in mobile operations reinforced the need for the barrage, which had been used in the past to 'sweep the 
ground' of un-located enemy. He also challenged the Soviet lildng for destruction, arguing that the most 
important criterion was the time for which an enemy was unable to fire his weapons, in other words, 
neutralization. This took less time and required less logistic support, both of which were attractive to 
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Lieutenant General Stroganov noted that whereas fire against static targets should above all be accurate, 
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termed 'fire strikes', and the view that they should replace the prolonged preliminary bombardment of the 
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battery over a period of time was less effective than that of three batteries on the same target for one-third 
of the time. The battalion fire mission therefore became standard, as it did in NATO armies. 47 Isby (198 1). 
46 It was calculated that an assault would be effective only if it progressed at no more than about 5kph. If 
it were faster, insufficient times would elapse for enemy targets to be suppressed effectively. A possible 
solution was to engage successive lines of defence simultaneously, as had been common practice in the 
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defence would not have enough time to engage effectively, and would be overwhelmed. But these 
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'The Rocket Field Artillery Battalion, FleldArfillery Journal, Vol. 35 (September 1945), pp. 515-522. An 
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, internafional Defense Review, Vol. 19, 
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104 
at Rate 20, and that fire would be more accurate than with solid propellant In addition, blast 
overpressures would be less because re-ignition of muzzle gases would not occur. These gases would be 
inert and non-toxic, and would not compromise a gun's position with a bright flash. SeeUsscls(1986), 
and 'Liquid Prcpellant Charges... ' (1986), cited in the preceding note. 
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characteristic of the latter is the shock and psycho! ogical cffcct created by sheer weight of explosive. It 
seemed unlikely that a few accurate weapons destroying their targets would achieve a similar effect on 
morale by neutralizing those who were not themselves hit. To be effective, emerging technology would 
have to destroy a higher percentage of targets to compensate for its probably reduced neutralizing cffect. 
Equally it would be necessary to apply the concept of precision in a wider sense than geographical 
accuracy. Timing would have to be as precise as accuracy, and so too would the degree of effect matched 
to the target. Technology would have to provide cffects as precisely against a variety of area targets as 
against a point. 21 3 Tegnelia (1985), p. 645. 214 Goure & Cooper (1984). 
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CHAPTER 4- OPERATIONS SINCE 1945 
4.1 HIMODUCTION 
For nearly half a century after the Second World War, the Cold War dominated military 
thinking. The war for which the rival alliances planned seemed a natural derivative from 
the style and technology of the great wars of the 20'h Century. It was the military centre 
of gravity, yet numerous 'warm' and 'hot' wars of lesser intensity and importance were 
fought concurrently with it. Care was taken to ensure that these other conflicts, often 
involving members of the Warsaw Pact or NATO, did not cross the threshold into wider 
conventional and nuclear warfare between them. The armies of these alliances were 
equipped and trained for the worst; but their combat experience lay in lesser conflicts. 
Attempts have often been made to delineate between types of wars, conflicts and 
opeiations, using terms like 'small', 'limited', 'out of area', 'operations other than war', 
"other operations', 'low-intensity', 'spectrum of conflict' and 'terrorism'. These come in 
and out of fashion, and have generally proved unsatisfactory, reflecting the inability of 
annies to find a conceptual constant, and hence a firm doctrinal foundation on which to 
base their operations and defence spending. Here, these military activities will all be 
regarded merely as 'operations'. Some have been of high intensity and long duration, as in 
Korea (1950-3) and Vietnam (1965-73). Some have been of high intensity and relatively 
short duration, such as the Gulf War (1990-91), and others have simmered for years. 'The 
war against terrorism' is expected to last for a protracted period, and could even come to 
be seen as the backdrop to everyday life. This chapter examines all operations since 1945, 
identifying the enduring principles in the application of fire and its effects, along with the 
powerful, evolving trends which often demand that these principles be applied differently. 
Warfare throughout history has been 'limited' in some respect. Even in the Second World 
War, self-imposed limits were placed on the use of chemical weapons. The novelty of the 
modem strategic environment is that with the end of the Cold War and the imminent 
possibility of a general cataclysmic war, the limitations on wars are likely to be the greater; 
and yet the scope of what conflict may entail beyond mere military action may once more 
be expanding. At the same time, even though a war may be limited by geography, time or 
intensity, it may still be 'total' for one or more of the belligerents. In some senses the term 
'limited' has clearly lost some of its power of differentiation, and hence utility. 
Nevertheless, the likelihood that operations in the foreseeable future will be subject to 
greater limitations has profound consequences for the employment of artillery and fire in 
general; for its optimal application in a new and complex environment requires a different 
approach to that proven in the two World Wars and for which the armies of the Cold War 
trained. 
With the advantage of little more than a decade's hindsight, the Cold War may now be 
seen to have been but the largest and most limited of the 'limited wars' that have taken 
place since 1945. ' It was of great length and vast economic cost, but cheap when set 
against some of the alternatives. It had few direct casualties, other than those sustained on 
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clandestine operations; but millions died as a result of wars regarded as peripheral to it, 
but which were in some ways its proxies. However, many of those conflicts had an 
enduring logic and 'life' of their own; and many new conflicts arose after the Cold War, 
and partly because of its demise. Wars whicla might once have been regarded as limited, 
and thus of some lesser military standing to the mainstream of 'general' war, may now be 
seen in historical perspective to have been surer indicators of more substantial strategic 
trends and longer-term evolutions in military affairs. By comparison, many aspects of the 
Cold War reflected a paralysis in the fading strategic dynamics of 1945. 
Nevertheless, the importance of winning the Cold War and the energies and stakes 
involved were enormous and should not be minimized, for it was the strategic imperatives 
of the Cold War which most determined the manner in which force, including artillery, was 
applied in the last half of the 2& Century, and much of this legacy will endure. While 
acknowledging the all-pervading influence of the Cold War, it seems helpful to regard all 
conflicts since 1945 as mere evolutions of warfare, and to regard the Cold War as an 
aberrant military episode; although it was itself the incubator of many conflicts, and the 
cause for which many new technologies were developed. 
The hardest operations to analyse and categorize are those involving 'Peace' - keeping it, 
supporting it or enforcing it. Together with other forms of intervention, these operations 
reflect the dynamic strategic context in which firepower will in future be deployed. If 
there is now a call for military force beyond national self-interest, it may be in the name of 
some 'New World Order' or even 'Humanitarian Intervention', for this 'Empire of Ideas' 
and form of universalism sounds less 'neo-impefial'. 2 
Many 'Peace' operations incorporate combat, and at times may only be set apart from war 
by their political dimension. 3 While the context of recent Peace operations may appear to 
be new, the actual military tasks that they involve are familiar to any army which has 
conducted 'imperial policing' in its history. The military means applied in these Peace 
operations may appear to be different to 'imperial policing' of old, but often thanks only to 
their technological modernity. Peace operations are treated separately at the end of this 
Chapter. This is not to portray them in the first instance as fundamentally different to 
other military operations, but rather to highlight certain of their particular facets, although 
these frequently turn out merely to be evidence of the same trends found in other military 
operations since 1945, especially at the Operational level. This analysis should reinforce 
the view that while Peace operations may be purported to Mer from other military 
operations, they are both products of the same turbulent environment, and consequently 
share much in common. 
Operations against terrorists may involve traditional military combat; but international 
sensitivities and the need to avoid counter-productive 'overldfl', wiU probably cause them 
to be 'limited' by many of the restraints that Inave become familiar in Peace operations. 
The Changing Strategic Environment4 
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Shifts in the strategic environment since 1945 have affected the manner in which artillery 
has been employed and changed the consequences of its effects, the least of which may be 
tactical on the battlefield. The wars fought by the major powers since 1945 have not been 
ones of national survival. In democracies at least, Governments have been increasingly 
susceptible to the views of electors who have proved vocal in expressing opinions as to 
whether they should be involved in military operations or not. Objections may be moral, 
political, financial or based on a reluctance to sustain casualties. Even the Government of 
the USSR was vulnerable to adverse public opinion on its involvement in its war in 
Afghanistan in the 1980s. On the other hand, in cases such as the attacks on the USA on 
11* September 2001, which stir the emotion and raise issues of fundamental principle, 
democracies may prove robust opponents. 
The increasing interdependence of the international economy has made national economies 
and mass markets more sensitive to the disruption caused by conflict. The globalization of 
expanding news media and their technology has increased the access ofjournalists to 
conflicts; and the volume and accessibility of their products has created an all-pervading 
awareness of it. There has also been an increasing 'globalization of morality', whereby a 
Western standard of human rights has increasingly been adopted as the international 
'bench mark', or 'default setting', against which all should be measured; and a new legal 
apparatus is evolving to which all may be held accountable and judged. Failure to 
acknowledge this standard may in itself be deemed a 'causus bell? in the name of 'peace'. 
Not only has news of conflict become more commonplace, but domestic and international 
opinion seems also to have become more sensitive to the suffering portrayed. This has 
been expressed by a growing expectation of 'proportionality', not just in the absolute scale 
of force used against an opponent, however justified in purely military terms, but also in 
the relative suffering sustained by both sides. In the Second World War it was often 
deemed legitimate by all sides to slaughter civilians. Today, electorates do not wish their 
own forces to sustain unnecessary casualties, but they have also become increasingly 
queasy about enemy casualties if these are, or appear to be, excessive. This does not mean 
that Western nations are not prepared to inflict civilian casualties or sustain casualties 
themselves; but it does mean that they will probably have to make a convincing political 
case for doing so, especially to their coalition partners. 6 
Initiating, managing and sustaining operations have become more challenging, particularly 
for Western Governments. They must be aware of and measure domestic and 
international support for their actions. They must monitor and perhaps influence the 
media on which this feeds, and their actions will be reinforced if they can shield them with 
legal and at least apparent moral legitimacy. They must judge the threshold of acceptable 
cost both human and financial, but this may move as events develop. They can prepare for 
both of these. They can build sound economies, forge alliances and invest in the full 
spectrum of military capability and readiness in times'of peace. When crises arise they will 
need to make the case for their actions to their electorates, who may or may not be willing 
to pay the advertised or actual price. All of these factors are likely to be more readily 
controlled if the duration of an operation is short, but above all likely to succeed. 
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The opportunities for factors which might once have been favourable to become adverse 
increase with an operation's duration. Time is thus likely to be a vulnerability of Western 
Governments, which are more subject to the forces described above; and to be a potential 
ally of their opponents. Yet rapid, decisive action may be at odds with democratic 
decision making, alliance building, force generation, deployment times and targeting with 
due care for proportionality. A 'cult of the quick' carries its own dangers. 7 
Such is the complex strategic context in which artillery firepower must be set. It is not 
constant, it is dynamic; and the advantage goes to whomever perceives the fundamentals 
in this dynamic, understands its implications and deli-vers military capability appropriate to 
its next iteration not its last. Comprehension, anticipation and the will and ability to act 
are at least as important as information. 
The Impfications for Artiffery 
Since 1945, artillery has been used in operations to deliver raw combat power whose 
intensity has often at least matched that of the World Wars. Its firepower has been an 
Operational as well as a tactical tool. The challenge for artillery since 1945 has usually 
been not so much to generate unlimited firepower, as to provide measured effects, at the 
right time and place, appropriate to the occasion. By 1970, the Vietnam War had shown 
that sheer weight of fire could have negative consequences, not so much in the form of 
self-obstructing battlefield damage, as self-defeating effects on domestic and international 
opinion. It was clear that the application of fire would need to become more 
discriminating, causing less material and political collateral damage. 
Too much force may compromise the viability of the campaign; but underestimation of the 
firepower required may waste the resources which are deployed. More dangerously, it 
may delay achieving success; and this delay may compromise the political foundations of 
an operation, domestically, in an alliance, or in the court of international opinion. 
The strategic and tactical reach of artillery has increased thanks to technical improvements 
in the capabilities of aircraft and specialized shipping. The greatest advances, however, 
have been in the technology of the munitions themselves. If an enemy can be engaged 
effectively early, and at greater distance, friendly casuzlties are likely to be lower, and the 
desired effects accomplished more quickly. The unit costs of smarter munitions and their 
precise effects might be higher, but the overall financial and human cost, and hence the 
political viability of achieving the desired effects, could be lower. 
At the tactical level, precision essentially entails achieving the chosen effect on a selected 
target at the optimal time and location. At the Operational level it incorporates the 
military judgement as to what specific effect is required to create the desired n-dhtary- 
strategic consequence that matches the definition of military success. The art of command 
at this level is to marshal the resources and to deliver the combat power to accomplish the 
military task; but to have gauged this precisely to the strategic tolerances bearing in on the 
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commander. 
The virtue of artillery at both the tactical and Operational levels in this environment has 
been that its characteristics lend themselves so well to the technology and techniques of 
the ever-increasing requirement for precision. Precision may entail the timely delivery of 
massive yet accurate unsubtle explosive effects. Equally, artillery may be used to commit 
precise, discrete acts of violence, forming an instrument of sophisticated psychological 
manipulation. 
4.2 COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS (COIN) 1945-1970 
In COIN operations, or others of relatively low-intensity, political considerations usually 
make it desirable to restrict firepower to the minimum necessary to achieve the aim, 
sometimes even at the risk of underestimating that requirement. In low-intensity 
operations it may be domestically unacceptable, or internationally counter-productive, to 
deploy the number of troops or quantity of equipment best suited to defeat an opponent. 
It may also be unacceptable to use certain advanced technologies, which may be deemed 
'unfair' in some way and cast an opponent as an underdog. Equally, non-lethal weapons 
may have a far greater effect in such operations than they would in more intense conflicts. 
Much of this logic may also apply to operations against terrorists, which are likely to 
feature short, sharp actions with demonstrably successfid outcomes, but achieved with 
precise and politically attuned military effects. 
Mobifity 
Such constraints have meant that commanders have often had to control large areas of 
ground with slender resources. Equipment mobility, both strategic and within the theatre, 
has therefore usually been a more important factor than the ability to concentrate massed 
fire through fire mobility. 
For example on Borneo in 1962, there was no in-theatre logistic support for British 
operations and all stores had to travel 1,3001an by air or sea. There were few roads, and 
the only way to deploy troops and their equipment tactically was by air. 8 By March 1965, 
the British had the equivalent of four regular infantry brigades supported by two regiments 
of artillery. 9 Brigade fronts varied in size between 3001an and 1,100km, while in Cold 
War Europe at the time, 161an to 201an was normal. To concentrate artillery would have 
been to leave most of the theatre without fire support, so dispersion was the norm. Thirty 
guns were often deployed singly over a 1,600krn front. Coverage was thus achieved at the 
expense of concentration, also the expedient of the French in Vietnam. The fortunate 
difference for the British was the relative weakness of their Indonesian enemy, and the 
availability of aircraft to move guns rapidly, which prevented isolated British gun positions 
from becoming easy targets. 'O 
The British relied on the deployment of artillery by aircraft in the Radfan, in the Arabian 
Peninsula, in 1964 for similar reasons. " The terrain was rugged, but not as impenetrable 
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as that of Borneo, and there was scope for improvization. At various times guns were 
towed by Land Rovers, porteed on 3-ton trucks, and carried in pieces by donkey and 
camel. The terrain was similar to that encountered by the British in their Dhofar campaign 
of the late 1960s and early 1970s, where the 25pdr was the standard artillery piece. This 
was frequently deployed by Skyvan STOL aircraft to remote landing strips, and even the 
5.5-inch gun was broken down and flown by Caribou transport aircraft, or underslung 
from helicopters. " 
Firepower 
In many COIN campaigns the threshold that requires artillery firepower is not crossed, and 
British gunners have frequently left their guns to undertake infantry tasks -a more precise 
application of lighter firepower. 13 As the level of enemy firepower has increased, 
Government response to insurgency has tended to become more forceful. Thus artillery 
was used by the British in Palestine between 1948-52, and in East Affica, between 1952- 
5 5.14 Artillery can, however, be a clumsy weapon when wielded against the guerrilla, and 
some have doubted its value in COIN operations. In Malaya in 195 1, for example, 
artillery fire was often unobserved or used against fleeting or ill-defined targets. " 
Artillery has often been used to clear the way for other arms. Artillery covered the drop of 
the 3'dBattalion of the Parachute Regiment on the CAP BADGE DZ in the Radfan from 
3& April to I't May 19641", and in the Dhofar campaign artillery was frequently used to 
shell ridges dominating DZs which were used to resupply infantry patrols. 17 British 
artillery fire support bases never reached the scale of those of French forces in Algeria or 
US forces in Viietnam, but the principle was similar. The guns had to be prepared to 
defend themselves with direct fire's around 6,400 mils; and in Arabia defences were built 
up in the form of rock walls or 'sangars. 19 
Although the intensity of operations may be low, artillery should always be ready for 
surges of activity. For example, in Borneo in 1965-66, the confrontation with Indonesia 
escalated to the point where the British found it necessary to employ tactics similar to 
those used against the Japanese in Burma. Full artillery support was required to support 
company-sized operations, often in unacknowledged operations across the border against 
regular Indonesian forces; but by 1966 the campaign had reverted to what amounted to 
terrorism by two- or three-man units, hunted by British platoons. 20 
British artillery firepower in COIN operations has scarcely been comparable in weight with 
that in conventional war. In Dhofar in the late 1960's a troop of three guns might fire 500 
rounds per month . 
21 In the Radfan, J Battery RHA fired 20,000 rounds in 14 monthS22 ; 
and in Kenya, 156hBattery fired only 23,977 rounds throughout the entire campaign. 23 
Dispersed deployment places greater responsibility on sub-units, junior officers and non- 
commissioned officers (NCOs). The Borneo campaign, for example, was described as a 
battery commander's war, but battery organizations had to be flexible. 24 Artillery was 
most commonly used to cover light infantry patrols in attack, ambush and withdrawal. In 
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Bornio in 1964., the commander of one ambush laid by 2/2ýdGurkhas said that the fire 
support of two guns saved his position from being overrun by his prey. 25 Artillery was 
also used offensively to block enemy escape routes from ambushes. The British 
commanding officer of the Muscat Regiment wrote of operations in Dhofar in the 1970s 
that, "rimely and accurate artillery support is both the greatest saver of own casualties, 
and the best means of inflicting casualties on the enemy, and provides far swifter and more 
intimate support than strike aircraft. "26 
Air support was, however, especially valued when guns were out of range and could not 
keep up with the infantry. 27 In operations in the Radfan on 4hMay 1964, aircraft hit 
targets 150m from friendly positions when artillery was insufficient. 28Nevertheless, when 
artillery was available it had many advantages. It was found in Dhofar that even if aircraft 
were overhead, in good weather with good communications it could take from five to ten 
minutes to indicate and hit a target, while a good FOO could respond in seconds. 29 
Although COIN operations often take place in relatively unpopulated areas, the nature of 
such conflicts makes it even more important to avoid civilian casualties. In Malaya in 
19513, it was observed that artillery fire often caused damage and casualties in friendly 
villages", working against British interes-ts. Lieutenant General Sir Walter Walker, 
commander of the British forces during the Borneo campaign, observed that, "We went to 
any lengths to keep our hands clean". Precautions were taken to avoid casualties by air, 
artillery and mortars. "It was indelibly inscribed on our minds that one civilian killed by us 
would do more harm than ten killed by the enemy. "3' The rigorous application of this 
policy, the antithesis of the 'body count' syndrome, helps to explain the successful 
outcome of that campaign. 32 
4.3 THE KOREAN WAR 1950-1953 
In 1945 the USA demonstrated the means and the will to employ atomic weapons. When 
used against Japanese cities, their direct military effect was relatively small compared to 
the political and indirect military consequences - the surrender of Japan. " 
However, the political consequences of employing atomic weapons could also prevent 
their being used to military advantage. Since the First World War, the use of massive 
conventional firepower has been seen at times to have military disadvantages, but never 
the political complications of atomic weapons. When the USA entered the Korean War in 
1950, a powerful lobby in the USA advocated the use of atomic weapons; but this 
firepower was never used, primarily for fear of a Soviet response, adverse international 
political reaction, and for moral considerations. Nevertheless, American belief in the 
efficacy of massive conventional firepower which it had developed during the Second 
World War remained undiminished. The problem lay in mobilizing and deploying it in a 
war in which the fate of the nation was not at stake. 
Mobifity 
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The ability of artillery to keep up with manoeuvre arms was not a major issue in the 
Korean War. While the campaign ebbed and flowed on the Korean Peninsula, advances 
were generally made at the speed of the infantry soldier, and, in the event of UN 
amphibious landings, techniques developed in the Second World War were found 
satisfactory. Tactical mobility was often demonstrated in 'raids', such as those by several 
artillery regiments of the I" Commonwealth Division in August 195 134, but the apparent 
strategic deadlock, in what was expected to be a short war, caused persistent concern and 
demands for greater firepower to break the apparent stalemate. 
Firepower 
US commanders urged Washington to send more artillery to Korea. Their major 
deficiencies were in anti-tank guns, heavy artillery and ammunition. At the Battle of Osan 
on 5'h July 1950, the US 2.36-inch rocket launcher, the Bazooka, proved ineffective 
against North Korean Soviet-made tanks. '5 Yet again, direct fire artillery proved the only 
effective anti-tank weapon, and in a letter to General MacArthur on 8hJuly 1950, Major 
General W. F. Dean appealed for the delivery of 90mm towed anti-tank guns. MacArthur 
was particularly concerned at the shortage of non-divisional artillery, but he was offered 
only one third of what he requested of Washington. 'Tighting in World War Two had 
proven to him that a successful offence against a determined enemy required non- 
divisional artillery of one to one with divisional artillery. "36 
After the Second World War, the USA possessed a large stockpile of ammunition, which 
encouraged the complacent belief that this would suffice in a short war. True to 
expectation, the early stages of the war were highly mobile on both sides; but by mid-1951 
movement had slowed. The quantity of US artillery deployed in Korea rose sharply, but it 
was handicapped by a shortage of ammunition, of which three tons were required to 
produce each enemy casualty. 37 The role of artillery became increasingly important, as 
attempts were made to regain momentum; and US DAER rose above those of the Second 
World War as a consequence . 
3' General Ridgway described the expenditure as either 
extravagance or misuse. 
Doubts about the ability of US forces to sustain these high rates of fire arose during the 
Battle for Bloody Ridge in August-September 195 1, where the US 2nd Division fired 
153,000 rounds, and the 15'hField Artillety Battalion set. a US light battalion record of 
14,425 rounds in 24 hours . 
39 Five battalions suppoiting the US TO Division fired over one 
million rounds over a three week period. The rate may have been high, but the firepower 
itself was less impressive and of moderate effect. The number of guns employed was 
small, in comparison with battles of the Second World War, hence the need for high rates 
of fire; and much was wasted in inaccurate high-trajectory fire against bunkers-40 
Even such high rates of ammunition expenditure were deemed insufficient against the 
enemy's overwhelming numbers, and by November 1951 the use of atomic munitions was 
being guardedly considered. 41 General Mark Clark saw 'increased forces', and the 
'removal of certain restrictions", as the only means of success without, 'Ughly unpalatable 
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personnel costs, against an undemoralized. enemy, in superior strength, in well organized 
defensive positions in depth! ". 42 However, atomic firepower was withheld and the 
apparent inadequacy of available conventional firepower led to ever greater calls for 
artillery reinforcements. 
There was no rationing of ammunition at Bloody Ridge, and such expenditure rapidly 
consumed the US stockpile. The first restrictions on ammunition expenditure were 
imposed in October 195 1, and General Ridgway complained to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of 
the dangers of providing for the relatively low Second World War rates of fire when the 
number of guns had been greater, and DAER consequently less. The deluge of fire 
continued. On one day in Autumn 1952,6,000 rounds fell on I-fill 281. On another, 
20,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire fell on Pork Chop jEll. 43 In April 1953, nine 
battalions fired over 37,000 rounds at it in twenty-four hours. 44 
General van Fleet maintained that by the standards of the Second World War in Europe 
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the US Eighth Army was short of 70 battalions of field artillery, and that !m reduction in 47 higher compensating rates of fire in Korea would result in more casualties. General 
Ridgway took the traditional US view that firepower saved the lives of ffiendly troops 
and, if only for domestic political reasons let alone military considerations, it should be 
increased: "... artillery has been and remains the great killer of Communists. It remains the 
great saver of soldiers, American and Allied. There is a direct relation between piles of 
shells and the piles of corpses. The bigger the former, the smaller the latter"" - the inverse of the 'body count'. 
By Winter 1951-52, ammunition rationing had become strict, and this continued into the 47 Summer, at a time when Communist artillery fire almost doubled . Belief in the merits of fire superiority was shared by the USA's allies, and where artillery was lacicing, ways were 
found to increase it by other means. For example, greater use was made of mortars. The 
British 4.2-inch mortars operated in batteries in the same way as field gunsý' and the US 
Army used them increasingly as a substitute for guns. 49 
The other major source of firepower was aircraft. When ammunition was short, B-29 
bombers, otherwise assigned to Air Interdiction, were tasked to engage close targets, a 
trend resisted by the USAF, which believed this to be a misuse of aircraft. Despite this, 
close air support (CAS), coordinated with artillery fire became routine, and techniques 
improved throughout the war. 50 Air superiority yielded many benefits besides close 
supporting fire. On 25b September 1950, following the Han River crossing and capture of 
Seoul, aircraft were used in conjunction with corps artillery to attack withdrawing enemy 
columns. Air-power made up for the lack of heavy artillery, and enabled air ON to 
operate with relative impunity on CB tasks. 51 It did however lead to a stiffening of 
Communist AD, and the need to coordinate SEAD. In September 1952, artillery delivered 
a major SEAD fireplan in preparation for CAS by 5h USAF. The latter suffered only 
twenty percent of anticipated casualties, and subsequently detailed SEAD planning became 
routine before major air operations. 52 
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Tactics 
UN artillery tactics during the Korean War followed a traditional pattern. Artillery and 
air-Power were used wherever possible to break up enemy attacks by counter-preparation 
fire, before they could close with friendly PoSitionS. 53 Speed of response was critical, and 
the I" Commonwealth Division expected its artillery to respond to calls for divisional fire 
in just over one minute, and for regiments to do so in slightly less. 54 When fOures 
occurred, they were often the fault of poor fireplanning. " The role of manoeuvre arms in 
protecting the source of their supporting fire became more pronounced. In 1950, US 
forces found that North Korean infiltration tactics effectively did away with any concept of 
a front fine. Gun positions had to be prepared to defend themselves and the supported 
arms had to be prepared to move to support them. 
Although individual artillery pieces were a match for UN artillery, communist artillery was 
substantially outnumbered6, and resorted to massive protection and cunning concealment 
as a substitute. 57 It was clear to the Chinese that if they concentrated they would merely 
present targets. They tried to disperse as much as possible in small units, with the 
consequence that their tactics became focused on limited objectives such as the 
destruction of company or battalion sized units. 58 The primary mission of Chinese artillery 
was close support, provided by guns moNing frequentJy between prepared concealed 
positions. In May 1952 it was estimated that there -were 500 concealed positions opposite 
the South Korean 11 Corps area alone. CB fire assumed at least as high a priority as close 
support, and the value of locating equipment increased as a result. 5" 
Conclusion 
US conventional firepower during the Korean War at times matched, or by some criteria 
surpassed that generated in the Second World War; but it was severely restricted for other 
than tactical reasons. These were the withholding of nuclear weapons, the shortage of 
guns deployed in the theatre, and the failure to supply the quantity of ammunition to 
satisfy the military appetite. 
The US Army emerged from the Korean War convinced that as firepower grew, American 
casualties fell; that both tactical and strategic aircraft could and should carry out close 
support tasks, in addition to artillery; and that ammunition expenditure norms established 
in the Second World War were lower than those required in a war in which numbers of 
troops and guns were limited for political reasons. 
The experience encouraged the assumption that wars outside Europe would be against 
enemies over whom the USA held air and fie superiority. Such future conflicts would 
require the maximum ratio of firepower to manpower, and methods of delivering that fire 
in the greatest quantity that political constraints would allow. 
4.4 THE INDO-CHNA WAR 1945-1975 
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US involvement in Vietnam began on a small scale with the provision of advisers to the 
South Vietnamese Army, fighting a COIN campaign. The commitment of combat units to 
this theatre in 1964 caused the US Army to re-think much of its tactical doctrine, 
including that of artillery; but the long-standing principles behind that doctrine did not 
change. The challenge was to find the appropriate means of applying them. 
In Vietnam, it was seldom practical to concentrate artillery against the enemy, since the 
latter usually avoided presenting a massed target. There was no readily identifiable 
tactical front line. The front line in the strategic sense was the border between North and 
South Vietnam, which US ground formations were forbidden to cross. Ground combat 
was restricted for political reasons to the South, where the enemy was potentially 
ubiquitous, and operations were continuous, widespread and often on a relatively small 
scale. 
Artillery battalions leaving the USA had to adapt to battalion, battery and section tactics in 
a '6,400 mfls' environment. The priority was not so much the concentration of fire so 
much as the dispersal or mobility of assets, in order to provide coverage over a large area. 
For this reason fire control, which in Europe was increasingly focused at battalion level, 
was reinforced in Metnam at battery level. Batteries tended to move with their affiliated 
infantry battalions; and as the British found in their colonial experiences, this tended to 
reinforce the relationship between the two, at a time when elsewhere it was becoming less 
important. 
Area coverage could be maintained by a combination of high mobility and dispersion, 
reinforced by air and sea power. The coordination of air-mobility, rotary and fixed-wing 
fire, NGS and artillery therefore became extremely close, and was the primary concern of 
artillery commanders at higher levels. The task was complex, requiring considerable 
ingenuity and flexibility to accomplish. 
The ostensible aim of US operations was to benefit the people of Vietnam; and yet the 
enemy sheltered among these people. The avoidance of civilian casualties has always been 
desirable for humanitarian reasons; but in Vietnam, as in other COIN campaigns, it 
became an important factor in achieving war aims; and yet it was singularly difficult to 
achieve in view of the US predilection for massive firepower following the Korean War. 
In 1966 US forces in Vietnam expanded greatly, artillery alone doubling in size. The 
COIN campaign assumed a more conventional aspect when the enemy deployed regular 
troops; but until her withdrawal, the USA remained in the uncomfortable position of 
fighting a war which was generally COIN in character, with forces trained, equipped and 
inclined to fight a conventional one. The consequence was almost always local military 
success, but ultimately strategic fOure. 
Area Coverage: Mobifity 
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The US Army estimated that in COIN operations government forces needed a manpower 
superiority of ten to one. Unable to match this in Vietnam, the USA attempted to make 
up for lack of numbers with superior firepower and mobility. Despite being a war of 
unprecedented mobility, the US Department of Defence estimated that forty percent of 
combat took place in static positions. In such cases, the Communists were 'fixed" and 
rendered themselves vulnerable to overwheIrning firepower. 60 The reach of guns and 
hence their firepower was increased by augmenting their range with high mobility of 
equipment. 
The US Army in Vietnam was the most mobile in history, and often used the manoeuvre 
of infantry in order to apply firepower, rather than fire to facilitate manoeuvre. Light units 
with fire support would seek out the enemy and then disengage, so that the enemy could 
be destroyed by fire, with the minimum American casualties. 6' General D. R- Palmer 
maintained that in time the US Amy forgot how to manoeuvre in contact and PUrSUit. 62 
Roads were few and Vietnamese terrain was ill-suited to an army hitherto reliant on motor 
tranSport. 63 Nevertheless, roads were the primary means of US mobility throughout the 
war, proving the most effective, albeit a vulnerable means of logistic support. However, 
road movement alone was never adequate for artillery to provide the fire support expected 
of it. Guns needed to fire on targets in all directions. It was therefore important that they 
be positioned at locations of maximum advantage, and these positions could often be 
approached only by helicopter. " In a war where helicopters became a regular mode of 
infantry transport, the guns could give satisfactory support only if they travelled in a like 
manner. 63 
The Vietnam War saw the first major use of helicopters, both as a means of transport and 
for aerial fire support. " US helicopter doctrine was the product of the vision of Generals 
J. M. Gavin and H. H. Howze. The requirement for an airmobile brigade had been 
established in 1962, and in 1904 the US I VhAir Assault Brigade was formed, 
incorporating three artillery battalions and 434 aircraft. Further development led to the 
creation of the I" Cavalry Division (Airmobile), equipped with the 105mm field gUIL67 
The predominant US tactic was the highly mobile search and destroy operation. 
Operations such as CEDAR FALLS, from e to 20h January 1967, and JUNCTION 
CITY, from 22"dFebruary to 14"May 1967, exemplified the search and destroy concept 
on the grand scale. The latter was supported by seventeen artillery battalions. " At 
battalion level, search and destroy operations might last for a few days or a weelc Guns 
would move out of their FSB to suppoit the infkitry, who would rely for heavier fire on 
longer-range artillery in other FSBs, or on aircraft. 69 
US forces conducted 'artillery raids', combined-arms operations designed to support field 
artillery rather than manoeuvre forcer. The intention was to bring artillery fire to bear on 
enemy sheltering out of range of FSBs in remote areas. 70 Mobility was also used on the 
few occasions when concentrations of artillery were required. For Operation 
BMMINGHAM in 1966, for example, the US moved seventy-two guns at short notice 
117 
50-1001an to Tay N-mh Province by air and roa(f 1; and major moves of artillery were also 
undertaken to support operations in Cambodia in 1970, and Laos in February-March 
'r 1971.2 
Area Coverage: Dispersal 
Equipment mobility was a means of bringing fire to bear by surprise in remote areas of 
Vietnam, albeit in relatively limited quantities. Where possible, however, the US preferred 
the benefits of fire-mobility from dispersed and fortified FSBs which could dominate 
critical areas of operations, and together with highly mobile firepower from the air, 
provide US troops with the support to which they had become accustomed in previous 
wars. US forces were also able to learn from the earlier mixed fortunes of the French. 
During the French war in Vietnam in the early 1950's, the First Indochina War, static 
artillery bases had been foci of vulnerability, because they lacked sufficient guns and air 
support. 73 The French, and later the South Vietnamese Army who copied them, tried to 
provide route security between bases by placing two or three guns at positions along 
major roads. These were also extremely vulnerable, but their absence would have left 
road movement still more so, and without helicopter support, the guns were indispensable 
as a source of fire support. Artillery bases did have some advantages. It was, for 
example, better to protect a hamlet with guns already in place than to rely on their moving 
to an incident in time . 
74 The French had elaborate plans to ensure mutual support between 
their bases; but in the event, the fire from these was generally ineffective because an agile 
foe was able to outpace their ponderous adjustment procedures . 
75 The Viet Minh also 
showed an unnerving ability to absorb punishment when hit. 
The French did, nevertheless enjoy some significant victories when their enemy 'fixed' 
himself upon these fortifications and massed firepower was available to the defenders. 
The Viet Minh suffered appalling casualties from artillery, bombs and napalm when they 
attacked in human waves at Vinh-Yen in January 195 1. French firepower was also 
decisive in March 1951 at Mao Khe where a French battalion held off a force six times its 
size thanks to heavy Joint fire support. General Giap learned from these experiences and 
sought to avoid situations where the French advantage could be brought to bear. Instead, 
he attacked vulnerable convoys where he could concentrate the effects of his own 
firepower and create temporary superiority in time and space. He did, however, aspire to 
strike a decisive Operational blow against a French base. 
The French were encouraged by another disastrous attack by Giap on a large French 
garrison at Na-San in November 1953, and -decided to construct a similar 'anvil' at Dien 
Bien Phu. This dominated an area of the country which it was assessed Giap could not 
abandon. In the event, the French overestimated the effect of their own fire against a 
tactically innovative enemy, and underestimated General Giap's astute political 
understanding of this type of conflict. 76 
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At Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the French suffered only two thirds of the casualties suffered by 
the Vietnamese, and less than four percent of their overall strength in the theatre, while 
Giap lost a quarter of his combat strength. Its fall, however, signalled the downfall of 
French interests in South East Asia. The means of mobility available to the Viet-Niinh in 
1954 were less sophisticated than those of the French, but more effectively employed; and 
Dien Bien Phu fell to superior firepower as a result . The Viet-Nfinh's supply route to Dien Bien Phu was 800km long, yet they transported their artillery and ammunition along 
it in unforeseen quantities. 77 The French General Navarre realized that success depended 
upon his ability to block that supply route . 
78 Seventy-five French aircraft were tasked to 
cut it and dropped 650 tons of bombs, but this was wholly inadequate for such a massive 
task. 79How much so became clear later, given the weights dropped on the Ho Chi NImh 
Trail by the Americans. 
The Battle of Dien Bien Phu demonstrated the vulnerability of light infantry and 
unsupported field positions to artillery fire"; and General W. C. Westmoreland noted the 
French blunder in accepting battle in a remote region with minimal air support or 
resupply. " 
The USA was undeterred by the French experience and constructed FSBs throughout the 
country, confident in the ability of its forces to repel surprise attacks, and of superior 
firepower in battles of attrition. 82 The FSB proved remarkably successful in military 
terms, given the aim of providing a secure base ftom which to guarantee fire support; and 
none was ever overrun and lost, although some. were abandoned. " Whereas remote bases 
offered the Communists the chance to achieve material and numerical superiority over a 
relatively more sophisticated opponent, they offered US forces opportunities to fix an 
elusive enemy who might thereby present a valuable target for superior firepower. 
The epitome of this balance of opportunities occurred at Khe Sanh. Valuable experience 
of such operations had been gained in previous years at the defence of Plei Me Special 
Forces camp. On 19* October 1965, the North Vietnamese were broken by US firepower 
and had to acknowledge their failure to take this fortified base. A similar failure occurred 
the next month at LZ X-Ray. 84 The siege of Khe Sanh between I sP January and 31d 
March 1968 demonstrated the superiority of US artillery, and most devastatingly of air- 
power. The US garrison started with a strength of 6,680 men against 20-30,000 
besiegers. The North Vietnamese calculated that they would have sufficient troops to 
overrun the base, but failed thanks to overwhelming US firepower. 85 
The most destructive firepower came from the air, but both air and artillery support were 
controlled from Khe Sanh's Fire Support Control Centre (FSCC) with its Fire Direction 
Centre (FDC) and Direct Air Support Centre (DASC). The aim of the fire controllers was 
to break up waves of attacking North Vietnamese before they reached the perimeter of the base. The targets presented were similar to those in many battles of the First World War. 
Masses of lightly armed infantry formed up in predictable locations, and advanced against 
positions defended by bunkers and wire. It is not surprising that many fireplanning 
techniques, and the phrases used to describe them, evoked those of the First World War. " 
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17 The greatest weight of firepower available to US forces came from the air. General 
Westmoreland awarded Khe Sanh the highest priority for air support. B-52s from Guam 
and Thailand flew undetected at 40,000 feet, each dropping 108 mixed 5001b and 7001b 
bombs. Ninety-five percent of these rnissions we: re targeted by the FSCC, which often 
then called on artillery to rake the target area to hit dazed survivors. " 
North Vietnamese human-wave attacks failed because their firepower was too weakened 
to wear down the garrison defences, and their reserves were destroyed by US firepower 
before they made contact with the US defenders. 89 An average of 1,800 tons of munitions 
fell around Khe Sanh every day of the siege. In seventy days of air operations, aircraft 
dropped nearly twice the total tonnage dropped by the USAAC in the Pacific in 194243. 
Major General Ott maintained that the defence of Khe Sanh "demonstrated that good fire 
support could effectively neutralize a superior force. " Perhaps he should have said a 
larger number of men. 
The US learned the lessons of Dien Bien Phu in 1954 better than did the North 
Vietnamese, and as a result of Khe Sanh's experience in 1968 came to see the usefulness 
of FSBs as offensive bases. " They were used to lure an elusive enerny onto prepared 
positions, where he could be despatched by superior firepower, 91 
The Value of Air-power Versus Artillery 
FSBs achieved area coverage by fire mobility from static positions, and the flexibility of 
US air-power compensated for their immobility and frequent lack of mutual support. Air 
bombardment was undoubtedly effective, and although its close integration with ground 
operations was regarded as a novelty at the time, precedents had been set in Korea and the 
Second World War. Although the French lacked the air-power enjoyed later by the 
Americans, they had occasional successes. For example, at Vinh-Yen in 195 1, the Viet- 
Minh tried to break through French positions towards Hanoi, but were halted by the fire of 
three artillery groups and 250 aircraft. The real novelty of the American experience was 
the degree of control exercised over it by military fireplanners and the sheer scale of 
operations. 92 
The use of helicopters as a source of firepower was an innovation which matched the 
development of heficopter-bome 'air cavalry'. 93 Aerial artillery was an extremely flexible 
forni of fire support -"the success enjoyed by the aerial artillery battalion has been 
astounding! '. 94 It was ideally suited to the engagement of awkward targets in contact with 
fliendly troops inclose country. On occasions it could engage targets just 50m from 
fiiendly troops, by firing across the front of the FLOT. 
There were, however, critics of the growing dependence of ground troops on air-power as 
a substitute for conventional artillery support. 9' Air-power was susceptible to bad weather 
conditions, and fixed-wing attack was also often less accurate than tube artillery, which 
was an important consideration in densely populated areas. Air-power became an integral 
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factor in all US fireplanning, but it was not always an adequate substitute for artillery. For 
example, artillery was particularly important in the Battle of Long Tan on I 8'h August 
1968 because severe weather meant that only one air mission was flown to support the 
Australian position. 96 
Air-power was a great asset to US forces where artillery was weak, but the power and 
availability of aircraft was such that they were often used excessively in place of artillery. 97 
This was an uneconomic use of resources, since it risked pilots and expensive aircraft, 
when shells would have sufficed. Wherever artillery was deployed in range, it was a more 
flexible weapon, able to concentrate measured fire in a given area, over a fixed period of 
time, in all weathers, 24 hours per day, and able to respond in seconds. The response time 
of aircraft was likely to be minutes, even if they were overhead. 
The South Vietnamese Army was particularly prone to ignore artillery in favour of air- 
power, and there were many cases in 1970 whet) critical time was wasted in waiting for air 
support when artillery was in range and ready to fire. As US troops withdrew, the South 
Vietnamese proved even less likely to summon support from their own relatively inept 
artillery, relying even more on US air-power, although this had become a diminishing 
asset. 
The Benefits of Firepower 
The firepower of artillery and aircraft ensured that, arguably, US forces never suffered a 
military defeat in Vietnam. As early as 1967, General Giap, realized that he needed to 
minimize the effects of US firepower and he focused his efforts against the US Marines in 
the I Corps area who had less firepower avaflable. On the few occasions when the war 
developed a conventional character, the US forces prevailed, albeit, as in crushing the Tet 
Offensive, at some political cost. As US firepower increased, the North Vietnamese paid 
an ever greater price. Following their massive losses during the Tet Offensive, they 
increasingly 'hugged" the Americans and their casualties fell in proportion to those of 
Government and US forces. 9' The firepower wielded against than in the Tet Offensive 
thus forced the North Vietnamese to return to a form of guerrilla operations. They were 
only able to return to more conventional tactics once American firepower began to 
withdraw from the theatre. 
The US hoped that, as its forces withdrew, the South Vietnamese would rely more heavily 
on their own artillery, but the latter's survey, registration, meteorology, ammunition 
handling and C2 were below US standards and, more importantly, were infýrior to those 
of the North Vietnamese. As US firepower withdrew from the theatre, the North 
Vietnamese themselves deployed conventional firepower against the demoralized South 
Vietnamese and won the war. The South Vietnamese had the equipment to match the 
firepower of the North Vietnamese, but lacked their skill and determination. 
With the departure of US artillery, South Vietnamese artillery had to cover a larger area, 
and often resorted to dispersed two-gun positions, as it had in the early and mid- I 960s. 
121 
The South Vietnamese Military Region I was overwhelmed in April 1972 by a 
conventional attack against which they seemed incapable of making an integrated all-arms 
response. FSBs fell, and the weight of enemy fire usually made air evacuation impossible. 
Road evacuation was out of the question, and in Military Region I alone 113 guns were 
lost. 99 
In the counter-attack of June and July 1972, the South Vietnamese abandoned the FSB 
tactics favoured by the US, which depended on dispersed firepower, and launched a 
mobile conventional offensive; but the South Vietnamese forces were doomed, and the 
hope that US air-power would save the day proved vain, as it had in 1954. 
The Costs of Firepower 
US firepower won military victories, but the manner and quantity in which it was applied 
imposed a heavy cost, which probably conttributed to overall defeat. On the Somme, at 
Passchendaele, Monte Cassino and Caen the penalty of excessive firepower was military; 
in Vietnam, as so often in COIN and 'Peace' operations, it was political. 
The basic problem was the danger of massive firepower to the ffiendly civilian population. 
It was estimated that sixty-five percent of all bombs dropped and shells fired in 1966 were 
unobserved. Without precise intelligence of the enemy's whereabouts 'area saturation' 
became common practice, and units tended to be judged by their ammunition expenditure 
rates. Huge resources were wasted in unfocused attacks against an ill-defined enemy. " 
The surest way to identify a target was to make ground contact, to manoeuvre in order to 
apply fire; yet only fifteen percent of artillery ammunition fired and four percent of bombs 
dropped in Metnam, were in support of friendly ground actions. The most effective shell 
was the Improved Conventional Munition (ICM), and yet ICMs accounted for only one 
thousandth of those fired during the War. 
The US Army War College study, Yhe Dyýjcs ofFire andManoeuvre of 1969, 
concluded that firepower dominated the battlefield. Some found this phenomenon 
disturbing, for it encouraged the application of fire when other solutions night have been 
more effective. In the 25h Idantry Division, all available fire assets were dispatched to the 
scene as soon as a contact was reported. All contacts thereby became divisional battles. 
Elsewhere it became standard that a commander was required to explain and justify why 
he had not called in artillery or air support. Firepower became the protective shield that 
reduced casualties, although not necessarily with the most beneficial military outcome at 
any level of war. 10' 
Between January and June 1967, forty-five percent of all artillery missions were harassing 
or interdiction fire, the primary US tactic for pre-empting attacks on bases by Communist 
indirect fire. Tons of ammunition were wasted on empty ground, advertising "the futility 
of our CF efforts and adding to the tremendous cost of the Vietnam War. " The risk of 
civilian casualties from harassing fire was especially high, and the "excitement and haste of 
the conditions under which CFs are conducted further enlarges the risk". 102 
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CF proved most effective when its response was rapid, preferably within seventy-five 
seconds of the enemy's first round. Delays could -be serious 
if clearance was required, 
despite efforts to keep maps up-to-date with fiiendly locations and areas safe for firing. 
Major General ILMcC. Tompkins, one-time commander of YdMarine Division in Vietnam 
said, '? vlost harassing and interdiction fire is utterly worthless. It is a great waste of 
ammunitior? '. 1"3 Besides this, two percent of shells were duds and gave the Met Cong an 
estimated 800 tons of explosive for re-use every month. Lieutenant General F. T. Mildren, 
Deputy Commander US Army in Vietnam, stated, "In my estimation pure harassing and 
interdiction fire in the Vietnam environment has little if any value while doing practically 
no damage to the enemy". '04 
Some believed that harassing and interdiction fire achieved a moral advantage over the 
enemy, but it was expensive in ammunition, and the key to good results was good 
targeting. 'a' Fire often missed the enemy anyway. For example, in Operations 
PERSBING and PERSBING II, which ended on 29dFebruary 1968, 'Even under 
artillery fire the enemy can reorganize and attempt an escape with his main force through 
many avenues such as hedgerows, tunnels, stream beds, paddies or sugar cane. 106 
The collateral damage of such US firepower was severe. For example, the operations of 
Task Force Oregon in Quang Ngai Province in 1967 destroyed enemy positions but 
caused excessive destruction; and it was estimated by one forward air controller that half 
the civilian casualties were women and children. "" Operation CEDAR FALLS devastated 
a densely populated area of the Iron Triangle, flattening villages, bulldozing tunnels and 
destroying jungle cover with herbicides. Thousands of refugees fled from the area, but the 
US commander estimated that the Viet Cong headquarters in the area was out of action 
for only six months. '" In 1967, the Agency for International Development's 
representative in the US I Corps asked the commander to stop 'generating' refugees. The 
military command agreed, it is alleged, but instead of stopping the bombing and shelling of 
villages, stopped issuing warnings to villagers of impending attacks. '09 Frances FitzGerald 
maintained that, "Harassment and interdiction, the creation of 'Free Fire Zones', the use of 
artillery to replace patrolling in the populated areas - these and other bombing and artillery 
practices would have been unthinkable for US commanders in occupied France or Italy 
during the Second World War". 110 
South Vietnamese and South Korean troops acquired a similar addiction to firepower, 
using it "as a substitute for, rather than in support of, infantry forces"; and much of the 
time they seemed quite oblivious to the destruction and suffering these weapons inflicted 
on the civilian population. General Westmoreland observed that Korean units "were 
sensitive about keeping (their own) casualties down, which resulted in a deliberate 
approach to operations involving lengthy preparations and heavy preliminary fire'. "' In 
depopulated areas this may have been effective, but in crowded areas it was disastrous for 
the pacification programme. One US officer observed, 'Miat the Viet Cong did was 
occupy the hamlets we pacified just for the purpose of having the allies move in and bomb 
themout. By their presence the hamlets were destroyed". "2M many other guerrilla 
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forces before and since, they succeeded in turning the superior power of their opponent 
against himself 
The worst effects of mass destruction followed the cruslAng of the Tet Offensive by US 
and Government forces. Large sections of cities such as Hue, Cholon, Kontum, My Tho 
and Ben Tre were flattened. After three weeks of fighting, the US estimated that 165,000 
civilians had been killed and 2 million refugees created. "' The actions of the North 
Vietnamese and Viet Cong also created numerous refugees sometimes deliberately, but 
seldom through the application of excessive firepower. "" 
US forces were aware of the problem, and tried to strike a balance between immediate 
military requirements and longer-term interests by imposing controls on fireplanning. In 
some areas 'No Fire Zones' were established to curtail the massive weight of fire that was 
often the automatic prescription for even minor targets. 115 Elaborate clearance procedures 
were imposed, recognizing that while a short round may be a disaster in conventional war, 
a long round may be equally unfortunate when fighting guerrillas, not least for friendly 
troops. 116 
Many have blamed American 'addiction' to firepower for- strategic failure and seen it as a 
symptom of a misappreciation of how best to fight such a war. It is ironic that despite the 
unprecedented firepower deployed by the US and the counter-productive damage which 
frequently resulted, it was considered by many that lack of firepower was to blame. 
Lieutenant General D. E. Ott maintained that the enemy "could not be destroyed - only 
repulsed - because of the restrictions imposed". 
"" To their cost, US forces never 
achieved a successful balance between military requirements and political constraints. 
C3 
The control of fire to moderate civilian casualties was just one aspect of what became the 
most complex fire support operations in history. Along with tactical mobility and the use 
of air support, the US handling of C3 was one of the prime military achievements of the 
war. 
The scale of the problem became apparent when the US commitment increased in 1967118, 
and failure to coordinate fire adequately could be seen to have dire consequences. ' 19 On 
the ground, the battlefield was fidl of ordinary supported US units, reconnaissance units, 
South Vietnamese troops and the enemy; in the air were close support aircraft, drones, 
helicopters on reconnaissance, and aircraft resupplying bases, transporting troops, 
evacuating the wounded, ferrying VIPs and later on performing a fire support role. The 
factors in C3 became more complicated, and the decisions as to where 'No-Fire' or 'No- 
Bomb' fines should be drawn became more awkward. The answers lay in creating air 
corridors for aircraft, plotted to avoid the trajectories of fire missions at particular times, 
and in establishing priorities for their use. 120 
Calls for fire were carefully monitored and a slower response time accepted in exchange 
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for greater accuracy. This was particularly important in heavily populated areas where the 
target lay between fiiendly troops and civilians and it was not possible to adjust fire. The 
need to hit only confirmed targets, and with greater accuracy, resulted in the proliferation 
of forward observers and in turn in the expansion of low-level communications, which 
needed greater control. In Europe at the time, US Army corps artillery communications 
ended at artillery group level; but in Vietnam corps communications often went down to 
battery level. This reflected the general proliferation of radios and telephones. 121 
Tactical control of field artillery was centralized, but nýissions were executed at the lowest 
level possible. Brigadier General W. D. Crittenberger described it as a battery 
commander's war. 122 Whether a particular type of artillery unit could be used in support 
of an operation often depended upon its air-portability or mobility over given terrain. In 
those circumstances, the fighter towed 105mm. often proved more useffil than the 155mm 
SP, which was becoming the dominant piece in gurope at that time. 
Although large numbers of guns were occasionally concentrated, these were relatively 
small compared to those frequently massed in the world wars. 123 Nevertheless, the US 
Army was better suited by inclination and ability to managing the comple-mities, of 
battlefield firepower than most, in particular the South Vietnamese Army. The most 
complicated C3 problems of the war arose in the fire control for Operation TOAN 
THANG in April 1970 in Cambodia. This entailed the deployment of seventy-nine US and 
South Vietnamese battalions supported by eighty-one US batteries and all South 
Vietnamese guns available. The operation brought together the largest concentrations of 
artillery, tactical air support and B-52s of the war, and was controlled by task force 
commanders in the air. 
In 1968, in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive, General Westmoreland created two new 
headquarters to coordinate actions in I Corps and the Capital Military District; and 
reorganized assistance to the South Vietnamese Army. 124 After 1968, the US was keen to 
update the equipment and mobility of the South Vietnamese artillery, but increases in its 
size never made good the reductions in US artillery, which was gradually withdrawn. As a 
result, by 1969 South Vietnamese artillery became even more dispersed in weak static 
locations. The South Vietnamese never achieved the ability to concentrate fire, either by 
equipment and logistic mobility or by C3. The US Army had the materiel, if not political 
strength, to win the war - the South Vietnamese had neither. '2' 
The problems of locating an elusive enemy in difficult terrain caused the US to adopt 
special techniques of target acquisition and indication. Some of these were based on past 
experience. For example, where it was hard for aircraft to identify a target on the ground, 
artillery would often pinpoint it with smoke rounds. When artillery itself was unsure of 
the enemy's map coordinates or even its own, guns could fire at a known safe target and 
adjust fire from that onto the new target. 
The FOO was the principal means of target acquisition and on occasions, as at Da Nang in 
June and July 1966, observers were able to identify the flash of enemy mortars, and return 
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fire promptly. A range of sophisticated equipment was, however, soon developed by the 
US Amy to improve locating. 126 
Conclusion 
After the First Indochina War, a French commander noted the complexity of 'limited' 
warfare, "... success is fundamentally more dependent upon political action than upon 
firepower. "127 It is also clear that in such scenarios the application of firepower is but one 
element in a symbiotic relationship in which political utility should determine the effects 
that are to be created, and those effects may in turn change the political environment in 
which further decisions are made. When this relationship is fractured, success is Uely to 
prove elusive. 
The experience of the Vietnam War caused the US to turn away from contemplation of 
similar involvement in lengthy 'limited wars", where military power alone could not 
achieve national objectives. 12' The War taught US fire coordinators numerous lessons. 
Helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft proved their worth in support of ground operations. 
Improvements were needed in target acquisition, which had not kept pace with other 
equipment capabilities and mobility. The three-dimensional battlefield made C3 problems 
ever more complex, but these could be alleviated by combining sophisticated technology 
and management techniques; and the US needed strategically mobile 105mm and 155mm 
guns, with ranges at least comparable to those of Soviet manufacture. 
The US Army suffered a decline in morale and equipment in the mid 1970's; but it was 
clear nonetheless that a so-called 'Out of Area' capability was still required . 
129 The ability 
to intervene in the most strategically important areas of the world called for an 
expeditionary force with high mobility and a light conventional role; but it was not the 
intention to commit this to protracted COIN operations. 
The perception that the USA needed to maintain such an intervention force was stimulated 
by a number of short wars, or wars of lesser intensity, elsewhere in the world during the 
1970s. Some were struggles for national existence, but the resources deployed and the 
areas of conflict were restricted. Although the intensity or duration of these wars may 
have been less than those in Korea or Vietnam, the importance of artillery firepower was 
demonstrated in each. 
The greatest consequence of the Vietnam War for the US forces was much broader and 
more important than the implications for any particular capability. The war produced a 
generation of officers, scarred by their experience, who were determined to change the 
'culture' and doctrine of their forces; and their drive was matched by the resources to 
build anew. The forces tl-ds mixture produced did much to determine the outcome of the 
Cold War, and the military triumph in the Gulf War was its most impressive consequence. 
4.5 WESTERN POWER PROJECTION IN THE 1970s AND 1980S 
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After 1945, the British, French, Portuguese and Belgian's fought numerous 'small wars', 
the rear-guard actions by which they extricated themselves from imperial commitments. 
Decolonization and the centralization of military forces in the home base did not, however, 
diminish the need for contingency forces to take part in overseas operations. The loss of 
major overseas bases in former colonies created the need for specialized forces capable of 
rapid strategic deployment, and self-sufficiency for limited periods in a hostile 
environment. By the beginning of the 21" Century, the debate about such power 
projection with updated technology was expressed in the terminology of 'medium forces' 
and 'rapid effects', although the basic concepts were already well-tried. 
The United States, France and Britain were amongst those nations which maintained such 
expeditionary forces. During the 1970's these tended to be small and to specialize in light- 
scaled intervention operations such as the rescue of citizens trapped in hostile countries. 
The Franco-Belgian Kolwezi operation (I VhMay 1978) was a model of that Idnd; but 
artillery seemed to have a relatively minor pan to play in this type of mission. 130 
The most significant developments in the 1970s occurred in the USA. After the 
withdrawal ftom Vietnam, it took time for the appreciation of overseas threats to 
overcome isolationist sentiments and opposition to high defence expenditure. The process 
was assisted by a number of international incidents. . 
The first was the 'Mayaguez Incident' 
of 1975, which reinforced the view that whatever the climate of national opinion, the USA 
should retain at least a small capability to act unilaterally anywhere in the world. 13' The 
Israelis' action at Entebbe (P-e July 1976) And the Franco-Belgian operation at KolweZi 
confirmed the need to be able to rescue US citizens in an emergency. The Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan in 1979, and the shock that resulted around the Gulf from the Iran-Iraq 
War in the 1980s,, caused the USA to create a much larger force, capable of major 
intervention, but designed to win a quick victory rather than to fight a damaging lengthy 
war as it had done in Vietnam. 
The US Rapid Deployment Force, later renamed Central Command (CENTCOM), was 
the product of President Carter's 'Gulf Doctrine. 132 Logistics held the key to success, 
and British operations in the Falkland Islands, described below, showed that sustaining 
long operations over great distances was possible, even for a country of more modest 
means than the USA. The scale of US resources, matched by a massive strategic transport 
force, made CENTCOM a potent, integrated all-arms force. 133 It practised the same 
doctrine of AirLand Battle as US forces in Europe. 
The philosophy behind global operations outside the NATO area emphasized speed in 
execution to maximize early military success and reduce the political penalties of a 
prolonged campaign. They were designed primarily to operate against relatively small 
conventional threats, which were nonetheless capable of serious strategic damage to 
Western interests if undeterred or unchecked. Artillery in a force designed for such 
operations required high strategic mobility to reach the theatre, and high tactical mobility 
for battlefield deployment. It needed to make the best of relatively small numbers in a 
hostile terrain by means of firemobility from improved target acquisition, ranges, rates of 
127 
ell 
fire, C3 and the benefits of advanced miufitions. 
The USA believed that towed artillery equipment was more suited to rapid global 
deployment than SP pieceS134 , and 
US forces were equipped with the 105mm MI 19 field 
gun, the British 'Light Gun', and the towed 155mm. M198. The USMC's direct support 
batteries consisted of eight M198s with a range of over 18km, 241an with charge 'Super 
pM. 135 8", and 301an with " The M198 could fire DPICMs, nuclear shells, chemical rounds 
and FASCAM. Its range and the ability to split a battery of eight guns into two troopS136 
helped to provide continuous fire support in mobile operations, which had not been 
1 137 It relied upon helicopter lift for its possible with previous shorter-range equipment. 
tactical mobility, and inclined to depend on the protection of hardened positions rather 
than on 'shoot and scoot' tactics. 138 The M198 cannot, however, be lifted by the 
Blackhawk helicopter and was deemed too heavy for the strategic and tactical 
requirement. 139 In December 1985, the USA began the search for a lightweight 
replacement for the M 198 to support five fight divisions. 140 
US expeditions to Grenada (Operation URGENT FURY) in October 1983 and to Panama 
(Operation JUST CAUSE) in December 1989 tested the theory and effectiveness of the 
new capabilities in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. On Operation URGENT FURY, 
there was criticism that guns were left unused on the dockside; but the most serious flaws 
were deemed to be the failures of Joint fireplanning. 141 
By contrast, there was criticism not only of the number of US casualties in Operation 
JUST CAUSE, but also of the use of field artillery in populated areas and the collateral 
damage that resulted. Tight rules of engagement virtually ruled out indirect fire, but 
artillery direct fire was used extensively in Panama City and Colon. 142 Maj Gen R. J. 
Hallada noted that, 'Ifistorically field artillery has been used as an area weapon system of 
mass destruction with little regard for collateral damage ... avoiding collateral damage 
caused this perception to fade in Panama. Fire supporters had to choose either direct fire 
weapons or precision weapon systems to accomplish the mission. , 143 Edward Luttwak, 
however, described the US approach as a "grossly excessive use of firepower". 144 It was 
clear that a growing international intolerance of such damage would be a growing feature 
of future operations. 
The greatest test of the USA's ability to project its power with expeditionary forces came 
with the Gulf War (1990- 1) against Iraq, which was mounted on a scale scarcely 
imaginable in the context of the Cold War which had just ended. Much of the thinking 
behind that Operation drew on the developments of the previous fifteen years, even 
though that had tended to focus on more modest intervention operations. 
4.6 THE CEE[NESE EYPERIENCE 1962-1979 
The Chinese were undeterred by their experiences against UN firepower in Korea, and 
relied on massed infantry with fight artillery support to overwhelm Indian forces in 
September and October 1962. Equipment mobility, particularly of mortars, enabled the 
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Chinese to concentrate fire with greater ease than the Indians, whose artillery lacked both 
equipment and fire Mobility. 
145 
When China invaded Vietnam on 17'h February 1979, her style of operations had hardly 
changed since the Korean or Indo-Chinese wars. '46 The balance of advantage appeared to 
lie with the Chinese, but other factors worked against them. Most Chinese artillery was 
towed and committed to road movement; but in the rugged terrain of Yunnan and 
Guang: Ki Provinces and the Vietnamese border areas there were few roads. The Chinese 
did not possess the enormous capacity of US forces to airlift whole formations by 
helicopter. They had to concentrate their forces on narrow fronts, dependent on a few 
vulnerable roads, or to advance across country, forgoing normal artillery support. 147 In 
either case, it was not possible to manoeuvre masses of troops to large decisive 
engagements. 
It was hard for artillery to support Chinese infantry, which faced prepared and well- 
defended Vietnamese positions. In other circumstances, artillery's task would have been 
to reduce these before the infantry assaulted; but in this campaign Chinese artillery was not 
able to play its proper role. 148 
The failure to provide sufficient artillery with forward troops was felt especially in the 
urban fighting after 27h February, when the Chinese needed to reduce V`ietnamese bunkers 
in towns. By then the Vietnamese had brought up heavier US-made 155mm and 175mm, 
and Soviet-made 130mm M46 pieces, which outranged the fighter Chinese guns. The US 
had appreciated the value of long-range artillery in its Vietnam War-, and the Vietnamese 
reaped some of the benefits in their war against the Chinese. 
The war demonstrated, not surprisingly, that light infantry needs artillery support to 
advance against prepared positions manned by efficient defenders. It showed that, as so 
often in the past, the pace of an advance may have to be slowed to bring forward artillery, 
and that only by the lavish and expensive use of helicopters can artillery achieve adequate 
mobility in rough terrain. This, and the exposure of other shortcomings, help to explain 
the reported Chinese belief that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had 'ýnot been able to 
conduct a modem war". 149 Firepower is useless if artillery firing platforms cannot move to 
and on the battlefield to apply its effects - 'reach' is more than the range of the munition. 
Whereas the Korean War had perhaps erroneously reinforced the Chinese predilection for 
infantry manoeuvre in the face of overwhelming firepower, war against the Vietnamese 
had convincingly demonstrated the limitations of such tactics. The experience may well 
have been the genesis of ideas that China needed an alternative approach, one which might 
have to accommodate enemy superiority in a conventional sense and which would have to 
be countered by more subtle means. 
4.7 SOUTH AFRICAýS ANGOLAN WAiS 1975-1988 
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South Affican forces supported the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(UNITA) against the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (WLA) during the Angolan 
Civil War of 1975-6, and found their artillery of Second World War vintage to be 
outranged by that of their opponents who were equipped by the Warsaw Pact (WP). 150 
Cuban forces arrived in Angola in the late 1970s and came to play a major role in the War. 
This brought them into combat with the South African Defence Force (SADF) on a 
number of occasions. The South Afficans could only successfully counter the fire of the 
Cubans" WP pieces by bold forward deployments. It was such experiences, combined 
with an international arms embargo, that caused the South Afficans to develop their own 
arms industry, pioneering many of the advances in field artillery, such as long-range 
155mm pieces firing long-range rocket assisted projectiles (RAP) and base-bleed (BB) 
rounds, and wheeled 155mm SPs. '5' Many of the wheeled 155mm guns being introduced 
at the beginning of the 21' Century have their conceptual and technical genesis in these 
developments; and in that sense are belated conceptual and technological consequences of 
the Cold War. 
The effectiveness of South Africa's ncw a. -tilleiy inventory was demonstrated in the late 
1980s. From September 1987, the SADF's Operation HOOPER subjected Cuban and 
Angolan Government forces to months of air and artillery bombardment. 152 By 30' 
January 1988, UNITA forces, supported by the South African Army, had surrounded 
Angolan government forces at Cuito Cuanavale; and between I Oth-30th January the latter 
were subjected to a bombardment of between 170-200 shells per day, concentrated mainly 
on knocking out Angolan air defences. 153 It was this attack that eventually led to the 
Cuban withdrawal from Angola and a negotiated settlement. 
4.8 THE SOVIET-AFGHANISTAN WAR 1979-1988 
The Soviet Union intervened in Mghanistan in December 1979. By Spring 1980, the 
Soviets' major installations in Mghanistan were secure and by late Summer 1980, they had 
begun to develop a wider-ranging network of firebases, rather as US forces had in 
Vietnam. These bases generally contained a mixture of 130mm guns, 122mm. rocket- 
launchers and mortars. Where possible, these were usually about 10-15km from each 
other so as to offer mutual support. The size of the country, however, meant that many of 
the most important locations, such as at the Salang Tunnel and the entrance to the 
Panjsher Valley, were isolated. 154 
The Soviets began their campaign in Afghanistan using conventional tactics, and the ratio 
of artillery to manoeuvre arms was high. "' At times they fired traditional massive 
fireplans, lasting up to five hours, but they seldom found or fixed targets commensurate to 
their potential firepower. "6 It is unlikely that these large fireplans caused much damage; 
but they did have the effect of keeping tile Afghan guerrillas' heads down. As a 
precaution against ambushes, the Soviets also used barrages to sweep the margins of roads 
ahead of convoys, which were increasingly accompanied by the SP 152mm. 2S3, armed 
with flechette rounds. These ambushes were, however, often over before accompanying 
guns and mortars could be brought into action. 
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Soviet artillery in Afghanistan was not employed to save lives so much as to support the 
main effort; and therefore differed from the US experience in Vietnam, in which the 
smallest contact had unleashed all available resources. The Soviets were frequently unable 
to apply their superior firepower, given that their opponents could usually choose the 
ground on which to ambush them. Soviet experience seldom matched the doctrinal 
premise on which its artillery operations in Europe were based; and it became clear that 
the main effort might indeed be some small engagement which at least had the chance of 
'fixing' an elusive enemy. The Soviets therefore increasingly decentralized their artillery, 
attaching fire units to the lowest tactical level. 
Mortars and howitzers were often more use than guns in rugged terrain, and rockets were 
more effective than either against the dismounted and dispersed MuJahideen; but the 
Soviets usually lacked tactical intelligence and accurate target data to make the best of 
these capabilities. Soviet battery commanders were normally located close to the forward 
manoeuvre battalion headquarters, too far back to make the level of decision required in 
fast moving guerrilla operations. 
By 1985, the Soviets had adopted a tactical model based upon the battalion with its own 
organic artillery support. Rather than advance into an area by a single vulnerable road, 
they preferred to fly in by helicopter, or advance across country on a number of axes with 
armoured vehicles accompanied by the SP 122mm 2SI. They could not hope to achieve 
or sustain the densities that they recommended for a European battlefield, and artillery 
planning norms were adjusted accordingly. 
The Mujahdeen fought a typically dispersed guerrilla campaign, but once in contact they 
tried to 'hug' their opponents closely to prevent them using their artillery. Even when a 
Soviet commander knew his location to within 50m, supporting artillery often refused to 
fire without greater precision. "7 The Soviets often responded to an ambush or raid solely 
with artillery fire, rather than the deployment of ground troops. This fire was often 
ineffective and the tactical initiative remained with the guerrillas. "' Even where tactical 
coordination was successful, the efforts yielded little of lasting consequence as the 
Mujahideen returned to reoccupy terrain. "' 
Heavy reliance upon artillery had disadvantages in this type of warfare. The effects of 
indiscriminate fire on the civil population militated against hopes that the Soviets and their 
Mghan Government allies might gain the support of the people. Strangely, it was often 
the Soviets' specific intention to attack the civilian population. For example, long-range 
artillery was employed at an Operational level to shell and depopulate remote villages, 
draining the 'sea' so that the 'fish' could not swim in it. 160 Louis Dupree labelled this 
policy, 'migratory genocide'. 161 The Soviets also cleared large areas of troublesome cities 
by artillery fire. In 1982, three battalion-bases were constructed in Kandahar, and in 
March 1984 the Soviets started firing into the south-west comer of the city, causing ninety 
percent of the population to leave. Herat also suffered and villages close to vital cross- 
roads were often depopulated by artillery to prevent ambushes. 
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The role of air-power grew steadily throughout the campaign. lEnd helicopters replaced 
fixed-wing aircraft in the CAS role; and they, rather than artillery, became the most 
reliable source of fire for ground commanders in mobile operations. Convoys and 
airmobile infantry all had direct conmaunications, with these helicopters. If the Soviets 
managed to fix guerrillas, Flinds could not be used at night, because the enemy crept too 
close to ffiendly forces to be engaged safely. Rather than allow the guerrillas a pause, the 
Soviets kept up their attacks using mortars which were flown in by cargo helicopters. 
By 1984 the Soviets commonly delivered a preliminary bombardment by air rather than 
artillery. 162 However, air support was often not available, and artillery was often out of 
range. Even when it was in range, the failure to deploy forward observers to adjust fire at 
night meant that fire was often wasted in ineffective area bombardments of an archaic 
sort. "" Occasionally however, the Soviets did succeed in conducting well-coordinated 
Joint fireplans; such as that for Operation MAGISTRAL in November 1987, which had 
high-level Operational objectives. 164 Ironically this accomplished, set-piece operation was 
essentially a 'face-saving' measure before the Soviet withdrawal - almost an admission 
that theoretical fire superiority was not enough. 165 
The Afghan Mujabideen used rockets'66, mountain guns and howitzers to attack 
Government bases and constructed multiple sites from which to fire, sometimes for up to 
two hours, before dispersing before CF could be applied. I" The fight shelling of 
Government bases by Afghan guerrillas was in many ways more effective in accomplishing 
their aims than was the heavier firing of the Soviets and their allies in accomplishing theirs. 
The Soviets and Government forces constituted a better target and tended to adopt a 
'bunker mentality' which discouraged the garrisons of small posts from venturing out and 
seizing the initiative from the guerrillas. Government forces sometimes waited until 
outposts had fallen, and the enemy was withdrawing, before saturating the area with 
fire! " Occasionally, the Mujahideen mounted more complex operations, in which access 
roads to a base were cut, and an artillery preparation was fired for perhaps seven days 
before an infantry assault. '69 
The Soviets are thought to have lost 433 guns and mortars in their Afghan War. Their 
experience provided evidence corroborating that gathered in the Vietnam War: "'Absolute 
supremacy of firepower did not guarantee victory. Native knowledge of the terrain and 
detailed study of a known adversary offset that advantage. "170 This lesson appeared not to 
have influenced the Russian approach in their First Chechen War which began in 1994 and 
which saw firepower applied on a massive, albeit traditional scale. 
4.9 THE FAIXLANDS WAR 1982 
The Falklands War of 1982 was dominated by the manoeuvre of light infantry against 
prepared defences. Few would have predicted that a Western army would be involved in 
such an anachronistic, or 'Third World', military scenario on such a scale. 
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Outside Port Stanley there were no roads. The British Army deployed only a very few 
fight tracked vehicles to the theatre, and there was consequently little vehicular movement 
at all. Without the bulky, vehicle-bom computers of the day, ballistic computation 
reverted to manual methods, and was without meteorological input. Guns and 
ammunition were only able to keep up with the infantry thanks to helicopters, even when 
the latter advanced on foot. The weather, workload and lack of air superiority placed 
great strain on helicopter resources; and their availability, rather than the speed of infantry, 
dictated the pace of the CaMpaign. 171 
British artillery operations fell into two major categories: deep attack by CB, harassing 
and interdiction fire; and close support. '72 The major contribution to depth fire was made 
not by artillery but by naval guns, and to a lesser extent aircraft; and the coordination of 
Joint fire was an important factor in the success of the campaign. 
NGS proved its worth in US operations in Vietnam, where warships acted as invulnerable 
FSBs. In the Falklands Campaign, British warships were far from invulnerable but, at 
some cost, delivered effective fire onto enemy positions which British artillery could not 
engage. '73 
The success of NGS in the Falklands was due in large part to the skill of the Army's 
artillery naval gunfire forward observers (NGFO), who were the first British troops 
ashore. Without the intelligence they produced, and their adjustment of fire, sometimes to 
within 100m of ffiendly positions at night, NGS would have been largely wasted. 174 
Despite such operations, NGS was complementary rather than an alternative to field 
artillery. NGS cannot be guaranteed, as naval operations and the safiAy of a ship will 
generally override considerations of the land battle. Naval guns make up for their lack of 
numbers by a relatively high rate of sustained fire. 17' The consequences of one gun's 
being put out of action are therefore more severe than those following the loss of one gun 
in a field battery. The primary ro! e of the field artillery is to support troops in combat, if 
necessary without regard to its own casualties; and the close support of field artillery is 
therefore usually preferable to NGS - but both is better. 
Air support proved devastating when available, and perhaps decisive when demonstrated 
to the Argentines at the Battle of Goose Green. It was a valuable source of firepower 
when artillery was not available, particularly against enemy artillery out of range of British 
guns; and cluster bombs proved the most effective aircraft munition to be used against 
ground targets. 176 
The Falklands Campaign featured a series of battalion-sized attacks, mostly at night, by 
which the British concentrated their inferior numbers against an enemy whose positions 
were eliminated piecemeal. Superior mobility and coordination brought greater force to 
bear than the Argentines could muster with resolution at any one time or place. '77 
Argentine guns were tied to the vicinity of the few roads and tracks, and coordination of 
fire above battery level was not achieved. Worse, the gimis of A Battery of the Argentine 
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Air Transportable Artillery Group had no observers with communications to the guns. 
The battery fired only predicted fireplans and ended the War firing directly over open 
sights. The few Argentine 155mm pieces which could have proved devastating if handled 
properly, fired single rounds in a desultory fashion. 178 On 12'h June, in a rare example of 
Joint planning, Argentine artillery fired smoke onto Mount Kent to mark targets for 
Pucara ground attack aircraft, but these failed to appear. Argentine artillery also seemed 
to lack ammunition. A typical mission for the British 97hField Battery of 4hField 
Regiment was 'Continuous Fire', which sometimes amounted to 300rpg. Onthesame 
day, a typical Argentine mission in the Mount Longdon area was 10- 15 rpg. The total 
ammunition used by the Argentine 3dArtillery Group on ffhJune was 2,500 rounds. 179 
The Argentine guns were apparently unable to move tactically to avoid CB once located 
and they were systematically destroyed. 180 Some were so mired in the boggy ground that 
they became immobile, facing the wrong way. C Battery of the 4'h Airportable, Artillery 
Group was prevented by CB fire from manning its guns at the critical moment when 
British infantry advanced towards it at 1,500-2,000m. 
The war was unusual in modem times for its lack of civilian casualties. The theatre 
provided a barren environment in which land forces, virtually bereft of vehicles, annour, 
computers and the heavy technical paraphcmalia of modem war, fought each other in 
isolation from society and the rest of the world; and yet even here, political as well as 
humane considerations for the few civilians had military penalties. "' 
The British deployed only thirty 105mm light field guns to the South Atlantic, and 
although their individual ammunition expenditure for phases of the campaign was 
comparable to those of major engagements in the World Wars, the absolute volume of fire 
generated was relatively small. On the other hand, the available firepower was employed 
efficiently, and whenever guns were in range and ammunition available, the concentration 
of fire was maximized, which was not the case with the Argentines. 112 Little British 
artillery was available for the battle for Goose Green on 28, h May 1982, and it was badly 
missed. After that battle, the British always ensured that they had substantial artillery 
support for their attacks. 's' 
Although it was a 'small war', the Falklands Campaign had moments of relative intensity, 
and the artillery used in support of 42 Commando's attack on Mount Harriet on 11"' June 
1982 was the first British regimental fire mission since the Korean War. '" Artillery was 
usually employed in short, timed preliminary bombardments, and then against a series of 
con call' targets, matching the infantry advance. Although British artillery teaching 
traditionally emphasized detailed preparation of closely-timed fireplans, lists of 'on call' 
targets and 'continuous fire' were generally preferred in the Falklands'85. 
The Falklands Campaign demonstrated the value of light artillery with strategic mobility 
and the need for helicopters to provide tactical mobility on the battlefield. It showed, if 
there had ever been any doubt, that however artillery may be undervalued in peacetime 
training, supported arms demand its support in war. The extent and effectiveness of that 
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support is detennined largely by logistics and the degree of successful Joint coordination. 
4.10 ISRAEL AND BER NEIGBBOURS: HALF A CENTURY OF CONFLICT 
Introduction 
The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) has always lacked space, and therefore time to conduct 
its operations; and has enjoyed little margin for military error. Israel has, therefore sought 
solutions to its strategic predicament through short, sharp campaigns with decisive 
outcomes. Israeli national culture, and the brilliant international reputation of the IDF, 
have consequently been rooted in brisk military victories on the battlefield, and Israel's 
frequent wars have apparently been short by historical standards. In reality, however, 
Israel and her neighbours have been in a continuous and on-going conflict of varying 
intensity for more than fifty years. Their wars have amounted to no more than brief 
episodes of intensity between long 'phoney' wars and the two 'Inta&das'. Just as time has 
been the enemy of the Israelis, so the Arabs have found ways to make it their ally. Their 
hopes have lain in prolonged conflict, ensuring that even defeat in a war is not a defeat in 
the extended time scale they have set, thereby denying the Israelis strategic success from 
their Operational victories in the field. Equally, some might argue that Israel's only 
chance of achieving a state with expanded 'biblical' borders lies in prolonging the conflict 
and winning it. 
Disasters on the battlefield have often caused Israel's neighbours to feel that they have 
little to gain from further conventional wars with an IDF, well-equipped and trained for its 
'Blitzkrieg' style. They, or at least the Palestinians who have the greatest stake in conflict 
with Israel, have instead developed methods of challenging on other terms, where Israel's 
conventional power has been rendered inappropriate or counter-productive. The IDF was 
perhaps a victim of its early, dazzling successes in conventional war, and was ill-prepared 
doctrinally and by training, to contend with the more complex and subtle challenges posed 
by its enemies as a result. Two contrasting approaches to the utility of artillery have 
resulted. 
The Utflity of ArtiUery: Two Approaches 
Israel has generally employed its artillery in a conventional tactical manner in conjunction 
with other arms and services. By contrast, since 1968, Israel's Arab enemies have 
probably been the world's most sophisticated users of artillery at the Operational and 
strategic levels. It has been the primary arm in their wars of psychological attrition. 
'Habituation', when troops become accustomed to attack by shelling, is a recognized 
effect of artillery fire. Between 1968-73, this phenomenon was exploited at the 
Operational level by the Egyptians to erode Israeli readiness in preparation for the Yom 
Kippur War. They operated just below the threshold of all-out war in their relentless 
artillery duelling with Israel, conditioning the Israelis to lower their guard, as war 
approached on Egyptian terms and timings. In that sense the Egyptians fired a 
'preparatory bombardment, for over six years prior to their attack. This sophisticated 
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fireplan proved extremely successful, the epitome of artillery employed at the Operational 
level, using carefully measured effects in space and time, including non-lethal, 
psychological ones to yield complex military-strategic consequences. 
Since the mid 1970s, Israel's Arab enemies have honed artillery as a weapon of 
psychological warfare. Geographical target accuracy in this sense has almost no 
significance, and the tactical details have been almost inconsequential. In the strategic 
context of the last twenty-five years, success has lain in actions which turn the effects of 
their enemy's combat power precisely against himself 
The rocket launcher has often been Hezbollah's weapon of choice, used in conjunction 
with the 'manoeuvre' of its own urban operations and those of the Palestinians. Rockets 
have done relatively little material damage in attacks on northern Israel, but have had 
major impacts on the politics of the region. The long-term intent of such organizations 
may be the elimination of Israel, but in the meantime such actions reinforce the morale of 
their supporters, influence international opinion, and wear down the resolve of the Israeli 
population to hold onto territory occupied since 1967. 
The Israelis' use of artillery in their short wars has been successful in Many respects. They 
have not, however, been as successful as the Arabs in 'leveraging' artillery firepower as a 
psychological weapon, except in the sense of remorseless retribution, and the creation of 
an aura of military invincibility. In 'peace', artillery has often been Israel's means of 
striking back in revenge, and to deter, but in Operational terms this seems usually to have 
failed, or been counter-productive. 
A tough Israeli response has been so predictable that Arab attacks appear often to have 
been targeted precisely to have this desired effect, knowing that the Israelis would rather 
respond as expected than abandon their traditional policy of appearing strong at all times. 
Far from deterring further attacks, provoking harsh retaliation by the Israelis seems to 
have been the purpose of most Arab attacks, for the Israeli actions have often been so 
imprecise, or deemed so excessive, that they have had an adverse international reaction, 
losing Israel the moral 'high ground' she seeks in strategic affairs. The Arabs have set the 
Israelis a conundrum. If they take retaliatory action harsh enough to be a true deterrent at 
the tactical level, they face heavy penalties at the Operational and strategic levels. If they 
take lesser measures, they fail to deter; and if they fail to act at all they jeopardize the 
military reputation they have established over fifty years and suffer adverse domestic 
reaction. The Arabs thus induce the Israelis to claim compulsion, justification and even 
satisfaction for tactical actions which reduce the likelihood of a beneficial strategic 
outcome for IsraeL 
During the Gulf War of 1990-91, Iraqi Scud missiles were used to attack, not so much the 
Israeli cities against which they were targeted, as the cohesion of the Coalition opposing 
them. '" On this occasion and under intense international pressure, the Israelis understood 
the 'game' and did not respond as Iraq hoped, thwarting another highly 'leveraged' use of 
artillery by the Arabs. 
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Despite these shortcomings, Israel's military reputation has been high; and the lessons of 
her conventional wars with her neighbours have had profound effects upon artillery 
doctrine in other countries, which have taken them as reference points for their own 
planning. 
Early Experience 
Between 1945 and 1948, Jews and Arabs in Palestine fought a guerrilla war which saw the 
occasional use of artillery by the AjabS. 187 The new Jewish state rapidly armed itself, and 
its newly-formed units of 65mm howitzers were in action almost immediately against the 
Syrians south of Degania on 20'h May 1948, causing the latter to withdraw. On the other 
hand, supporting artillery fire may have compromised surprise when the Israelis attacked 
Latrun on 25h May 1948, and along with poor communications, it was blamed by some 
for the Israeli failure. However, the Israelis demonstrated competence in combined-arms 
operations as early as July 1948, when they encircled and attacked an Egyptian brigade at 
Faluja, supported by air and artillery. "" 
During the Sinai Campaign of 1956 the Israelis mounted an armoured 'Bhtzlaieg'. They 
had only a single battery of self-propelled 105mm AMX which supported their 27* 
Brigade. The remainder of their artillery was predominantly made up of towed 25pdrs 
which could not keep up with their arrnour. "9 In this concept of combined-arms combat, 
Israeli artillery seemed to have but a minor role. 
The Six-Day War 5k I O'hJune 1967 
The character and equipment of the Israeli Army of 1967 reflected the experience of 1956. 
It was built around a highly mobile force of tanks, and artillery was tasked to provide fire 
support as best it could. There was seen to be fittle scope for lengthy, supporting 
bombardments, instead the Israelis fired a number of short, intense bombardments to 
suppress or neutralize their enemies as manoeuvre forces advanced. '90 
Israel's SP artillery was generally used to accompany annour. For example, each of 
General Tal's three mechanized brigades, which broke through near Rafa, was supported 
by an SP battalion; and General Yoffe's two brigades, which cut off Egyptian forces at the 
Mitla Pass, were supported by an SP artillery battalion. Nevertheless, the role of Israeli 
artillery in 1967 was not decisive, and support of manoeuvre was not its primary task. 
Instead, Israeli artillery undertook a variety of other missions, including attacks on 
Palestinian commandos, Syrian guns, Egyptian oil refineries and the cities of Suez and 
Ismailia. It also succeeded in preventing workers trying to divert the River Jordan. 91 
Despite the overall success of the campaign from an Israeli point of view, deficiencies 
were revealed. For example, Israeli artillery lacked sufficient OPs. The Arabs fOed to 
make the most of their artillery equipment although much of it was excellent. Their C3 
was poor and their reactions slow. Egyptian and Jordanian target acquisition was very 
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limited, and the Syrians diverted too much effort to the shelling of kibbutzim. Although 
Israeli guns were used for CB, Arab guns were more often overrun from a flank by 
armour, neutralized by paratroopers, or destroyed by 1,0001b airburst bombs. In this way 
Arab artillery, like Arab air forces, was hamstrung before it could take advantage of its 
superior numbers. 192 
The Six-Day War increased Israel's confidence in the efficacy of high-speed armoured 
operations; but this had been pren-dsed on air superiority and the fire of Offensive Air 
Support (OAS). After the War, growing Arab air defences threatened this concept. As a 
result, the Israelis provided more SP artillery to bolster the firepower of manoeuvre units 
called ugdas; and by 1973 all ugdas were supported by the 155mm. M109 or 175mm 
M107. The Israelis also became convinced of the value of the 120mm mortar, but in some 
respects this was a dangerous lesson. If they held the initiative on the offensive, they 
could choose where to concentrate mortar fire at short range; but this would not 
necessarily be the case if that initiative were lost and they were thrown on the defensive. 
The Israelis were generally unimpressed by Arab artillery, but had great respect for the 
MBRL. Quantities of these, particularly the 240mm BM-24, were captured and 
incorporated into the IDF which displayed an appreciation of rocketry ten years ahead of 
most NATO annies. 1" Thus, even though the Israeli style of warfighting still did not 
place a high value on artillery compared to other arms, the Israeli artillery almost doubled 
in size between 1967 and 1973.194 
Phoney War 1968-1973 
After the Six-Day War, a phoney war of psychological attrition was waged across the 
Suez Canal between July 1967-October 1973, in which artillery was the primary 
weapon. '9' The Israelis deployed experimental super-heavy, sbort-ran8e rocket launchers 
opposite Suez and Ismailia, capable of firing half-ton warheads 21an. "* The Egyptians 
responded with a massive artillery attack on 8hSeptember 1968, in which 150 batteries 
fired 10,000 rounds. This in turn resulted in the Israelis attacking oil refineries at Suez 
and Ismailia. The Egyptian attack was repeated on 264 October. The rebuilding of 
Egyptian forces continued, and by the end of 1968 they contained more artillery than they 
had had before the Six-Day War one year earlier. 
The Israelis found themselves locked in a static attritional confrontation dominated by 
artillery, and studied the Battle of Verdun of 1916 to try to understand its dynamics. 197 
They constructed the Bar Lev Line, judging that a defence based on mobile armour could 
not hold back an Egyptian crossing under massive artillery fire. A fortification was 
required which could survive and engage the crossing sites, buying time for mobile forces 
to deploy across the Sinai. '" The Bar Lev Line came to constitute a psychological target 
in its own right, and was subjected to heavy attack by artillery for eighty days beginning 
on WhMarch 1969. '99 
Egyptian artillery was also used for more conventional missions. On 19 th -20 th July 1969, 
Israeli commandos attacked Green Island in the Gulf of Suez. The Egyptian commander 
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Walled for fire onto his own position and the Israelis were driven off By December 1969, 
the Israelis had some cause to feel that they were whining the phoney war. The Bar Lev 
Line had held and the Egyptians were paying a heavy price for their attacks; but the battle 
of attrition was to last another four years. Egyptian artillery continued to harass the Bar 
Lev Line in order to study Israeli reactions. This 'reconnaissance by fire' from static 
positions also allowed the Egyptians to register targets covertly for their eventual attack 
on e October 1973. "o 
The Yom Kippur War 6h-2e October 1973 
The Israeli military aim in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 was similar to those of 1948, 
1956 and 1967, to win a quick victory led by mobile armour. In 1973 artillery still played 
a relatively minor part in Israeli concepts; and the practice of combined-arms combat did 
not meet even the theory. The assumption of air superiority and CAS still cast artillery in 
an auxiliary role. Like the Wehrmacht between 1939-41, the IDF regarded tanks and 
aircraft as the decisive combination, and like the Wehrmacht, experience would force it to 
revise this analysis. The new factors in 1973 were that Arab air defence, which was 
twenty times denser along the Suez Canal than WP air defences in Central Europe at that 
time, made Israeli air support for ground forces too expensive; and that Arab infantry was 
armed with new anti-tank guided weapons (ATGW). Unsupported armoured operations 
could be extremely costly if these were not suppressed by fire. 
On the morning of 6th October 1973,2,000 Egyptian artillery pieces fired 3,000 tons of 
explosives in fifty-three minutes across the Suez Canal, on a front of 173km. Their fire 
was complemented by that of 1,000 anti-tank guns. Major General Mohammed el Mahy, 
Chief of Egyptian Artillery, planned for 10,500 shells to fall on the Bar Lev Line in the 
first minute of the War. 201 The fireplan attacked Israeli C2, infantry strong points and 
likely Israeli concentration areas. Artillery was also used to weaken the sand banks of the 
Canal in preparation for the engineers' water-cannon. Egyptian fire fell on the crossing 
sites, then moved on to Israeli positions in depth to deter counter attacks, focusing on 
more C2 targets, artillery positions, roads and logistics. Egyptian long-range artillery was 
intended to keep Israeli tanks from reaching the Bar Lev Line, giving artillery sufficient 
time to suppress the fortifications while a crossing was constructed over the Canal and a 
bridgehead established. 202 The bombardment proved generally successful in its objectives. 
Meanwhile the Israelis struggled with moblization problems, and their armour was unable 
to concentrate in time to counter the crossing. The Egyptians also mounted an extensive 
and successful SEAD operation, allowing them to fly 250 aircraft against Israeli artillery 
and C3. 
The Egyptians crossed the Suez Canal and their artillery observers moved forward, some 
infiltrating deep behind Israeli lines. The aim was to use artillery to separate Israeli 
armour from its accompanying mechanized infantry, and to prevent the latter from 
attacking the ATGM traps into which the Israeli tanks were to be lured. 203 
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Although Egyptian artillery was initially successful, its deficiencies were subsequently 
revealed. 2" It was largely confined to road movement and was unable to support 
annoured engagements, lacking effective target acquisition beyond the Canal. The Israeli 
Airforce remained intact, blocking aerial reconnaissance; and Egyptian long-range artillery 
fire became less accurate once it moved on to engage opportunity targets. The Egyptians 
acquired few fresh targets of value, and after serious early disruption, Israeli armour 
succeeded in breaking through the screen of fire to attack the crossing sites. Several 
Egyptian bridges were disabled by shellfire as soon as Israeli artillery had come into range, 
and Egyptian artillery proved unable to locate and suppress it. The Egyptians also lacked 
artillery commanders and observers for rear area operations, and once Israeli armour had 
infiltrated Egyptian rear areas, there was little to protect their artillery from it. 
The Israeli reaction to the initial Egyptian attack was to take drastic action to destroy the 
bridgehead as rapidly as possible. Israeli armour often plunged into unsupported attacks 
on the newly established Egyptian anti-armour kill-zones, only to be broken up by 
Egyptian aircraft, artillery and the new ATGM. 203 Some Israeli divisions lost about a third 
of their strength in such actions. 206 The arm best able to neutralize or destroy Arab air 
defences and anti-tank weapons was artillery, for which this was a traditional task. Israeli 
artillery was, however, found wanting; and on one occasion an Israeli division could find 
only four howitzers to support it. One Israeli divisional commander observed ruefully that 
tank units would need more artillery support in future. 207 
Israel's 105mm field guns proved ineffective against armour, although they achieved some 
successes against landing helicopters. Even 155mm shells proved relatively ineffective 
unless used in massive concentrations, and they were an expensive and relatively 
inefficient way to stop armour. As an emergency measure, Israeli 155nun pieces were 
withdrawn from close support missions, placed under centralized control and fired in units 
of thirtyý-six guns. This use of concentrated artillery against hard targets surprised many 
observers who had become unused to such tactics, although such groups were only half 
the size of General Montgomery's 'seventy-two-gun battery', thirty years earlier. The 
greatest merit of Israel"s 155mm SPs was revealed to be, not so much their ability to keep 
up with armour, as their ability to move position frequently, and thus survive against the 
less agile Arab artillery. The latter was towed and unprotected, and proved vulnerable to 
Israeli artillery, which was forced to undertake more CB tasks in the absence of sufficient 
Israeli aircraft. 
As the battle tilted in the Israelis' favour, they pushed long-range guns forward to attack 
deeper targets. 208 On 13'hOctober, Israeli artillery shelled Damascus airport and did so 
for the next ten days, having a psychological impact as the war drew to a close. By 18 1h 
October, the Ismailia Road was almost unusable thanks to the fire of Israeli MI 07s which 
had been sent forward to engage SAMs and other targets. 
The experience of 1973 caused the Israelis to re-assess the role and importance of 
artillery. The need for greater artillery support for manoeuvre units was clear, and it was 
no longer envisaged that tanks would fight on their own. The primacy of armour was 
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replaced by the close integration of an anns, and by the recognition that manoeuvre with 
inadequate fire support could be disastrous if strategic surprise were not achieved. 
Events of 1973 reinforced the judgement of 1967 that 120mm and 160mm mortars were 
excellent close support weapons. The Israelis were keen to issue the mortar as a weapon 
organic to infantry and annour, recognizing that field artillery was too valuable to reserve 
for close support, and that its concentration under centralized C2 achieved better results 
against an armoured enemy. The 105mm field gun was revealed to be obsolete in 
armoured warfare, and it was clear that the 155mm piece and the rocket should 
predominate. The Israelis were impressed by the effect of their captured BM-24 MBRLs, 
used in Sinai and on the Golan Heights2", and after the war they developed MBRL of 
t ir own. 210 he 
The lessons of the Yom Kippur War of 1973 had a profound influence on the development 
of subsequent WP and NATO doctrine. The WP recognized the merits of SP guns, and 
the War confirmed the need to protect its armour by suppressing NATO's anti-tank 
missiles. The WP and NATO both recognized the benefits of centralizing C2 and 
concentrating fire on high-value targets, if necessary at the expense of close support; and 
NATO armies recognized what the Soviets had known since the Second World War, that 
the MBRL was an effective means of delivering an intense, heavy weight of fire rapidly 
with maximum shock effect. 
NATO annies were surprised to find that artillery ammunition expenditure rates were 
many times greater than those on which they had theoretically planned, let alone those that 
could be sustained by stocks actually in place. It was clear that firing large quantities of 
ammunition at a high rate of fire per gun was an inefficient way to stop or destroy armour, 
and was a diversion of efforts which would be better directed against enemy anti-tank 
forces. 21' The Yom Kippur War therefore proved a major stimulus to the development of 
improved anti-armour artillery munitions. 
Israel and the Lebanon 
212 By 1982, artillery had become, in effect, the newest combat arm of the DDF . In 1973 it had 300 pieces, many of which were 105mm in ca)ibre, and most were towed. By 1982 it 
had 958 pieces, most of which were SP, and of 155mm or larger calibre. Before 1973, 
artillery had tried to support tanks, but had often lacked comparable mobility. By 1982, 
the Israelis could field fifteen artillery brigades to accompany tanks and APCs- 
On 6h June 1982, Israel launched Operation PEACE FOR GALILEE. The IDF entered 
the Lebanon to fight the PLO, but became embroiled with Syrian forces. Israeli artillery 
proved effective against slower-moving Syrian artillery; and it was valuable in breaking 
down fortified positions in rough terrain, and in urban areas in support of infantry-heavy 
ugdas. In Beirut, the M109 was sometimes used to fire directly at strongpointS. 213 If 
tanks were isolated, they became very vulnerable, especially at night, and on occasions 
they were saved by bringing down defensive artillery fire. 
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The targeting and speed of response of Israeli artillery was enhanced by the intelligence- 
gathering ofnew RPVr, and the Rafael DAVID fire control computer. The logistic system 
needed to be yet more flexible to feed increasingly mobile artillery, and problems were 
eased by resupplying forward gun positions directly by helicopter. 214 
Artillery firepower proved its worth, but the campaign in Lebanon was unlike those of 
1967 and 1973, and was a harbinger of the changing strategic environment in which Israel 
would have to operate thereafter. It was conducted within tighter political controls, which 
hindered efficiency in purely military terms . 
21' Even so, it attracted intense political 
criticism at home and abroad which grew more intense the longer the campaign lasted. 
'Blitzkrieg' had become a thing of the past - the Arabs had changed the 'rules of the 
game'. 
The onslaught of Israeli firepower in a densely populated area, where winning 'hearts and 
minds' was necessary to achieve broader strategic objectives, showed once more that 
victories on the battlefield do not necessarily constitute success in more complex 
situations. A record of earlier military successes led the Israelis to apply over-simplified 
military criteria to the use of force, in a campaign where political intricacies touched 
military tactics as well as strategy. Israel faced new Operational predicaments. This 
complexity has permeated all operations involving Israel and her neighbours since; and the 
use of Israeli artillery has not always taken this fully into account. 
Artillery has also been used in the region to influence 'hearts and minds' on an entirely 
Merent premise - to create fear and to deter. Syrian artillery proved ruthlessly effective 
in urban operations on 2" February 1982, in an internal security operation against Islamic 
extremists in Hama, Syria. Artillery pounded the city for days, and Amnesty International 
estimated that between 10,000 and 30,000 casualties were inflicted, mostly civilian. "The 
whole town looked as though a tornado had swept back and forth over it for a week - but 
this was not the work of mother nature. "2'6 The Syrian Government was not bound by the 
same strategic logic as the Israelis, and consequently the utility of its artillery also differed. 
The political utility of artillery firepower was widely understood by other parties in the 
Lebanon. In July 1989, the Christian Lebanese forces of General Michel Aoun engaged in 
prolonged operations against the Syrians, using artillery as their primary means of attack. 
Their aim was to put political pressure on the international community to intervene or 
assist them, and the scale of their operations was impressive . 
2" The positioning of guns 
around the city and the psychological attrition they inflicted, the 'moral effect', was much 
greater than any destructive effect, although that was substantial. Artillery duels and 
bombardments became attractive to the media, and much of the fighting was viewed, and 
its intensity measured, in terms of artillery action. Artillery had the dramatic power to 
engage the attention of the international community and policy makers in a way that less 
potent image-makers could not. The sense ofinternational crisis and its resolution was 
played out to the beat of artillery, as it would be in subsequent sieges of cities in the 
Balkans a few years later. 
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Tensions between Israel and her neighbours reached a fresh peak of violence in April 
1996, when Israel launched Operation GRAPES OF WRATH against Hezbollah guerrillas 
in Southern Lebanon, whose weapon of choice had become the artillery 'Katyusha' 
rocket . 
218 Hezbollah guerrillas would typically emerge from a house, set up a launcher, 
fire at Israeli positions in Northern Galilee and depart, in an operation taking perhaps sixty 
seconds. Israeli weapon locating devices would trigger a rapid response by Israeli guns 
into this populated area. 
It was reported that Israeli officials accepted that the avoidance of military casualties in 
ground fighting, and their reliance instead on CF, would result in higher civilian 
casualties. 219 It highlighted the importance of the debate on rules of engagement (ROE) 
and collateral damage that became increasingly sensitive, particularly in Western nations. 
What was notable about this Israeli action was the apparent willingness to risk 
antagonizing international public opinion by ROE that accepted such high and inevitable 
civilian cost, irrespective of whether or not they were permissible under the Law of Armed 
Conflict, which they probably were. 2" So long as the campaign to keep international 
opinion at bay held, this tough approach might have worked; but when those civilian 
casualties became too great and the threshold of acceptability was crossed, the whole 
strategy 'unwound'. 
On Ie April 1996, Hezbollah set up a Katyusha rocket and a mortar about 400m from 
the Fijian-manned UN base at Qana, where 800 refugees had taken shelter. Israel had 
previously shown-off its UAV technology by flying over and identifying Hezbollah 
positions, yet was apparently unaware that the refugees were in and around Qana. 
Presumably in response to a detection by radar, the Israelis fired nineteen 155mm artillery 
shells towards the Hezbollah weapon site, of which five missed it by 350m and hit the 
crowded base instead. One hundred and two occupants were reported to have been killed. 
The Israelis were caught in a perception trap, either they had targeted the base, as 
Amnesty International claimed, and struck it successfully, or their military machine was 
flawed and they had missed the target by 350m. 22' 
Mr Zeev Schiff, writing in Haaretz, noted that whatever the operational causes, the 
massacre had damaged Israel's ambitions for the operation. 222 Tbs example demonstrates 
how a single tactical artillery mission can have adverse Operational, even strategic 
consequences. Hezbollah's greatest triumph was not any physical damage it may have 
caused to Israel with its rockets; but to goad Israel into infficting a 'psychological injury' 
on the international community. Israel's Deputy Chief of the Defence Force, Maj Gen 
Matan Vtlna'i conceded as much in his comment, "... Hezbollah are doing their utmost to 
get civilians killed by sheltering among them and by firing their Katyushas and mortars 
close to UN or civilian positions. "223 Hezboflah's action succeeded in provoking what 
was seen to be a disproportionate or an incompetent Israeli response, which was seen 
around the world on television and undermined Israel's entire operation, leading US 
President Clinton to call for an immediate ceasefire. 224 
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Nft Schiff and others noted that the use of such Israeli firepower was ineffective against 
small targets such as the Katyusha rocket launcher, "like a tiger trying to catch a mosquito 
in its teeth. "22' Such incidents present modem armies with stark conceptual, moral and 
technical challenges. What is the utility of their hi-tech weapons against targets such as 
fifty-year-old rockets, carried on a donkey's back, concealed in a bush and fired remotely 
by a cheap timer? An effective response probably requires a more imaginative approach, 
and certainly not one based on equipment and methods designed for other tactical 
circumstances in a very different Operational environment. 
Retaliation and retribution for acts of violence against Israelis have remained a feature of 
Israeli policy. Sometimes this has been carried out at close quarters against individuals 
suspected of involvement, or with the heavier firepower of helicopter gunships and 
artillery. For example, Israeli guns fired on suspected Hezbollah positions in Southern 
Lebanon on 26hNovember 2000V in retaliation for a bomb attack in the Shebaa Farms 
area. 226 Such attacks placed Israel in the difficult position of having to choose whether to 
retaliate harshly, drawing finther international criticism and perhaps escalating the 
'Katyusha War' with Hezbollah, or resorting to shelling empty ground in a face-saving 
operation. According to some observers, Israel apparently sometimes chose the latter, 
perhaps perceiving the disadvantages of obliging with an automatic and predictable 
response. 2" 
Further missile attacks were launched by Hezbollah on 14'h April 200 1, apparently 
intended to complement those of the Palestinians in GazaP",, and resulted in Israeli artillery 
and airstrikes. On 10h April 2001, the Israeli response escalated as the Israeli air force 
attacked the Syrian Dahr el-Baidar radar station in Lebanon - "The rules of the game have 
changed", said Mr Ben-Eliezer, the Israeli Defence Minister, emphasizing Israel's 
determination once more to retaliate. n9 
By 2002, the implications of a 'second front' on Israel's northern frontier seemed more 
serious, given the escalating conflict on the West Bank and in Gaza. Attempts were made 
to stretch the IDFs resources on a second, northern front in support of Palestinians, 
overrun by the IDF in the West Bank. For two weeks from 3 V* March 2002, Hezbollah 
launched 'Katyusha' rocket attacks on Israel from the Lebanon, the first since the IDFs 
withdrawal in May 2000. Hezbollah's bombardment wounded seven IDF soldiers on 7h 
April 2002, and struck the Golan Heights for the first time since 1973. This resulted in 
fiercer CF by EDF artillery and deeper attacks into Lebanon by aircraft. Lebanese 
observers claimed that Hezbollah appeared to be doing its best to provoke Israel to 
retaliate2'0, presumably to provoke an adverse international reaction. 
Israel, however, refrained from invading the Lebanon, Minister Vilnai claiming that, 
'Israel won't play into its hande'. 23' On I& April, Hezbollah escalated the conflict 
attacking an outpost on Mount Dov with infantry supported by artillery fire. Minister E. 
Yishai insisted that Israel's lack of response should not be interpreted as weakness. 232 The 
eventual withdrawal of Hezbollah artillery from the border on 4hý_5 th May 2002 was 
reported to be in response to pressure on Syria by the USA rather than Israeli military 
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action. "' In this case, the Israelis succeeded in suppressing Hezbollah fire &symmetrically 
- the rules had changed again. 
Israel and the Palestinians 2001 
Over the last hundred years, the field mortar has proved its lethality in num us wars; but 
in the Balkans in the early 1990s and in Israel's conflict with the Palestinians, it proved to 
be a weapon with wider utility and highly potent non-lethal effects. The Palestinians 
adopted indirect mortar fire as their preferred Operational method against Israel in 2001, 
combined with very 'close' suicide bomb attacks, and concurrently with Hezbollah 
operations mounted from Lebanon. They proved extremely artful in the application of the 
mortar's effects. 
In essence, the Palestinians mounted a prolonged bombardment of very low intensity 
against the Israelis. Given the slender resources available, it was extremely effective. Its 
intent was not so much to inflict material attrition as to have psychological effects, with 
political outcomes, changing perceptions about the state of Israel and the international 
context in which Israel operates. While some may assert that this was an intuitive rather 
than a conscious plan by the Palestinians, its evolutionary pattern, sculpted by fifty years 
of conflict, seems clear, and the products of evolutionary experiences are not necessarily 
the agents of the process itself Given the probable 'concept of operations', the elements 
within it of action, reaction and consequent, effects are clear, whatever the merits or 
otherwise of that concept from a political or moral point of view. 
The Palestinians mounted mortar attacks on Jewish settlements in Gaza on I& April 
2001, demonstrating their potential to reach into Israel itself The local IDF commander 
noted that these fifty bombs were in effect home-made mortars with insignificant effect, 
but others saw the attacks as tantamount to a declaration of war. Israeli forces did not 
respond by shelling this densely populated area but entered Gaza and fired anti-tank 
rockets at selected targets. Some commentators reported that this new Palestinian 
firepower, "... has had a deep psychological effect in Israel. "234 
These events even caused Israeli commentators to mull over the possible parallels between 
the Palestinians' aspirations and those of their own people fifty years earlier. Eitan Haber 
wrote, "One primitive pipe - 50 centimetres, long and a few thingamajigs - is driving a 
whole army berserk, tormenting thousands and engaging a government day and night. 
Every one of our Hagana and IZL museum3 has a few such pipes, and if David 
Leibowitch, the inventor of the Davidka mortar in the War of Independence, were alive 
today, he could explain how easy it is to build. The Palestinian mortar is our Davidka 
from those days ... A shot here, a shot there - and the State of Israel is pulling NIS 50 
million out of its empty pocket to fortify windows. The whole country is a front line. And 
this is just the beginning! " 
Presumably the Palestinians took heart from such reaction; but the purpose of their mortar 
attacks was clearly not merely to undermine Israeli morale. It was also intended to 
145 
provoke as harsh an Israeli reaction as possible, thereby bolstering the Palestinians' sense 
of victimhood and international outrage, outweighing that over the mortar attacks 
themselves. 
On Ie April 200 1, five mortar bombs landed near Sderot in the Negev, close to the farm 
of the Israeli Prime Mmister, Mr Ariel Sharon. This led to calls for dramatic action which 
was forthcoming that night as Israeli ships bombarded targets in Gaza; and Israeli troops 
entered areas governed by the Palestinian Authority for the first time since 1994, amidst a 
barrage of international condemnation. 236 By firing five 'ineffectual' mortar bombs and 
provoking the inevitable reaction, the Palestinians earned Israel a rebuke from the US 
Secretary of State, Colin Powell, who described Israel's actions as, 'Excessive and 
disproportionate. a37 The Israeli forces withdrew almost immediately, despite earlier 
asserting that this operation could last for months. As they left on 18 th April, the 
Palestinians fired another volley of mortars at Israeli settlements at Nir Am and Mar 
Darom, causing the Israeli Prime Minister to suffer domestic criticism for a premature 
reaction to pressure from the US Govemment, 238 for giving "... the impression that they 
had abruptly turned tail in the face of unexpectedly stem American criticism. "'239 More 
mortar bombs were fired over succeeding months and the Israeli response became more 
severe. 240 A greater awareness of the intent of Palestinian operations became evident that 
Summer as the IDF began to consider media reaction and international opinion when 
planning its operations. 24' 
The strategic utility of relatively light artillery fire was increasingly appreciated by Israel's 
enemies. The firing of rockets by the Palestinians early in 2002 graphically highlighted the 
sophisticated application of surface-to-sur, ace fire, using relatively unsophisticated 
technology. Rockets had a longer range than fight mortars, and this gave their attacks a 
greater psychological effect. Israelis could be made to feel vulnerable everywhere from an 
unseen enemy, a psychological effect comparable to that of the infantryman on 'the empty 
battlefield' one hundred years earlier. 
In mid-February 2002, the Palestinians launched attacks from Gaza into southern Israel 
with Qassam-2 rocketS242. If such pieces were fired from the West Bank, they could strike 
the heart of Israel's population centres; and with a short time of flight, there would be 
little warning time. It seemed likely that such rockets might be used to attack targets such 
as Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion Airport, 'It would not take more than a few shells, before 
airlines began refusing to fly heri". 243 The rockets proved a potent weapon, of relatively 
minor physical consequence but formidable psychological effect. This was recognized by 
Major General S. Arad (Retd), the former head of the Israeli Home Front Command, who 
noted that, "There's no question that the Palestinians see this as a strategic weapon. " One 
commentator noted that Qassam-2 represented no great increase in firepower, 'The only 
, 2244 real dfference is the psychological element. 
Israeli fears extended to the possibility that Israel might once more face an attack by 
SCUDs from Iraq. 24' They coincided with heightened sensitivity following the reported 
seizure by Israel of rockets with a range of 20kms, on the Karin A in the Red Sea, on the 
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4 th January 2002.246 Anxiety was exacerbated shortly aflerwards by reports that Israeli 
Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres, claimed that Iran had provided HezboUah with 10,000 
missiles with ranges of between 10-. 7okMS247, and by Hamas claims to be worldng on 
producing the Qassam-3, with a range of 20kms. 248 
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had promised retaliation for rocket attacks, and the 
Palestinian side "... despite everything decided to throw down the gauntlet: ". 249Mr Sharon 
was reported to have said that attacks on Israeli population centres would, "... bring about 
a complete change in our entire mode of operation. "2'0 Yet these rocket attacks set the 
l1DF a challenging task, if it was to locate and destroy the launch sites in heavily populated 
areas. It was also presumably the firers' hope that such Israeli retaliatory attacks should 
take place with consequent collateral damage, both physical and to Israel's international 
reputation. Retaliatory fire might be less effective than an attack by ground forces, yet 
what would be the strategic cost to Israel of semi-permanent operations in the West Bank? 
At the same time there was a growing Israeli understanding of this Palestinian ploy, and 
arguments were voiced that Israel should not 'cooperate, but should rather break out of 
its own strategic logic and do something different, not least dampen the ardour of its 
public opinion for revenge. Some Israeli officials noted that "inflatine' the threat posed by 
Qassam-2 attacks, 'locked' the Israeli Government into inflicting sharp reprisals, playing 
into the hands of those who fired them specifically to achieve this reaction. It was pointed 
out that the rockets were inaccurate and few hi number. 21' On the other hand, it was hard 
to see what appropriate response the IDF could make to such attacks-, other than to clear a 
buffer zone around Israel which would probably be politically damaging; and if such a 
buffer were created, what would happen when new rockets were used with ranges that 
could traverse the whole of Israel? 
Further attacks by Qassam-2 missiles, but especially suicide bombings, seemed to cross the 
threshold of Israeli tolerance on 16'hFebruary 2002. The IDF launched operations into 
the West Bank and Gaza the following day to prevent rockets being fired from the area 
near the 'Green Line'. By March, the IDF had launched large combined-arms operations 
to find and destroy the workshops where Qassam rockets were being manufactured. 252 As 
a consequence, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan condemned Israel's "illegal 
occupation! ' of the West Bank and Gaza, and the 11DF's use of excessive force: "Such 
actions gravely erode Israel's standing in the international community. " This was the first 
time that Mr Annan had termed Israel's presence in those areas 'illegal'. 253 This may well 
have been deemed a high-value effect by those who fired the relatively few rockets that 
provoked the Israeli operation. 
Despite the IDF raids, two further rockets were fired south of Ashkelon on Ie March 
2002, and in response to these, and a number of suicide bomb attacks, the IDF launched a 
major operation throughout the West Bank in mid-April. However, the role of Israeli 
artillery in operations against the PalestLnýians in 2002 was minimal. 'Tighter jets, 
advanced artillery and other staples of military might have become virtually irrelevant in 
Israel's ongoing campaign against Palestinh-m terror... ". 2ý4 General S. M. Mofaz claimed 
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that a number of Qassam rocket factories were destroyed in these Israeli operations; 2" but 
the long-term strategic price for Israel has yet to be audited. - 
4.11 THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR (1980-8) 
The 'First Gulf War', between Iran and Iraq, offers insights into the relationship between 
mobility and firepower, the part played by mass and technology in the provision of 
firepower, and the role of artillery in its generation. The War was certainly not limited so 
far as the belligerents were concerned, but it was confined to a relatively small theatre of 
operations. In many ways the War was a military anachronism; but the scale of the 
fighting and the quality of the equipment deployed made its lessons seem relevant at the 
time; and these did much to inform Coalition judgements in preparation for the 'Second 
Gulf War' of 1990-9 1. 
At the start of the War in September 1980, Iran had 1,000 guns and Iraq 800; but it was 
annoured forces that were expected to produce an early and easy victory for Iraq. They 
did not. The importance of tanks was not diminished so much by their short supply as by 
their evident vulnerability, and thereafter the Iraqis relied increasingly upon artillery. By 
July 1982, the balance of firepower had shifted, and Iran had just 800 guns and the Iraqis 
1,800.256 By then, however, Iraqi population centres were in range of Iranian guns, and in 
August 1982 Iraq acquired FROG 7 missiles to retaliate. 257 It became a war of attrition, in 
which infantry had superseded armour as the leading manoeuvre arm, and in which 
artillery had become decisive over both. For years the two sides blasted each other, 
guided by their domestic hybrids of Soviet artillery doCtrine. 258 
By 1986, artillery had become the Iraqi Army's decisive arm, providing firepower as a 
substitute for a shortage of manpower and as a salve to a growing political sensitivity to 
casualties. 2'9 The deadlock was reminiscent of the First World War, with both sides 
measuring their success by the capture or recapture of small areas of blasted desert or 
marshland. In the attack, artillery was tasked to destroy field defences, to allow the 
advance of massed infantry, while armour waited behind the lines for the breakout which 
might follow. In defence, artillery was to annihilate the attacking masses of infantry. 
The balance of firepower continued to tip in favour of the Iraqis, and by 1987 the Iranians 
had just 750 guns to the Iraqis' 2,800. The Iraqi Army did on occasions demonstrate a 
limited capacity for all-arms tactics. Gazelle helicopters searched for Iranian formations, 
and when these were located, the Iraqis called in M-24 Hind attack helicopters, rather as 
reconnaissance units in the Second World War had called in tank destroyers. The Iraqis 
then hit the target again with artiflery. 260 At times, such battles gave the Iraqi Army the 
appearance of sophistication, but when pitched against 'First World' forces in 1991, this 
was seen to be an illusion. 
In the Iran-Iraq War, the value of armoured manoeuvre was seen to be questionable in the 
face of modem firepower, but even the value of modem sophisticated weapons was shown 
to be limited, when faced by masses of highly motivated troops. These phenomena were 
148 
noted and were factors in some of the forecasts of casualties prior to the Gulf War of 
1990-91. The apparent triumph of technology and training in Coalition operations in 1991 
appeared to have rebalanced the equation; but the survivability of Yugoslav ground forces 
in Kosovo 1999 against a sophisticated aerial onslaught begs a less simplistic analysis. 
There was one unusual feature of technical and strategic interest in artillery developments 
in Iraq at this time. Iraq embarked on Trogramme Babylon', which incorporated Saddarn 
Hussein's 'Supergun, designed by Dr Gerald Bull. 261 This had a 1,000mm calibre barrel 
of 40m length, in thirteen sections; and it was probably intended to fire chemical and 
perhaps even nuclear weapons several hundred kilometres. 
4.12 THE GULF WAR 1990-1991 
The employment of artillery in the Gulf War of 1990-91 demonstrated nothing 
conceptually innovative, rather that the Joint Operational and strategic, context in which 
artillery operated was changing rapidly. These changes accelerated over the following 
decade. The War was remarkable for showing the continuities and soundness of the 
principles of Joint fireplanning which were firmly rooted in the early years of indirect fire 
in 1917-18. It followed the pattern of much fireplanning of the Second World War, and 
had striking similarities to that for the Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal in 1973. 
The essence of Coalition fireplanning in the Gulf War may not have been original, but its 
appearance was novel, thanks to the impressive technical upgrades that were available to 
make this old model more efficient, most notably in the capacity of air-power. It was 
remarkable for the competence with which it was accomplished and the disproportionate 
outcome. The scale of the success was largely attributable to the fact that most of the 
Coalition forces involved had been specifically equipped and configured for this style of 
conventional operation, and had personnel of high quality and training. The NATO 
contingents of the Coalition had trained intensively and at great expense for forty years to 
match a first class adversary. The Iraqi Army was a dangerous opponent, but hardly its 
peer. It possessed years of recent battlefield experience but suffered the misfortune to 
have spent those years shaping itself to win against an enemy, Iran, whose approach was 
often characterized by primitive human wave tactics. 
The War followed a readily recognizable historical pattern. It started with a period Of 
deployments, the marshalling of forces and a static stand-off, as each side considered the 
other and prepared for battle. One side adopted prepared defence. The other planned to 
attack after winning the firefight with air and artillery, the new 'artillery duel', before 
executing a decisive manoeuvre. In these essentials, it would not have been extraordinary 
in 1870, and an analysis falls readily into the traditional historical Structure . 
262 
Strategic Context 
By 1990, NATO doctrine had reached a peak of sophistication; but the war for which its 
forces trained, and thereby deterred, never took place. Instead, these resources were 
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available to be applied against Iraq, a wealthy but third-rate power. Iraq possessed a large 
army, equipped by the WP, and with a mass of other weapons acquired during its war with 
Iran. It practised a hybrid version of Soviet doctrine and its human resources were of 
dubious efficacy. This mismatch, of Iraqi making, resulted in a decisive military victory, 
unequalled in the 20"' Century. 263 It was perhaps both the first of the wars of the 
'Information Age'2"; and thanks in part to its completeness, it was predicted to be the last 
of the wars fought by armies of the 'First World' that had been designed and equipped in 
the 'Industrial Age'. 
Although the NATO members of the Coalition were fortunate in being able to fight in the 
style of war for which they were uniquely well trained, most were less familiar with 
offensive operations, let alone the climate and geography of the theatre. Merely to 
exercise an offensive concept in Europe, in the thinking of the Cold War, would have been 
regarded as politically provocative. 265 The Coalition plan called for rapid advances, more 
in keeping with those for which the WP had trained. Fortunately, in the closing years of 
the Cold War, NATO's doctrine had called for greater manoeuvre and an emphasis on 
fighting Close, Deep and Rear battles simultaneously. In addition, commanders were 
perhaps better educated in the need to think Operationally than ever before. 
Nevertheless, the circumstances often called for novel approaches to problems, not least in 
the practice of artillery. New rocket launchers were fielded along with various new 
munitions, surveillance and target acquisition devices, communications, logistic and survey 
equipment. Some of these were tried for the first time, and desert conditions required 
changes in tactics and procedures. In devising the techniques to provide artillery support 
for fast moving armoured units, bringing artillery into action off the line of march, the 216 British Army certainly learned much from its assessments of Soviet techniques. 
Strategic air-power was a key factor in the overall success; and Operational and tactical 
fires delivered by air played a proportionately greater role than in any other major conflict 
to that date. In a sense, air-power provided the majority of the sustained preliminary 
bombardment over several months, wearing down Iraqi field forces, C2, logistics, and 
morale. 267 Manoeuvre was indispensable to the success of the mission, and it was 
paralysing fire, primarily from the air that made it possible at acceptable cost. It fell to 
field artillery to provide the tactical fires to support air and ground manoeuvre, 
undertaking tasks for which aircraft were iff-suited, unavailable or an inefficient means of 
delivery. 
Equipment 
The Gulf War was the first occasion on which many elements of major weapons systems 
had been used in combat. The most notable advance was in the intelligence, surveillance, 
target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) supporting attacks by smart munitions, 
such as the Stand-off Land Attack Munition and Tomahawk cruise missiles, most of which 
were reliant on the Global Positioning System (GPS). The Joint Surveillance and Target 
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Attack Radar System QSTARS), in targeting mode, was able to search an area of 4x5lan 
with sufficient accuracy for artillery to attack, passing data in real time. 
Many in the manoeuvre arms were astoms'ned by the sheer destructive power of MLRS; 
but then so too were many who manned the system. 268 In training, few had seen the 
quantity or concentration of rockets fired in their first operation. The same was true of 
the new British L 15 shell, which created an over-pressure with which many were 
unfamiliar. Some captured Iraqis tended to dismiss the effects of bomblet rounds, but 
commented on the dreadful effects of L 15 on troops in trenches. 269 The most appreciated 
technical upgrade to the field artillery was probably the availability of GPS as a navigation 
aid, particularly in complex manoeuvres, advancing in unfamiliar, featureless terrain at 
night. It was also used to synchronize the TOT for fire missions. Brigadier General C. W. 
Abrams, commanding VH Corps artillery later noted, "It didn't just tell us where we were, 
it did so in terrain where the other side had no idea where they were, and thought we 
would get lost out there ... before August 1990 very 
few of us had ever heard of GPS. "" 
At the other end of the spectrum, much remained low-tech. The 8-inch MI 10 was 
brought out of retirement, dumb shells remained the primary munition, and artillery often 
fired with meteorological data which were eight hours old and bore little relation to 
prevailing conditions. Despite this, observers were satisfied with the accuracy achieved; 
and thanks to the accumulation of numerous technical improvements over many years, for 
the first time in history, the kill radius of artillery was greater than its radius of error. 
The Preliminary Bombardment 
The first element of the fireplan was the pre! hrzinary bombardment. TI In's was initiated by 
the air and maritime components of the fb= which reached the theatre first, and had the 
longest reach with which to apply fire to the enemy's vulnerable rear areas. "' This Joint, 
strategic and Operational attack by fire was highly successful; but it also raised some 
difficult issues. It was not clear whether the Land component commander or the Air 
component commander had primacy in determining the crucial Fire Support Coordination 
Line (FSCL) on which both depended to ensure the safe and efficient application of their 
fires. "The dialogue between ground and air commanders soon began to look more like 
litigation than combined-arms warfare, with each side marshalling its evidence and trying 
to score points. "m "After the war, it became clear that the positioning of the boundary 
(the FSCL) was one of the most important miscalculations of the war. "273 The Air 
component believed it should have the tight to make such decisions, because it provided 
the majority of the resources at that stage of the campaign, and thus the criteria for the 
success of its operation should take priority. 274 
The view of the Land component was that targets attacked should be coordinated with its 
own plans for manoeuvre. It was particularly keen to avoid littering its future routes with 
the unexploded submunitions which eventually became a major hazard to friendly 
manoeuvre. Reconciling the sometimes differing interest of the components became a 
major topic of debate in the USA after the War. During the air operation which 
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comprised part of NATO's Joint campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999, it became clear 
that the problems of Joint coordination in a complex multinational command had not been 
solved. 275 f 
Once the Land force had deployed into theatre, -the closer, tactical element of the fireplan 
was executed in preparation for the ground assault. This was designed to wear down 
those Iraqi forces that would eventually be engaged in ground combat and to assist with 
the Operational deception plan. 276 The attrition was both material and psychological. This 
multi-facetted preliminary bombardment was prolonged, heavy and of unprecedented 
precision against an enemy most of whose dispositions had been identified in great detail. 
The duration of the bombardment could not compromise strategic surprise because a 
Coalition offensive was the obvious purpose of its deployment. The issue was merely one 
of Operational and tactical surprise in time and place. The longer the bombardment lasted, 
the less the blinded Iraqis were able to see,, and the greater the possibility that the attack 
could come anywhere. At the same time, the greater were the Coalition's apparent 
options and scope for deception. 
Mobility enhanced the survivability of Coalition artillery during its preliminary 
bombardment. It conducted raids, moving forward to attack high-value targets such as 
headquarters and signal intelligence units before withdrawing out of range . 
2" Such raids 
required detailed coordination with ground protection and air-power. They also required 
air defence, NBC reconnaissance, engineers for mobility and to dig rapid protection, 
medical evacuation and electronic warfare systems to jam Iraqi detection systems. In the 
event, the Iraqis did not return fire, confirming their inability to 'see' what their opponents 
were doing. 27" The raids were a good example of artillery delivering combat power in its 
own right, supported by manoeuvre arms, rather than the o ther way around. 
On 7h February, the US VII Corps initiated a series of artillery raids near the Wadi al- 
Batin both to reinforce the deception that the Coalition attack would be made in the East, 
and to erode Iraqi artillery strength on that sector. The US I" Cavalry Division conducted 
a series of artillery raids and feints on its right to pin down four Iraqi divisions . 
2" 
On 1P February, artillery raids became more intense. Twenty-seven MLRS launchers 
fired 216 rockets, dropping 140,000 bomblets onto Iraqi batteries. One of the US 
batteries was linked to a Q-37 counterbatte, radar in case of CF, but there was none. 
The largest raid occurred on the night of 16 -17th February when VII Corps artillery 
supported Apache helicopters of the 1 Ph Aviation Brigade. Five battalions of artillery 
opened a 21an corridor, saturating Iraqi air defences with artillery fire. Artillery continued 
to fire at targets to the flank and beyond the helicopters' objective . 
280 
British reconnaissance drones had been flying since 2e January 1991, identifying targets 
for attack. Over five days from I 8'h February, I" (UK) Armoured Division conducted 
twelve artillery raidS. 281 They were carried out on radio silence and were supported by 
radar and sound-ranging against the threat of CF. These raids also constituted a form of 
training for artillery prior to the advance into Kuwait. ' 
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The attack on deeper targets by air and maritime systems continued during the period of 
the artillery raids, ensuring that the enemy was engaged simultaneously throughout the 
battlespace. On 17'h February 1991, US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that 
Coalition airforces had destroyed more than 1,300 of the 4,000 tanks in the Kuwait 
Theatre of Operations, 550 in the previous five days. 
The Preparatory Fireplan in Support of the Breaching Operation 
Having fired a preliminary deep and close fireplan, the Coalition then fired its preparatory 
fireplan in support of the breaching of the Iraqi defensive positions. This integrated 
artillery fire with long-range missiles, air, aviation and psychological operations. 282 On 
23'd February, the 21& Field Artillery Brigade fired for nine minutes to cover the 
engineers of the US 2"dArmored Cavalry Regiment as they cleared holes through the 
border berm. 
The US VII Corps artillery Commander, Brigadier General Abrams, massed two divisional 
artillery groups of 350 howitzers and ten NERS batteries on the breakthrough sector - 
twenty-two pieces per km of sector. He had scheduled a three-hour fireplan to support 
the breaching operation of the US I" Infantry Division on 20 February, G-Day. 283 This 
was reduced to sixty, and later thirty minutes, as confidence grew that the Iraqis were 
weaker than had been originally assessed. 284 Simultaneously, other artillery attacked the 
C2 of the opposing Iraqi corps whose reserve also came under air attack. 
Fire Support for Offensive Manoeuvre 
Support for offensive manoeuvre was typically provided by short fireplans from artillery 285 
deploying rapidly off the line of march to support the momentum of the advance. In at 
least one US field artillery battalion the idea of breaking down batteries to fire by platoons 
was soon abandoned to make C2 easier. Equally troops had to get used to the notion that 
firing less than a battalion at a target did not constitute 'massing fire'. 286 Typically, 
artillery was brought down 200-300m from fiiendly forces. During the 100-hour offensive 
the US element of the VII Corps artillery fired 12,821 shells, 5,634 NHAS rockets and 
twenty-five ATACMS rockets. 187 Not an artillery shell or rocket was fired in response. 289 
It was, however, often difficult to acquire target data for such missions. The value of 
UAVs in providing this service was appreciated when, on 2e February, the I" Infantry 
Brigade of the US I" Infantry Division used their imagery to plan its scheme of fire and 
nianoeuvre. 
The difficulty in providing timely intelligence to brigades and divisions was evident on 26h 
February when US troops ran into an Iraqi brigade in prepared positions on the '73 
Easting' and had to engage it without the preferred level of artillery support. Observers in 
Bradley fighting vehicles often found that their direct observation range was the same as 
the range of a direct fire engagement, and that the latter erupted before they could bring 
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down indirect fire support. The need to introduce longer-range observation devices was 
noted. 289 
In the British divisional battle, fireplans were not originated by F00s. All originated from 
brigade or battle group level and the main task of the FOOs was to stop the filing at the 
last safe moment. Such a fireplan typically had one hour's warning and consisted of a 
'cocktail' of bornblet and LIS BE, fused to detonate at nine metres above the ground. On 
the night of 25h-20h February, for the attack on Objective BRONZE, one gun from 26h 
Field Regiment fired illuminating rounds for the benefit of the attacking UK 4h Armoured 
Brigade, to find that this in itself prompted a mass surrender of Iraqis. That gun fired a 
total of 66 rounds of illuminating to encourage the practice. On 26"' February, 4h 
Armoured Brigade attacked Objective TUNGSTEN following a bombardment by 100 
guns and NMRS. The attack by the UK's 7h Armoured Brigade on Objective LEAD on 
26'h February met with resistance, and aircraft were bought in to complement the MILRS 
of 39h Heavy Regiment which was firing at very short range. 
There were many excellent examples of Joint and all-arms cooperation. On the morning 
of 2e February, the artillery of US I" Armored Division fired a heavy bombardment of 
155mm shells and NERS immediately prior to its ground attack. As I' Armored Division 
swung east, it came into contact with the Tawakalna Armoured Division of the Republican 
Guard, and the 52"dInfantry Division, which were attacked by aircraft. Meanwhile I" 
Armored Division's artillery fired MLRS against the Iraqi Adnan Division, forcing it to 
withdraw, and Apache helicopters made deep attacks against the Medinah Division which 
had taken up positions of hasty defence. 
On 26th February, the US XVIH Corps advanced into the Euphrates Plain supported by 
concentrated artillery fire. Artillery was directed not "... to waste time or ammunition on 
targets of less than battalion size, but when you do find a suitable target, bring everything 290 
to bear with an immediate crushing bombardment - then move out. " Corps artillery 
attacked deep targets and divisional artillery fired a bombardment for thirty minutes. It is 
thought that this destroyed three Iraqi artillery battalions. On the final night of the War, 
the US 2e Infantry Division identified seven Iraqi tank battalions, five mechanized 
battalions and thirteen artillery battalions. These were attacked by artillery and fled, 
pursued by American armoured units. 29' 
The Iraqi Perspective 
The Iraqis faced a 'First World' force with superior capabilities in fire and manoeuvre. 
These were underwritten by information dominance, logistic superiority, greater skills in 
Joint operations and a powerful Coalition. If the Iraqis concentrated in static positions, as 
they chose to, at least in the initial stages before their surrender or flight, they became 
targets for fire. If they dispersed, they were outmanoeuvred. In either case, they lacked 
the intelligence to conduct effective fire and manoeuvre; and field fortifications, 
camouflage and deception proved to be inadequate shields against Allied firepower in 
barren terrain. 
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On paper, Iraq appeared a formidable opponent. Its artillery was assessed to have up to 
3,500 artillery systems and had been the backbone of its Army in its war against Iran. 
About 3,000 Iraqi guns were towed. Pieces such as the GH N45 and the G-5 were highly 
capable, with an assisted range of 40km which outranged the field guns of the Coalition. 
It is thought that the Iraqis deployed over 600 pieces of artillery to Kuwait, and these 
were mostly positioned in a continuous belt along the border, between 141an and 201an 
north of the berm. Once separated from their vehicles towed guns could not move to 
survive, and were in effect abandoned to their fate in fortified positions. Iraqi self- 
propelled artillery was mainly held to the north with manoeuvre forces. Iraqi artillery did 
not possess much of the technology required to exploit its potential advantages. It lacked 
adequate target-locating devices and aids to accuracy such as meteorological data, survey 
and computation equipment; and it was essentially only capable of conducting large, pre- 
planned fireplans. The target-locating radars Xyhich the Iraqis did possess were seldom 
switched on because they would merely have acted as beacons attracting Coalition fire. 
The Iraqis were tactically blind and when they did fire, caused little damage. One of the 
few occasions when the Iraqis managed to fire back with any effect was against the e 
Brigade of the US 3d Armored Division on 26'h February. After some delay coordinating 
the fire of corps artillery across the boundary with XVHI Corps, NLRS eliminated four 
Iraqi battalions, and in the next twenty-four hours destroyed another seventy-two Iraqi 
guns. ' 
Iraq's surface-to-surface fire was generally insignificant in tactical terms, but her Scud 
missiles were influential at the strategic level, when attacks on Israel threatened the 
integrity of the Coalition. They were also damaging at the Operational level, diverting up 
to 300 Coalition air sorties per day and most of the scarce special forces effort to 'Scud- 
hunting'. 293 
Conclusions 
The Gulf War taught little of note about the handling of artillery at the tactical level, rather 
it validated many of the lessons of the previous sevcnty-five years. Its primary interest lay 
in broader developments at the Operational level and its strategic context. The outcome 
seemed at once so certain, and yet beset by fresh uncertainties. The importance of field 
artillery, the Land component's prime contributor to Joint fires, appeared to some to have 
diminished along with the importance of Land operations in a Joint campaign. Coalition 
artillery fired only about a quarter of the ammunition expected, thanks largely to the short 
duration of the ground war. This was in large part due to the effectiveness of the 
preliminary air bombardment. Air-power would clearly play a larger role in future Joint 
considerations when the USA was involved, and the Air or Maritime components would 
presumably be first into action. Airmen claimed a commensurate increase in decision 
making, in campaign planning and the coordination of Joint fires. Their claims to primacy 
in designing the Joint fireplan and the delineation of FSCM became more strident. 
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The Gulf War seemed to some to mark a fundamental shift in the way wars of the future 
would be fought as air-power and space-based systems became dominant. It was now 
perhaps possible for Western powers, or at least the USA, to fight its wars at a safe 
distance, with only minimal risk to ground forces as they occupied territory once held by 
an enemy who had been defeated from the air. The old aspiration of troops occupying 
ground without a fight seemed almost to be realized, but the fire that would make it 
possible would be from the air not artillery. Later evolutions of such air-power theories 
called for radical reassessments of the readiness and peacetime deployment of US ground 
forces. Air-power, some said, could react quickly to hold off an aggressor while ground 
forces deployed to the theatre and then advanced against an already defeated enemy. 
Yet many had doubts. The ground war had been made much easier thanks to a highly 
effective air operation, but there had still been vicious ground combat, requiring 
manoeuvre supported by fire. Air-power alone had not been sufficient, let alone the most 
efficient means of eroding Iraqi forces when these lay within range of Coalition artillery. 
There was also the nagging suspicion that, despite the unusually poor weather conditions 
at the time, fighting a war on a generally flat, unpopulated desert was not a reliable model 
when planning for future conflicts. Would air-power really always be that effective in 
other theatres, in poor weather conditions and over complex terrain? Would a future 
enemy always cooperate and present himself to air-power in such monstrous target arrays? 
Could a future enemy's powers of deception outdo the power to acquire him as a target? 
Could the Land component really afford to be shrunk in order to free resources to pay for 
the new 'silver bullets' in the Western armoury - or rather hangar? Were the new theories 
of the air-power constituency a sound basis for an entirely new direction in 21" Century 
doctrine? 
Nevertheless, even if assertions of dominance were moderated, it was clear that the 
significance and potential of air-power had changed in some new and obvious way. Its 
role in the provision of Operational, let alone strategic fires in depth, would be an 
invaluable asset in the hands of the West, thanks primarily to the USA. Dominant air- 
power permits both the attack of ground targets and the protection of the force from 
enemy air attack. Air superiority when fighting a ground war became almost an 
assumption, the condition without which such combat would not be conducted. 
Unfortunately, as a result, the importance of ground-based air defence (GBAD) came to 
be questioned, just as the threat from UAVs, cruise missiles, theatre ballistic missiles 
(TBNO and AH began to grow. 
There remained doubts about how effective air-power had really been against Iraqi ground 
forces; and even though that effect, whatever it was, had clearly been outstanding by any 
military historical criteria, air-power had seemed disturbingly ineffective against the most 
dangerous Iraqi threat, the Scud missile. Coalition attempts to hunt and destroy Scuds 
had been extremely disappointing despite the massive diversion of efforts from other tasks. 
The Iraqis had leveraged significant utility from this relatively cheap asset, without using 
the fearful WMD warheads they might have carried. The lesson for Iraq, and other 
nations of similar inclination, in the future might be: Never fight a 'First World' military 
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power on its own terms. Fight below the thresholdof conventional military operations, or 
move above it to deterrence or hostilities, underwritten by surface-to-surface artillery such 
as the Scud and its successors, armed with WMD. The initiative over what sort of military 
challenge a 'rogue state' might make, rests with that state and is not easily gauged. 
The West and its allies appeared to have won a startling victory, almost without historical 
precedent; but the very scale of that victory seemed to ensure that it would not soon be 
replicated. It was a model of military accomplishment in many ways, but one which had 
possibly made itself obsolete. At the same time it became the benchmark against which 
Western nations had to measure their future military capability, for they might some day 
have to fight 'Gulf War H'. The dividend from invez-, ting in this heavy, high-tech 
warfighting capability was to close, or at least red-u-ce, the attraction of this option to a 
potential opponent. Maintaining a major warfighting capability has also assured the 
West's military lead over some future peer competitor for some decades. The price may 
have been the 'locldng up' of resources in a style of warfare that may have passed, and a 
delay in diverting resources to forms more relevant to the future, if they could be divined. 
This debate over the utility of force and balance of investment don-dnated military thinldng 
at the turn of the Century and remains unresolved. 
The West also learned that, after the predictability of the Cold War, conducting 
unexpected expeditionary operations had become- its greatest challenge. 'Out of Area' 
operations were now the mainstream, and high readiness, rapid deployment and rapid 
effects were critical to them. It was highly unlikely that the logistic resources of a future 
host nation would match those of Saudi Arabia, or that an enemy would give his opponent 
so much time to deploy, marshal his forces, build-up logistics and train, while presenting 
himself for attack by fire over a prolonged period. The West would need the ability to 
create military effects more rapidly, and not merely from the air, to succeed against a 
faster-moving opponent than Iraq had proved to be. 
Military victory in 1991 seemed overwhelming. Iraq had apparently been defeated, 
massively and disproportionately, and yet perple7dngly, even that had not amounted to 
strategic victory. Air operations against Iraq continued more than a decade later. On the 
I air-power as a tool of coercion to control and one hand, this validated the unique role o. 
deter, and yet at the end of it, the gains (if the war seemed relatively limited, and the 
regime of Saddam Hussein endured and he remained a threat to his own people and 
neighbours. 
The Iraqi regime's survival was partly due to the reluctance of the Coalition to press on to 
Baghdad to 'total victory'. The international reaction to the bombing of the Al-Firdos 
bunker in Baghdad on the night of the 12'hFebruary, which may have killed 300 people, 
had made commanders and political leaders realize that civilian casualties to the enemy 
were unacceptable if they appeared disproportionate, unnecessary and were graphically 
portrayed by the press. Similarly, the scale of the carnage shown on television on 27h 
February of the Basra I-Eghway, the 'FEghway of Death', also had a major effect on 
Western electorates and international opinion. 294 The increasing availability of information 
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enabled Western nations to fight more effectively, but it also enabled the international 
community and their electorates to scrutinize their actions more critically. The battle for 
perceptions had become more akin to judo than boxing. The greater the military power, 
the greater the risk that its force might be turned against itself The Gulf War revealed the 
growing force of these trends in whose context future wars would be fought and 
firepower applied. They were amplified by experience in the Balkan conflicts of the 
following years. 
The Gulf War changed the setting in which firepower would be applied in future conflict. 
New factors were evident: The rise of air-power, albeit with doubts about the extremes 
with which it was evangelized; the likelihood that a-'Gulf War II' would not be fought in 
the near future, if only because Western readiness deterred it; an appreciation of the 
growing threat from theatre ballistic missiles with WMD; the realization that an opponent 
might choose to attack Western interests below the threshold of general war, and that the 
scope of operations for main forces was expanding. Above all, it was clear that future 
operations would be conducted against a background of an increasingly sensitive 
international opinion, beset with legal ambiguities and hazards which would place greater 
strains on commanders and those who applied firepower. 
4.13 RUSSIA'S CBECIHEN WARS 1994-2000 
Russia's wars in Chechnya (1994-2000) were often characterized by lack of restraint in 
the application of fire, but the techniques of applying it became more sophisticated with 
bitter experience. During the First Chechen War (1994-6), Grozny was heavily shelled 
between December 1994 and January 1995 as Russian commanders sought to maximize 
the effects of fire before committing troops to close battles in the devastated urban 
terrain. 295 This was only partially successful, for the Chechens left the upper stories of 
buildings unoccupied and constructed defensive positions in basements. From these 
positions they remained a lethal threat for much longer than expected, ready to engage 
Russian manoeuvre units in close combat. 
Despite the lavish use of fire, the Russians still committed armoured units to urban 
operations before their opponent had been adequately subdued, and they suffered high and 
politically damaging casualties as a result. 2" It could be argued that such attritional tactics 
were inappropriate; but given a plan based on the elimination of the enemy rather than 
something more subtle, the answer from a Russian perspective lay in increasing the weight 
of fire until the desired effect had been achieved. 
After costly early experiences in the First Chechen War, the Russians reorganized their 
forces, 'repackaging' and re-balancing the components of fire and manoeuvre. For 
example, a battalion tactical group formed around a naval infantry company from the 
Black Sea Fleet included a reconnaissance company, a Nona 2S9 mortar battery from the 
Caspian Flotilla, a 2S I self-propelled artillery battery, an engineer company and other 
subunits. Mixed units of artillery were formed including tube and rocket subunits. Some 
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of these were integrated with tactical manoeuvre units and others held at higher level to 
reinforce critical sectors. 297 
In the Second Chechen War (1999-2000), the Chechens again intended to fight the 
Russians at close quarters in complex urban or mountainous terrain of their own choosing. 
They hoped to inflict sufficient casualties on the Russians to cause their withdrawal, rather 
as the Afghans had succeeded in doing a decade earlier. The Russians sought to keep at 
greater distance from their enemy than they had in the First Chechen War, trying to avoid 
the human attrition caused by manoeuvring in urban terrain. They relied to an even 
greater extent on firepower, relative to other arms, than at any time in their history. The 
ability of artillery to fight 'at anns-length' gave it a crucial role in the new approach: 
'Long-range fire destruction". 298 
Russian artillery was highly effective in early manoeuvres, supporting 'set-piece' advances 
across the plains south to the Terek River. South of the Terek, in the woods and urban 
areas, the Russians chose to employ the fire-planning techniques they had developed in 
Afghanistan. They created 'Fire Blocks' to prevent the enemy from escaping, 'Fire 
Sweeps' to harass and damage him in otherwise inaccessible regions, 'Box Barrages' to 
ring and protect friendly positions, 'Fire Corridors' to integrate the fire of many units on a 
variety of targets and 'Target Boxes' to saturate suspected enemy positions. Most of 
these missions consumed huge quantities of conventional ammunition, but some also 
required the limited use of precision, laser-guided munitions. ' 
The Russians reached Grozny at the end of November 1999 and subjected it to weeks of 
artillery and air bombardment . 
300 The Russian commander of the operation to take 
Grozny, General G. Troshev, was reported to have described his tactics thus, "This time 
everyone knows what we are fighting for. We are avoiding the heavy casualties we 
suffered during the last war, so we won't storm Grozny. We will strangle it and besiege it 
with air strikes and artillery" . 
301 The Russian Army possessed large quantities of arms and 
ammunition to match a doctrine based on overwhelming fire superiority, generated by 
heavy bombardments, pre-planned at high-level. They also appeared to make good use of 
sophisticated surveillance and target acquisition technology such as the Story-P UAV 
which will form a larger component of their future force structures. 
There were significant changes in the manner in which air and artillery strikes were 
commanded. In the early stages of the First Chechen War, the strict regulation of 
fireplanning and execution at high level had been found to be insufficiently responsive in 
complex guerrilla operations, whether urban or rural. In the Second Chechen War, 
tactical commanders were permitted to make fireplans in a way fundamentally at odds with 
the Russian tradition. Colonel General Karatuyev, Chief of the Rocket Troops and 
Artillery was a keen advocate of the new decentralized approach. Under the new 'zonal- 
territorial' method, every force from battalion upwards had a defined zone of 
responsibility for reconnaissance and 'fire destruction', giving low level commanders much 
greater freedom of action. Every company was supported by an artillery or mortar battery 
for use at close quarters, and artillery was aflocated to every level above that. One fifth of 
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artillery ammunition fired by the Russians is reported to have been smoke or white 
phosphorous. "' One informed commentator also judged that there was probably a higher 
proportion of direct fire in these operations than in any conflict in Europe since 1914.303 
In a sense, however, this was a very traditional Russian approach, making artillery fire 
available at all levels, but now with decentralized control. This firepower was 
substantially augmented by air-power, both Exed-and rotary-wing. Its responsiveness to 
tactical demands was improved by a large increase in the number of Forward Air 
Controllers (FAC), sometimes provided at even company level. 
On 64 December 1999, the Russian forces gave an ultimatum to the residents of Grozny 
to leave by a safe corridor, prior to their assault on the city. Rather than send infantry and 
armour dashing forward to secure key points as they had attempted to do, at a very high 
price, in the First Chechen War, the Russians circled the city with tanks and artillery, and 
infantry infiltrated in to identify strong points. They then held back while these were 
systematically destroyed by artillery and aircraft. The Russians' predilection for heavy 
firepower was seen in their use of very heavy mortars. 304 They also used fuel-air, 
'thermobaric', weapons against guerrillas sheltering in cellars. 305 Chechen positions that 
survived were quickly engaged by the artillery of the advancing company in whose zone 
they lay. On seizing an area, the Russians constructed defensive strong points, and 
advanced once more from these bases, in the wake of a further 'fire destruction'. It is 
estimated that eighty percent of this fire was generated from the air and just fifteen to 
seventeen percent by artillery. 3D6 
The Russian, approach was similar in essence to that practised on the Western Front 
towards the end of the First World War. Provided sufficient firepower could be massed, it 
was virtually certain that a limited piece of terrain could be seized at the price of appalling 
devastation in what was termed a 'bite and hold' operation. Artillery tactics in urban 
operations became very sophisticated. Sometimes assaulting infantry would forgo artillery 
support in order to maintain surprise. Artillery would fire at a constant rate over a 
prolonged period to deprive defenders of sleep. A lull would follow and attacking Russian 
infantry would then catch Chechen defenders unprepared at dawn, 'biting off a limited 
objective of perhaps a couple of city blocks. The predictable Chechen counter attack 
would be held off by massive defensive artillery fire. 
The ruined city of Grozny eventually fell, much later than expected, in the first week of 
February 2000 after four months of bombardment. 117 With its capture, Russian artillery, 
air and helicopters switched their fire to the villages to the west of the Grozny. 308 The 
elusive Chechens; dispersed to the mountains to avoid Russian fire and to exploit their 
ability to manoeuvre. This exceeded that of the Russians upon whom they continued to 
inflict humiliating attrition using guerrilla tactiCS. 309 On the other hand, the Russians had 
captured the Chechen capital and their domestic political requirements had been satisfied - 
up to a point. 
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The Russians may have become more sensitive to friendly casualties, but in contrast to 
Western countries they do not appear to have developed the same inhibitions about the 
collateral damage resulting from their fire. Although their approach seems to have 
achieved their military goals in the short term, it remains to be seen whether inflicting 
damage on such a massive scale will help to achieve a satisfactory long-term solution to 
their Chechen problem. In such wars the lessons of Vietnam remain telling. Optimal fire 
is that which is the minimum necessary to achieve the desired effect on the target. 
Anything greater than that is likely to have negative side-effects on the campaign. It must 
also be certain that the need to destroy or neutralize the target outweighs the 
consequences of any side-effect, even from optimal levels of fire, whatever the mere 
military justification for so doing. If this is not acknowledged, the entire Operational 
concept may be undermined. Complex military-political judgements have to be made, and 
these should be factored into the campaign plan, and not left solely to either military or 
political decision makers. 
4.14 SMALL WARS AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENNTUM 
At the turn of the Millennium, artillery continued to be used around the world in numerous 
wars many of which had been siminering for decades. Artillery remained the primary 
'currency' of the long-running, 'warm-war' along the 776km 'Line of Control' in Kashmir 
between India and Pakistan. 310 Peaks in the Kargil and Drass areas were contested in 
infantry engagements, supported by artillery bombardments; and fighting was particularly 
intense on the Siachen Glacier, where artillerymen on both sides contended with unique 
environmental challenges. The Indians fired 13 Omm guns at altitudes of 18,000 feet in 
temperatures that fell to -50C in Winter. 
311 It was also reported that they fired between 
312 500,000 and 700,000 artillery rounds. 
Artillery was also an important element in the forces on both sides in the Sri Lankan civil 
war, and used intensively in May and October 2000. "' In 2000, the war between Ethiopia 
and its former province of Eritrea erupted once more in conventional fighting, and artillery 
played a crucial role in the Ethiopians' breaking through Eritrean defences. 314 
Artillery may have caused as many as 50,000 casualties in Kabul during the Afghan civil 
war in 1996; and it was also a major factor in clashes between the forces of the 'Northern 
Alliance' and the Taliban rulers of Afghanistan in September and October 2001. 
The issue of whether Western ground forces deploying to Afghanistan in 2001-02 should 
take their close support artillery with them became a contentious issue. Could airpower 
and mortars carry out the tasks previously inherent to field artillee" Did the logistic 
burden of artillery, given limited helicopter lift, outweigh the advantages of responsive 
close support field artillery? Should close support zlxvay3 be regarded as an essential part 
of the ground combat system? The 1,200 US gr. ound troops taking part in Operation 
ANACONDA (February-March 2002) did not take the' ir close support artillery with them, 
preferring 60mm, 81 mm and 120mm mortars, given the limited helicopter-lift available. 
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These apparently performed well, destroying a number of enemy mortars and 122mm. D- 
30 gun positions which had caused twenty-eight of the forty-six American casualties. 316 
There were, however, apparently problems coordinating Joint fires. A first sergeant from 
the 10 1' Air Assault Division noted that, "The problem with our mortars was there was a 
24-hour CAS cap. And (attack aircraft) wouldn't fly near us if we were firing indirect, 
even though our max ordnant was far beneath their patterns. The other problem was the 
Air Force could never hit small groups of personnel ... I watched and called corrections on 
numerous sorties and they could never hit the targets ... Every time (the 
direction of attack) 
was perpendicular to us, we were hit with shrapnel. Not to mention the time they dropped 
a 2,000-pound bomb in the middle of our company that didn't go off by a sheer 
miraCie., P)317 
Many A- I Os had been placed in storage and some noted the contribution that the A- 10 
could have made in Operation ANACONDA. US Navy SEALS trying to rescue SEAL N. 
Roberts were pinned down by mortars with a longer range than their small arms. After 
more than one hour F- I 5E Strike Eagles arrived to provide support, but "They've never 
trained to do this CAS tasle 2.3 11 The area was not secure for fifteen hours. TheF-15Es 
were designed as strike aircraft and were using the air-to-air 20mm Gatling guns for 
ground attack, and flying too fast to be effective. The A-10, with a loitering capability, 
heavier armour and slower speed would have been a more effective aircraft for this task. 
Another problem with air strikes was that A] Qaeda soldiers could hear the aircraft and 
hide in their caves and it was not always possible to hit those caves with precision from 
the air. The US Army's view of Joint fire coordination on operation ANACONDA have 
been contested by the US Air Force, which cites lack of prior planning as the cause of 
many difficulties. 319 
British commandos took their 105mm gun3 with them on Operation JACANA; and by 
May 2002 had fired over 100 rounds to support assaults on cave and bunker complexes in 
Afghanistan, although these turned out to be unmanned. The weapon locating radars 
which deployed with the British guns proved valuable in identifying firing positions, 
following attacks on Kabul and Khost. Guns at Bagrarn airfield fired daily to deter 
potential attackers . 
320 The base of British troops serving with the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul was hit by 107mm rockets on 7h April 2002 321, and 
coalition forces in Bagram air base was hit on 26"' April 2002. US troops were similarly 
attacked elsewhere in Afghanistan, such as Gardez and Kandahar, and they deployed the 
Q-36 counterfire radar at Kandahar airfield. Once a target had been located, great care 
had to be taken to ensure that no collateral damage was caused; and rather than reply with 
mortars, whose range was shorter than the rockets being fired at the base, a patrol or AH- 
64 was often sent to deal with the attaCker. 322 
By September 2002, US forces based in Kandahar were supported by six field guns and 
weapon-locating radar as a force protection measure, creating a defensive arc with a 
radius of 15km. Major General R- Scales (Retired) commented that, 'Tou can have 
rounds going back at the enemy (mortar) before that (incoming) round actually lands on 
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you. " RE O'Hanlon noted that, "If they are able to lob a sheU at you and run, you can't 
call air power quickly enough to go after them. T lie only way to deprive them of that is to 
be able to respond really fast, and artiBery is very quick in its response time. " Another 
observer noted that, in March 2002, neither airpower nor mortars had proved an adequate 
response to enemy mortars which succeeded in inflicting casualties on US soldiers. 323 
4.15 THE NEW WORLD ORDER: PEACE OPERATIONS 
The Strategic Enviroment 
During the Cold War, there were numerous limited conflicts 'sponsored' by the great 
ideological rivals, who 4irmished with each other in relative safety through their pro)des. 
The end of the Cold War removed much of the logic for these conflicts, although some 
had a dynamic of their own. On the other hand, the removal of Cold War inhibitions 
encouraged some latent conflicts from which the great powers had deliberately remained 
detached for fear of escalation into more widespread warfare. These often erupted into 
open hostilities for a variety of nationalist, ideological or socio-economic reasons which 
the international community sought to bring under control. So-called Peace Operations 
have been conducted in various forms for many years under UN and other auspices. 324 
Their scope and frequency grew rapidly in the aftermath of the Cold War, as the UN tried 
to 'police' what some heralded optimistically as 'The New World Order'. 
The Gulf War (1990-9 1) presented the Coalition with few conceptual military challenges, 
other than those of a rapidly evolving strategic environment. The operations wMch 
followed shortly afterwards seemed radically different. By the mid-1990s, modem cities in 
Southern Europe had experienced sieges by hundreds of artillery pieces lasting years, 
while elsewhere on the Continent life was untouched by these local horrors. Even in the 
late 1980s, such events would have seemed far-fetched, a doctrinal regression unrelated to 
the 'modem' world. In two Chechen Wars, which were regarded either as civil wars, wars 
of liberation, wars of secession, peace operations or 'police' actions against organized 
crime, Russia deployed her firepower on a massive scale. NATO chose to apply equally 
impressive firepower in 1999 in its strategic assault on Yugoslavia from the air, yet at the 325 
other end of the spectrum also fired artillery in Kosovo to counter criminal activity. 
It is difficult to classify and analyse the components of the broad span of Peace operations 
and to define how or whether they necessarily differ from warfighting. The semantic 
challenge accurately reflects the lack of conceptual and doctrinal clarity that has pervaded 
them. 326 Peacekeeping operations, in which the parties to a dispute consent to the 
presence of an outside intervention, create particular challenges regarding the utility of 
force and the application of firepower. Peace Enforcement, where some or all parties may 
not consent to the presence of an outside force, is more akin to warfighting, although the 
political context is likely to be rather different. Operations in the Balkans in the late 
1990s, whether under UN or NATO command, encapsulated those challenges. These 
were especially acute when operations appeared to slide unpredictably across distinctions 
between warfighting, Peace Enforcement and Peacekeeping. The power to determine 
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which of these obtained at any one time often seemed to he with the local actors, rather 
than the international force, which may not have been best configured to deal with some of 
the contingencies which arose. 
Peace Enforcement and Peacekeeping operations entail many military tasks common to 
warfighting; and the pressures of the rapidly evolving strategic environment apply equally 
to all. Some considerations in Peace operations, such as minimizing casualties on both 
sides,, seem also to have become established factors in warfighting. These new 
complexities are most apparent in the application of firepower by artillery and from the air, 
and they entail tactical and Operational nuances which can sometimes appear daunting. 
Command in Multinational Peace Operations 
Multi-nationality creates particular advantages and disadvantages. NATO armies have 
long experience of working together, and have detailed procedures to ensure 
interoperability. This yields immense political and military advantages when they deploy 
on operations of any type. During the Cold War, multi-nationality in NATO seldom went 
below corps level; while in Peace operations, in an extreme example, there can be 
multinationality even at the lowest. '27 Peace operations are very like to include non- 
NATO nations in the force, even though they may be led by NATO. 32 The contingents of 
these other nations are likely to try to follow NATO procedureS329 , but they may well not have interoperable equipment, and their soldiers may have very different levels of training. 
It is relatively unimportant if they have different platforms and munitions. More serious 
problems arise if they have incompatible communications systems, but even these can be 
overcome by the human interface of a liaison officer. 330 
The most difficult and even dangerous aspect of multi-nationality in Peace operations is 
likely to be, not incompatible technology or procedures, - but rather a different 
understanding of the mission. For example, there may be disagreement within a multi- 
national force as to the nature of the shared operation, especially when the contingents' 
political and legal viewpoints and military doctrines do not coincide. One national 
contingent may regard the operation as an armed conflict, while others may not. Some 
may believe that the Law of Armed Conflict applies, while others may not. The use of 
legal force may therefore be assessed differently by the various elements of the force, 
leading to different ROE, creating potential difficulties in the provision of fire support 
between national contingents. 331 There may be Merent interpretations of policy as to 
whether a target may be engaged, given the risk to civilian life, collateral damage and even 
environmental hazardS. 332 Such disagreements could have political consequences affecting 
the cohesion of the force and the continued viability of the mission. 
These are not bizarre, marginal considerations. They are part of the new strategic reality 
in which commanders and fireplanners, have to operate. These sensitivities seem likely to 
become even more acute, except in societies which believe themselves to be engaged in 
struggles of national survival, when atavistic, rather than legalistic attitudes, are more 
likely to prevail. Particular problems arise for Western societies when they are engaged in 
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operations, regulated by such sensitivities, against an opponent who perceives himself to 
be fighting for survival by almost any means. 333 
In a NATO 'Article 5' operation, the roles played by member nations in combat and the 
chain of command are clear, In Peace operations, the situation is likely to be very much 
less so, even amongst NATO members. For example, the very participation of a NATO 
nation in a Peace operation is discretionary, as is the size and nature of its contribution. A 
force commander, of whatever nation or alliance, has no guarantee that he will have a 
force with which he has trained, or with the capabilities he might like. In NATO, nations 
react to requests for such forces through the 'Force Generation' process, and the 
commander may have to report that the force generated fails to meet the minimum 
required to execute his mission, or he may have to devise a different plan using the force 
that is allocated to him. 
Even if the force of a multinational commander were to contain all the elements that he 
might wish for, he may not be able to use those capabilities in the most efficient way - 
from his point of view. In the case of artillery, for example, he would wish to have as 
much as possible as 'force artillery', under Operational Command (OpCON4). 334 
If there were no force artillery, the commander would face even greater challenges. For 
example, if the force consisted of a number of national or multinational brigades, and the 
only artillery in the force consisted of artillery organic, or subordinated at some other state 
of command to those brigades, the force commander would probably find it difficult to 
deploy those pieces and apply his firepower as flexibly as he would wish. Some brigades 
might have too little, or even no organic artillery, if the force generation process had failed 
to provide it. Should the need arise to provide supporting fire to one such brigade, the 
force commander could not in theory order the movement of artillery from a brigade with 
organic artillery, which was perhaps not in contact, to one that needed it. 335 
Experience has shown that the surest way to derive maximum military effectiveness from a 
multinational force is through the personality of the commander. It is probably 
unreasonable to expect nations to commit their forces under less restrictive command 
states, or to give a foreign commander 'carte blanche' in the missions he gives to them. 
The commander will, however, be able to use the force of his character to influence 
subordinate national cominanders, and encourage them to 'interpret' their state of 
command in such a way as to assist him accomplish the mission. This conclusion may 
sound uncomfortably imprecise and even unconstitutional to some, but it was a successful 
feature of operations in the Balkans in the 1990s. It has long been a major element in the 
'art of command', and a key attribute found in multinational commanders such as the 
Duke of Marlborough in the I Sth Century and General D. D. Eisenhower 250 years later. 
A commander will seldom embark on a mission with the force of his precise choice, and 
uncertainty and complexity of this sort are inherent in Peace operations. The record of 
such operations is also that the mission will almost certainly evolve as political 
developments unfold. A force might be generated and configured for one very low- 
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intensity operation, but escalate with little warning, and almost certainly more rapidly than 
the decision-action cycle of the force-generation and deployment processes. "" 
Care should be taken to avoid inadvertent 'n-dssion creep', but maybe 'Mission creep' is 
the name given to 'mission evolution' by those who cannot handle dynamic situations. 
The deliberate commitment of an inadequate force would be foolhardy, but the tidy 
military mind should be cautious about a rigidity that demands certainties, and seeks to 
govern inherently "chaotic' political situations. If the political situation was predictable 
and firmly under control, the force might not have been required in the first place. 
There are risks in burdening commanders with such imprecision, and failure has its price, 
but success may also demand it. Maybe success goes to those who can dominate rapidly 
changing circumstances and adapt their posture and modus operandi. Perhaps this is the 
equivalent in Peace operations of the qualities of agility and tempo in warfighting, where 
success may go to those who can exploit opportunities and turn them to their advantage. 
Commanders and staffs will have to be inventive and radical, unafraid to devise new 
techniques to be effective with given resources, where solutions in manuals prove 
inadequate. This requires a military culture that regards 'doctrine' and 'tactics, techniques 
and procedures' as guides rather than regulations, and gives fresh life to the 
'Auftragstaktik' that many profess to follow but dishonour in practice. 
Artifleiy Tactics 
Artillery became the most potent arm in the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, not merely on 
account of its physical power, but because of its psychological influence. In Peace 
operations, commanders must often play the role of the diplomat, reinforced by military 
superiority. The presence of guns can calm an unstable situation. The effects of artillery 
and air strikes, especially when broadcast by the press, can have other more significant 
consequences than the actual physical damage might entail, creating psychological effects 
upon intransigent politicians. This is in a sense the 'Moral effect' of artillery applied, not 
to the field commander, but through the power of the media in the Information Age, 
directly to the strategic leadership, and perhaps more importantly, to its electorates, power 
bases and national psyches. 
The application of fire may seem an attractive option at the time, but it can create counter- 
productive obstacles to future progress. Misjudgement may merely stiffen resistance, 
rather as the aerial bombing of cities seems to have done in some cases in the Second 
World War. Fire which bolsters resistance is, by analogy in the Information Age, the 
virtual equivalent of the rubble obstacles of the shelled cities of Caen and Ortona or Monte 
Cassino. As in all operations, it is the carefully measured application of effects, given the 
total context of the Operation, that is crucial rather than mere immediate tactical utility. 
Relatively small numbers of guns can have decisive effects in Peace operations and 
artillery will probably be deployed in relatively small groups. Artillery can achieve a 
variety of effects in operations which are likely to be non-bear in character, in which the 
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forces of all parties are likely to be of a low densfity, and the need for a heavy weight of 
fire unlikely. It can deter by deploying and exhibiting the means to use credible, decisive, 
military force against transgressors. That credibility may require that it be used, or at least 
demonstrated on occasions. It can support the deployment of ground manoeuvre forces 
which may be required to deploy into potentially hostile areas; and it can reach into areas 
from which they may be threatened, but against which their direct fire weapons cannot be 
brought to bear. 
If fire is to be seen to be discriminating and proportionate, identification of targets is a 
particularly sensitive matter, requiring detailed analysis and political judgement. NATO 
tactical targeting has become the standard means, at least in the West, by which the 
allocation of fire resources is optimized. This methodology requires commanders to 
Decide their priorities, Detect and Track the highest-payoff targets, Deliver fire onto them 
and Assess the damage that results. "' This process was devised originally for high 
intensity warfare, but has proved just as applicable to Peace operations, where careful 
judgement and precision is required before attacking a target. The need for greater 
certainty when opening fire means that a force is likely to need more STA assets per fire 
unit than in general war. Even so, the hope of achieving an adequate recognized ground 
picture is likely to be very limited. A greater number of ISTAR equipments may be 
needed, not merely to confirm accurate target data and BDA, but also to establish an 
auditable evidential trail to support the commander in subsequent investigations of his 
actions. A consequence of the targeting process will be the selection of a particular 
system to achieve the desired effect in time and space. Precise munitions may be as useful 
in Peace operations for their avoidance of collateral damage as they are for their military 331 efficiency in general war. 
In conventional war, physical targets such -!; hcadqu? -fters, guns and missiles are likely to 
be the immediate priority. In Peace operations, -the most valuable targets are the minds of 
leaders, the local population and international opiniou. The highest pay-off targets are 
therefore likely to be those that affect pa,, rceptions and 'play well' in the media . 
339 The 
intent of fires is less likely to be to destroy or neutraUe per se, although these may be the 
necessary physical effects selected, than to prcduce a Moral Effect upon the win of the 
various actors and influence their subsequent behaviour. Weapons effects are therefore 
measured not so much in terms of fragmen! ation efficiency, lethal distance or depth of 
penetration as by the emotional impact of the graphic image created, and its global 
distribution through the media to electorates and decision makers. 
In Peace operations and in some warfighting, the primary danger to artillery may not be 
from indirect CF but from ground attack by guerrillas, sniper fire, ambush on deployment, 
mines, local people living in close proximity, direct fire or indirect rocket attack. The 
circumstances in which fhendly fire is authorized will probably be transparent, and the 
conduct of missions is likely to be analysed at leisure by international opinion, judging its 
legality and care for collateral daMage. 340 Tactical actions by all sides can have 
Operational consequences. Close scrutiny means that, along with physical threats, the 
most effective CF against the international force is likely to be non-lethal; and may take 
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the form of self-imposed ROE. Prohibitions on firing, a form of suppression, may also be 
inflicted by media pressure, possible conflict of interests with NGOs, including charities, 
or legal constraints. Strict controls on firing will also be imposed to prevent 
fratricidelamicide. 
In operations such as those in the Balkans in the 1990s, restrictive ROE and sensitive 
political circumstances meant that in most cases prompt and overwhelming force was 
unlikely to be the best response by artillery, contrary to norms of gunnery in other types of 
conflict. 341 A more sophisticated, graduated response of credible deterrence, followed by 
minimum force proved more likely to be appropriate. This minimum force might 
nevertheless entail a rapid response to a situation with overwhelming fire; but symbolic 
and limited fire, demonstrating proportionate response to a given act, may well be the 31 
political imperative. 
The task of protecting a humanitarian convoy from attack by indirect fire illustrates some 
of the problems which could face artillery in a Peacekeeping operation to deliver 
humanitarian aid. The primary task is to deter or to strike the source of the indirect fire, 
but artillery would accomplish little more than direct fire systems if it accompanied the 
convoy itself The challenge is to locate a weapon before it fires and to be prepositioned 
to strike it when required. Artillery might not, however, be permitted to fire at a 
threatening weapon before it commits a hostile act. 343 If a weapon did fire, or rather a 
round land on or near a convoy, what certainty would there be that that round came from 
that weapon rather than another nearby which had also fired, perhaps on some other 
unrelated target in a conflict in which the peacekeeper was not permitted to become 
involved? Those two weapons might belong to different forces, and firing at one might 
have entirely Merent political consequences to firing at the other. Over a long route in 
complex terrain, radar might not be available to provide adequate evidence. Would a 
mere supposition of guilt provide legal protection to the artillery commander who decided 
to kill those who might have been the firers - but then, might not have been? 
What is the gunner's legal position? Will the man who fired the gun that killed unintended 
victims, always be exempt from legal culpability? In the past, the man who originated the 
order to fire has been legally accountable. The man who fired the gun many kilometres 
away may have had no knowledge of what he was shooting at on a complex fireplan. Will 
he always be able to say that he fired and killed innocent people because he was ordered to 
do so? Will he always be able to claim that he was not responsible? Can he escape a 
charge of reckless firing that endangered innocent lives on the grounds that it is not his 
responsibility to know about, or to be accountable for the consequences of his lethal 
actions? At any other time in military history, this legalistic approach would have been 
deemed absurd, but it may not be so in future, if soldiers are brought before international 
courts to take individual responsibility for their actions. Blaming the orders of superiors 
to fire may prove an inadequate defence. 
It has been suggested that the very possession of precision weapons may render their 
owner legally vulnerable. Should they decide to use 'dumb' munitions instead of their 
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tsmart' ones and cause collateral damage in the process, they night face legal action as a 
result of that conscious choice that would not be open to an opponent who had no 'smart' 
munitions - 'smart' weapons may require 'smart uge'. '" This might appear implausible 
today, but it would probably be unwise to discount the rate at which such legal 'friction" 
will impact upon military operations. 
In Peace operations, mere considerations of legality may not be enough. Perceptions 
about 'proportionality of response' can become paramount. Even if the firing of artillery 
is strictly legal, commanders will have to consider whether it is also wise, given the 
manner in which collateral damage might be presented in the press, and used by the 
propaganda machines of those on its receiving end. The presentational and emotional 
complexity of peacekeepers killing people, intentionally or by accident, remains a perilous 
factor in calculations about the application of fire. 
Croatia and Bosnia 
Cities under siege by artillery became symbols of the entire Balkan crisis. The precise 
accounting of the numbers of guns and their locations came to have the highest 
Operational significance in the construction of cease-fires. The monitoring of their fire, 
along with that of mortars, came to determine and mark the points of policy shift, both 
within the UNPROFOR mandate in Bosnia, and in the transition to NATO's IFOP, What 
in other modem guerrilla campaigns has often been termed the 'politics of the last 
atrocity', became the 'politics of the last shelling' - or at least alleged shelling. 
Concealment and deception when firing were not merely a matter of survival for the piece, 
but a means by which international opinion and decision-makers could be manipulated or 
induced to apportion blame and punishment. The verification that particular guns had or 
had not fired came to have diplomatic importance at the highest level. A single mortar 
round could have military-strategic as well as tactical significance; and the ability of 
artillery and aerial acquisition systems to provide this information had commensurate 
importance. Equally, the skills of crater-analysis by UN or NATO forces could have 
strategic significance. 
Cynical observers soon realized that in the Balkans sides might even shell themselves, 
knowing that this could cause outrage and lead to Western action against their enernies, 
outweighing any consideration of the price in casualties to their own side . 
345 The power 
of artillery magnified through the lens of the media could thus generate Operational and 
strategic outcomes, beyond any immediate effects on the target. 
Artillery played an important role in the hostilities resulting in and from the break up of 
Yugoslavia, and soon captured international attention. The first 'cause calibre' was the 
siege of Dubrovnik which began in September 1991 and was graphically reported by the 
Western preSS. 346 Such coverage played a major part in influencing international opinion, 
making political decisions to intervene more likely. Attacks on other cities followed, such 
as that on the Croatian town of Osijek, where shells were at one time reported to be falling 
at the rate of one per minute. '4' Artillery became an essential weapon for all sides, and 
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played a notable role in the Croatian Army's Operation STORK 4k5h August 1995, the 
largest conventional offensive in Europe since 1945. It 'cleansed", or led to the 'voluntary 
withdrawal', of over 150,000 Serbs from the Krajena area of Croatia . 
348 As so often in 
the Balkans, the choice of term depends on the politics of the observer. 
The Western media regarded artillery as the key equipment in the campaign of the Bosnian 
Serbs. Once this had been firmly registered in the political consciousness, dealing with it 
seemed increasingly to become a military, political, and apparently humanitarian necessity. 
Western opinion and resolve to intervene were further energized by press reports that the 
Serbs were using artillery to attack Muslim and Croat villages before going in to conduct 
'ethnic cleansing'. 349 The British public was told, "It is these guns which give the Serbs 
their power. Against them the Muslims - and the Croats involved in Bosnia - have no 
recourse. Unfortunately, artillery is difficult to destroy from the air. The guns themselves 
are robust pieces of equipment, usually only disabled permanently with demolition 
charges. They can also be easily hidden and quickly moved... Their (the Serbs) power to 
do harm derives almost exclusively from their possession of artillery. 'zso 
Reports claimed that the shelling of villages by Serb artillery was deliberately intended to 
ldll civilians . 
35' The artillery siege of Gorazde, which started in 1992 and lasted for more 
than two years, received particular international publicity. There was outrage that on one 
occasion about 200 shells were reported to have landed in a UN-declared 'safe area'. Mrs 
Lyndall Sachs of the LJNHCR caUed this shelling by Bosnian Serbs, "Random violence 
directed against a civilian populatiorfo. 352 Artillery made the concept of 'safe areas' 
essentially meaningless, unless there was a physical force, and the will, to make them safe 
by controlling the locations from which they could be shelled. 
The siege of Sarajevo in the early 1990s became an even more intense drama. Bosnian 
Serbs besieged the city with relatively few guns and very little ammunition, fuing for many 
months from static positions. The guns were usually well dug-in, in concealed positions 
close to inhabited buildings. Serb observers knew the ground well and usually 
communicated by means of buried fine. Their shortage of manpower meant that their 
gunners often moved around from position to position to fire small amounts of 
ammunition from static guns, although at critical moments they were able to increase their 
rate of fire . 
353 The purpose of the foot-soldier, when not sniping, was to provide local 
protection for these guns. The bombardment became so intense and international opinion 
so inflamed that on 25h May 1995 NATO was granted permission by the UN to respond 
with air strikes which destroyed eight ammunition bunkers near Pale. In response, the 
Serbs fired rockets into the Tuzla 'safe area', killing seventy-one people, and took UN 
personnel hostage. 
Artillery played an important part in the Bosnian Federation's advance across northern 
Bosnia in September 1995 which coincided with NATO air strikes. 'NATO aircraft 
served as de facto close air support for the allied (Federation) forces, complementing the 
ground attacks", seizing about thirty percent of the territory held by the SabS. 114 
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Artillery was deployed by the peacekeeping forces of UNPROFOR, the Implementation 
Force (IFOR) and the Stability Force (SFOR)355. In each case, novel roles emerged. 
UNPROFOR artillery deployed on Mount Igman on 234-24h July 199535", and by 3 lat 
August had identified 255 targetS. 337 Artillery had primacy in the mission to protect the 
Sarajevo safe area by fire, and on the first day of Operation DELEBERATE FORCE fired 
931 rounds on thirty missions. This demonstration of the resolve to use force influenced 
the perceptions of those who had to deal with British artillery as part of IFOR in 
December that year. The role of infantry in the UNPROFOR operation was to protect this 
artillery, and all had to relearn the skills of long-term surveiHance, in what amounted to 
'trench-warfare with radar and night vision I, . 
358 
The British Army's I 91h Regiment which was part of that force on Mount Igman, faced an 
unconventional type of artillery threat which did not meet the criteria of traditional CB 
doctrine and procedures . 
3'9 At the same time, all its OPs which were established to 
dominate the Serb positions were routinely attacked by snipers and heavy weapons. Its 
problems were complicated by unclear ROE, international law, and whatever the legal 
position, the political wisdom of opening fire in a particular situation. Targets were 
engaged, not to ensure their destruction, but with a sense of proportionality, sufficient to 
suppress them with minimal collateral damage. Many targets were extremely difficult to 
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engage and some could not be for fear of creating unacceptable collateral damage. 
Artillery and mortar locating radars played a crucial role in operations in Bosnia, not only 
in detecting firing by factions in the conflict, but also in force protection, guarding bases 
against attack by a variety of threats. 361 
By mid-September 1995 a combination of NATO air-power, UNPROFOR artillery and 
ground operations by the Croat and Bosnian Federation forces had helped bring about the 
Dayton Peace Accord. The key to Serb, power had been artillery, and this had been 
neutralized by superior Joint fires. 
Kosovo and Macedonia 
Artillery was used during Yugoslav operations in Kosovo in 1998_9.362 Yugoslav forces 
seldom pursued units of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) into forests. When 
ambushed from the edge of a wood, the Yugoslavs held back and shelled the KLA as they 
withdrew through the trees. The KLA claimed to have suffered most of their casualties of 363 the War in such artillery actions. 
NATO nations contributed the bulk of the forces comprising Kosovo Force (KFOR) 
which entered the Province in June 1999, following the Military Technical Agreement 
(MTA) at Kumanovo. This followed a NATO air bombardment in which no surface-to- 364 
surface artillery played a part. It was not politically acceptable to use KFOIVs surface 
to-surface fire against Yugoslav forces. These difficulties reveal the complex 
characteristics of various types of Joint fire, their qualities and disadvantages, all of which 
must shape decisions in optimizing effects. On the other hand, it seems probable that the 
threat of an imminent land offensive was a factor in the Yugoslavs' consent to the 
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MTA. 365 The air operation proved controversial at the time, and debate about the 
effectiveness of aerial fires and the ability of land forces to deceive and escape it 
continued long after it ended . 
3" The contention was over how much damage air-power 
had been able to inflict on Yugoslav forces deployed in the field; and whether campaign 
planning had indeed been Joint between the Air and Land component commanders, as it 
had been assumed after the Gulf War that they would necessarily be thereafter. 
The Yugoslav Army proved unexpectedly'successful at making itself invisible to the 
military technology of the day. It protected itself physically and through NATO's 
inhibitions over collateral damage, and shielded itself with innovative techniques of 
deception. It also became apparent how long it can take even a large modem air force to 
have a decisive effect in difficult terrain and weather, and how difficult it can be to make 
accurate assessments of the battle damage to units in the field. There was some public 
disquiet during the air operation at the unexpected time it was taking to show results, 
some of it by well-known military commentators. 367 Short campaigns tend to entail fewer 
political risks and frictions, and the time taken to erode Yugoslav forces did much to 
encourage the subsequent debate about the need for Western nations to develop the means 
to achieve more rapid effects. 
Given the likelihood that a ground force would eventually enter Kosovo, with or without 
Yugoslav agreement, it was important to ensure that air-power was focused not only on 
strategic ends, but also on the requirements of the subsequent Land operation, for which it 
provided merely the enabling Preliminary Bombardment. Despite the lessons of Grenada 
and the Gulf War, the land component was not represented during most of the planning of 
air operations in 1998-9, and the air bombardment consequently sometimes lacked a land 
perspective. 368 
Roads and bridges which KFOR planned to use to enter Kosovo were hit, and empty 
barracks designated for occupation by KFOR were destroyed. A large number of 
munitions were also scattered in areas where KFOR troops would have to operate. This 
may have implications for future artillery systems using similar munitions. 
Artillery continued to play a major part in subsequent operations. In December 1999, US 
artillery in Kosovo fired illuminating rounds as a demonstration of solidarity with 
neighbouring Russian units and to deter further attacks on them by Albanians. 36' In mid- 
March 2001, Macedonian forces used fight artillery against Albanian rebels in the hills 
above Tetovo. In early April, KFOR deployed British 155mm AS90s both as a deterrent 
and to fire illuminating rounds in support of infantry operations . 
370 The Macedonian Army 
continued to use artillery against Albanian rebels throughout the Summer of 2001, 
sometimes coordinated with tanks and helicopter fire, amid accusations that the rebels 
were deliberately holding civilians as human shields in the villages being shelled. 371 
1 The end of the Cold War was precipitate in a way few, if any, had predicted. In some ways, the sudden 
collapse of the USSR and the fortunes of its components in the final decade of the Century were analogous 
to the sudden collapse of the German Second Reich in 19 18, and the fate of Germany in the 1920s. Both 
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resulted In a fitndamental degradation of the structures and effectivcness of the state's military apparatus, 
and both saw the dismemberment of the state under a variety of national flags and political ideologies. 
2 On the other hand, nco-impcrialism is mustering some advocates. Robert Cooper believes that 
'imperial' interventions often bring stability and prosperity to weak states. Cooper (200 1). 
3 Terminology can be politically and financially sensitive. For example, British operations against 
Communist guerrillas in Malaya 1949-54 were only ever termed an 'Emergency'. 
4 Aj, Ircial 01 British analysis of trends in the future strategic environment is given in Strategic Trends, 
Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (Shrivenham, 2003) 
5 On 26h June 1999, there were reported to be 3,942 registered members of the press approved to operate 
in Kosovo. Nevertheless, it still proved diMcult for the press to gain access to Israeli operations on the 
West Bank, in towns like Jenin in April 2002; and many within the press corps considered that the Israeli 
operation was far from being a transparent peace opcration. 
6 The Coalition partners in the Gulf War of 1990-91 faced challenges to the prosecution of their air 
operation when Iraqi civilian and military casualties were seen to be disproportionate. NATO air 
operations against Yugoslavia in 1999 faced some similar criticisms, 'Blue on blue' incidents also caused 
controversy. 
7 Hughes (200 1). 
1 Between November 1964 and December 1965 a montlily mverage of 19,000 men and nearly four million 
poný was airlifted to Borneo. Walker (1969), p. 8. 
A British artillery regiment equates to a battalicn in most other armies, although at times it can contain 
up to thirty-two guns, in four batteries. 
10 The 105mm Pack Howitzer, for example, could be moved 301ou in less than an hour. On one occasion 
a platoon of Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and a Pack Howitzer were successfully helicoptered 
forward to cutoff a retreating enemy patrol. Lyon (1972), pp. 11-12. 
11 For example, 105mm Pack Howitzers were lifted by Belvedere aircraft for Operation NUTCRACKER 
in January 1964, and helicopters enabled guns to be placed on otherwise inaccessible peaks such as the 
4,000-foot COCA COLA. Lee (1977), p. 356. 12 Colley (1971). 
13 In Kosovo in 1999-2002, some British artillery units had both artillery and infantry roles. Others had 
purely infantry tasks, for example, batteries acted as extra companies for infantry battalions serving in 
Pristina. 
14 In Palestine in 1948, Jewish and Arab terrorist firepower increased to the point where the British 
decided to use SP guns in the direct fire role against strong points in Haifa, rather than to risk unnecessary 
infantry casualties. Similarly, when the Bulak Nizam organization increased its attacks on Britons in 
Egypt, and seized the villages of Tel-el-Kebir and El Hammada in January 1952, resistance was crushed 
by 26'h Field Regiment, using 25pdrs in support of an infantiry assault, helping to reduce British 
casualties. Lyon (1972), pp. 1-2. 
In the East AErican campaign of 1952-55, British gunners were employed initially on infantry tasks, but in 
1954 they were eventually given a limited artillery role. At first, two guns were deployed with an air OP, 
but this unit expanded to three guns. In January 1955, a bombardment of 525 rounds was fired in twenty- 
five minutes in support of Operation NUTCRACKER against the Mau Mau headquarters. Throughout 
the period, however, 156h East Africa Battery deployed only olice in a true battery position, when 
supporting Operation DANTE on the Kikuyu Esmpment in July 1955. Staclmle (1980). 
13 In the operations following the assassination of Sir Henry Gurney en 0h October 195 1, aircraft and 
25pdrs were used in an attempt to drive terrorists onto infantry 'stop lines'; but there was little evidence 
that this was effective. Lyon (1972), p. 3. On the other hand, artLilery demonstrated its worth when 
handled well in the swamps of Southern Selangor, whcr. u it was di, rected by air OPs and carefully 
coordinated with air support and naval gunfire support (NGS). "s Lee (1977). 
17 Thwaites (1971), p. 42. 
" Lambe (1967). 
19 Colley (1971). 
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20 Walker (1969). 
21 Colley (197 1). 
22 Stagg (1965), p. 49. 
23 StaCpoole (1980). 
24 A battery might have had anything from four guns and two forward observation officers (FOOs), to ten 
guns and seven FOOs over a 150km front. There were seldom enough FOOs to accompany infantry 
patrols. In the early days of the Dhofar campaign there was only one FOO per supported battalion. In 
Borneo the problem was solved by training all iriflintry NCOs in directing artillery and mortar fire, air 
support and air resupply. 
25 Lyon (1972). 
26 Thwaites (1971), p. 45. 
27 For example, the advance of the Yd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment from CAP BADGE to Wadi 
Taym in the Radfan in 1964 had to rely on Hunter aircraft for fire support; and in Dhofar it was often 
necessary to rely on air support to bolster meagre arti1leryfire. Stagg (1965), p. 41. 
28 Stagg (1965), p. 49. 
29 In Borneo, the British Green Archer radar enabled artillery to respond to mortar fire in under thirty 
seconds. Beaton (1969), p. 16. 
30 Lyon (1972), p. 3. 
31 Walker (1969), p. 9. 
32 A similar approach was adopted by the British elsewhere. For example, in the PLadfan during an 
operation on V May 1964, care was taken to avoid civilian, casualtics from bombing. Stagg (1965), p. 44. 
Before troops entered an area, leaflets were often dropped warning civilians to leave. Even then, all 
targets had to be positively identified as hostile. This limited tactical surprise and made the FOO's task 
harder, but paid greater dividends in community relations. Nevertheless identifying military targets can 
be a problem British artillery using the ZB298 radar in Oman in 1971 found that at times the harassing 
fire they were directing against guerrillas sometimes turned out to be hitting wild camels. 
33 The material damage was also relatively small compared to that inflicted by incendiary attacks on other 
Japanese cities. 
34 Pike (1953), p. 199. Infantry battalions would advance to about 101an from the enemy tine supported by 
three artillery regiments. By September 1951 these raids were conducted in brigade strength, re-supplied 
ýr when necessary. 
3 
Zleman 
(1961), p. 69. 
36 Schabel (1972), pp. 96-97. General Ridgway made further requests for heavy artillery, which were 
granted in October 195 1, and in September 1952 a number of 105mm pieces were converted to 8-inch. 
37 Hermes (1966), p. 228. 
38 Hermes (1%6), p. 225 
39 The three batteries of the British Army's 2Wh Field Regiment fired 13,400 rounds on 28'h May 1953 in 
defence of the Hook feature. 20,000 North Korean rounds fell on the defending battalion prior to and on 
the day of the attack, which failed. 20'h Regiment fired 300,000 rounds in seven months. Fawcett (1996), 
u). 68-9. 
The latter were defeated only when 9-inch howitzers firing delay-fused 'concrete-busting' shells were 
brought forward in the direct fire role. 
41 Dastrup, p. 259. 
42 Hermes (1966) p. 332. The US Army had grown accustomed to military superiority, and was disturbed 
by the relative strength of North Korean, and later Chinese, forces. At the outset of the war, the South 
Korean artillery was outnumbered three to one, and the North Koreans' 122mm howitzers, 76mm towed 
and SP guns 0 outranged the South Koreans' M3s by at least 4km The North Koreans also handled 
their artillery competently. For example, at Taejon Airfield on 160' July 1950, and on the Kum River, 
they generated firepower comparable to that of Second World War battles. 
`3 Robertson, p. 107. After two days, US forces had fired 77,349 rounds. S. L. A. Marshall wrote, "Never 
at Verdun were guns worked at any such rate as this. The Battle of Kwajalein, our most intense shootout 
during World War II, was a lesser thing when tneasured in terms of artillery expenditure per hour, weight 
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of metal against yards of earth and the grand output of the guns. For this, at least, the operation deserves 
a place in history. It set the all-time mark for artillery effort. " Quoted in Jaffe (1989). 
44 Dastrup, p. 258. 
45 Hermes (1966), p. 228. 
46 Hermes (1966), p. 227. 
41 A US 155mm gun with a planned DAER of forty rounds was rationed to fifteen, and by July it was 
suggested that this might be reduced to five. It was claimed that the US Eighth Army never ran out of 
ammunition, but the truth is that it often ran short. Although ammunition was judged by many US 
commanders to inhibit their firepower, this far exceeded that of their opponents, and by December 1952 
the ratio of artillery rounds fired was 19: 1 against the Communists. Hermes (1966), p. 352. 48 Calvert (1954). 
49 The US Under Secretary for the Army, E. D. Johnson, claimed that mortars caused the most casualties 
in the Korean War. Military staff contested this claim, but the increasing value of mortars could not be 
denied, particularly in the rugged Korean terrain. 
50 These were demonstrated at Hill 303 in August 1950. On 5b November, US forces assaulted Howitzer 
Hill with massive air and artillery support, causing what the Chinese reported as "crippling casualtiee. 
Appleman (1961), p. 743. 
51 Hailes (1954). 
52 Hermes (1966), p. 353 
33 The Variable Time fuse proved particularly effective in these operations at, for example, the Nam River 
on I' September 1950. Hermes (1966) p. 353. The South Korean 14 Division adopted tactics similar to 
those often demonstrated by the Germans in the world wars. Their forward positions resisted the enemy 
assault for about ten minutes, then withdrew, letting the enemy advance onto known positions which 
would be heavily shelled before a strong countcr-attack. Hermes (1966), p. 284. 
54 Pike (1953), p. 202. 
35 On 14'h August 1950, at the battle of Clovcrleaf-Obong-niý it was intended that an air strike be followed 
by an artillery bombardment before an assault Bad weather prevented flying, the ten minutes of artillery 
bombardment proved inadequate, and the attack failed. On 17'h August, after a reinforced fireplan that 
raked the feature from top to bottom the attack was successfid. Appleman (1961), p. 314. The setback of 
Heartbreak Ridge in September 1951 was blamed on the failure to coordinate fire support; but it was 
followed by a successful fircplan in Operation TOUCHDOWN, which coordinated all divisional assets, 
including tanks, machine guns, mortars, artillery and Marine Corps Corsairs. Hermes (1966), pp. 92-94. 
This set the pattern for success which was repeated in March 1953 at the 'Nevada Complex', when 
preliminary bombardments, CAS, DFS and counter-preparation fire were employed, using all available 
resources. Many close quarter battles were fought over rugged terrain at night. This added to the 
confusion which was largely responsible for the frequent amicicide by supporting artillery. Shrader 
(1982). 
m Hermes (1966), pp. 79-80. 
31 Thomas (1953). 
58 Bjorge, p. 119. 
59 Stott (1955). Although relatively weak, Chinese artillery strength continued to grow, and by Spring 
1952 numbered 884 pieces. In April 1952 it fired a daily average of 2,388 rounds, but by June this had 
risen to 6,843. The c1lects of this fire could be severe. In the US IX Corps sector, both sides seized the 
Triangle Hill-Sniper Ridge feature, only to be driven off again by artillery fire. General van Fleet 
determined to destroy enemy artillery with the combined fire of the 1, X and IX Corps before resuming the 
attack. The idea was sound, but it met with only moderate practical success. Many targets were hit but 
thanks to the strength of opposing field defences only thirty-nine enemy pieces were destroyed. 
60 Vietnamese bunkers proved resilient and often survived intact unless they received a direct hit, which 
was a rare occurrence. The 152nun gun of the Sheridan tank proved an effective 'bunker buster' in what 
amounted to a traditional assault-gun role, but it was often not available. A common tactic was to fire 
105min airburst shells to keep the enemy under cover while 155mm and 203mm guns broke the bunkers 
with delay-flised ammunition. Even then they would have to be assaulted, and the assault was least costly 
when it followed as closely behind the artillery bombardment as possible. Aircraft were also often used, 
21, 
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but were harder to coordinate than artillery fire. The best sequence was considered to be: artillery fire, 
followedby 5001b napalm bombs, more artillery and finally an assault. Camfano(1988), p. 39. 
61 The prime advocate of using infantry manocuvre in support of fire was General W. DePuy, commander 
of the US I* Infantry Division in Vietnam 1966-67. His case is described in Scales (1999), p. 37. Scales 
maintains that, "Pressure late in the war to reduce casualties served to pervert DePuy's intent. As the war 
dragged on, firepower was misapplied to a wastefid or counter-productive degree. Manoeuver 
commanders began to complain that a fircpowcr-intensive doctrine had become a millstone around their 
nech. " 
62 Palmer (1978). Ile argument that over-reliartm on firepower undermined US willingness to 
manocuvre is also presented in Scales (1986). 
63 US Marines arriving at Da Nang in April 1965 found poor roads with weak bridges that prevented 
deployments, or which, if blown up after deployment, left units isolated and vulnerable. Ferguson (1966). 
All batteries consequently carried bridge repair equipment. 
64 Australian artillery preferred helicopter movement to time-consuming and insecure deployments by 
road. Burge (1968), p. 89. 
65 For example, on 19'h October 1965, the US special forces base at Plei Me was besieged by an NVA 
division. B Battery of 2nd Battalion of the 17'h Artillery was deployed by helicopter to support the base 
and the relief column An artillery observer in the leading tank placed a rolling barrage in front of the 
column. Dodge (1988). 
66 Ott (1976e). The price of helicopter mobility was high. The USA lost 4,900 helicopters in the Vietnam 
War. IISS Strategic Survey (London, 1972), p. 50. The French also pioneered the tactical employment of 
helicopters in Algeria in the preceding decade. 
67 Ott (1975b). The introduction of the CH-54 in 1966 enabled even the 14,0001b towed 155mm piece to 
be deployed by helicopter. Ott (1975c), p. 49. The first large mobile operation across corps boundaries, 
Operation MASHER/WHrM WING in 1966, was possible only because of the helicopter. For a 
description of operations by the US I' Air Cavalry in Vietnam see Dodge (1986). The effects of the 
division's artillery was greatly increased by the availability Dual Purposc ICM (DPICNO rounds which 
contained anti-armour and anti-pcrsonnel grenades. At times, seventy percent of all artillery rounds fired 
by the US I' Cavalry Division were DPICM 
" Ott (1975d). 
69 Most patrols were accompanied by an observer who could expect to engage a variety of targets, from a 
two-man patrol, to a Viet Cong regiment. When targets were engaged, they were often unseen, and fire 
was adjusted by car. 
70 Ott (1976c). These operations were usually controlled at brigade level but initiated at divisional 
headquarters, An infantry company usually provided security and the division would provide air support. 
The teeth of the force would be a battery of 105mm guns and three 155mm pieces, landed by CH-47 or 
CH-54 helicopters. The guns would fire several hundred rounds and then retire to base. Hay (1974). As 
US troop levels declined in the early 1970s, such raids increased, using mobility to enhance firepower, 
and other arms in support of artillery. 71 Ott (1975c). 
72 For Cambodia, see Ott (I 976e), for Laos, see (Fulbrook 1986,1986a and 1986b). 
73 Although they Lviced adequate concentrations of firepower, they accounted for a large amount of 
ordnance in absolute terms. In Tonkin these bases contained over 400 artillery pieces. 
74 Ironically, the US Army, which was so critical of Vietnamese artillery in the early days of the war, was 
itself later obliged to adopt this same 'platooning' of artillery. It seemed the only way to increase area 
coverage, when US troop levels were falling; and US artillery suffered many of the same penalties 
? reviously experienced by the French and South Vietnamese. 
5 The French also built artillery FSB in Algeria from 1954-62. 
76 Scales (1990), p. 52, quotes a study that noted the relative ineffectiveness of bombs and shells against a 
determined enemy in Vietnamese terrain. In 195 1, the French fired one third of a million rounds in 
Vietnam, while in 1969, US forces fired ten million. French ammunition expenditure soared as attempts 
were made to bolster infantry morale 
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77 The scale of the Vietnamese achievement may be appreciatted by comparing the length of this supply 
line with the 'Burma Road' in the Second World War whichwas a mere 200km Ion& 
" The Viet-Minh made good use of bicycles, sometimes carrying as much as 400lbs each. They managed 
by such means to move 10,000 tons, equal to the amount flown into the base by the French. Brown 
(1986), p. 23. The French nevertheless also managed to drop 49,000 gallons of wine to the garrison. 
79 Brown (1986), p. 23. 
so Brigadier General Christian de la Croix de la Castries, the French commander at Dien Bien Phu, noted 
that, "Our defences had been founded on the fact that planes would be able to detect and destroy the (Viet- 
Minh) guns". Quoted in Hamilton and Kaplan (1983). The French hoped that US air-power might save 
their garrison. They estimated that sixty B-29 bombers, each loaded with eight tons of bombs, and 150 
fighter escorts, could raise the siege; but by Yh April 1954 they had concluded that only activation of 
Operation VULTURE, which included the use of atomic bombs, would suffice. Smith (1984). 
81 Tactical defeat for the French led to a strategic victory for the Vict-Minh. Ironically, it was to be the 
tactical defeat of the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive that precipitated the US strategic defeat. This 
indicates that the significance of battle in limited war may be not so much its military outcome, as the 
relative trauma the experience itself inflicts on the social and political fabric of the participants. 
32 The concept provided force protection matched by the ability to generate massive, coordinated firepower 
from and around FSBs. For example, from 14'h-l? 'h N3vembcr 1965, during the Battle of la Drang, 
twelve howitzers in LZ Falcon fired 18, OW roun&, sometimes right up to the perimeter of LZ X-Ray. 
83 One mason for this was the care taken to en-mrs ralitual support of FSBs, which proved vital, for 
example during the defence of FSB GOLD on 21 d jqarch 1967, Ott (1975d), pp. 30-3 1, the defence of FSB 
PIKE VI on I Ph May 1968, and that of FSBs RITA and DOT on I' November 1968 during Operation 
FISHHOOK. Ott (1976b). 
84 For an account of the four days of air and artillery strikes in defence of this camp see Scales (1986a). 
'15 The North Vietnamese brought up numerous ar 0 cry pieces in an attempt to crush resistance and put 
the airstrip out of action. In one cight-hou: period on 23"d February they fired 1,307 rounds at the base. 
Despite this, US guns were so well protected that during the whole siege only three were lost. In reply, 
the garrison fired 158,891 rounds during the siege, augmented by fire from the 175mm pieces in mutually 
supporting bases at Rockpile and Camp Carroll. The US base commander, Colonel D. E. Lownds, said 
that the side which kept its artillery intact would win the battle. Quoted in Hamilton (1984), p. 19. 
86 Whenever possible, US forces would engage the enemy with counter-preparation fire on his FUPs. As a 
North Vietnamese formation advanced, the garrison would engage its head, and three artillery batteries 
fire a box barrage on its flank and rear. A fourth battery would fire a rolling barrage back and forth on 
the formation itself, like a piston in a cylinder. Further out at 500m, two 175mm batteries would fire 
linear missions parallel to the advance, and A6 Intruder aircraft would drop bombs on the reserves 
following behind. 
By night US artillery fired pm-planned counter-preparation missions, increasing the shock effect of nine 
batteries' fire by a common time-on-target (TOT). The response to a call for fire became well-practised 
and its time reduced to forty seconds for any target in range. 
87 Nalty (1973). 
"' At their peak, airstrikes rose to sixteen a day with thrm. B-52s arriving overhead every ninety minutes. 
The North Vietnamese calculated the USAF safety distance to Khe Sanh and moved within it, but were 
caught when this was halved During the siege B-52s flew 2,000 sorties, and tribesmen reported finding 
groups of North Vietnamese bodies 200-500 strong lying in the approaches to Khe Sanh. Miller (1978). 
Areas of 100 x 500m were plotted for lower-! cvcl alla& by A-4 and A-6 aircrafL which flew a total of 
4,989 missions, striking as close as 200m to the base. 'rhe A-6 could drop twenty-cight 5001b bombs, 
with an accuracy of ten metms. The fall of these bombs was cmi-dinaied with the fall of shellfire to give a 
common TOT for maximum cffect. The 175nim guos fircilsixty rounds on half of the plotted area, and 
155mm, 105mm and 4.2-inch pieces from Khe Sanh viotfld fire 200 tounds on the other half. 
During the siege 12,430 tons of supplies were brought ido I! Lz earrison by air, a capacity greatly 
undcrestimated by the North Vietnamese. The resupply of Khe Sanh was one of the greatest logistic feats 
of the war. Hamilton (1984), p. 18. 
89 A lesson acknowledged in US AirLand Battle doctrine of the 1980s. 
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90 Ott (1976b), p. 55. 
91 FSBs were used in this way in operation FISHHOOK in November 1968 and in the defence of FSB 
CROOK in June 1969, a ploy which led to the defeat of a Viet Cong regiment. 
The Fire Support Surveillance Base (FSSB), such as FSSB FLOYD, was a development of this by 173"d 
Airborne Brigade. A so-called 'Total Interdiction Base' was created, covering a whole valley, using 
sensors and radar, enabling quick reaction to enemy movement. It met with success on 29h August 1970, 
inflicting heavy casualties on an enemy battalion, without close infantry contact at all. This was termed 
an 'economy of force measure', an operation that achieved the US ideal of maximum enemy casualties 
from heavy Exepowcr without American casualties. 
The French built an 'interdiction line' of field defences supported by radars and artillery on the border 
between Algeria and Tunisia in 1959-60. This proved militarily successful in preventing infiltration 
across the frontier. Thc British Hombearn Line and the nearby Iranian Damavand Line in Oman in 1974- 
75 proved to be major contributors to the defeat of insurgents. Israel built a high-tech defensive line along 
her northern border, following her withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000. This was equipped 
with a range of novel surveillance systems. W-Rome (2001b), pp. 23 and 30. 
92 Between 1966 and 1968 the US delivered 2,865,808 tons of air munitions, compared with the 2,057,244 
tons of all bombs dropped in the Second World War, and air support increased to a peak in April 1970 in 
operations over Cambodia. Between January 1969 and March 1971 the USA dropped 2,539,743 tons of 
bombs in Indo-China, FitzGerald (1973), p. 626, Note 15. 
93 In 1968 the AH-IG (Huey Cobra) was equipped with rockets. It was used as an escort aircraft for 
surface vehicles and vessels, to give direct fire support to ground units, to provide security for observation 
helicopters, to engage opportunity targets, to adjust tube artillery, and then to engage the enemy it had 
flushedout. Picou(1967), p. 20andHay(1974), p. 16. The terms Aerial Rocket Artillery, and after 1970, 
Aerial Field Artillery, reflected its tasks; and its C2 was the same as that for field artillery. For a 
description of US helicopter tactics in Vietnam, and the evolution of ideas from them see Fulbrook (1986, 
1986a, 1986b). 
'" Picou (1967), p. 19. 
95 In 1966, success in the Central Highlands was widely attributed to US air-power which broke up and 
dispersed enemy formations, but such force was not so widely applicable elsewhere, for instance, in the 
North and Central coastal zones, where flying was hindered by the 'Crachin' fog between February and 
April. 
" Observers brought down fire very close to friendly positions and then 'walked' it back and forth over 
the NVA attackers. Later analysis showed that the majority of NVA casualties were caused by artillery 
shells bursting in trees. On one occasion the infantry called for fire on their own position. The weather 
was unusual in that heavy rain fell without any wind. As a result, a cloud of toxic gas built up over the 
gun positions. Ammunition expenditure was very high and men from other units were used to augment 
gun detachments. Gun positions at Nui Dat were resupplied by Chinook helicopters, dropping their loads 
at night on sites illuminated by vehicle lights. McAuley (1987), p. 70. 
Dye (1968). 
See Scales (1999), p. 37. During the Battle of Lam Son 719, in Laos: Wh February-9 th April 1971, the 
North Vietnamese used 'hugging' tactics, getting to within ten to twenty metres of US and South 
Vietnamese forces, causing the latter to consider it unsafe to apply their firepower against their enemy. 
Taddonio (1985), pp. 28-9. 
99 Ott (1977). 
100 Large amounts of munitions were dropped in Vietnam with very poor return. From August 1969 to 
February 1970, US artillery in the Central Highlands Region fired 1,600,000 rounds, 270,000 per light 
and medium battalion, achieving one kill per thousand rounds. Scales (1990), p. 143. 
101 Scales (1990), pp. 77-82. 
102 Love (1968), pp. 36-37. 
103 Lewy (1978), p. 100. 
104 Ott (1976c), A43. 
178 
105 Lieutenant General Mildrcn replaced hanissing and interdiction fire with intelligence and interdiction. 
This proved effective when used with a tingle TOT for the fire of seveml batteries rather than single 
rounds fired in succession. 
106 Lawy (1978), p. 72. 
101 Lewy (1978), p. 71. 
"08 FitzGcrald (1973), p. 459. 
109 FitzGerald (1973), p. 503. 
110 FitzGerald (1973), p. 502. 
111 Lcwy (1978), p. 97. 
112 FitzGerald (1973), p. 525. 
113 FitzGendd (1973), p. 524. 
114 The Vietnamese did, however, make heavy use of artillery firepower in their operations in Cambodia in 
the 1980s, causing large numbers of civilian deaths and creating many refugees. See report 'Children of 
the Killing Fields Await Their Fate, in the London DailyTelegraph, 1 Vh September 1989. 
115 Hay (1974), p. 3 1. 
116 In 1965, for example, it was estimated that fifty percent of artillery missions supporting the US I' 
Cavalry Division were fired towards friendly forces. Picou (1967), p. 17. The difficulty of firing in close 
country without hitting friendly forces is described in Shrader (1982), pp. 16-24. 
The US recognized that ultimate success would depend on the pacification programme and rooting out 
Viet Cong, from the villages. Those responsible for the pacification programme in respect of seven million 
inhabitants between Quang Tri and Phan Rang in 1967 realized that, "However essential to military 
success, supporting firepower must be handled with precision". Quoted in Eliot (1967), p. 472. 
Curfews were imposed in hours of darkness in many areas, but these were so often broken by innocent 
civilians that fire controllers had to exercise restraint when engaging targets, even though the curfew had 
been intended to make fireplanning easier. 
Attempts to clear targets to ensure civilian safety before firing often caused delays running counter to 
artillery convention which requires a speedy response to calls for fire; yet what controls were imposed 
often failed to achieve their aim. 
Ott (1977a), p. 33. 
Ferguson (1966). 
The failure to use artillery to sweep the route marched by the 2d Battalion, 7'h Cavalry on 16th 
November 1965 has been blamed for its sustaining 279 casualties in a major ambush. Leonard (1998), 
pp. 17-20. 
20 The complications of C3 in a battalion engagement using artillery, fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters 
were evident in the combat at Loc Ninh, on I Ith October 1967. Hay (1974), p. 42. Problems became 
worse at night, when it would often be necessary for guns to illuminate and fire on targets until helicopter 
'flareships' arrived. The appearance of helicopter gunships further complicated the trajectory and flight- 
lath problems. Hall (1972). 
21 In the Second World War there would usually have been four channels of communication from corps to 
division. In Korea that rose to eight, and in Vietnam it was common to find thirty channels going down 
to a single brigade. Hay(1974), p. 32. 
122 Hay (1974), p. 54. 
123 During Operation MASHER/WHITE WING, for example, US artillery fired only 141,712 rounds 
between 25h January and e March 1966, Ott (1975c). This was slight compared with the 3,200,000 fired 
in the first three days of the Soviet I st Bclorussian Front's offensive on the Vistula/Oder in 1945; but the 
rate of fire of relatively fewer guns had often to be comparable as a result. For example, the US deployed 
seventy-seven pieces for the battles around Dak To in October and November 1967, and these firedjust 
150,000 rounds in thirty-scven days, but at an average of over 2,000 rpg over that period, Ott (1975d). 
124 South Vietnamese artillery was in poor condition. In 1967, for example, in II Corps' tactical zone, 
which covered 30,000 square miles, the South Vietnamese artillery was deployed in two-gun, or split 
battery, positions, and was unable to manoeuvre at all. A study showed that artillery provided support for 
less than half of short-term operations, and that those which were supported could count on just two guns 
per battalion. 
179 
125 The inability of the South Vietnamese artillery to master C3 was evident in the performance of 24th 
Special Tactical Zone in Operation DAN QUYEN in May 1969. Ott (I 976d), p. 13. 
126 The AN/MPQ-4A radar proved valuable in identifying enemy fire during attacks on neighbouring 
FSBs. Radars were often used by the 101" Airborne Division in 1969 on so-called 'radar raids, moving 
forward to dominant terrain features to provide intelligence for FSBs. Morelli and Ferguson (1994). 
Flash spotting, sound ranging and radar were augmented by Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS), which 
used seismic, magnetic and acoustic devices to detect enemy movement. Many sensors were placed along 
the so-called McNamara Wall on the De-Militarized Zone to trigger fire support by air and artillery. It 
was hoped that these would reduce dependence on search and destroy missions. UGS were later used with 
success at FSBs such as MALONE in March 1969, and CROOK in June 1969. 
121 Quoted in Scales (1990), p. 36. 
129 Morelli (1984). 
129 'Out of Area' was the term in common use rcf: rrin, 1-, to expeditionary operations by NATO nations 
outside the territory of NATO. 
130 In the case of the UK, just one battery was allocaled for such missions. The experience of the 
Falklands War caused a more ambitious assessment of roles and the allocation of resources to project 
power. The revised organization for the UK's amphibious and airborne capabilities and their artillery 
support are described in Mountford (1986). France's rapid deployment force of the 1980s is described in 
Turbe (1987b). 
131 McCollum (1976). 
132 Harvey (1984). 
133 The intention was to ensure that by 1989 CENTCOM comprised two amphibious marine divisions and 
five army combat divisions. lungcrich (1984), p. 95. Many potential enemies in CENTCOM's area of 
responsibility were heavily armed. In the 1980s Libya had 1,100 artillery pieces, Syria 2,600, and Iran 
about 1,000. Without adequate conventional weapons, CENTCOM would have had to rely on nuclear 
deterrence, which would have been likely to prove inappropriate or ineffectual in the scenarios envisaged. 
Saunders (1984). CENTCOM was therefore allocated substantial organic conventional artillery support. 
A survey of the US Army's light division of the 1980s is given in Lopez (I 987a). 
134 The USA considered wheeled self-propulsion in what amounted to a portee by trudL This was similar 
to the British modification to the 2pdr in 1941. The USA considered a number of SP options including 
the South African G-6SP. Foss (1987). The South African concept of operations for this equipment is 
described in Heitman (1987). 
135 See Williams (1984), Pengcllcy (1979) and Moore ct al (1979). 
'36 The history of the organization of US field batteries is given in Keenan (1986). 
137 The M198 replaced the MI 14A2, which had a range ofjust 14,600m, and the MIOIAI, both of which 
were outranged by contemporary Soviet pieces. 
138 Ott (1983). Many of CENTCOM's light-weight mobile systems were developed in service with the US 
9th Infantry Division which was used from 1981 as an experimental test-bed for a mass of new equipment. 
Berry (1984). 
139 The M198 weighs 16,000lbs. In the 1980s, it was thought that its replacement should weigh about 
9,000lbs. Stability at that vveight can be achievcd only by reducing the recoil by hA which in turn 
requires new materials and technology. Voight (1986). 
140 Fifteen years later, the BAE Systems M777 was scleved to provide this capability for the US Army and 
USMC. 
141 No representatives from the US 82nd Airborne Division's fire support element participated in pre- 
deployment Joint plannin& No US Navy representative assisted in Ranger fire support planning to 
coordinate NGS and air support; and the ANGLICO and TACP personnel became involved too late. 
Grandin (1998), p. 45. 
142 US forces were highly sensitive to this problem before launching the Operation. Troops were issued 
with wallet-sized cards outlining the rules of engagement, and a large proportion of this was concerned 
with fire supporL At Fort Amador, 105mm howitzers fired at empty buildings to encourage the enemy to 
surrender. Wood (199 1), M 14-17. 
11 Quoted Wood (1991), p. 16. 
ISO 
144 Quoted in Brodie (1990). 
143 Ruffner (1994). The experience caused the Indians to form a mountain division, among other reforms; 
and in the September 1965 war with Pakistan, Indian artillery had considerable success at, for example, 
Ichhogil Canal and Usal Uttar. 
146 China committed about 80,000 men to combat in Vietnam out of approximately 300,000 made 
available, Jencks (1979). Each infantry battalion was supported by six 85nun Type 55 guns, and 
sometimes the 122mm Type 54 guns held at regimental level. In addition, each division had eighteen 
107mm or 140mm rocket launchers. The Vietnamese defenders were of roughly equal numbers, but 
initially had only a few 76mm and 85mm, guns and mortars with which to reply. Jacobs(1983). 141 Jencks (1979), p. 813. 148 Most attacks were by dismounted light infantry at battalion level, like those of the British three years 
later in the Falkland Islands, facing similar difficulties with terrain and manoeuvre. Unlike the British, 
the Chinese attacked with little artillery support. Most were preceded by a light five-minute 
bombardment, which failed to dislodge the defence, and the Chinese suffered unexpectedly heavy 
casualties as a result. 149 Jencks (1979), p. 812. 1-50 Steenkamp (1989), pp. 49-57. Turner (1998), p. 48. 
151 South African artillery of this period, such as the G5, G6 and the Valkiri rocket launcher is described 
in Heitman (1987). The requirement for rapidly deployable expeditionary forces in Western armies, 
particularly in the USA, has caused many to seek innovative solutions to strategic and tactical mobility, 
and they continue to look at South African wheeled systems developed from those of the 1980s which 
were ahead of their time. The excellence of much of South Africa's artillery equipment was thanks to the 
involvement of the maverick Dr Gerald Bull, later assassinated in Brussels. South Africa remains a 
world-class producer of artillery, especially of amnumition. 
1 52 Steenkamp (1989), pp. 152-6. 
153 Heitman (1988). In June 1988, artillery was used to knock out Cuban SA-6 missiles. Steenkamp 
(1989), p. 164 
154 The application of firepower during the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is described in Scales 
(1990), Chapter 4. 
"s It was typical to find a motor rifle regiment supported by an extra two artillery battalions, or an 
infantry battalion supported by a battalion of artillery. On at least one occasion, an infantry battalion was 
supported by an anti-tank battery, two SP howitzer battalions, a battery of 220mm BM22 MBRL, a 
squadron of Su-25 Frogroot ground attack aircraft and a flight of Mi-24 helicopter gunships. Grau (1996), 
pp. 20,37-8. The Soviets made frequent use of the Vasilek SP 82mm mortar which could fire 20-30 
rounds per minute out to a range of 5km. They also found artillery useful in the direct fire role against 
buildings. In October 1984, on the outskirts of Herat the Soviets used 152mm, 2S3, SP howitzers and 
BM21 rockets in this role. 
156 Such fireplans were provided for Operation TANJSHER VH' in 1984, the abortive relief of Khost in 
1995 and the drive on Zhawar in early 1986. 
157 Grau (1996), p. IS. 
152 Jalali and Grau (1995), p. 87. 
159 A futile operation such as this is described in Grau (1996), pp. 24-6. 
1 60 Isby (1997). 
161 Scales (1990), p. 196. 
162 At the peak of their campaign, the Soviets mounted approximately one hundred sorties per day. 163 A good example of this occurred near Abdullah-e B0 on 5'h-0 October 1980, Jalali and Grau (1995), 
pp. 30-33. Soviet inability to apply artillery fire and air-power accurately at night caused the Mujahideen 
to make most of their attacks in darkness. By 1986, major Soviet operations were conducted around the 
clock, supported by air-delivered illumination. 
1 64 This required the deployment of divisional and army artillery groups with BM21 and BM27 MBRL, 
and the seizure of key pieces of high terrain for use by light guns. Over a period of five days the Soviets 
surprised the Muiahideen and inflicted sigrifficant losses on them. Soviet troops tried to make artillery 
observers' tasks easier by painting numbers on large rocks as reference points. Grau(1996), p. 289. 
181 
165 From April-July 1989,15,000 Afghan guerrillas besieged Jalalabad, creating attractive targets for the 
Government forces which were successful in hitting these concentrations with BM-2 1, aircraft and 420 
Scud missiles. Adams (1989). 
1" Rocket attacks could be highly effective. On I Ph August 1988, guerrillas fired 107min BM I rockets at 
a Government storage area at Baghlan, containing two years' supply of fuel and ammunition. The 
secondary explosions and fires lasted for two days, and it is estimated that the Soviets and their allies 
sustained over 600 casualties. Fowler (1988). 
167 Grau (1996), Chapter 3: 'Shelling Attacks'. The Soviets managed to fire back but they found it hard 
to engage mortars in reverse slope positions. In September 1982, the Mujahidocn bombarded the district 
capital Panjwayee for two days before withdrawing under countcrfire. Sometimes the Mujahidecit fired 
rockets remotely from unmanned, exposed positions which they had set up by night. lbid, p. 115. 
168 An example of this was the mid on Utaband outposts in September 1985, Grau (1996), pp. 93-96. 
'69 The Afghan Government's Bagh-e Mumtaz Brigade broke after just one day of such bombardment, 
even though it was locatedjust l5km from Kabul. Grau (1996), pp. 134-137. 
170 Jabli and Grau (1995), p. vii. 
171 All but one British Chinook helicopter were lost when the WAtlantic Conveyor was sunk by 
Argentine aircraft on 24h May 1982. Movement over land was therefore heavily reliant on Royal Navy 
Sea King helicopters. The final assault on Argentine positions around Port Stanley was delayed until 
artillery and its ammunition had been flown forward. The Israelis also found helicopters an important 
means of resupplying gtin positions in Lebanon in June 1982, (Schnell 1984). 
172 This would have been rnu h more effective if the British Task Force had possessed a drone system to 
identify targets. Such a system was available in the UK, but contrary to the drone battery commander's 
expectation, it was not deemed necessary when the Task Force sailed, and was left parked at the roadside 
outside Southampton, the port of embarkation. 
173 Long before British ground troops invested Port Stanley, the Royal Navy engaged Argentine positions, 
wearing down the morale of the defenders before their land battle had even begun. Morgan (1983). Fifty 
percent of the naval rounds fired had VT fuses, which proved particularly effective in this respect. 
Argentine soldiers later reported the demoralizing effect of airburst rounds detonating at random intervals 
over their positions by day and night. 
The effect of NGS was demonstrated in the first British success of the War, the recapture of South 
Georgia. In Operation PARAQUAT of 25k26h April 1982, after a heavy naval bombardment the 
Argentine garrison surrendered without a fight, rather as the Axis garrison of Pantelleria had done in June 
1943 after air bombardment. 
174 NGS also proved extremely accurate. At Port Howard on West Falkland it was too accurate, with 
twelve rounds falling within 25m of each other, when a greater spread would have been desirable. 
Morgan (1983), p. 90. The US Army lacked an adequate NGS liaison at this time, and discovered the 
penalties in Operation URGENT FURY, the invasion of Grenada in October 1983. McMichael (1985). 
The value of NGS was also demonstrated by the Israelis in June 1982, north of Tyre, in support of their 
advance on Sidon, and in support of their advance on the DamurRivcr. Schncfl(1984), p. 24. 
115 One British 4.5-inch naval gtm could generate fire equivalent to that of a field battery of six 105mm 
guns of that time, thanks to automation. 
116 On one occasion, the effectiveness of laser designation for an HE bomb was proven, but this was an 
inefficient and excessive means of destroying the occupants of a single trench. 
177 Apart from the early reinforcement of Goose Green, they never attempted major manoeuvre across East 
Falkland. 
178 During the Battle for Port Stanley, the Argentines firedjust 1,700 rounds in seventy-five missions. 
They often had no means of locating British guns, but between the 10 th -11 th June, Argentine 155min guns 
fired at the 105mm British batteries around Bluff Cove. They failed to drop their rounds into the fold in 
the ground in which the batteries were positioned, and their airburst shells burst too high to cause 
damage. It seems that they could not apply an appropriate correction for the 'angle of sight', the 
difference in height, and were eventually knocked out by British aircraft. 
179 Mottino (1986). For the final battle for Port Stanley the Argentines had only 60 rp& although C 
Battery of 4h Air Transportable Artillery Group had 2,000 rounds at its ammunition point. Mottino noted 
182 
the effects of counter-battery fire and the supreme difficulty in carrying out missions at night, with poor 
target data and guns sinking up to the axles in the mud. The British experienced similar frictions. 
'so The battery of the Argentine Yh Marine Infantry Battalion was knocked out by CB fire at 1530 hours 
on IP June 1982. The Argentines remarked on the serious effects of VT-fused CB fire. 
121 The Argentines had little to gain, and much to lose politically, by mistreating the Falkland Islanders, 
and generally they treated civilians fairly. The British fought the campaign to protect the FaUdand 
Islanders, and it would have been hard to justify even militarily sound actions which were careless of 
civilian lives. Concern for civilians did not stop the Argentine artillery from deploying in the cover of 
Goose Green and Port Smiley, safe from British CB fire; and on 29"h May HMS ARROW had to cancel a 
harassing fire programme around Goose Green for fear of hitting civilians. Morgan (1983), p. 87. It was 
equally important to avoid hitting friendly troops The difficulties of directing fire in the 'fog of war' are 
described in Bailey (1983). 
192 The view that concentrated "firepower broke the back of Argentine resistance" is expressed in Scales 
(1986), p. 21. 
183 An exception was the early stages of a deliberately 'silent attack! at Mount Longdon on I Vh June 
which soon became 'noisy'. 
184 Vaux (1993), p. 43. 
1: 5 Rice (1983). 
16 Iraq fired about ninety missiles at Allied forces and Israel during the Gulf War of 1990-9 1. 
197 The Arab Legion used artillery in its attacks in Jerusalem on 200'May 1947, and Syrian artillery 
attacked Jewish settlements at Mishmar Hayarden on 9'h July 1947. On 4h April 1948 seven Syrian guns 
attacked Nshmar Haernek, but with little effect. Artillery played a significant role in operations around 
Jerusalem on I8'h April; and Arab guns shelled the Jewish quarter of Safad on S& May 1948. The Jewish 
HarCl Brigade suffered heavy casualties from artillery when it tried to scize Beit Machsir on Vh May 1948. 188 They had a similar combined-arms success at Sasa on 20 October that year. By contrast, artillery 
support for Egyptian attacks in May 1948, for example at Kfar Darom, was often poorly coordinated. The 
Egyptians were more successful at Nitzanin 6'h-7h June; and artillery on both sides played a major role in 
the fighting at Iraq el Manshiyya on 15'h October 1948, and between the Egyptian 10dMotorized Infantry 
Battalion and the Israeli force under Adnan Dupuy (1984). 189 The 25pdrs of Th Brigade, based at Abu Agheila, fired the opening barrage but remained in their 
original position throughout the War. Eshel (1985) p. 55. Despite its misfortunes, Egyptian artillery 
delivered accurate fire, slowing the Israeli advance on Hills 29 and 30. 
190 The largest, and for the Israelis the most successful, set-piece attack of the Six-Day War was at Abu 
Agheila on 5h June 1967, where General Sharon deployed six battalions of guns against six regiments of 
Egyptian guns and mortars, sheltered behind heavy field fortifications. He intended to attack at night to 
prevent Egyptian artillery from returning fire accurately. Israeli guns fired on forward positions and a 
battalion of Israeli paratroopers attacked Egyptian gun positions from the rear. Sharon recalled, "half an 
hour of tremendous fire, the like I have never seen in my life, Campbell (1969), p. 133. Israelmassed 
220 guns to prepare the way for two battalions of Colonel Gur's paratroopers on the Jordanian front on 6h 
June. On the same day, a Jordanian relief brigade was caught on the move by Israeli artillery and aircraft, 
and suffered severely. The Israelis caused controversy that day when their artillery hit a UN command 
f*ý in Gaza killing fifteen Indians. 
91 This was probably the first time since the bombardment of Ms in 19 18 that tubed artillery, as 
opposed to rockets, had been used as a strategic system. Gudmundsson(1993), p. 156. 192 It is thought that the Egyptians may have lost over 400 field guns in the Six-Day War. 
193 Eshcl (1984a). 
194 By 1973 the Israelis had more than 370 pieces of more than loomm. 
1" Jordanian artillery scored a notable success at Kemma on 21'* March 1969, when it helped to repulse 
an Israeli attack on a Fedayeen camp on the West Bank of the Jordan River. 196 Dupuy (1984), p. 357. 
197 They invited Alistair Home, the author of The Price of Glory - Verdun 1916, to assist saying, "The Egyptians are shelling us night and day, and we are losing two to three men each week - which Israel 
can't afford. So we want to explore which side got it right at Verdun, the Germans or the FrencY. 
183 
Quoted in Alistair Home, 'The Danger in Sharon Using my Book on the Algerian War', The Daily 
Telegraph, London, V4 June 2002. 
'-" Ile alternative would have been to hold a very large force of armour forward in range of artillery, or to 
abandon the idea of forward defence on the Canal and to fight closer to Israel's centres of population. 
Having bought space at such a cost, it seemed unwise to trade it again so cheaply. There was also a debate 
as to whether funds should be allocated to construct the defensive Bar Lev Line, or to build new military 
roads across the Sinai to speed reinforcement of the Suez Front. 
199 The Egyptian Army's Chief of the General Staff, General Riadh, was killed near Ismailia by Israeli 
counterfire. 
200 Artillery was also used as a means of psychological attack by Syria in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur 
War. The Syrian Foreign Minister, Abdel Halim. Khaddam, said on Yd February 1974 that continuing 
Syrian shelling was part of a deliberate war of attrition to paralyse the Israeli economy. This was intended 
to put pressure on Israel to yield occupied territory. 
201 The Syrians had 600 pieces on a front of 65km. Syrian artillery on the Golan Heights could fire more 
than tcn tons of shells per minute from 265 guns. The Syrians had large numbers of MBRL to defend 
their l5km-deep defensive lines. In the event on 9h Octobez; their artillery fire was so devastating that 
the Ismeli'7'b Brigade was ordered to withdraw from its forward positions. 
202 Egyptian artillery failed to defeat all the Israeli forts in the initial attack, and some held out for many 
days. 
"3 Gawrych, pp. 131-33. 
204 A notable success for Egyptian artillery later in the war occurred on 12'h October when it sank the boat 
carrying Israeli commandos trying to land at Hunghada Island. Dupuy(1984), p. 563. 
205 Morony (1975). After early mistakes, the Israelis were forced to adopt combined-arms groupings and 
coordinated tactics. Ile value of these, incorporating tanks, infantry, artillery, engineers, helicopters, 
naval support and CAS was demonstrated during the Israelis' Operation GAZELLE, the crossing of the 
Suez Canal at Deversoir. 
206 As late as 24h October, Israeli armour made unsupported attacks and suffered heavily from ATGM and 
artillery concentrations. 
201 Weller (1974), p. 35. 
2m The role of artillery grouping in support of Israel's counter-offensive against the Egyptian Third Army 
in 1973, and details of the subsequent provision of corps artillery to reinforce divisional artillery, are 
described in Gay (1986a). 
'09 Eshel (1984a). 
210 Israel produced the heavier IMI 290mm MBRL mounted on a Sherman, and later on a Centurion tank 
chassis. Each vehicle carried four rockets with a range of 40km. They also produced the LAR- 160 with 
fifty light rockets for area saturation at shorter range. See, 'Lightweight Towed... ' (1986), p. 261. The 
South Africans, with whom the Israelis had close military relations, similarly observed the merits of 
MBRL when used against UNITA forces in Angola in 1976, and also developed a system of their own. 
Dodd (1977), p. 237 and Pretty (1983). 
"' This same conclusion was reached by all armies in 1942, after three years in which manoeuvre had 
been emphasized. 
212 Gabriel (1994). The reform of Israeli artillery and its subsequent operations in Lebanon in 1982 are 
described in Eshcl (1985a). 
21 -1 At times, the Israelis fired fifteen to twenty batteries at a single target. Schnell (1984), p. 32. 
214 Lewis (1983), p. 9. 
215 For example, in the West, Israeli artillery proved less militarily effective because of the care that was 
taken to avoid civilian casualties. Gabriel (1994), p. 57. Surprise was often lost when leaflets were 
dropped urging the civilian population to flee and so reduce casualties. Lewis (1983), p. 10. 
216 Thomas Friedman, reporting his visit to Hama in 1982, in 'Arab States Must Tell it Straight', The 
Guar&an, London, 22d September 200 1. 
217 On the night of 28& July 1989, the Christians claimed to have fired 10,000 rounds, and both sides used 
152mm and 155mm guns. Gumichio (1989). 
184 
21g Hezbollah had fired more than 750 rockets of between 80mm and 240mm. into Israel and the Israeli 
'Security zone' in Lebanon. 
215'On one occasion, casualties in a Lebanese village were reported to exceed one hundred. Goldberg 
(1996). 165 people died and 340 were wounded during the Operation. No Israelis were killed. 'Israel 
Defends Record on Grapes of Wrath, Jane's Defence Weekly, 5"' June 1996, pp. 20-23. 
m The same willingness to inflict civilian casualties at the risk of losing international sympathy was 
evident in Israeli operations against Palestinian crowds in October-November 2000 and in operations on 
the West Bank and against targets in Gaza in 2002. 
221 Arich O'Sullivan wrote in the Jerusalem Post that more than 12,000 rounds were fired into Lebanon in 
the first eight days of the operation and that, despite the showing-off of Israel's sophisticated precision 
weaponry, "It tookjust five deadly rounds from aI 55mm howitzer to bring the meticulously planned 
operation crashing down. The shelling of innocent refugees will go down in history as the turning point 
in Israel's latest foray into Lebanon. " Walker (1996), p. 9. This Israeli fire mission is probably the most 
analysed in military history. A Yahoo web search in 2001 revealed over 1,000 items on the sutject. Many 
explored details such as the charge temperature and other ballistic data. Hezbollah appear to have 
appreciated the growing political utility of their rockets, and it was reported that by 2000 they had 
hundreds of Iranian-made rockets with ranges of up to 100kms. Jane's Defence Review, IP September 
2000, p. 15. Ile London Sunday 771mes of e July 2001 reported that Iranian soldiers were thought to be 
based in Southern Lebanon armed with 240mm, Fagr-5 rockets with a range of 801cm, making Haifa a 
T2 ssible target. 
223 
Walker (1996), p. 9. 
Quoted in, 'Israel Defends Record on Grapes of Wrath', Jane's Defence Weekly, Vh June 1996, p. 20. 
He blamed the use of 155mm, artillery, rather than helicopters assisted by UAVs, on the poor weather at 
the time. 
224 In the immediate aftermath of the Qana incident, the Israelis nevertheless intensified their air and 
artillery strikes to attack as many hostile sites as possible belfrore they were stopped by rapidly mounting 
political pressure. 
225 Quoted in Walker (1996), p. 9. Many saw this public relations disaster as a consequence of the hubris 
of overplaying the effectiveness of new technology. "-- The military brass did not take account of the way 
that television has transformed modem warfare, especially so-called, low-intensity warfare. " Walker 
(1996), p. 9. The NATO Allies were also judged by some to have been guilty in 1999 of over-estimating 
the sophistication of their technology when judging the likely duration and costs of the air operation 
against Yugoslavia. Critics commented on the contrast between early optimism and later assessments of 
the actual damage caused to the Yugoslav field army in Kosovo. 
226 The exchange was repeated on 3d January 2001 
2" Timur Goskel, the UN spokesman for the UN Interim Force in Lebanon noted that, "In the old days, 
you could predict Israel's snapping point with almost a 100 percent success rate. Now the dynamics are 
not so clear. " Blanford (2000), p. 2 1. 
2n Reported by David Rudge in The Jerusalem Post, 15 th April 200 1. The mortar attacks on Mount Dov 
on 3rd October 2001 were thought by some to be linked to Palestinian circumstances. D. Rudge in The 
Jerusalem Post, 4h October 2001 
229 Reported in the L4)ndon Daily Telegraph, Ila' April 200 1. Israel also constructed an 'electronic Bar 
Lev Line' on her border with Lebanon. This compensates for the depth lost when Israel withdrew from 
her security zone in southern Lebanon in May 2000. It employs electronic fences, aerial and ground- 
based sensors and a computerized C3 system. It is supported by 100km of roads and gun positions. It 
places high reliance on optical images to give commanders the confidence to act in sensitive situations. 
Brigadier General S. Scbahror describes the Total Area Control System (TACS) in Opall-Rome (2001b). 
230 On P April 2002 IDF guns returned fire when Hezbollah attacked with heavy mortars. D. Rudge, 
'Hizbullah Fircs Katyushas at North', The Jerusalem Post, 0 April 2002. 
231 The IDF claimed that Hezbollah had thousands of missiles on the border with a range of up to 30km. 
A. O'Sullivan, 'IDF: HizbuUah Determined to Open Second Front'; and D. Rudge and H. Keinon, 
'Hizbullah Continues Attacks', The Jerusalem Post, Oý April 2002. Hezbollah's method of firing 
'Katyushas' is described in 'Hizbollah's Katyusha Rockets', albawaba. com, dated 14'h April 2002. It was 
185 
also reported in October 2002 that Iranian Revolutionary Guard units in the Bekaa Valley had been 
equipped with the Zebal-2 missile with a range of perhaps 2001an and carrying a 6W4 warhead. 
Blandford (2002). 
232 M. Dudkevitch, 'Hizbullah Barrages Strike at North', Me Jerusalem Post, I Vh April 2002. 
131 S. Lackey, 'Syria Plays the Long Game', Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 th June 2002, p. 18. 
' A. Philips, 'Conflict is Turning into War in Middle East', The London Daily Telegraph, I Vh April 
200 1. Others noted the long-term damage that such conflict was doing to Israeli society, turning it into a 
'Sparta'. See, 'For Israelis, Endless War and Sharon Put Peace Off Agenda', in The New York 77mes, IP 
April 2001. 
231 Eitan Haber, 'The Mortar that Torments Us', in The Jerusalem Post, 15"' April 2001. 
2m See 'Five Mortar Shells Hit Sderot' and 'Reasserting Israeli Deterrence', 7he Jerusalem Post, 17'h 
April 2001. 
237 Quoted by A. La Guardia in the London Daily Telegraph, 18'h April 200 1, p. 11. 
231 Reported by W. A. Orme, 'Palestinians Again Shell Israeli Posts in Gaza Strip', New York Times, 19'h 
April 2001. Two more bombs wcrc fired at Nir Oz on the evening of 19'h April, taking the total number 
of mortars fired by the Palestinians in 2001 to over one hundred 
239 "The brief reoccupation caused friction between Israel and the United States, and provoked European 
censure and wrath in the Arab world It generated tension between the government and the army, and 
within the government, because many ministers learned about it from the news media. It earned Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon criticism from settlers for retreating. and from leftists for advancing in the first 
place. " D. Sontag, 'Israeli Operation cams Rebukes from All Sides', 77te New York 77mes, 20'h April 
2001. 
240 Mortar bombs continued to fall on Israeli settlements, for example at Kfar Darom, on 27h April and on 
Nisanit on 2e April 2001. Five Israelis were wounded in a mortar attack on Gush Katif that same day, at 
Netzarim and Ncveh Dekalim on Ith May 200 1, other communities in Gaza on Ie July and Netzarim. 
again on 290ý-30'h July 2001. Ile first mortar attack on a Jewish community in the occupied territory near 
Jerusalem took place at Gilo on 17'h July 200 1, and attacks continued into late August. Many were 
followed by retaliatory Israeli helicopter strikes and the seizure of Palestinian key points. 
241 Major General G. Eiland described the impact of the media and international opinion as factors like 
terrain, weather and intelligence when evaluating the effectiveness of military operations. He specifically 
cited the mishandling of the Israeli response to a suicide bus attack in November 2000, "For us this was a 
learning episode". Opall-Rome(2001a). 
242 The 120mm Qassam-2 rocket was first fired into Israel on IOh February 2002. See Dudkevitch and 
O'Sullivan (2002). It had a range of about ten kilometres. The Qassam-I rocket was reportedly home- 
made in the Gaza Strip by Hamas, and first used against an Israeli settlement in October 200 1. It had a 
longer range than Hamas' mortars, allowing them to be fired from a safer distance at a greater target am. 
'Israeli Arrest Draws Attention to Hama Rocket Artillery' (2002). 
243 Ze, eV Schiff quoted in Burston (2002). Schiff maintained that the Palestinian intention was to escalate 
the level of violence to such a degree that the international community would get involved, which might 
be to the Palestinians' advantage. 
244 Reuven Pedhatzur, quoted in Burston (2002). 
24s Burston (2002). 
246 See, 'Israel Seizes Weapons Ship, Accuses Arabt'Al Bawaha (2002). 
247 See, 'Peres: Iran Provided HizboW. .. 
'Al Bawaba (2002). 
24 See, 'Palestinian Rockets... 'Al Bawaba (2002). 
249 Ze9ev Scha quoted in Burston (2002). 
2" See, Palestinian Rodiets... '(2002). 
251 Harel (2002) 
752 A. O'Sullivan, 'On the Offensive Before the Ccasefire', 7he Jerusalem Post, IP March 2002. One 
workshop in Gaza was reported to have been blown up by the IDF on 12'h March. A. Harel et al, '31 
Palestinians Killed in IDF Operations in Ramallah Gaza Strip', Virtual Jerusalem, 1P March 2002. 
253 Quoted by M. Radler in 'Annan Blasts Israel's 'Illegal Occupation, The Jerusalem Post, 13'h March 
2002. 
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254 Opall-Rome (2002). 
255 A. O'Sullivan, 'A War in Defense of Our Homes', The Jerusalem Post, 17'h April 2002. 
2m Hiro (1989), pp. 44 and 88. 
257 Iraq is thought to have fired more than 600 surface-to-surface missiles into Iran during the War. The 
enmity lived on. On 19'h April 2001 it was reported that Iran had recently fired fifty-six SCUD missiles at 
camps inside Iraq belonging to Iranian rebel groups. 
2'-" The human-wave tactics of Iranian Revolutionary Guards in the MaJnoon Offensive offered ideal 
artillery targets and resulted in heavy casualties. On I Id'March 1985, the Iranians broke through Iraqi 
lines in their 'Badr' offensive, but were caught in lethal Iraqi fire-traps. Many judged Iraqi forces to hold 
a "qualitative superiority, in a target-rich environment". Evans and Campany (1985), p. 43. For a report 
on the shelling of Basra, see 'Black Banners of Death Fly over Baghdad', in the London Sunday Rmes, 
25'h January 1987, p. 12. 
259 Iraqi artillery tactics were demonstrated in the battle for the Hawizah marshes between I Ikle March 
1985. On 14th March an estimated 12,000 Iranians were surrounded in the Tigris Loop and annihilated 
primarilyby artillery fire. O'Ballance(1985). The importance of artillery in Iraqi tactics was 
demonstrated one year later, in March 1986, on the Faw Peninsula. Laurence(1986). Thelraqismarked 
off 'killing zones' for the destruction of Iranian infantry by artillery fire. Tbey concentrated masses of 
artillery to saturate whole areas, rather than engage pin-point targets. The Iraqis enjoyed air superiority 
which enabled them to observe targets from the air, and to scom manoeuvre as a means of survival. 
Major General Tala'al-Douri of the Iraqi Seventh Army Corps said that his "guns cover the whole area 
invaded by the enemy, and I do not need to move there. I will use the number of shells I need to destroy 
them. " Progress was slow, and ammunition consumption high. Iraqi infantry played a limited role, 
holding ground while, as General Al-Douri maintained, "We attack with our artillery. We are patient. " 
Ibid. Artillery was regarded as an independent offensive arm, not merely one in support of others. 
260 Timmermann (1986). Iraqi artillery played a major role in stemming the Iranian offensive on Fao, 90, - 
I& February 1986, although at first it faced tough opposition from Iranian artillery which had recently 
been resupplied with French 155mm and 203mm ammunition. The Iraqi artillery was equipped with the 
Astros 2 MBRL, with a range of 301ra, and the G-5 155mm gun with a range of 40km. 
261 Dr Bull was murdered on 22d March 1990,, shortly before the parts of his gun were impounded en 
route to Iraq. The story of the gun, its likely derivation from the German 'Begonia' project and his death 
are considered in Bonsignore (1990). Had the Supergun ever come into service, its fixed installation 
would have been highly vulnerable to attack The Supergun appears to have been just a part of a larger 
contract, signed on 6h June 1988, to develop a sophisticated family of artillery pieces, including 155mm. 
(Majnoon) and 209mm (Al-Fao) SP guns. The latter was said to have a range of 57,340m. Kemp (1990). 
On 9th October 2002,7he Wall Street Journal, p. 1, reported that the Iraqis were continuing to develop the 
Al-Fao. In 1989, Lieutenant General A. G. Trudeau suggested that Dr Bull's High Altitude Research 
Project a-1ARP) could form the basis for a NATO attack system, with a range of over 2,000kra, if Pershing 
rockets and cruise missiles were ever withdrawn from Europe. HARP is described in Trudeau (1989), 
pp. 26-9. 
Interest in 'super guns' appears to have lived on in China. In 1995, the Chinese were reported to have 
built a 'super gun', based on the designs of Dr Gerald Bull, similar to the Iraqis'. They are also reported 
to have produced a 'super range rocket gun'. The 406mm system was said to carry six launch-tubes and 
missiles with a range of 360km. There has been continuing speculation about the possibility of building 
9super guns' to launch satellites into space, the purpose for which Dr Bulls gun was originally designed. 
M. Glaskin, 'Supcrgun Launch for Space', in the L6ndon Sunday 2-imes, 12'h May 1996, p. 11. 
262 Familiar issues arose, such as the ability of close support artillery to keep up with faster moving 
manocuvre arms. The M109 lacked the speed and cross-country performance to keep up with the US 
Abrams tank and the Bradley infantry vehicle. The position of artillery in the line of march, and whether 
it should move as a 'column' on its own, or distributed with other arms also had to be considered. In the 
US 20' Infantry Division, artillery travelled in a mass rather than split up with various manoeuvre units. 
The aim was to ensure that when required it was all available to hit battalion-sized targets hard, the 
essential lesson of 1866. 
197 
263 Major General Barry McCaffrey, who commanded the 20 Wantry Division was asked by the US 
Senate Armed Services Committee how the war had been won in 100 hours. He replied, "This war didn't 
take 100 hours to win, it took 15 years. " Quoted in Scales (1993), p. 35. 
264 The means of handling the growing masses of information remained primitive. In the Gulf War, the 
Joint Communications-Electronic Operating Instructions used to allocate more than 35,000 frequencies, 
call signs, call words and suffixes weighed over cighty-five tons in paper form. McL4ndon(l995), p. 185. 265 During the Cold War, the notion of NATO launching offensive operations into East Germany was 
taboo, and manocuvrcs: which might have been construed as such were not exercised. 
2" The British experimented with a new 'Reece Strike' concept adopted from Soviet doctrine. The 
divisional artillery commander commanded the divisional reconnaissance force which included a battalion 
ofMLRS. An account of British artillery's role in the War is given in Durie (1991), the artillery 
commander in I' (UK) Armoured Division. The intent was to ensure that any enemy located could be 
struck decisively at short notice so as to maintain the momentum of the advance. At times MLRS was 
used in what amounted to a direct support role. At first light on 26h February 1991, the divisional 
reconnaissance unit, 16'b/5dLancers, called for MLRS fire and air support onto Objective LEAD, in the 
face of Iraqi counter attacks. This followed nuatcrous historical prececLents of heavy artillery moving well 
forward in an advance, and was also a way of shortening the 'sewr to shooter' link between 
reconnaissance and the weapon platform 
267 Air-power is taken here to includee maritime aircraft and cruise missiles. 
268 MLRS was widely praised by officers such ar. Major General McCaffrey, commander of the US 24h 
Infantry Division. He said that its primary contribution was to the CF battle, but that it also played a vital 
role in providing SEAD for missions by Apache helicopters. He also noted the terrifying effect it had on 
the enemy. He claimed that an attack by four artillery brigades of MLRS on the Republican Guard 
Hammurabi Division between 0100 and 0330 hours on 27"'Fcbruary, "... essentially broke the will of that 
enemy armoured division, causing their soldiers to begin fleeing to the rear before we actually made 
contact with their manoeuver forces. MLRS was right on the money. " McCaffrey (1994), p. 4. 
269 When the L15 round was first used on the NATO artillery ranges at Munsterlager in Germany, some 
civilians living around the range, who had become familiar with the sound of exploding shells over many 
years, reported that rounds were falling outside the range area, such was their surprise at the 'crack' of its 
detonation. 
270 Abram (2001), p. 9. 
271 The first long. -range precision tactical missile strike in history was fired on Ie January 1991 to disable 
the al-Abraq SA-2 SAM site in Kuwait Scales (1993), p. 193. v2 Gordon and Trainor (1995), p. 320. 273 Gordon and Trainor (1995), p. 412. 274 Ur the War, , 4A Michael Gordon and retired Lt Gen G. Trainor described the effect of this dispute in 
their book, The General's War. "It became clear that the positioning of the boundary was one of the most 
important miscalculations in the final hours of the War. Moving the line east and north was correct if the 
Army followed through on the ground. But if the Army attack was delayed, the line should have been 
moved back so that Allied warplanes could concentrate their firepower on the fleeing forces. CENTCOM 
did neither. As a result, much of the Iraqi Army was shielded from the sort of punishing bombing raids it 
endured during its retreat from Kuwait City. A doctrinal technicality and inertia took precedence over 
common sense. " Quoted in Applegate (2000), p. 18. 
275 Ile Land component played little role in the plaaning of air operations against Yugoslavia, even 
though these had a major impact on the Land scheme of manoeuvre and subsequent operations in Kosovo. 
276 Axtillery played a major role: in General Schwarzkopf s Operational deception plan. While his 
manocuvre force moved west to positions from which it would swing round to prevent Iraqi forces from 
escaping back into Iraq, Coalition artillery continved to fire on positions to the immediate South of 
Kuwait. This caused the Iraqis to reinforce that sector in the belief that it would receive the brunt of the 
Allied alladL Naval manoeuvres and bombardnicrats in the Gulf reinforced this beliet The USS 
Wisconsin and the USSMIssouri fired 16-inch shells onto lmqi positions on the Kuwaiti coast to deceive 
the Iraqi's into thinking that an amphibious landing was imminent. At 0100 hours on 24h February they 
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""I-0ýi Tf I %, - '. -- joined in an intensive bombardment of IraqiAefcnces pii9r to the land assault of theUS I* Marine 
Expeditionary Force. Watson (1991), p. 97., 
217 Iraqi guns were between 14-20kni north of the ýertn wýicii ft Iraqis had constructed as pan of their 
fixed defences. The conduct of raids by the P US Marine Expeditionary Force (MM is described in 
Burgess (1997), pp. 21-22. 
272 The initial British assessment was that guns engaging these should remain on their firing positions for 
no more than fifteen minutes to avoid Iraqi countcrfire. Durie (199 1), p. 23. 2? 9 Amongst the targets was a 12m Iraqi observation tower. It was 'lased' and destroyed by a single 
Copperhead round, followed by bomblet rounds to kill surviving personnel .A further six towers met the 
same fate. Scales (1993), p. 203. On 19'h February, the 4-41d Field Artillery Battalion fired a single 
Copperhead round which destroyed a border post illuminated by a laser. This was part of an operation by 
the US 24h Infantry Division to prepare its crossing points into Kuwait. Another post was destroyed in 
the same way on 2 1" February. Scales (1993), p. 200. 
280 A further example of all-arms cooperation was the fire support from 1-20 I't Field Artillery Battalion 
on I ga'February, supporting air and attack helicopter operations by the US 82nd Airborne Division against 
Objectives Rocharnbcau and White. In another example, the same battalion fired 227 rocket assisted 
p! ojectiles in support of French troops. Scales (1993), pp. 199-200. 
A-10 pilots reported that the action by the MLRS of 39dHeavy Regiment on le February had 
destroyed three battery positions and some tanks. Durie(1991), p. 23. 282 Scales (1993), p. 226. 
283 They fired 414 rockets and 11,000 shells, dispersing 600,000 bomblets over an area of 20x40knL 
Scales (1993), p. 226. I., . . 1. ý"I. 1 224 The efflectivencss of the artillery bombardment was described by captured Iraqis. The commander of 
the Iraqi 48'h Infantry Division Artillery Group, captured b. the UK's 4h Armoured Brigade, claimed that .y he had lost eleven pieces during the air campaign, but cighty-seven pieces in the artillery bombardment 
Operation Granby (1991), p. 5-18. 
283 On 26d'February, the US I" Armored Division took al-Pusayyah after an intense bombardment oflust 
fifteen minutes. Scales (1993), p. 243. Thc same day, t4q 1"' Brigade of the US P Armored Division 
advanced to take a bunker complex, SUPPOrted by a heavy bombardment by artillery and aircraft. 
Copperheads were used, as was white phosphorous which ignited fuel tanks causing huge secondary 
explosions. Scales (1993), p. 274. On 2e February. the artillery of US I' Armored Division fired for 
forty-five minutes prior to the attack by Apache AHs and the ground brigades on the remnants of the 
Mcdinah Division. The Desert Jaybawk, p. 20. 286 Davis (1993), p. 46. 281 The DesertJayhawk, pp. 5,16,19,20,33,34. 
288 Abrams (2001), p. 7. 289 Davis (1993), p. 47 
290 Quoted in Watson (199 1), p. I 11. 
291 McCaffrey (1994), p. 4 
m Typically a US radar would locate Iraqi firing, and MLRS respond within two minutes with fire from 
twelve launchers and a battalion of 8-inch cannon. Scales (1993), pp. 298-9. 293 The hunt for Iraqi Scuds is described in Scales (1993), pp. 184-7. Scud hunting received close attention 
in subsequent US military training. Kinnamorn (1998), p. 18 294 The &-bate over the military imperative of 'decisive force' versus the 'jus in bello' requirement for 
proportionality is analysed in Obcnhaus (2000). 
295 Glenn (2001). There were reports of dozens of Grad rockets being fired into the city. Aircraft also 
attacked the city. The most common of these was the Su-24, often armed with laser or TV-guided 
munitions. See Renfrew (1995), p. 12. 2" The 13 1" Motorized Rifle Brigade was reported to have lost 102 of its 120 vehicles in the disastrous 
assault on New Year's Day 1993. Celestan (1997), p. 46. It has been claimed that the majority of Russian 
casualties in the War were caused by Chechen mortars and artillery. Cclestan (1997), p. 47, quoting N. 
Novichkov. Operations in Chechnya in 1995 are described by the Russian commander at that time, General A. S. Kulikov in 'The First Battle of Grozny', in Glean (2001), pp. 13-57. 
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29'7 Orr (2000). Western armies are alsso considoriag Gv. merits cf such mixtures to provide a variety of 
effects, from a tailored patAlagr. of equipmcw, 1br a Oven wntingency. 
2" The Russians were particubarly vulnerable, as the), Itad been in their Afghan War, to attack from an 
enemy within 300ra, the range of the RPG anti-armour weapon. They tried to keep the area around them 
clear out to this range. Equally, the Chechans tried to get inside this range, not only to attack the 
Russians, but also to 'hug' them to deter them from bringing down fire for fear of fratricide. Russian 
artillery tactics in the Second Chechen War are described in, Orr (2000a). 
299 The most common delivery systems were the BM21 and BM22 MIBRL and the 9K-58 Smerch with its 
300mm rockets. The SS21 and Scud B surface-to-surface missiles were also used. Russian artillery 
technology employed in the Second Chechen War is described by Grau (2000). The Russians also fired 
laser-guided 152min 'Krasnopol' rounds from the 2S 19 SP howitzer at stubborn defensive positions in 
and around the city. This munition may also have been used in the First Chechen War in conjunction 
with the EL219 target acquisition radar. It is thought that the Russians did not use the expensive 
'Smelchak' precision mortar round or 'Santimetr' artillery round in Chechnya in 1994-5. Celestan 
(1997), p. 47. 
300 Whittell (1999). 
"' Quoted in 'Ring of Fire Closes Round Grozny', in the London Sunday 771mes, 5'h December 1999, p. 23. 
3M Graii (1999) 
30 Orr (2000), p. 4. 
304 The 240mm, breach-loadcd, SP mortar, 'Tulip' (2S4) can fire a RAP 181an. it seems that the Russians 
also used heavier tactical rocket systems in Chr. -clmya, such as the Tochka and Tochka-U systems as well 
as the older Scud. 
305 Reported in the London Daily Telegraph, I" Dcc; c; rZcr 1999. Ru-c-; ian operations around Grozny, 
prior to their forces entering the city, are descril-ed by M. Franchetti in the London Sunday 77mes, 12'b 
December 1999. Tlicrmobaric munitions crcaic firebaliswhich are followcd by massive destructive 
overpressures. They were originally designed to clear winef telds, but were then developed as a form of 
massive firepower to break through NATO deftericcs in NcXic. m Errope. They are intended for use 
against troops in field defences or in urban arxis, a, -. d thi-jupffects can be similar to those of a tactical 
nuclear weapon without the residual radiation. It is thau,, ght that Russia, the USA, China and India have 
such weapons which can be delivered. as a bomb bjairaý11, as a rocket from a helicopter or by surface-to- 
surface artillery such as the Russian 300mm Snicrch rc.; kct launcher, the 220mm Uragan rocket launcher 
and other systems. In 2000, there were calls in the pmss for thermobaric weapons to be banned In the 
Second Chechen War, thermobaric weapons were fired against defences in Grozny by the tracked, 30- 
barrelled, 220mm 'Buratino' (TOS-I), which had also been used in Afghanistan and in the First Chechen 
War. It has a range of 3-5km and achieves destruction over an area of 200 x 400m. Grou (2000), p. 104. 
The Story-P UAV was regarded as a vital component of this strike system. The early model Pchela-1 
UAV had been used in 1995. 
3wOrr(2000a), p. 94. Expensive precision munitions such as the KAB-1500L and KAB-1500 TK bombs 
were occasionally used. 
"7 Some Russian soldiers attributed the blame for the delay to inadequate artillery support and the failure 
to reduce strong points manned by Chechen snipers. London Daily Telegraph, 3& December 1999. 
" The effects of the artillery bombardment on Grozny are described by M. Franchetti in the London 
Sunday 2-Imes, 6th February 2000, p. 23. 
309 The loss of eighty-four men by a single Russian ccmpany fighting in the area of the Argun Gorge, and 
other incidents, were reported by D. Williams in the International Herald Tribune, II th -12 di March 
2000, p. 4. 
310 In july 1998, artillery duels lasted for ten days and killed about 100 people. Bedi (1998). 
311 The Indian deployed 155mm. Bofors M-77B. At 3,660m, these could achieve a range of 42km with 
base-bleed (BB) ammunition. Sawhney 1997, pp. 58-61. Special skills had to be learned to cope with 
these abnormal meteorological conditions wid spcrial logistic techniques developed to deploy and sustain 
theforce. Tbomas(1989), p. 31. Guns couldoftr. only be deployed in pieces by helicopter and 
reassembled on site. Some soldiers died from avalauchc;: sct off k, - the firing. Itwasalsocommon 
practice in Alpine warfare during the First World Wai to c=c avoklanches deliberately. 
19-11) 
312 It has been suggested that a precise lascr-guided round such as Krasnopol might be more cost-effective 
for the Indian Army than ordinary cheaper rounds. Fcwer. are required for a given cffect, barrel wear on 
the gun itself is consequently reduced, as is the logistic burden., Williams and Holthus (2002), p. 32. 
313 In early May 2000, Jaffna in northern Sri Lanka was besieged by Tamil Tiger separatist guerrillas. 
Government forces used artillery and mortars to try to reopen the supply line to the city through the Jaffna 
Peninsula, which had been cut at Elephant Pass on 2ýý April ; 000, leading to the withdrawal of 10,000 
Government troops. It seemed likely that the Tamils would try to capture further ground so that they 
could hit the strategic Government airbase at Pulaly. with 122mm guns captured at Wanni six months 
earlier. See 'Tamil Tigers Lay Siege to Jaffna', Tfic Sunday 771mes, London, 7h May 2000. On I& 
October 2000, the Tamil Tigers also used artillery to shell polling stations in an attempt to disrupt 
elections. The Government of Sri Lanka believed that it had been 'outgunned' by the Tamil Tigers' M-46 
130mm artillery pieces and sought to buy a range of new artillery equipment for CB operations. 'Where 
Artillery is King', Armed Forces Journal International, July 2000, p. 18 and Jane's Defense Review, 
November 2000, p. 21. 
314 'Ethiopia Advances in Border Battle', in the London Times, 1'/h May 2000. 
315 The commander of the US 10h Mountain Division, Major General F. L. Hagenbeck, made the case for 
mortars over guns and explained some of the shortcomings of airpower in Hagenbeck (2002). He praised 
the effects of the Apache AH-64, A-10s and AC-130s in the CAS role, but noted the problems that fixed- 
wing aircraft had in finding and attacking fleeting targets. He, also noted the inflexible tasking procedures 
for CAS. He claimed that it took at least 26 minutes to, calculate the desired mean point of impact and 
that it was sometimes hours before the target was hit. The problems associated with the Air Tasking 
Order (ATO) which operated on a thirty-six hour planning cycle are also discussed in Bentley (2002), 
p. 13. The USAF contested Hagenbeck's views. See 'After Leaving USAF Out of Anaconda Planning... ' 
(2002). 
316 See Prochniak and Yates (2002), p. 15. The debate was particularly intense because seven US soldiers 
were killed in Operation ANACONDA; and any suggestion that lack of close support artillery was a factor 
in those deaths was seen to carry weight in the arguments over the wisdom of cancelling the US Army's 
155mm SP Crusader programme. See Novak (2002). 
317 Grange et al (2002), pI5. 
318 Grange ct al (2002), p14. 
319 See 'After Leaving USAF Out of Anaconda Planning.... ' (2002). 
320 The guns also adjusted DFs in support of 45 Commando's advances to contact, and illuminating 
rounds in support of Australian special forces. Gunner, Royal Artillery, Woolwich, October 2002, pp. 4-5. 
321 J. Strauss, 'Missiles Shake British Base in Kabul', The Daily Telegraph, London, e April 2002. 
322 Prochniak and Yates (2002), p. 16. 
323 Loeb (2002). An observer team from Britain's 148 Battery was involved in a contact during Operation 
BUZZARD, and although they did not fire their supporting guns, they appreciated having immediate fire 
available when air support was fifteen minutes away. Gunner, Royal Artillery, Woolwich, October 2002, 
r 4. i4 For example, the multinational ceasdire monitoring operation in Rhodesia in 1979-80, Operation 
AGILA, was led by Britain, but authorized by the Commonwealth. 
323 US and Netherlands artillery units in Kosovo Force I (KFORI) in the Summer of 1999 fired 
illuminating rounds to deter looters. Illuminating missions were also fired by US artillery in Somalia in 
December 1992 in a force protection role. A few guns were based at Mogadishu Airport, but the majority 
of those in the force were left on ships, and the troops used for other tasks. In operations in Sierra Leone 
in 2000, the British fired illuminating rounds from 105mm guns to deter rebels from approaching too 
close to their positions. 
326 Categorizing Peace operations and developing military doctrine for them has been difficult. Even, the 
intervention by the Coalition in the Gulf War, authorized by the uN, was in its way a Peace operation, 
enforcing the will of the international community. Some nations such as Russia have labelled their 
internal counter-insurgency operations as Peace operations. UK national doctrine, developed in the mid 
1990s, tried to distinguish between Peacekeeping and PeacP Enforcement. It saw the former as an activity 
undertaken with the consent of the parties to a conflict. Peace Enforcement, on the other band, was seen 
191 
as an intervention without consent of all the parties to the conflict, probably involving the greater 
application of force and requiring a very different force structure. In Peacekeeping the force should seek 
to maintain consent, lest it find itself engaged in hostilities for which it is ill-equipped. Most nations have 
produced working definitions, and there is a vasst literature on this subject which will not be discussed 
here. For a British view, see Peace Support Gperations, Joint Warfare Publication 3-50 (JWP 3-50), Joint 
Doctrine and Concepts Centre (Shrivcnham). 
3" For example, five nationalities were represented in a single infantry section of ten men in the UNFC`YP 
reaction form in Nicosia in 20M. 
323 Some UN led operations such as those in Cambodia in the early 1990s, Bosnia in the mid 1990s 
Rwanda in 1994 and East Timor in 1999 contained troops from NATO nations. Others such as that in 
Liberia in the 1990s did not. The UN operation in Sierra Leone in the late 1990s and early 2000s did not 
contain NATO forces, but was morally reinforced by the presence of a NATO nation (UK), which 
deployed troops in the country on a purely national mission. 
329 NATO Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCM) may be clear to those who have studied and 
exercised them, but the forces of say, Russia or some Arab states, may not share a common understanding 
of them with NATO members. A difference in interpretation could be lethal. 
330 In 1997 in Bosnia, the Divisional Artillery Group of Multinational Division (South West) (MND(SW)) 
had to operate through thirteen liaison teams. 
331 Within one force during Peace operations in Bosnia in the mid-1990s, there were times when different 
national forces had different ROE, but the same mission. 
332 Military damage to the environment can cause controversy and restrict operations. Examples of such 
damage include: The leakage of toxic pollutants from damaged enemy chemical ammunition and 
industrial sites, smashed oil wells and refineries. wrecked water sources and fires. Unexploded munitions 
can delay a return to normal life after a conflict. 
333 The prolonged absence of a threat to its survival tends to increase a society's reluctance to use force, 
and the legal restrictions it places upon it. Western nations have their own experience of how rapidly 
peacetime sensitivities can m-aporate under the strcsses, of war. Apparent legal impediments to the 
practice of submarine warfare before 1914, and the failure of the British Army to demolish vital bridges 
over the Mons Canal in 1914 because they were privately owned, seemed morally compelling at the time, 
but rather quaint shortly afterwards. Equally, the restrictions in 1939 against bombing private property in 
Germany seem bizarre in the context of the saturation bombing, firebombing and atomic warfare which 
followed. In December 1939 twenty-four British Wellington bombers flew to attack the German naval 
base at Wilklmshafen. They found eight warships tied up to the docks, but fearing that their bombs 
might injure civilians, merely took photographs. Ten of them were shot down. Murray and Millett 
(2000), p. 53. It is reported that statues of Saddam Hussein were not destroyed by air attacks in February 
1991 on legal advice that they were 'cultural monuments'. Murray (1998), p. 35. After the bombing of 
the World Trade Centre (WTQ on I Ph September 200 1, it became clear that public acceptance of curbs 
on some civil liberties in the interests of security might be more flexible. It became apparent that aspects 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, so recently accepted into British law, might have to be 
reviewed. On the other hand, it was reported that early in the Coalition bombing operation in 
Afghanistan, US bombers did not attack a vehicle carrying the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, on the 
advice of a CENTCOM legal adviser. B. Fenton, in the London Daily Telegraph, 15"' October 200 1, and 
W. Murray in the London Evening Standard, 25h October 2001. 
334 NATO has a complex system to define the powers of a commander over elements of his force. 
OPCOM would empower him to move that force artillery about within the boundaries of his Area of 
Operations (AO) and give trussions to subordinate parts of each force or unit at that state of command 
Thus, if he had a battalion of MLRS at OPCOrvL he would be permitted to move a battery of that battalion 
from one flank of his AO to another, and give it a specific mission. If that battalion was under 
Orrational Control (OPCON), the most common state for troops of another nationality, he could not. 
33 -. In Kosovo Force (KFOR) in 1999, ad hoc arrangements had to be made for unique command 
structures. Before entering Kosovo from Macedonia, many elements of the force were at times under 
threat from Yugoslav artillery across the Yugoslav/Macedonian border, and later across the Kosovo border 
with the rest of Yugoslavia. Fire support was requircd for the whole force. Many parts of it had no 
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organic artillery, yet the artillery of those which did have it was under restrictive command states. Purdy 
(1999), p. 7-12. 
3m However much the force may seek to avoid itý there is always the possibility in Peacekeeping that 
consent by one or more parties may be withdrawn for some rqason beyond its control. It is in such 
circumstances that the skills of commander will be most tested. 
33' An effective STA capability is important in Peace operations. not merely as part of a fire system, but 
also as a means of compliance monitoring. 
338 This was evident in 1993 in the planning of the US 2e. Infantry Division's artillery for operations in 
Somalia. Whereas the normal unit basic load included a high percentage of dual-purpose improved 
conventional munitions (DPICM), these were likely to cause widespread collateral damage if employed in 
Mogadishu. Priority was given to precision BE rounds. Out of sevcnty-two rounds of Copperhead in the 
Division's war reserve, sixty-four were shipped to Somalia and eight used in pre-deployment training. It 
was the range of Copperhead and the opportunities for lasing targets by OH-58D helicopters that 
determined the manner in which US guns were deployed. Lennox (1994), pp. 14-17. 
339 Perception operations now form a major part of Peace operations . In operations where lethal fireplanning, especially at high levels of command, is minimal, the task of planning Perception operations 
has sometimes been given to fire coordinators. This has been deemed appropriate because the use of such 
, non-Icthal fire' bears a striking similarity, conceptually and in procedure, to that of lethal fim albeft at 
an entirely different level of intensity. The 'target' to be influenced may be an individual, group of people 
or an organization. The desired outcome is determined, the precise effect to achieve this is assessed and 
the most appropriate means of influencing the target selected. 
340 One US artillery commander who served in Bosnia in the Implementation Force (EFOR), noted that, "if 
we have to fire, the effects of our fires will be felt around the world, so accountability is crucial. There's 
no doubt that CNN would assess the battle damage for the world. Therefore, the system is in place to 
document the fire mission process - from target acquisition through mission approval to execution. We 
have to be prepared to show beyond a doubt that the target was legitimate, the fircs were accurate and we 
made every effort to minimize collateral damage. Cqrpac Q996), p. 38. The measures to ensure that CF 
was fully accountable are described in Hodges et al (199§), p. 39. 
341 Ile appropriate choice of munition can also be a problem in Peace operations. Political pressure built 
up in the 1990s to make some militarily effective weapons illegal, and anti-personncl landmines were 
banned. Aircraft munitions scattered bomblets across Bosnia and Kosovo, and thousands of these failed to 
explode on impact but caused numerous casualties aftqr hostilities had ended. International pressure to 
ban depleted uranium (DU) ammunition gathered pace in 4000, and similar pressure in future could 
obstruct the use of other surface-to-surface systems such as thermobaric weapons and lasers. 342 When firing is infrequent, it naturally attracts allention, which can of itself prove useful. American 
artillery in Kosovo in 1999 found that when it fired illuminating missions, faction radio operators reported 
their action, betraying the location of their radio transmitters. Stramam (2001), p. 39. 
343 British UNPROFOR artillery in Bosnia in 1995 was authorized to fire at targets whose 'threatening 
behaviour' was deemed to constitute a 'hostile act'. 344 Schrage (2002). 
34's The infamous mortar bombing of the marketplace in Sarajevo on 2e August 1995 which kMed thirty- 
seven civilians, had a similar Operational consequence. The United Nations delivered an ultimatum to 
the Serbian General Hadic demanding that he withdraw his artillery from the Samjevo 'exclusion zone'. 
which had a radius of 20km. He refused. Air strikes were launched against Serbian installations, and 
UNPROFOR artillery, which had deployed on Mount Igman one to two months earlier, opened fire. Some 
have claimed that this and similar attacks on 27h May 1992 and 5th February 1994 were perpetrated by the 
Bosnian Muslim themselves. If this were the case, it would illustrate a striking combination of cynicism 
and skill in the use of indirect fire at the Operational level. See 'Did Government Forces in Bosnia Shell 
their own Civilians?, Sean MacMathuna, flamemag. dircon. co. uk 1999. 346 For example, 'Dubrovnik Pounding Fuels Hatred of Serb 'Butchers", in The Sunday 7-Imes, London, 
27d'October 1991, p. 2. The headline of the London Daily Telegraph of 13'h November declared, 
'Dubrovnik Faces Death by Shellfm' and reported that 'Like the barbarian hordes advancing on Rome, 
the federal forces have abandoned all restraint. ' 
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t, 
347 See, 'Vital Croat Town Shelled as Ceasefire Failss Again', in the London Daily Telegraph, 211, 
November 1991, p. 9. 
3'8 The role of American advisers and the influcnce of US military doctrine in Croatia and subsequent 
operations by the Bosnian Federation are described i", Clark (1999). See also Nialcolm (1996), p. 265. 
349 In the second week of April 1992, Scrb artillery shelled Zvornik for days before paramilitaries moved 
in. 
3" John Keegan writing in the London Daily Telegraph, 16'h December 1992, p. 17. 
331 A bombardment of Srcbrenica on 12'h April 1993 W23 said to have moved systematically across the 
town killing fifty people. Another eight were said to have been killed the following night. Brown(1993), 
P. 11. 
352 'Gunners Lay Waste to Western Gorazdc', in the London Daily Telegraph, 20'h April 1994, p. 12. Serb 
artillery also besieged Bihac for years, with particularly intense fighting in November 1994. 
353 On 16dMay 1995, it was assessed that 800 shells and rockets landed in Sarajevo over a six hour 
p. ýfiod. 
` See Clark (1999). 
355 The mission of WROFOR was to protect the supply of humanitarian aid within Bosnia. IFOR was 
to implement the Dayton Peace Accord between the warring factions, and SFOR was to provide stability 
in the country while its institutions developed. 
3m French mortars had already fired by this time, but French 155mm guns did not arrive until August. 
357 These guns were part of an ad hoc artillery force which included French and Netherlands artillery, 
facing more than 300 guns and mortars of the Serb besieging force. I'liese operations are described from 
a French perspective in Biegala (1995). 
3"A British armoured infantry company was allocated to this artillery unit for its protection. The 
recollection of Lt Col S. G James RA. 
359 Ile experience of this unit deploying to Bosnia in 1995 is described in Nicholls (1997), pp. 11-2 1. 
360 For example, the Serbs used anti-aircraft guns in the direct fire role against convoys entering Sarajevo. 
One such 40mm piece was located in a barn, in a well-populated area, maintained by a septuagenarian. It 
was fired intermittently from within the building, through a small camouflaged aperture, against a 400m 
sector of the route at a range of 2km. Other sectors wcz-. engagod by equally well-sited pieces. Attacking 
these from the air over dangerous terrain and in hazardous weather conditions was an unattractive option. 
However, in such a complex situation, if infantry cannot close with the offcndcr, how should artillery best 
engage such a target, yet avoid collateral damage? 
30 Sometimes the ability of these systems has been cmemited, and they cannot detect all that some 
gine. Kimmit (1999), p. 219. The complexity of dctcrmining which of thousands of acquisitions are 
valid targets is described in Campbell (1997). 
m In May 1999, Yugoslav artillery also fired across the border at villages in Albania, thought by the 
Yugoslavs to be bases for the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). 
363 A point made by KLA commanders in conversation with the author in August 1999. 
364 US and Dutch artillery fired illuminating rounds shortly after entering the Province to deter looters. th ef 365 The NATO Operation ALLIED FORCE (24h March-10 June 1999) against Yugoslavia saw th Irst 
air deployment of a multi-role force by the USA including tanks and MLRS. This deployment of Task 
Force HAWK to Albania was made possible by the lift capacity of the C-17, but at huge cost. The 
deployment required 737 ftights. The deployment of MLRS and ATACMS tested their ability to support 
Apache AR Hennes and Cory (2000), pp. 20-5. It was reported that at least thirty pods of Extended- 
Range Rockets (ER-MRLS) for NffRS were deployed to Albania, along with between thirty-two and 
eighty ATACMS Block I missiles, probably incorporating the Improved Positioning Determining System 
(IPDS). ER-NILRS carries 518 M77 DPICM to a range of 45.51an, and ATACMS Block I has a range 
beyond 300kni. Gourley (1999), p. 5. In the event, the Apaches never flew and MRS did not fire. 
Whether it would have been politically acceptable to fire ATACMS at targets in Yugoslavia, with the 
attendant risks of collateral damage, or whether the Apaches would have flown, but for the threat from 
many cheap machine-guns and shoulder launch missiles, has been a matter of much debate. The scale of 
the challenge was revealed in exercises, where it was found that a SEAD mission in support of the 
Apaches might require the attack of eighty-one targets by ATACMS. 
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366 The extent to which the Yugoslav forces escaped physical damage became immediately apparent on 
KFOR's entry into the province, but was not widely debated in the press until Spring 2000. NATO was 
keen to avoid pitfalls which might arise from the untelegenic aspects of firepower in its operations against 
the Yugoslav Forces in 1999. Most of the backlash camc. aftcr the operation, with stories in the press 
about the editing of the television footage shown to the international media, the effectiveness of the 
bombing, collateral damage, civilian casualties and tho., attack on. the ItelcyWon studios 
in Belgrade. On 
the other hand, there was surprisingly little adverse cp nt at the time about the number of people who 
were killed or injured as a result of the large number of d6d b6mblet-rounds left scattered over Kosovo. It 
was estimated that after the NATO air bombardment th&c-wcre more than 15,000 unexploded 
submunitions scattered across the province. It has bbewestimated that 30,000 tons of unexploded 
munitions were left on the Gulf War battlefields ef 199l, includingthose from MIM. Lloyd (2000), 
20. 
Of the NATO air operation over Yugoslavia, John Keegan, ; ma cri h jor tic of t. e 'apostles of air-power', 
noted, "... the apparent failure of high-performiLice aircraft znd a tried and tested bombing force to achieve 
miyof the campaign's aims. " Keegan (1999), 0.3. ýLn later "recanted' admitting that in many 'Keeg 
respects his judgement in this article was wrong. 368 Given the long-standing acknowledgement of the importance of a Joint approach and the sophistication 
of many mechanisms to achieve it, the absence of this was one of the more surprising aspects of the 
Kosovo campaign. Until the ARRC-led KFOR entered Kosovo, it was not clear who was the Land 
component commander for the operation. COMKFOR was merely a subordinate commander in the 
theatre, responsible for troops in Macedonia and his line of communication back to Thessaloniki in 
Greece. Others who might have had claim to be the Land component commander during the air operation 
included COMSFOR in Bosnia and COMAFOR in Albania. Some have assumed that it was 
COMARFOR, the US national Land commander in Albania. 
369 These missions are described in Stramara et al (2001), pp. 3841. 370 Three AS90s fired thirty-six rounds over three days. Such missions were planned forty-eight hours in 
advance of firing and cleared through the local US brigade headquarters. The firing of illuminating 
rounds by British artillery between January and April 2001 is described in Williams and Monks (2001), 
pp. I 1- 16. 
371 See the London Dal ly Telegraph, 0,5h, 2 Vh and 20h May 200 1; and Jane's Defence Weekly, 4b July 
2001, p. 6. 
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CHAPTER 5: INTO THE FUTURE 
5.1 THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT' 
At the beginning of the 21' Century there is one superpower, the USA, but one that must 
almost of necessity operate in an enviromncnt of alliances or coalitions. It is influenced by 
the constraints of international institutions and opinioný, even when wounded, as it was on 
I I'h September 2001. The USA shares many of the interests and values of other Western 
nations and is frequently cast in the role of their champion, acting either through NATO, 
or with its support and that of ad hoc coalition partners. Whether these values will also 
find expression through a more clearly defincd European military identity is under review. 
There is an apparently widening variety of other lethal threats to Western interests which 
may be less focused and dire than that perceived during the Cold War, but whose very 
diversity and even 'disembodhnent' present perhaps an even greater intellectual challenge. 
Even the definition of military success, not to say 'victory', may be elusive. 
At the end of 2000, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General H. Shelton 
astutely observed that, "As the diversity of threats and non-state actors increases, so too 
will the complexity of our military tasks. Future adversaries may try and stay below the 
threshold of clear aggression, further complicating appropriate response options. We can 
expect more failed states as people struggle for independence, for political legitimacy, 
economic and resource advantage, all done in climates of violence, repression and 
deprivation. "' 
Less than a year later, on I Ph September 2001, the 'threshold of clear aggression' was 
crossed; and even if the tactical adversary was identifiable, his strategic roots were less 
tangible even though General Sheldon had described them well. President G. W. Bush 
declared "the war against terrorisnf' to be the first war of the 21" Century; although the 
character and extent of this lengthy 'war' has yet to unfold. 4 The military capabilities 
required to meet such threats, and the concepts and manner in which these capabilities 
may be most effectively applied are matters of unresolved debate, although trends are 
clearly identifiable. 
Against this background, the dynamism of military technological innovation matches that 
of civilian life with which it is ever more inextricably entwined. The Age of Chaos is also 
the Information Age. At the same time, Western nations do not feel, at least for the 
present, that their very survival is at stake, even though they may believe that their values 
are under attack, and their citizens may be the victims of 'terror'. There is fierce 
competition for Government funding in most countries. Defence spending is genemlly 
lower than during the Cold War; and decisions about which technologies and equipment 
prograrnmes will yield disproportionate strategic political advantages are perhaps even 
more contentious than they were then, particularly as it is hard to detennine which tools 
will achieve best purchase on new problems. 
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If most democratic societies are less willing to spend their wealth on defence; they are also 
less willing to sacrifice their fellow citizens for matters of mere national interest. If their 
emotions are engaged, they may be prepared to pay a higher one. Few armies will retain 
conscription; and even in the case of-volunteer forces, public sensitivity to casualties is 
likely to become greater not less. Military operations remain an essentially human 
endeavour; and finding, motivating and training the human resources to conduct them 
effectively will become increasingly difficult. Nevertheless, given the political support for 
a well articulated cause of merit, which also strikes a chord with public sentiment, 
democracies are well able to make sacrifices without undermining their political stability. 
This is the environment in which firepower will, be employed in the 2 1' Century, and the 
characteristics of firepower he at the heart of the debates about the very nature of military 
power, the utility of force and the structures and mind-sets that support it - which 
elements are malleable or ephemeral, and which arc enduring principles? 
Firepower will be applied in very different ways by different national forces depending 
upon their resources and strategic situation. Until perhaps 2025, it seems reasonable to 
assume that Western forces will command the most effective sources of firepower and 
manoeuvre for 'traditional' warfighting, if not necessarily the most assets in absolute 
physical terms. Thereafter, it is a unclear whether a 'peer competitor' will emerge who is 
capable of matching them. Some might argue, as Jan Bloch did a century ago, that the 
sheer cost and destructiveness of modem warfare between states has made it prohibitive 
and unthinkable. ' Bloch was right in many respects, but in totality his thesis was soon 
found wanting. Could Bloch be right after one hundred years? ' 
The critical issue for Western forces is whether an advantage in 'traditional' ' symmetric' 
warfighting will deliver the decisive outcomes in the 21' Century that it usually did in the 
20'hCentury. That very success should be the cause for others who seek to challenge the 
West to do so on other terms, avoiding the 'middle ground' of conventional battlefield 
engagements. Potential rivals are likely to buy fewer forces that mimic those of a superior 
Western opponent, although many countries around the world will wish to maintain 
substantial conventional forces to match their neighbours' in regional rivalry. 
Those states or non-state actors who see the West as their possible opponent are more 
likely to fight on other terms. Some Chinese analysts maintain that, "Warfare no longer is 
an exclusive imperial garden where professional soldiers alone can mingle ... it is precisely 
the diversity of the means employed that has enlarged the concept of warfare ... warfare is in the process of transcending the domains of soldiers, military units, and military affairs, 
and is increasingly becoming a matter for politicians, scientists and even bankers. "7 
On the one hand, missiles with conventional warheads or delivering 'weapons of mass 
destruction' might seem to them to offer valuable leverage. Such systems generate 
massive effects, both physically and in political perception, and they could do so rapidly, 
getting inside the decision-making cycle of democratic nations and their alliances. They 
are hard to find and intercept, produce a high yield for a given investment and complicate 
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calculations of strategic risk. They might be used as an alternative to conventional ground 
forces or as a deterrent to Western intervention, giving their possessors freedom of action 
in other military operations. 
On the other hand, firepower may be employed below the threshold at which Western 
forces can operate, or so close to it that their actions run the risk of appearing 
disproportionate or even of dubious legality. Long, drawn-out harassing fireplans of low 
intensity fired by small rockets or mortars can achieve outcomes far beyond their 
immediate physical effects. Incremental actions over time may in themselves be 
insufficient to precipitate external intervention. The 'habituation effect' of these over time 
may be to inure the international community to their cumulative effect and not provoke 
intervention, when a more spectacular and shocking operation in a shorter timescale might 
energize a different reaction. 
The bombing of the World Trade Center (WTC) was shocking and galvanized just such an 
effect. It has yet to be discovered whether this 'asymmetric attack' was indeed a strategic 
misjudgement on the part of the perpetrators, causing 'collateral damage' to the 
perception of their own cause, or a deliberate escalation in the intensity of their 'fireplan, 
an act of propaganda designed precisely to provoke a reaction that would change the 
international situation to their advantage! 
The development of long-range missiles by so-called 'rogue states' has shown that it is not 
necessary to maintain a full spectrum of military capability to exert telling political 
leverage. Non-state actors and terrorist organizations may need only to possess a narrow 
yet precise capability, such as the control of an airliner in vulnerable airspace for a few 
minutes to achieve their desired effects. The electro-magnetic spectrum, cyberspace and 
biological operations present similar opportunities for exploitation. Conversely, it may 
also be possible for states of slender means to generate powerful conventional military 
capabilities based on sophisticated electronics which have become relatively cheap. These 
could come to constitute a force sufficient to act as a deterrent against Western 
intervention in some situations. 
Those who would challeng ge the West may also find advantage in the dimension of the, a luxury that is likely to be especially precious to it. The speed and intensity of media 
coverage, combined with a sensitized, alert, yet inconstant domestic and international 
opinion, have 'compressed' time, making it more valthable. Governments and alliances 
which are democratically accountable will probably require overt popular support for 
military action. History offers many examples Where the objectives of the belligerents 
changed with the circumstances of conflict. The longer a conflict lasts the greater is the 
scope for objectives to change, along with the popular perceptions of the conflict which 
sustain its continuation. 9 
Western powers may hold greater military power in absolute terms, but it may prove hard 
to apply it when only their interests are at stake, against those who feel that their very 
survival is the issue. Where survival is at stake, or the force in question is not 
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democratically accountable, time is less likely to erode political support, indeed history 
suggests that it may have the very opposite effect and that a grim resolution to succeed 
may grow. 10 Time is the friend of such forces and prolonging a conflict is likely to be a 
critical part of their pLan. In this sense, time is the fourth dimension of battlespace and 
offers some the potential for greater freedom of action. Equally, speed of action should 
not necessarily be seen in absolute terms, but rather as relative to that of other dynamic 
factors. 
The majority of the wars of the 2e Century witnessed artillery and other fire being 
employed in mass, over long periods, consuming great quantities of materiel and inflicting 
large numbers of casualties. Those who seek to fight 'limited wars' against those fighting 
'total wars' of 'national liberation' or survival, may experience particular challenges. The 
attempt to reduce casualties by expending huge resources over a protracted period proved 
unsuccessfid for the USA in Vietnam, against, an enemy for whom time seemed of little 
importance, and who skilfully obviated the worst effects of fire by dispersing or 'hugging' 
his opponent, denying him a timely victory. 
Modem Western forces have largely been designed to be 'one-shot weapons'. Equipment 
is often sophisticated in order to avoid the need for masses of it, and to make it more 
rapidly deployable. The great arsenals of the Industrial Age no longer exist, and the great 
'smoke-stack' industries which could be converted to wartime industrial production are no 
longer geared to such eventualities. 
Both time and materiel have become too precious to expend on a large scale, and unless 
vital national interests are at stake, long and costly commitments will seem unattractive. In 
future operations the virtue will be not speed alone, but tempo, speed relative to strategic 
and Operational decision-making and Operational capability. The great commanders 
always appreciated the value of time; but strategic decision-makers now have less time to 
act and achieve an acceptable outcome than they might have had in the past. The draining 
passage of time has, in a sense, become the 'barren steppe' of space that faced Napoleon 
and Hitler; and should be seen as a form of attrition. 
It may be possible to reduce this attrition by compressing the strategic, Operational and 
tactical levels of war into each other. Western forces are likely, in the first instance, to be 
reacting to events; and control over the tempo of operations and the thresholds of 
escalation will be the most immediate reqtfirement. This will be particularly acute when 
responding to terrorist acts and in this respect a doctrine of 'pre-emptive' intervention has 
attractions. 
If Western forces can 'rewrite the rules', and escape from the tyranny of time by winning 
acceptance of a long war on their terms, their centre of gravity will have been secured. " 
A campaign of such duration will nevertheless almost certainly require a 'low density' of 
military events, each of which may be rapid and of high intensity, but should be 
demonstrably successful. Seizing and holding the ini-tiative is to time as seizing and 
holding vital ground is to manoeuvre. 'Pegging' out the boundaries of this battlespace and 
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turning the attrition of time on an opponent is an accomplishment of strategic command 
and Operational art; but a daunting task. The terrorist in turn will wish to suck his 
opponent into prolonged and ineffective operations of high density, which ultimately prove 
self-defeating. 
The consequence of this strategic logic is that Western forces and their allies will wish to 
achieve ever more rapid effects, with decisive outcomes at times of their choosing, at all 
levels of war, defeating an enemy's will, his forces in the field or both, before their own 
'centre of gravity' collapses, wherever that point may lie in time. This has now become 
axiomatic in much of Western military thinking. The Gulf War largely met this aspiration, 
but merely heightened the consciousness that the generous amount of preparation time 
permitted to the Coalition forces by an incompetent opponent was unlikely to recur. It 
seemed more likely that in future a Second or Tbdrd World opponent, or even a non-state 
entity, would try to revalue the factor of time in the strategic equation. They would not 
allow their opponent the luxury of a long pcrj: od L-1 which to deploy and train, followed by 
her way around. a short war - better for them the ot. 
The challenge for Western forces is to achieve objectives by new techniques in these 
evolving novel circumstances. A Western force will seek to react as quickly as possible 
once a political decision to act has been taken. Battlespace has expanded in absolute 
terms but has shrunk in relative terms, given the improvements in global communications 
and transport; and relative to the contraction of time the challenges of dominating that 
battlespace remain daunting. Maritime resources and airlift may have improved, but the 
perceived need to lift large quantities of men and equipment further and quicker has also 
grown. The contraction of time means that lighter and more fragile logistics must supply 
combat effects more quickly. In the past, a large battlespace and lengthy operations 
consumed vast resources. In the future, the contraction of time may reduce the ability to 
deploy and employ them on such a scale; and even though the logistic burden to achieve a 
given effect may be lighter, it may also be more fragile with less built-in redundancy. 
For their opponents, the key will be to find means to avoid or prevent Western forces 
deploying in the first place, or to ensure that they do and expend their energies and 
political capital inappropriately. They will withdraw into their hinterland of time, as they 
try to suck their enemy into a protracted negotiation or conflict of lower intensity, even 
seeking to win merely by avoiding defeat, while Western will dissolves. They may 
disperse and employ sophisticated techniques of camouflage and deception to reduce rapid 
effects; and much greater knowledge of intentions and dispositions will be required if 
tempo is to be maintained against such forces. The infýrior combatant is unlikely to 
challenge superior firepower directly, but wili protcct himself against a superior force by 
denying it a target, or turning it agahist itself tIzough the generation of hostile or at least 
negative perceptions. Time, numbers, casualties, perceptions, legal constraints and 
political will may be his allies, and these constitute forms of 'virtual manoeuvre' to avoid 
superior firepower. 
5.2 CAPABILITY AND EFFECTS 
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The strategic environment informs decisions about which capabilities to build and maintain 
at what readiness to achieve determined effects. Western nations will wish to maintain a 
range of capabilities to match the varying importance of their interests. They will wish to 
keep 'traditional' ground forces that over-match a given symmetrical threat. 12 Ifthey do 
not, then this capability wiU once more present an attractive investment for potential 
enemies. Warfighting will remain the most challenging role for field artMery. Experience 
in the Balkans in the 1990s showed the need for artillery in Peace operations as well, 
despite the limitations on the use of indirect fire imposed by ROE and the need to avoid 
collateral damage. Above all, capabilities will be assessed in terms of precise effects in 
time and space and not just primary, physical damage. Secondary effects on perceptions, 
especial1y those of enemy commanders, strategic leaders and public opinion may be the 
more important. 
One important consideration is whether or not the balance between fire and manoeuvre 
has fundamentally shifted once more. There was a major shift at the beginning of the 2& 
Century when warfare underwent a revolution that placed firepower in the ascendant; and 
for the remainder of that Century, in conventional war at least, firepower was still usually 
the dominant element. This seems likely to remahi the case, for firepower gives the West 
its unique advantages; and others will try to find a way of neutralizing it if they can. 
Western forces will wish to create rapid and precise effects throughout the whole 
battlespace, for this ability will probably deliver valuable strategic outcomes. Early action 
can paralyse an opponent's decision making capability, buying time in relative terms. The 
massing of large amounts of equipment may be unachievable, either because they cannot 
be deployed in time, or increasingly because states will not actually possess them. Massive 
destructive effects may be logistically impossible to achieve, and militarily and politically 
counter-productive. Western nations will therefore develop ever more capable equipment 
with greater 'reach', the combination of firing platform mobility and munition-range, and 
precise effects. 
The consequences for artillery, as a partner in the delivery of Joint effects, are that it must 
be more rapidly deployable, yet not so light that it cannot achieve the required early 
effects. While supporting fire could come from any source at any achievable range, it is 
likely that at least some artillery would deploy with an expeditionary land force. These 
fewer platforms and their logistic support would have to be lighter, yet ranges and precise 
terminal effects greater. 
On the other hand, if accuracy is to a lesser degree a function of range; and if firing 
platforms do not need to deploy tactically into potentially hostile territory, it will be safer 
and logistically cheaper if some remain at a distance, perhaps at sea, in the air or protected in some distant 'bastion'. This will be no morc conceptually surprising than the 
withdrawal of artillery from the front fine to 'behind the hill', as occurred in the early 20'h Century. The critical matter will be constructing the optimal C2 to coordinate their 
effects. 
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The issue of who operates the firing systcms on land, sea or in the air will be less 
important, although no doubt contentious, as capability rather than 'legacy structures' 
become the dominant consideration. )Vhile scparate Land, Maritime and Air components 
may continue as the providers of capabilities, commanders will increasingly be Joint 
commanders of specifically packaged Joint forces. They will need ready access to a full 
spectrum of effects supplied by all systems, whether hand-held or from satellites. The 
notion of what is 'organic' will be seen less in terms of permanent structures, and more in 
terms of ephemeral C2 arrangements. It will also be less significant. This is also not 
conceptually revolutionary, for field artillery has long been used to reinforce other units 
for given periods; and it was the C3 of field artillery in the First World War that 
constituted the first sensor-decider-shooter network in the modem sense. Equally, armies 
have often had their own air wings, just as navies and air forces have had their own land 
forces. 
All armed forces are more likely than ever to operate in a Combined environment. The 
political risks of a nation undertaking mililary action unilaterally without allies are likely to 
be high. For all, including the USA, the military risks are also likely to be formidable. The 
very scale of US military capability, or rather its modcrnity, adds to the challenge of 
Combined operations. Its increasing lead in most areas of technology is in danger of 
diminishing interoperability with its allies. This is not an argument for the USA to hold 
back, rather to note the imperative to devise the means of operating with others, 
technically and doctrinally; and the obligations to achieve this he with all parties. " 
The arguments about interoperability also apply within national forces. The cost of new 
systems is such that armies run the risk of building 'two-speed' forces, led by a high-tech 
element which may operate uneasily with the remainder. Some engaged in the 
'Transformation' of the US forces argue that, as with the Wehrmacht of 1940, only 
perhaps ten percent might need to be of the highest technological calibre to deliver 
decisive outcomes. On the other hand, the persuasiveness of this argument also 
encouraged the Germans to make poor decisions. The Wehrmacht only reached Moscow 
in 1941 at the speed of the horse not the tank, and disaster followed. The need therefore 
is to succeed before reliance on the 'horses' becomes critical. Those forces most required 
in the 'Age of Chaos' appear to constitute only a small percentage of the total forces 
maintained, and have been described as 'high demand/low density'. Questions arise as to 
the utility of the remainder - the 'horses'. Perhaps they will have to deal with 'aftermath 
operations'. 
The precise effects that forces, or a given capability, seek to achieve is not merely a 
physical one in time and space. Neither is it one based on the effects of current 
munitions. " Full-dimensional precision must include 'psychological precision', shaping 
attitudes, beliefs and perceptions amongst the ea. -my, observers, non-combatants, global 
audiences and domestic constituents. In operations in the Balkans in the 1990s, non-lethal 
information operations were planned using the same methodology as for lethal 
fireplanning, and often by the fireplanning cells who had no lethal role at the time. The 
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development of the technology of psychological manipulation raises potentially severe 
ethical and legal issues, and it is unlikely to be pursued in the West. Problems may arise if 
others choose to deploy such non-lethal fire", and no appropriate means of CB/CF is 
available. 
Achieving the desired effects will remain a challenge. Western nations are likely to find 
their expensive conventional forces less effective in operations short of general war against 
targets which are 'opaque', either because they are well-concealed, because they are 
shielded by an environment such as complex urban terrain, or because in the eyes of the 
international community or law their very status as targets may be questionable. The 
opposition may even create such targets deliberately in the hope of miscalculation 
beneficial to themselves. Determining how to apply the effects of fire, both lethal and 
non-lethal, in such situations will probably constitute the greatest military challenge to 
those who possess superior firepower in absolute terms. 
The most important factor in maintaining freedom of action will be both political resolve 
at the militaryý-strategic level, and absolute compliance by the military with the legal 
requirements of the day. Wisdom in judging what perceptions win bear, when even these 
criteria have been met, also Res in the realm of. OPerational art. Equally, in cases where 
'propaganda of the deed' creates a wide sense of outrage, such as the bombing of the 
Pentagon and the VM, acceptance of what response is legal or not may in itself be 
$elastic'. 
The notion today of what is a 'precise' effect may come to seem somewhat quaint. The 
ability of munitions to loiter and make their own 'intelligent' decisions, not merely about 
what type of armourcd vehicle to hit, but perhaps the identity of the individual being 
targeted and the lethal or non-lethal effect required in the circumstances, could transform 
some operations. This does not imply that munitions will necessarily be small. If a precise 
effect is required in a deep subterranean bunker, the munition required will probably be 
large, directed by a sophisticated acquisition system and use special penetrating 
technology. On the other hand, if the target lies beneath a sensitive civilian area, an 
indirect approach requiring more guile is likely to be required. 
Artillery has always found it difficult to attack troops sheltering in trenches, larger field 
fortifications or in urban terrain. It will probably be difficult to locate and engage them, 
and hard to achieve the desired effects. If they are dispersed over a large area, the 
problem is compounded, and precision attack is extremely challenging. In the past, the 
solution lay in saturation bombardments or 'carpet-bombing, relying on the probability of 
lethality from massed fire, just as canister and shrapnel did in the days of direct fire. Many 
am-des already see fuel-air explosives as a solution to this problem, using precision of a 
different character. How such powerful effects may be countered presents a stark 
problem 16 Other future forms of indirect fire against area targets may include RF 
radiation and microwave energy, projected deep into enemy battlespace. 
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However rapidly a force deploys, and however technologically superior it may be in 
comparison to the bulk of an opponent's force, the theatre ballistic missile (TBM) may be 
the great equalizer for those who wish to balance Western superiority by 'placing a finger 
on the scale'. If unchecked, TBM could ensure that the rapid deployment of an opposing 
force was matched by rapid and unacceptable losses. This in itself might act as a deterrent 
to deployments. Long-range missiles will be relatively cheap. They will remain hard to 
detect and destroy, and maybe only a few have to survive for their purpose to have been 
accomplished. 
Those with slender resources who seek a disproportionate dividend will also shelter in the 
4complex terrain' of the fear of collateral damage, international law and public opinion. 
'Human shields' can balance an opponent's stealth technology, and successful perception 
operations can 'suppress' fire systems. A precise capability with acceptable effects to 
counter such ploys in these circumstances may be hard to achieve. Where asymmetric 
attacks are carried out with extreme effects, such 'protection' may be stripped away, 
creating collateral damage to the cause of tho perpetrators, unless they have already 
determined that this is irrelevant to them, or that it wrill soon be restored by the severity of 
the counter-measures against them. 
The long reach and accuracy of an expensive, hi-&-h-tech munition is a capability that can be 
matched by the reach of a relatively inaccurate, cheap, short-range missile or mortar, if it 
can be successfiffly emplaced close to its target, in extremis, even by a suicide bomber. It 
is generally only those who cannot risk such propinquity that have to invest in more 
expensive, long-range systems. 
The importance of force protection as a capability will encourage the development of 
passive techniques such as camouflage, more rapid displacement and higher rates of fire. 
Active force protection with CB/CF against the enemy's fire system will be increasingly 
important, especially against munitions in flight. In particular, many nations will wish to 
devise methods to protect their forces against a 'check-mate' by TBM; and will need to 
merge or at least develop greater coherence between their CB/CF and air defence 
capabilities. Commanders will therefore require the ability to engage high-payoff targets 
simultaneously throughout their battlespace, 'above' as well as deep, close and rear. ' 7 In 
so much, the apparent geographical discernment of those terms may lose much of its 
usefulness. " 
Once deployed, a ground force must be able to accomplish three-dimensional manoeuvre 
if it is to exert leverage throughout its battlespace. Many nations today are building air- 
mechanized or air-assault formations to achieve this capability. 19 The key to success will 
lie in information superiority and the 'meshbig' of precise fire and manoeuvre. 
Air forces acquired the technologies for hcavy and sustained long-range battlefield attack, 
both CAS and interdiction, during the Second World War. This capability became ever 
more precise and highly valued, and from the 1970s onward it soon took precedence over 
that of the less advanced land systems in what hLstorically might be termed the 'artillery 
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1 N4 ,V, I duel'. Ironically, airforces often bridled at thW lasksý*4eving that strategic attack was a 
more efficient use of resources, which may someftes have been true. Air-power went on 
to demonstrate its capabilities in the Gulf War of 1091, in Bosnia irk 1995, against 
Yugoslavia in 1999 and the Taliban in 2001-02., The potency of air-power and its rapid 
effects mean that large numbers of ground forces may not need to be committed early, but 
that they almost certainly will once the 'firefight' has been won. In future that firefight is 
increasingly likely to be Joint, and to be fought from the sea and by land forces, as they 
both acquire more of the sophisticated long-range precision munitions previously the 
preserve of airforces. 
Air-power retains unique capabilities in range against strategic targets, at higher altitudes 
and in space. Artillery cannot often reach into strategic battlespace, while maritime forces 
may be able to achieve both range and responsiveness. In many ways the viewpoints of 
those who deliver fire from the air and those who deliver it from the surface should be 
similar. Air, artillery and NFS/NSFS provide complementary fires, and all try to achieve 
decisive outcomes at maximum range and at minimum cost to friendly forces, to reduce 
the necessity for potentially attritional ground manoeuvre. However, as the component 
capabilities grow more alike and commanders are offered a greater choice of fires as a 
result, frictions arise over ownership of resources, structures and C3. Prioritizing 
resources in a strategic context, and synchronizing the effects of fire and manoeuvre must 
be a Joint command function. 
General R. E. Eberhart, commanding US Space Command, maintained that the Gulf War 
of 1991 was, "The first war where we truly understood how we could leverage space 
capabilities, capabilities that were built and designed for national reasons, and how we 
could use that at the tactical and operational levels. "20 Little was done to eXploit the 
military potential of space during the 1990s, but by 2002 the USAF was developing a 
doctrine for the control of space. The aim is to integrate airborne and space-based 
sensors into one seamless system 
Space is becon-dng the new 'high ground' to be exploited with new capabilities; but it 
could also be a vulnerability if others find ways to attack the 'space-to-surface 
continuum'. Communications, navigation and intelligence systems in space inform forces 
where they are, where the enemy is, and guide munitions to attack targets. CB/CF 
capabilities are reliant on various space systems, but will become much more so. Joint 
fires will increasingly be directed from, or at least through, space. "Space will help the US 
Army of 2010 maneuver fires for massed effects. "21 The US Army's Effects Control 
Centers (ECC) will control fire from space and the air onto the ground and vice versa; and 
future headquarters are likely to contain cells dealing with space issues. 
5.3 CONCEPTS OF OPERATION - 
At the beginning of the 2 1' Century, many in the USA see the offensive as the dominant form of warfare, although the early phases of an offensive might have to take the form of defensive actions. To seize the initiative and succeed in a full range of contingencies, the 
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USA needs a full spectrum of capabilities. TEsshould exploit its technological and 
cultural strengths, with emphasis on global pmNvr-projection; battlespace dominance; 
long-range precision-strike to deter, assure and dissuade; and information operations. 
Most other Western nations have similar notions or aspirations. The object of those they 
might face will be to obviate or neutralize these capabilities. This may be achieved by 
expanding the battlespace itself unexpectedly. For example, the USA lost air superiority 
for a short but significant time over New York and Washington DC on I PhSeptember 
200 1. Other 'quiet sectors' of three-dimensional space, or cyber-space, may also be 
attacked in future. 
The US Army's plans for 'Transformation' assess that US forces need to be able to mount 
a massive strike at short notice out of the continental USA and by submarine. Within 
ninety-six hours, forces would take control of the littoral and its air defence. As this area 
of control extended inland, ground forces would execute decisive offensive manoeuvreS. 22 
The principles of fire and manoeuvre against an inferior force will apply. Prior to 
offensive manoeuvre, during a defensive phase of an operation, superior fire can exert 
great leverage over a less sophisticated opponent who is manoeuvring. It can force the 
enemy to disperse and 'fix' him, while a ground force manoeuvres to positions of 
advantage. If he concentrates to meet this, he presents an optimal target for superior fire, 
unless he chooses to do so in complex terrain, or where fire is constrained for other 
reasons. Manoeuvre should not be an attritional activity giving the enemy an opportunity 
to fight on equal terms, although this has otlen been the case. In close battle, friendly 
forces should still seek to overmatch an opponent and engage him at ranges beyond those 
of his own weapon systerns. This approach would be equally applicable in limited 
operations against terrorist forces. 
The application of these principles to modeni and future conditions requires a much 
greater Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) 
capability than hitherto. It is knowledge, combined with understanding, that will render 
the enemy vulnerable to superior fire and manoeuvre. A commander must be able to 
orchestrate various sensors to detect and track targets, or at least have timely access to 
their products. Pre-emptive, perhaps non-lethal, strikes on enemy ISTAR systems may by 
analogy replace the 'artillery duel' as the necessary preliminary phase of a campaign. 
The skill of a commander will he not so much in the positioning of firing platforms as in 
the control of ISTAR resources, and making judgements about the optimal distribution of 
precise effects against high-payoff targets. This will require the precise packaging of 
resources for specific contingencies. It will also require alertness to the imaginative 
deception and concealment of an opponent who will seek to operate on other terms. 
The balance of decisive capabilities appears to have shifted to fires; but if too much 
emphasis is placed on precision-strilce, and the enemy has found ways to survive, a 
decisive early, or rather timely, outcome will not have been achieved. The manoeuvre of 
ground forces is therefore likely to play a vital role. in future conflict; but it seems 
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increasingly unlikely that such nianoquvre will ocCVT withQut every opportunity being 
taken to lessen its inherent human cost with preparation by fire. This fire may be of very 
limited duration, because, as has so often been found, 'rapid if smaller effects may be more 
rewarding than massive ones over a longer period of time. In this sense, few of the 
dynamics of the interaction between fire and mangeuvre have changed, merely their 
appearance. Ideally, sudden simultaneous precision-strikes throughout the enemy's 
battlespace will be mounted, coincidental with dominant manoeuvre. 23 
Most armies produce ready doctrinal formulas for success, amended with each revision of 
their manuals. Most are deeply rooted in historical experience and contain the essence of 
some or all of the following: Seize the initiative, maintain momentum and exploit success 
with the synergy of all resources, Joint and Combine ' 
d. This will require superior 
information, optimized C4 systems, the efficient use of resources appropriate to the 
mission, agility and the synchronizing of effects throughout battlespace. Fire plays a vital 
role in all of these, and at times may be used alone, and decisively. 
The US Army expects its artillery to deliver a full spectrum of effects, from massed fires to 
precision-strikes and the disabling of equipment with non-I es. 24 The latter includes I ethal fir 
broad information and psychological operations, and entails deception. Others aspire to 
achieve much the same, if on a smaller and less comprehensive scale. The source of such 
fire will be Joint, Combined and from a variety of platforms: cannon, launchers, UAVs, 
manned aircraft, satellites, the mouse and the keyboard. The important consideration will 
be their effects created throughout the battlespace, rather than their origin. 
A key issue in debates about rapid expeditionary operations is how much firepower and its 
effects should come from the Air component and how much from the Land. Air-power 
can provide theatre commanders with the potential to apply stand-off fires at ranges 
greater than those achievable actually or politically by surface systems. The issue of 
whether air is best suited to attack strategic targets, or to attack fielded forces remains a 
matter of hot debate. 23 Much will depend upon the weight of the ground force, whether it 
can deploy in the tirneframes deemed necessary, and whether air-power has to fill the gap 
if it cannot. 
This also raises age-old inter-Service rivalries, and some see the 'over-investment' in 
airborne precision, stand-off strike as a threat to the ground force's capabilities to 
manoeuvre. 26 There is still a lively debate over the fundamental roles of the two 
components. Who is supported by, and who is supportive of? 
Despite the existence of the US Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrinefor Joint Operations, both 
the US Army and US Air Force appear to have their own interpretations of its contents. 
The nub of the problem is C2. Air forces tend to believe that they require overriding 
control of interdiction given the complexity of airspace, targeting and execution, thus 
subordinating ground force deep operations. Land forces tend to see air interdiction as 
but a part of overall interdiction; and that their relationship with the manoeuvre battle 
means that land forces must play a major role in the coordination of all interdiction. The 
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pragmatic solution is to allocate an area for surface-to-surface interdiction. During the 
Cold War, that was largely the purpose of the FSCL and the RIPL, and setting them was 
relatively uncontroversial. In less predictable circumstances, the decision is more 
problematic and must fall to the Joint commander - but whose advice will he seek? 27 
Surprisingly, the real costs of achieving an effect seldom seem to be taken into account 
when making decisions about balance of investment in military systems and their 
employment. The real cost of an effect delivered by air includes the costs of the airbase in 
war and peace, personnel, forward deployment, the aircraft, supporting aircraft and their 
supporting costs and, perhaps least of all, the munition itself The cost of an effect 
delivered from the sea will include the costs of the carrier or gunship in war and peace, its 
home base port facilities, its personnel, its deployment, supporting vessels and their costs, 
the launcher or aircraft and the munition itself In the case of artillery, the real cost of a 
delivered effect will include the costs of maintaining the firing unit in war and peace, at 
home and in the field, its deployment, its personnel, the gun or launcher and the munition. 
In all cases costs will also include the 'opportunity cost' of what other effects of higher- 
payoff might have been achieved, in other words the comparative advantage in using a 
particular system, and whether its selection was optimal. Without understanding these real 
costs, it will be hard to select the most appropriate system within the joint system of fires 
to achieve a given effect. 
5ATECHNOLOGY 
Advances in technology have lured many into false asswnptions about enduring changes in 
warfare. In 1932 Hitler asserted that, "Ibe next war will be quite different from the last 
world war. Infantry attacks and mass formations are obsolete. Interlocked frontal 
struggles... will not return. I guarantee that... we shall regain the superiority of free 
operations. "2' Some caution that the USA's unassailable technological lead may 
encourage false notions about how to achieve military success. Colin Gray has noted that 
it is hard to find clear examples in war where decisive victory has been achieved thanks to 
superior weaponry. It may give its owner an edge, but it is unlikely that some new 
formula has now been found to change that historical pattern. General N. Schwarzkopf 
emphasized that the Coalition would have won the Gulf War of 1990-91, even if the two 
sides had swapped equipment. "What matters is how weapons are used and by whom. " 29 Lessons 'learned" from the 'Afghan model', "... may be hard to replay elsewhere". 
Nevertheless, technological advances offer promising opportunities. 
The primary areas of technological development for artillery are target acquisition, 
munitions, firing platforms, logistics, the C41 systems that bind them effectively, and 
training. Distinctions between these are made readily today, but in future these will 
become harder to discern. Important elements of the target acquisition system will he in 
the munition itself Platforms and munitions will constitute a lesser proportion of the 
system, but munitions a higher proportion of its cost. The munition has generally been 
regarded as distinct from the platfonn which fircs it; but in many cases in future it will be 
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harder to make a usefid differentiation. Platforms will fire munitions containing other 
platforms which themselves fire sub-munitigns. ', 
A greater proportion of the fire system and. itscost, will be he in surveillance and target 
acquisition (STA). Knowing the exact location of platform and target will be less 
important, because greater discrimination and precision will lie in the munition itself The 
emphasis in military thinking will be less on any of piece of equipment or munition, and 
increasingly on the precise effects which they can create in space and time. Those effects 
will also increasingly be non-lethal. The source of effects will be less relevant, as will the 
'ownership' of the platforms which deliver them, 
Technology will also reduce the vulnerabilities of all parts of the system, yet it cuts both 
ways, for all technologies contain the seeds of their own vulnerabilities. The advantage 
will go to those who occupy the 'high ground' of new technologies, relative to their 
opponents; but they will still be vulnerable to those who understand the essentially human 
nature of war, let alone technological counter-measures. " 
Many of the key questions don't change in essence over the centuries, but rather in the 
degree to which technology allows them to be answered at any particular time. For 
example, what is the balance of advantage between guns and rockets, how can firing 
platforms be made more mobile, how can range, accuracy and effects be increased and 
logistic 'drag' reduced? How can Q systems best serve the implementation of the highest 
commander's intent, and yet remain responsive to the tactical requirements? 
C41 
The command of fires, the marshalling and allocation of resources against targets to best 
achieve the commander's intent, is likely to remain at high level, assisted by Joint 
Targeting Boards, often in a Combined environment. These are held at theatre level to 
accommodate the requirements of the Land and Air component commanders in executing 
a campaign as effectively as possible. This form of centralized high-level consultation and 
decision-making about the effects required, where and by what means, seems likely to 
continue in principle. Increasingly, however, the control of the application of fire to 
achieve the required effects will be conducted, not only by human observers, but by 
computers, and in the case of terminal-guidance by intelligent devices in the munition 
itself 
Some elements of C4I systems are already incorporated into some munitions, and this will 
become increasingly common in future. On-board acquisition systems will identify targets, 
select those designated for attack and de-conflict targets with other munitions. As ranges 
and times of ffight extend and the situation changes during flight, so the ability to change 
the 'orders' for a munition in ffight will become more important. The ability to abort a 
mission, change target and make Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)3 1 will be Crucial. Will 
the munition be armed and controlled by a human on the ground or in the air, or 
automatically; and if the latter, working to what criteria and what tolerances? 
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Future munitions may also have to carry a selection of defensive aids to protect 
themselves in flight from enemy CB/CF/AD; and it may also prove difficult to protect the 
cormnunications on which all this depends. Munitions may have to be of modular design, 
not just to vary range and effect, but also to protect themselves. Deciding what 
proportion of a payload can be self-defensivo at the expense of the mission will be a 
command decision. 
The command of fires and the exploitation of battlespace will, in the future, also be greatly 
assisted by digitization. Ideally, it will permit the seamless engagement of targets, 
irrespective of which fire units are involved - full integration. This is analogous to the 
situation one hundred years ago, when indirect fire was introduced. Guns removed from 
the close action of a supported manoeuvre unit could engage an enemy attacking that unit, 
even though they could not see that enemy or the troops they were themselves supporting, 
by fire. The supported troops came to be more appreciative of the effects delivered than 
knowing the location or identity of the fire-units producing them. Digitization merely 
represents a technological upgrade to support this conceptual model. 
The US Army intends to create automated Effects Coordination Cells (ECC) as part of the 
Strike Force command post, linking widely dispersed fire delivery systems. The old 
relationships of fire units to supported manocuvre units, such as "general support' or 
4reinforcing', seem likely to disappear. Instead, a package of Joint fire assets, perhaps 
including guns, missiles, aircraft and non-lethal systems will be tailored for a specific 
mission. Commanders of equipment will command their movement, sustainment, 
survivability and firing; but the choice of targets and the command of the volume and time 
of firing will be the responsibility of the ECC working to the overall commander. In many 
ways this will merely reinforce the historical trend towards higher level command, 
moderated by responsive solutions- to achieve low-level control of fire when required. 
Most armies are introducing digitized C41 systenLs to assist in meeting these challenges. 
The Army Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) is the US artillery componcnt 
of the US Army's Army Battlefield Command System (ABCS), and is expected to be in 
service with all US field artillery units before 2010. It provides the tools to plan, execute 
and synchronize fire support in a US national, but also Combined environment, thanks to 
the Artillery Systems Cooperation Activities (ASCA) organization which started work in 
1991.11 
It is likely that AFATDS will encourage a change in the manner in which effects are 
achieved by US forces. The question is how much should AFATDS and equivalent 
systems do automatically, and how much should be controlled directly by humans 'in the 
loop'. AFATDS is not an automated decision maker, it manages and organizes 
information, presenting critical data to help decision makers support the commander's 
intent. It will enable the Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD) to use Intervention 
Points (IP), to override the automatic AFATDS 'guidance' on the provision of fire. 
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The emphasis in the US Army to date has been, qn a well-trained FI? C supported by a 
well-trained Fire Support Element (FSE). VAth AFATDS, the Fire Support Officer (FSO) 
will become more important in both planning and executing the focusing and massing of 
fires for chosen effects. The balance of respopsibility will therefore fall more to the FSE, 
supported by a well-trained FDC. 
This view of C2 relationships is Certainly shared by the British Army, which has always 
structured artillery C2 to ensure that effects coordinators are themselves the senior 
decision-makers, collocated with the all-arms cormwder. The British artillery will field a 
new Fire Control Battlefield Information Systc-ni Application (FC BISA) by 2006. This 
will eventually be replaced by a Joint Fire BISA. 
The plethora of new C41STAR systems bring its o-. -im problems. Throughout the 2 'h 
Century, fuel was the primary constraint on manoeuvre, and ammunition supply was the 
primary limitation on firepower. Greater efficiency, novel energy sources and increased 
precision have helped to salve thesc problems. In future, the availability of bandwidth Will 
be the primary limitation on C41STAR, and analogous solutions will have to be found. 
Target Acquisition 
In the days of direct fire, the placing of the guns was the primary test of a commander's 
skill in bringing his firepower to bear. In future, the deployment of artillery observers or 
target acquisition devices, rather than guns and launchers, will be the more important 
command consideration, as the latter's maximum range increases, yet therefore often 
becomes less critical. The acquisition system Will be in space, aircraft, including UAVs, 
and use numerous forms of radar, acoustic and seismic systems, thermal detection and 
human observation. The commander's skill will lie in deploying these, constructing 
networks for them and devising ways to respond efficiently to their products in order to 
meet his information requirements. 
A target may be successfully acquired, but it may still be hard to engage it accurately. 
This may be especially difficult at long range when the target is moving, possibly in 
complex terrain, and may be protected by a variety of active and passive measures 
including deception. The issue is whether future target acquisition systems will 
outperform developments in force protection. Is information dominance really achievable; 
and is it realistic to expect improvements in target acquissition to disperse the 'fog', and to 
'oil the frictions' of war? If it can, how long vAll this historically aberrant period last, and 
at what cost? 
In the 1980s and 1990s, it seemed that the importance of the observer was likely to 
decline as sophisticated technology became more widely available, although the need for 
effects to be coordinated seemed ever more important. Most nations wiU continue to 
place a high value on the 'man in the loop', in the target acquisition system. This wiU be 
particularly important in cases where target identification carries legal sensitivities, and 
perceptions are at stake. 
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In the British Army, the artillery commander has always been placed forward at every level 
of command from company to corps, as close to the commander as possible. Ile is the 
principal adviser on fires, allocates resources in accordance with the commander's plan, 
observes targets if necessary and coordinates the effects of the fire that he himself orders. 
Artillery commanders/observers at all levels have been responsible for coordinating the 
effects of all fires including air, NFS33' mortars and EW. Essentially, they have been 
commanders and effects coordinators, and in future they will probably play a larger role in 
tactical battlespace exploitation. This has not been the international norm. Elsewhere 
artillery commanders have more often been to the rear, commanding their platforms rather 
than the effects they create; and junior officers have undertaken target observation and the 
adjustment of fire. 
Observing the target, calling for fire and correcting the fall of shot used to be a more 
challenging task than it is today, especially in combat. Sophisticated technology which is 
simple to use will make it easier for all to summon firepower from diverse sources. 
"Rather than a 'shooter', the infantryman could become a 'spotter'. 9%34 The work of a 
&spotter', however, was and will be relatively menial compared to the greater challenge of 
coordinating effects with an understanding of the commander's intent. 
Artillery observers have flown in aircraft for nearly one hundred years, but their 
vulnerability in hostile airspace caused this practice to decline. Aerial observation and the 
direction of fire may now become more feasible from attack helicopters (AI-1). The 
advanced technology of AH makes them more survivable than slow, fixed-wing 'spotter 
planes' of earlier decades; and All will in any case need to be able to call for fire for 
SEAD. Observers in AH will also be able to observe and direct fire remotely via UAVs 
which they control. 
Remote observation may also be carried out using other platforms. Observation devices 
can be carried as cargo in projectiles, descending by parachute of glider, or as part of the 
projectile itself One of the 300mm rockets in a pod of the Russian Smcrch system carries 
the R-30 UAV which navigates using GPS, and can loiter over potential targets for thirty 
minutes at 9,000m. Several nations are studying the feasibility of mounting cameras in 
155mm projectiles, using their spin to give a constant image of a strip of sky and ground. 33 
The most promising platforms for visual observation from the air are UAVs. UAVs will 
continue to develop as essential elements of Indirect Fire Systems, both in warfightiný and 
other operations. Hundreds of UAV programnies are currently under development. 3 
The merits of UAVs were first publicly and dramatically demonstrated in the early 1980s 
by the Israelis in operations in Lebanon and their potential value was noted on Operation 
JUST CAUSE in Panama in 1989. Since then, the USA has led the way in much of the 
technology and concepts for the employment of UAVs; and this extends beyond their use 
by US ground forces, and beyond mere reconnais3ance and target acquisitiorL37 
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Just as with manned aircraft nearly a century ago, UAVs will acquire roles far treyond 
mere unarmed ISTAR, to include a wide variety of attack missions. 39 UAVs will acquire 
air-to-air combat, CAS, anti-armour, SEAD and strategic strike roles. It will seem 
increasingly perverse to use expensive, manned, strike aircraft to deliver precision 
munitions when UAVs could complete the entire task. The US National Defense 
Authorization Act for FY 2001 stated that, 'It shall be a goal of the Armed Forces to 
achieve the fielding of unniamed, remotely controlled technology such that by 2010, one 
third of the aircraft in the operational deep-strike force aircraft fleet are unmanned. " 
Technical progress towards combat roles is rapid., Over Kosovo in 19999, a US Predator 
became the first UAV to designate a target f6r an A10-launched, laser-guided bomb. On 
21' February 2001, a trial was conducted in which'a Predator fired a AGN-I 14 Hellfire 
missile at a ground target and this capability proved effective in Afghanistan in 2002. 
UAVs may also seem attractive platforms to carry directed energy weapons. However, all 
aspirations to increase the use of UAVs depend on considerable further work on 
airworthiness, certification and its C2 requirements. 
The distinctions between what is a sighting system, what is a UAV and what is a munition 
will become harder to determine. Shells will be developed which on being fired from a 
gun will be able to fly to I OOkm and beyond, loitering for some hours to acquire a target 
and attack it. 'O UAVs with imaging sensors will also be fired from tank barrelS. 41 
Progress has also been made in other forms of target acquisition. Interest in acoustic 
systems is growing. The UK fielded the Advanced Sound-Ranging Programme (ASP) in 
2002 to detect artillery fire out to about 20km. The USA is developing an advanced 
seismic and acoustic system to provide networked information, delivering situational 
awareness on the future battlefield as part of its Future Combat System (FCS). Acoustic 
systems have the advantage of being passive, and they are well-suited to cueing active 
systems such as radar, a variety of which continues to be developed in many countrieS. 42 
Munitions 
Greater accuracy offers the greater likelihood that the precise effect can be delivered at the 
correct location in battlespace. In the case of a simple HE munition, doubling its accuracy 
means that its explosive mass can be reduced by a factor of eight to achieve the same 
effect, yielding major logistic advantages. By the same token, if air-defivered munitions 
become so accurate that one weighing 2501bs is as effective as a less sophisticated one 
weighing 1,000lbs, an aircraft could conduct four times the number of attacks with the 
same pay-load. The technology to make munitions more accurate will increasingly he in 
the munitions themselves, rather than the platform that fires them, or in better target data. 
Munitions will 'know' more about where they are, where their target is, and its 
characteristics. Some will make decisions based on detailed attack criteria, giving greater 
assurance of avoiding fratricide and collateral damage, and some will make their own 
BDA. In time, some may also make decisions about what effect they need to create in a 
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given circumstance. To achieve all this they may need more time, and so some will be 
given the ability to manoeuvre, and to loiter to search for targets. 
Such discriniination and precision will require inckjor advances in the technology of 
propellants, warheadsý' and software. Precision does not mean only the ability to hit a 
point in battlespace accurately, it mzans the creation of mcasured effects in time and 
space, over an area as much as at a point. 
The disadvantage of rockets rem, -drs their long minimum. range and that, when fired at 
long range, their time of flight makes them relatively unresponsive to tactical targets. It 
seems probable, however, that there will Lv an fi,. creasing shift of resources from guns to 
rockets given the latter's inherent advantage in range; and that guns will often fire RAP. 
Rockets are weU-suited to the delivery of heavy loads of submunitions, but these have 
sometimes been controversial due to their high dud-rate. They can have significant 
implications for manoeuvre in general war, and moral and legal implications in Peace 
operations. 44 The bomblet munition of the 1980s is an area weapon which was developed 
to compensate for lack of terminal accuracy against complex targets; but its successors 
need to be much more accurate and reliable. As ranges extend, there wifl be powerful 
arguments for giving new munitions positive tern-dnal-guidance with a human in the 
decision loop, perhaps through fibre optic control. 
MILRS is the mainstay of Western battlefield rocketry, and it will receive a series of major 4S 
upgrades that will give it longer-ranged and more precise and reliable munitions. The 
longest-ranged of these is currently the US Army's ATACMS series, but its capability will 
be significantly improved . 
16 Extended Range-MLRS (ER-MILRS) will also be introduced 
into many annies. It is a free-flight area-attack system, providing a lower sub-munition 
dud-rate at a range of up to 45km. Guided MILRS (GMLRS) is an evolution of ER- 
M[LRS with a range of 60km which can be guided and controlled. '7 The MLRS Smart 
Tactical Rocket (MSTAR) will be the first MLRS rocket to carry smart munitions and 
could enter service in the US Army a3early as 2004, if funded . 
4' Research is also being 
conducted into hypersonic rriSSBCS. 4' These might have a range of 50-500km and cover 
1501an in two minutes. 
The US Army's FCS is a system of systems, which includes the robotic NetFires or 
'rocket in a box', formerly known as the Advanccd Fire Support System (AFSS). 'O This 
combines the platform with the munition. TBM are already prolific and seem likely to 
spread still further. " They are also relatively inaccurate, but the means to remedy this will 
become much cheaper and easier to develop. 
155mm has become the standard calibre for tubed artillery, and its effectiveness will be 
greatly enhance by the various smart munitions due in service in the early years of the 21 
Century. A camon-launched projectile needs a guidance system that can survive 
accelerations of 10,000-12, OOOG, so the demands on technology are formidable. It is 
harder to build such technology into the smaller 105mm shell, but progress has been rapid, 
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and new 105mm rounds with RAP and DPICM are coming onto the market, and smart 
WiU fHW. 
S2 105mm munitions 00 
The 155mm Copperhead was the pioneer of precision shells but it had serious 
disadvantages. It required the target to be illuminated for thirteen seconds and demanded 
high skills in training. Nevertheless, exercises at the US Army's NTC, showed that it 
could yield high returns against high-value targets. Shells with more modem technology 
will clearly yield even greater benefits. 
The US Army will seek to increase the conunonality of its advanced 155mm munitions 
with the XM982 Excalibur. 53 The British Army and many others will introduce similar 
munitions system. " One remarkable aspect of the post-Cold War defence industry is its 
multi-nationality, as many nations find the need , 
for 
i 
common capabilities, yet wish to 
maintain some industrial capacity at a time of generally Wg defence budgets. 5, Some 
have created 'niche' capabilities In a global niýrket. " 
Shells will take on increasingly unconventional forms and roles. Iley will be used as 17 
target acquisition devices in an effort to enhance 'first-round effects on target'. Field 
artillery could also assume an indirect fire air defence role. " 
Projectiles are increasingly likely to be built with modular, inter-changeable parts, some 
with a higher percentage of warhead and others with more propellant or fuel. They will be 
fitted with a variety of wing formations, depending on the length of their ffight path and 
the agility required to manoeuvre. 
The distinction between which arms fire directly and indirectly is blurring. Tanks were 
often used in the indirect role in the Second World War; but they will soon be armed with 
'fire-and-forget' top-attack rounds. Examples of such 105mm rounds already exist. The 
US Army has a requirement for a 120nun tank round with extended-range for the Abrams 
tank, with an indirect fire capability out to 8krrL 
As guns achieve ever greater ranges, there has been concern that the supported manoeuvre 
arms might lack the responsive close support that they need. This has led once again to 
greater interest in mortars, which have also been given extended range59 and greater and 
more varied effects, including non-lethal 'frangible' bombs of non-traditional materials to 
limit collateral damage. 
Greater range normally requires more or better propellant or on-board fuel supply. 
Progress is rapid, but some novel technologies have proved disappointing. 60 During the 
1980s, liquid propellant was seen as the next major leap in technology which would yield 
great benefits in terms of reliability and logistics. 61 The US Army's Crusader was 
originally intended to use liquid propellant, but plans were abandoned when the difficulties 
proved too severe. For now, the role of conventional propellant seems secure, and there 
are many improvements, both chemical and hi modular packaging to enhance its 
performance. 62 
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Terminal-guidance gives munitions the ability to hit unseen targets accurately at long 
range, mirroring the technical-tactical developments resulting from the mastery of 
predicted, indirect fire did during the First World War. Some munitions are externally 
guided, requiring gun-based processing for course correction. Others require an off-board 
sensor for trajectory measurement, and do not require line-of-sight from the fuse to the 
gun throughout the flight. This allows the gun to 'shoot and scoot' and has advantages in 
difficult terrain. Others are self-directing or initially guided. In the latter, the munition 
compares its desired point of impact with its anticipated actual point of impact, and 
corrects its flight accordingly with canards. 
The growing 'intelligence' of munitions incorporates these navigation devices, target 
sensorS63 and fuses that initiate and control the effect of the warhead. Much of this 
technology is located in the 'fuse' and is often ieferred to a:; such, even though strictly 
speaking the fuse merely initiates the detonation at the required time. 
So-called 'smart fuses' combine the detonating function with a course-corrcction 
capability, although course-correction can be appBed through the fuse or through the body 
of the projectile. Range-correcting fusee' do not adjust for line, as this would require 
power and batteries. They can be used on 'dumb munitions', which makes them 
economically attractive. Multi-option fuses mean that pre-Pased rounds are likely to 
become the norm, and an important requirement for automated guns/howitzers, with the 
fiises being set electronically in the baffel. 61 
NUcro-electromechanical systenLs (MEMS) offer numerous potential advantages in fuse 
design. For example, a single point of initiation may not give optimum lethality; and it 
should be possible to remote the detonator from the fuse. Base initiation could be useful 
because it would canalize the explosion forward not back. MEMS may also help in 
creating better delay and self-destruct mechanisms which will become more common in 
66 munition design. They will also prove useful in the guidance, navigation and control 
systems of future munitions. As fuses become more dependent on electronics so will 
electronic counter-measures, and counter-counter-measureS. 67 
Platfomm 
Although munitions rather than the platforms that fire them are the focus of the most 
intense research incorporating 'Inforniation Age' technologies, much is being done to 
transform platform design. The new imperative is to build lighter, more rapidly deployable 
pieces; but many heavier automated ones are also entering service, firing faster and 
further. 
Rockets are likely to become more common, but guns will continue to have a valued role, 
thanks in part to their short minimum range. In that sense, rockets have the same 
disadvantages as direct firing guns in the early 201h Century. Guns will become fighter and 
more deployable, but may seem to lack the range and utility of fight rocket systems. Those 
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requiring close support will continue to develop heavy mortars, but the new generation of 
heavy SP guns will remain an essential capability in most armies for many decades. In the 
longer term, the US Army will seek lighter yet more effective systems for its 'Objective 
Force'; but in the meantime the US Army is looking for an Interim solution to provide 
greater mobility for its field artillery. 
In the Quadrilateral Ballistics Agreement, major NATO annies agreed to make 155mm 
their standard calibre, and to transition from thq. 39-caUbres barrel to the 52-calibres 
barrel, giving shells a 'softer' ride and greater range. Despite that, the 105mm. calibre is 
becoming more popular again with longer ranges and advanced munitions. " A reduction 
in calibre from 155mm to 105mm implies a reduction in HE charge of three quarters, with 
clear logistic advantages. A typical I 05nmi gun, has the advantage of being portable inside 
a helicopter, rather than underslung, thus allowing tactical flying. 105mm pieces are also 
being designed to travel on trucks, or as wheeled SP pieces, Devices are also being 
produced to give fight guns the same supporting technology as heavier SP pieces. 69 
The area of greatest research is in light 155nun pieces, using aluminium and titanium 
alloys and novel recoil systems. " The USMC's M198 weighs 15,600lbs and has to be 
lifted by the CH-53E helicopter. With its ammunition, this 
* 
presents a formidable logistic 
challenge. The US Army and the USMC are to replace the M198 with the BAE Systems 71 YM777 lightweight howitzer, redesign Ted the M777 in 2002. If the ability to deploy by 
helicopter is not an imperative, greater tactical mobility might be achieved by matching it 
with a truck. There are numerous wheeled SP 155mm pieces on the market, such as the 
French Giat CaeSar72 and the Chinese WA021. The Russians experimented with fight 
pieces such as the 2A61, but appear not to have achieved the same weight and range 
advantages of Western models. 
Light-weight systems have inherent problems achieving the same ranges, rates of fire and 
protcctionasmorccapablc, heavicrSPpicccs. " The US Army's M109A6 Paladin was 
introduced in the early 1990s and was the first digitized combat vehicle in the US Army's 
inventory. The final conversion of M109s to Paladin was completed in June 1999.74 
Although SP systems may lack strategic deployabifity, there are many advanced SP 
systems coming into service to replace the venerable M109. What they have in common 
are greater capabilities to operate autonomously., fire automatically and to produce high 
rates of burst-fire. 
The French Army's basic AUF I" was first 
7 
produced in 1977 and is due to be replaced by 
the 52-cafibres AUF2 between 2002-2008 .6 The British Army's semi-automatic AS90 
entered service in the mid- I 990s and is likely to be replaced by an improved model with a 
52-calibres barrel. 77 The Bundeswehr's PzH2000 began to enter service in 1997 and has 
in effect become the predominant European SP gun/howitzer, being procured by the 
Netherlands, Greek and Italian armies . 
72 The Russian 152mm 47-calibres 2S 19 SP gun 
entered service with the Soviet Army in 1989-90, but has since been upgraded to the 
2S 19M. 7' The Chinese have developed the SP GCL45, reported to be based on the 
designs of Dr Gerald Bull from the 1980s. 
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The US Army's Crusader (XM200 1)" was to have been the most advanced SP piece in 
the world. The need for field artillery to keep up with the armoured vehicles of 
manoeuvre, arms was revealed during the Gulf War of 1990-91. General Shinseki 
maintained that, "Crusader is the answer to the long-standing (artillery) problem that we 
have not fixed. "81 It was due to replace all M109A6 Paladins and M992A2 FAASVs in 
the active US Army. It had long been a controversial design at a time when the emphasis 
was on 'Transformation', improving deployability as well as effectiveness. It also faced 
challenges from those who preferred naval vessels and aircraft as sources of fire. 
Under 'Transformation', heavy systems such as the XWOO I were required to make 
drastic weight reductions. The total weight of each of the two Crusader vehicles had to be 
reduced from fifty-five tons to no more than thL-ty-eight tons, or forty-two with add-on 
armour, to make them deployable simultaneously by C- 17 or C-513 aircraft. 82 In 2001, the 
US Army planned to buy 480 of the original intended purchase of 1,138 XM2001 s. Half 
of the supply vehicles (RSV XM2002) were to ber tracked, and the re=inder wheeled. 
Crusader was due to enter service in 2008, but was cancelled in 2002. 
There was heated debate in the US defence community over the cancellation of Crusader. 
This saw a great clash of view and interest, reminiscent of those in 17'h and 18'hCentury 
Europe over artillery ballistics, the need or otherwise for a light gun, and the merits of a 
'grande batterie'. In the 19'hCentury, similar partisan views were found in the arguments 
over breech- and muzzle-loading, and the merits of smoothbore versus rifled pieces. 
The case for Crusader was made by retired general officers such as Generals B. R. 
McCaffrey and G. Sullivan. " In essence they argued that UAVs and precision munitions 
do not constitute some 'silver bullet' that will make the close support of armourcd forces 
obsolete; and that without Crusader, US forces will be at a significant disadvantage in 
future conflicts. Others argued that war remains an essentially human endeavour, and an 
over-reliance on technology might have serious consequences come the 'knife fight'. its 
supporters cited the much greater capabilities of Crusader compared to Paladin, which 
was already a poor complement to the Abrams tank in 1991. It would be wrong, they 
argued, to see Crusader solely as an element of the Objective Force. It should also be 
seen as the long-overdue complemeni of the heavy force; and not so much behind-the- 
times, as indispensable and already late. They pointed out that Crusader is fighter than the 
tanks it would support, and no less dcployable or necessary than those 'legacy' armoured 
forces which will be the mainstay of US land capability for many decades. 
Crusader's advocates maintained that aL-power cannot be an adequately responsive 
substitute for close support, in all conditions, as evidenced by its relative ineffectiveness 
against field units in the Balkans. They believed that artillery, not aircraft, will be the 
dominant fire system within 501an of ground forces; and that the Crusader was an efficient 
system given its unit cost, the investment already sunk in it and its low manning 
requirements. Equally they noted the reductions in the US Army's field artillery and 
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elsewhere, made in the expectation that the superior capabilities of Crusader would 
compensate for these cuts. 
Others argued that wars in which the USA fights will increasingly be won from space and 
the air, with a much reduced need for ground forces. They maintained that Crusader 
would still be too heavy to be a readily deployable part of the Objective Force; and that 
the termination of Crusader will enable the US Army to skip a generation of technology, 
moving directly to the FCS incorporating 20-ton pieces, Neffires and the Excalibur 
ammunition system. R. McDaniel maintained that the cancellation of Crusader marked the 
end of the dominance of the battlefield by cannon artillery after one hundred yearS, 84 and 
that all indirect fire tasks should in future be conducted by missiles and mortars. He 
maintained that the balance of advantage of the missile over the gun has become decisive, 
with greater deployability, longer range and payload with greater precision, all contained 
in a more flexible and cost-effective system. Most of these factors have explained why, at 
various times over the last two hundred years, rockets have been preferred to guns. The 
significant difference today is that what was always held to be the inherent disadvantage of 
the rocket, its inaccuracy, has been overcome. 
With the cancellation of Crusader, it now seems* likely that Paladin will have to 'soldier 
on9, or a short-term replacement be found; and that funds will switch to systems such as 
FUMARS, variants of the M777, GULRS, Excalibur and NetFires in the FCS. 85 
The US Army's future 'Objective Force' will be based on the FCS, a networked 
combined-amis team of manned and robotic ground systems, and a type of UAV known 
as the Organic Air Vehicle (OAV). 8' The FCS's indirect fire capability will be vehicular 
not towed, and probably of 105mm calibre. The FCS seems likely to use a common 
chassis, and the family of vehicles must be fighter than twenty tons, and fifty percent 
smaller than the Abrams tank, to fit in a C-130 aircraft. The FCS will have amulti-role 
electrothermal-chemical indirect and direct firing gun, with a rate of fire of between 
twenty and thirty rounds per minute. " 
The continuing importance of the SP mortar as a source close support is reflected in 
numerous international developments. The Germans, Russians, Chinese and Finns are 
among those who have produced new models. 88 The USMC continues to develop 
Dragonfire, a mortar capable of 'ship to objective manoeuvre', which can be airlifted and 
towed. 
The greatest progress in rocketry is in the munition rather than the platform, but important 
advances continue to be made nonetheless. The fielding of the improved IýERS M270AI 
with a higher rate of fire will take place between 2000 and 20109 It has improved 
stowage, displacement, elevation and slew, which should reduce exposure by seventy-five 
percent. 
The need for fight rockets for early entry forces and rapid effects was identified and widely 
discussed in the late 1980s. It will be. met hi US forces by IRMARS, a wheeled rocket 
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platform, deployable by C- 130 aircraft and capable of firing within minutes of landing. 
IHMARS could re-ernbark on the aircraft immediately and fly off in what would amount 
to a new type of artillery raid. 90 The US Army's FCS will incorporate a missile system, 
NetFires or 'missile in a box', which will fire precision and loitering munitions. " 
The proportion of Joint fires delivered by aircraft has grown steadily and air forces will 
buy more stand-off, air-to-surface missiles such as the USAF's Joint Air-to-Surface Stand- 
off Missile (JASSNO which has a range of 370knL It is essentially a stealthy cruise missile 
with a variety of possible pay-loads. 92 Such weapons/munitions are designed to hunt and 
attack targets such as high-value missiles which would otherwise require an aircraft to find 
and attack them Depending upon whether they are air- or surface-launched, combat 
UAVs should probably be seen either as a form of artillery munition or as an aircraft; but 
increasingly such issues of categorization and ownership will seem less useful in 
understanding Joint three-dimensional warfare. " 
As surface-to-surface systems reach out further, it sccms likely that manned aircraft could 
become an inefficient method of delivering fire in areas within range of these systems. 
Low-level CAS, on the traditional model, Im become increasingly less attractive in recent 
year s94' while interdiction and strategic attacks ir-we become more so; and this trend will 
probably continue as the battlespace expands. 
On the other hand, new precise air-defivered munitions enhance accuracy, and thus the 
survivability of aircraft" and friendly forces on the ground. 9" The accuracy of bombs has 
risen from about 1,000m for a 2,0001b bomb of the Second World War, to 3m today. 9' 
Accuracy is no longer necessarily a function of altitude, just as the accuracy of precise 
artillery munitions is no longer necessarily a function of range. 
The delivery of precise munitions by high-flying aircraft is likely to make the distinction 
between CAS and air interdiction less distinct; and CAS delivered from mcdiurn and high 
altitudes seems certain to become a prevalent operation, at least in the case of US forces. " 
Some airmen now refer to CAS as 'precision off-board targeting. 
The Joint C2 arrangements for such missions will remain complex; but there will be a 
growing role for Forward Air Controllers (FAC), both airborne and on the ground. 99 
Ironically this is partly due to the deficiencies inherent in precision weapons. Over- 
reliance on precision-guided bombs without direction by an FAC "means that at least ten 
percent of air-dropped ordnance will go out of control and could kill our troops. As was 
tragically relearned in Afghanistan (in 2002) ... CAS fi-om above 15,000 feet can be as hazardous to friendly troops as to the enemy ... The current media euphoria over near- 
precision munitions as a battlefield panacea hasn't factored in the many friendly deaths 
these bombs have inflicted on our soldiers.... TDAMS ... use GPS'00 ... thus they can go 
astray... if misused as CAS weapons". 101 
Tfinehess is another problem The US Rcar Adiniral M. G. Moffit noted that "Satellite- 
guided weapons - like the JDAM- don't require a picture of the target, just its 
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coordinates. But they are not ideally suited for ti; iic-crittical strikes. The process of 
getting the GPS-guided bombs ready for firing takes longer than it would for an aviator to 
spot a target with its sensor pod, beam a laser and release a laser-guided bomb ... For time- 
critical targets, we needed a weapon that Nve could actively place on the target in real 
time. "102 
These problems can be solved. Major General R. Scales described the developing 
relationship between air forces and ground forces as, "A tectonic shift in the nature and 
character of how ground forces fight. "103 Ground forces reveal the enemy's position, or 
force him into the open so that he may be acquired and attacked from the air. Others, 
however, see this model as a flawed one, akin to the Maginot Line, whose effectiveness 
was based on the belief in the dominance of observers linked to fire, albeit artillery 
observers not aircraft. 104 They regard it as a model that may be too easily 'outflanked' by 
other methods of warfare. Equally, it is criticized by, those who believe that airpower can 
no more 'occupy ground with fire' than can artillery. 
When artillery has disappointed, it has often been when it has been party to the misleading 
prospectus that it has achieved the ability to so cover the ground by fire that the 
manoeuvre arms have merely to advance and occupy the ground of a defeated enemy. 
Inadequate target data and lack of responsiveness have often led to inadequate effects in 
the face of such excessive expectations. Analogousarguments today in support of 
airpower should be treated with similar caution for ' 
similar reasons - the imperfections of 
target information, discrimination and responsiveness. It is unlikely that an enemy can be 
defeated by airpower alone, although there will be s uch cases, -as there have been for 
artillery. Ground manoeuvre forces will require their own resources, including organic 
indirect fire support, working in conjunction with all Joint fires. 
5.5 FUTURE ROLES AND STRUCTURES 
Structures ought to reflect technology and missions, and this is indeed how most 
structures originate; but over time their relevance fades and they can sometimes constitute 
an inappropriate yet resilient legacy. In the long-run, the shifting 'tectonic plates' of fire 
and manoeuvre overcome this inertia. 
There are therefore likely to be significant changes in the manner in which armies organize 
themselves at all levels to deliver the effects of fire. There will be an increasing trend to 
deploy Joint forces in task forces tailored precisely to the mission, and to command them 
with an appropriately shaped headquarters. There will be less likelihood of deploying an 
all-purpose division or corps headquarters, just because it exists, rather one to fit the force 
commanded. 105 NATO's force generation process ensures that that has already become 
the nom with most national contributions to Peace operations, and the multi-national 
forces that result from it. On the other hand, some Joint and Combined packages will be 
'hard-wired' in peacetime, as many amphibious and air-mechanized forces are already, 
creating new types of permanent structure. 106 
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Historically, issues such as C2 and survey have been the chief determinants of artillery 
structures. Battery size has depended upon the number of guns that can be commanded 
by one or more command posts, given the dispersion possible with the type of platforms 
and their conununications available at any one time. This will become less significant as 
the autonomy of individual platforms hicreases. 
The future of the forward observer is much debated in the British Army. The need for a 
'Man-In-The-Loop' will probably remain, especially in Peace operations, but also in 
warfighting as ROE become more complex. The artillery observer is currently almost the 
only combatant with access to the necessary target acquisition devices and means of 
communication that enable timely calls for indirect battlcfield engagement. This will 
change as technology develops, particularly in the areas of ISTAR and C41. 
Remote sensors, communicating directly to strike platforms, win increasingly conduct 
target acquisition, allocate resources and cven control fire. Anybody with an appropriate 
communications link could call for fire from indirect systems with confidence that the 
target would be accurately engaged. Even though the forward observer might ofIcn be 
able to relinquish the basic roles of target acquisition and engagement, he will become 
even more important in the complex business of planning the coordination and delivery of 
Joint effects for his commander. His judgement in assessing a target's characteristics may 
be crucial in making legal judgements and decisions regarding ROE. 
Battlespace wiU become an increasingly complex and 'dense' environment, Mled by many 
more aerial and electromagnetic systems than hitherto. Many of these will have an 
offensive support task, and management and exploitation of the battlespace will be crucial 
to the successful conduct of operations. The role of the forward observer as the offensive 
support advisor could also naturally evolve to deal with the tactical management and 
exploitation of battlespace, informed by, and as a part of a broader three-dimensional 
picture which has previously been the preserve of higher-level airspace managers - 
something rather diflerent. 
As land warfare moves from operations in the area of the two dimensional plane, with fire 
and manoeuvre through the third dimension, it will increasingly involve fire and 
manoeuvre in the third dimension itself The challenge of how to mange and exploit the 
high-density, three-dimensional battlespace of the future, incorporating fire and 
manoeuvre on land and in the air, with low-level control but high-level command, has yet 
to be convincingly explained. 
5.6 OVER THE HORIZON 
The perceived importance of field artillery has varied greatly over 650 years. It has been 
least valued when the firepower of the supported arm grew relative to its own, as it did in 
the period 1860-1914, or when inadequate technology or techniques rendered its own 
effects inadequate against the primary threat, as was the casc against annour in the second 
half of the 20'hCentury. 
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t fire has also varýed- The importance The balance of advantage in the provision of indiýr: c 
of the gun versus the rocket at any particular time, his depended upo .n technological 
developments in each; and the mortar has often piOved more usefid than the field gun or 
rocket in certain situations. Naval fire has for ceýiýries often been vital to success in land 
operations, and since 1914, airpower has played an increasingly important role in the 
provision of fire across the battlefield. 
Some wonder whether the days of the camon are numbered as mortars, rockets and above 
all aircraft, manned and unmanned, take over its combat tasks. Certainly the provision of 
indirect fire by mortars, whether regarded as artillery or infantry systems, seems likely to 
increase in proportion to the greater use of tockets, because they complement them so 
well, compensating for the latter's long minimum range and lack of tactical 
responsiveness. Rockets offer exceptional efficiency in delivering precise effects at long 
range, both with accuracy at a point and with massive, shocking weights of fire over large 
areas. They will undoubtedly become more prevalent in the artillery's inventory. They 
will also become more important as surface-to-surface, strategic, offensive systems for 
many countries. Other forms of surface-to-surface. fire may also emerge in asymmetric 
forms to disrupt the traditional equations. Guns may become fewer in number relative to 
these other systems, but given their flexibility in'terms of effect, responsiveness, range and 
protection, they seem unlikely to disappear. "" 
A more contentious issue is the possiýle replacemeýn'Vof surfhce-to-surface fire systems by ,, I' t'be'p airpower. The suggestion that complete reliance migh 'laced on aircraft to carry out 
tasks in which artillery was previously dominant is one 
, 
that makes sense only in a limited 
6cultural' context, and even then is highly dubious. 'The 'cultural' factor is that the issue is 
effectively relevant only to the USA, and those nations ývhose forces conceive of no 
operations outside a USAF 'umbrella'. 
Few believe that wars can be won or conflicts resolved solely by airpower. At some stage 
ground troops become essential. For those without air superiority, there can be no 
guarantee of air support to ground operations, and so they must have their own organic 
fire system. It has also yet to be demonstrated that airpower can be organized, and its 
effects sequenced, to deal with rapidly changing and highly complex tactical situations 
over sustained periods against large numbers of targets. It would be advantageous if 
airpower could guarantee to achieve this, and in time the USAF might be able to do so; 
but in the meantime there is ample evidence that this is what artillery has been crafted to 
achieve by the process of combat evolution over 650 years. 
It seems likely that the proportion of fire delivered by the USAF will inevitably grow and 
be delivered in a diflerent combination and style to fortner times. In practice the purpose 
and sequencing of this fire would be much the same as that once mandated for field 
artillery. This increasing role of airpower is scarcely surprising, given the conspicuous 
trends of the last hundred years, but it does not invalidate the need for organic fire support 
for manoeuvre forces once committed. 
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For the remainder of the world's armies, fhere can be no guarantee of air superiority which 
might allow the use of airpower to support them. On the contrary, because of the very 
dominance of American airpower, forces w1hich might face those of the US can have no 
realistic expectation of any significant fire support from their own air forces, and will 
become ever more dependent on surface-to-surface artillery of all sorts to support their 
rnanoeuvre forces. It is also likely that most conflicts around the world will not involve 
US forces at all, and nations engaged in them may be expected to deploy the full range of 
air forces and field artillery assets. 
Since the mid-1970s, US air operations have become more effective and at a rapidly 
decreasing cost in casualties. The growing gap between this air capability and the 
counter-air capability may continue to grow; but on the other hand, historical trends might 
encourage the belief that it will eventually shrink again. The technologies of air defence 
may undergo a resurgence in novel forms, reducing the advantage, or methods might be 
adopted to make that airpower unusable. 
In the longer term, should a military 'peer competitor' to the USA emerge, assumptions of 
comprehensive air superiority over deployed forces would appear to be erroneous. In this 
case, the 'long term' could be only a thirty to fitly years, which in the cycle of equipment 
procurement is not very long at all. 
It may also be asserted by some that war., as they have bcen fought in the past, will not be 
fought again. Certainly some nation3 may br. fortunate etiough to make such an 
assumption for now, but for many nations around the world the utility of war still has its 
appeal, and the instruments of choice for waging, it include field artillery. Equally, 
terrorism and guerrilla operations may well be conducted using artillery systems of both 
the most primitive and sophisticated types, and in such a way that artillery is not the best 
response. Such 'pre-emptive suppression' is in itself a most skilful use of the artillery 
system. 
Artillery will be used in many future conflicts in a manner that has scarcely changed for a 
hundred years. Yet, those who can afford it will expand the boundaries of technology and 
doctrine to suit their changing circumstances and strategic challenges; and for them, 
significant and fundamental change seems inevitable. 
In the early 21' Century, field artillery must provide precise effects against high-payoff 
targets, as part of a responsive Joint system of fires, twenty-four hours per day and in all 
weathers, abiding by the ROE, and often with a 'man-in-the-loop'. New technologies will 
allow the detection, accurate location and identification of more targets than hitherto, and 
provide the delivery means and munitions to attack them precisely. This must be carried 
out with the minimum of expense, casualties mid collateral damage, while reducing the 
logistic burden. However, major changes in the underlying assumptions about how all this 
will be achieved seem likely, yet these fit readfly into the prevailing historical pattern. 
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The distinction between direct and indirect fire has been one of the most critical in the 
development and understanding of 20'hCentury warfare '. 
From 1880, all the fundamentals 
of indirect fire were understood, but they were technologically undeveloped and often 
ignored; and prior to 1914, warfare was essentially a battle of two-dimensional linear 
encounter. The advantages of indirect fire viere, fully rec: ' ognized 
in 1914. Thereafter, the 
Indirect Fire Revolution, using the third dimension, ensured that non-hear operations by 
fire could be conducted simultaneously, throughout the whole area of two-dimensional 
battlespace, close, deep and rear. Battlespace expanded as a consequence; but by the end 
of the 2e Century, longer ranges generally diminished terminal accuracy, and reduced the 
effectiveness of indirect fire against the highest-value t3rgets which tended to shelter out 
of its reach. 
A new phenomenon is, however, emerging that will reshape battlespace geometry and the 
style of warfare, probably as radically as it was by indirect fire at the beginning of the 20'h 
Century. The technologies at the heart of the US Army's 'Transformation' and the so- 
called Revolution in Military Affidrs (RMA), are primarily those which will deliver 
precision almost irrespective of range. 'O" They will restore the underlying 'logic' and 
'geometry' of fire relative to the battlespace that obtained in the first half of the 26' 
Century, even though the appearance of combat and military organizations might appear 
radically different in future. The new technologies of precision will also expand the Land 
component's battlespace still further into the third-dimension, making the 'above' as vital 
as 'close', 'deep' and 'rear'. High-payoff moving targets will increasingly be located in 
three dimensions and require precise engagement by responsive fire systems. As the 
fourth dimension, time, contracts; and as the fifth dimension, cyber-space, expands in 
unquantifiable directions, these actions will be assessed through the distorting lens of 
disparate perceptions. 
Arms and Services have evolved in step with major technological advances, and are to a 
large extent expressions of the different characteristics of direct and indirect fire and 
weapon-range - legacies of specific technologies at specific moments in history. The 
current distinctions between them may need revision as a result of imminent change. '09 
There is nothing alarming in this, rather it should be seen as an opportunity. Disruptive 
revolutions are best avoided by measured incremental evolutions, reflecting external and 
internal pressures, before they become essential at inopportune moments, but that is easier 
said than done. Arguments in favour of the status quo can often only be justified on 
'cultural' grounds and in the interests of stability. Whether the opportunity is seized or 
not is another matter; but those who identify the opportunities and act are likely to enjoy 
benefits denied to those who do not. 
Until now, artillery has generally provided the bulk of indirect fire, and direct fird has 
usually been the primary mode of armour, infantry, AH and GBAD. The concept of 
indirect fire as a separate entity is still useful in the short- to medium-term. In the longer 
term, the previously fundamental difference between direct and indirect fire may be 
unhelpful in understanding effects and how best to apply them in battlespace. 
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This change will be caused largely by a blurring of the capabilities of direct and indirect 
fire weapon systems; and the purpose of the effects generated by both will become 
increasingly similar. For instance, it is currently possible for a tank to fire a round with a 
top-attack capability directly from its barrel or vertically from a pod. This could and 
probably will be developed to give such combat vehicles a long-range, indirect fire role. 
What is the difference between a non-returning, air- or ground-launched attack UAV and 
a loitering, one-off rocket, or shell with RAP, in terms of combat effect? What is the 
significant difference between a loitering UAV that fires directly at a ground target, and an 
indirectly fired munition which itself loiters and locates its target before attacking it 
directly with its own sub-munitions? These different methods of attack cannot usefully be 
segregated and categorized as direct or indirect. In the same way, meaningful distinctions 
between platforms and munitions will be harder to discern. 
The distinctions between the effects of organic land and organic air systems may also be 
harder to distinguish, making the use of the term 'component' itself unhclpfiiL or even 
misleading. Operations between these two components will become increasingly 
integrated and Joint, except perhaps in strategic operations and space, which will probably 
remain predominantly the domain of the Air component. 
Until now, targets in the air have generally consisted of manned aircraft and have been the 
concern of direct-firing GBAD, or of friendly manned aircraft. In future, there will be 
many more objects throughout the three physical dimensions of battlespace, and most of 
them will be unmanned. The air will be populated, not merely by 'dumb' projectiles, but 
also by sophisticated munitions, that are themselves high-payoff targets, and various 
UAVs either loitering or heading for their targets. If an annoured ground force comes 
under attack from a large number of missiles carrying terminally-guided sub-munitions, 
which are dispensed at a distance and spiral down to attack it precisely, is it under air or 
artillery attack? Is that attack a direct or indirect one? 
In such a situation, the ground commander will require a means to engage in three 
dimensions and not just in two; and not merely with systems designed to match the 
rimary threat of a previous period -a relatively few manned aircraft. Would he wish to 
engage directly at short range, or would he prefer to do so indirectly at a greater distance? 
In either case, would he be conducting a CB/CF or a GBAD mission? "D New technology 
will make it possible to intercept and destroy munitions in flight, using novel methods of 
attack. ' 11 
It is somewhat surprising that GBAD has doggedly retained a direct fire modus operandl 
for so long, given that the air defender must usually place himself at a location within the 
range of the target's own weapon systems. Perhaps this has been caused by the 
assumption that friendly, manned aircraft would deal with aerial targets at greater ranges, 
and that GBAD was merely the means of last resort. 
The development of indirect fire GBAD weapons is now underway. Future ground 
rnanoeuvre platfornis will probably carry vertically-launched, indirect fire missiles to shoot 
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down helicopters, and other flying objects, in a top-attack GBAD role. Equally, field 
artillery guns and launchers could fire indirectly on long-range GBAD missions, given 
adequate C41, ISTAR and terminal-guidance. Combat UAVs will have a direct SEAD 
role, and future combat UAVs %ýM also have an air-to-air air defence role. They may, for 
example, be used to create flank guards for air man oeuvre. Screens of combat UAVs 
could be used against expensive AH in highly cost-effective engagements, or to force 
fixed-wing aircraft to operate at a greater distance than the range of the new generations 
of stand-off munitions with which they will be armed. These forms of fire can also not 
useffilly be categorised as direct or indirect, and such a distinction will become less 
relevant. 
It seems unlikely that the current structures of the components and their 'theology' can 
remain immutable in the face of such developments. The prime responsibility is to build a 
capability which will necessarily be Joint and capable of operating effectively in a 
Combined environment. That capability should be divided up to make the span of 
command manageable, and to make the connections between parts of critical functions as 
seamless as possible. The important issue is to identify where the 'joins' in a Joint 
capability should best He. It is increasingly unlikely that the 'legacy structures" of the 
components and the 'seams' between them will automatically coincide with the required 
spans of command and capabilities of the future, rather the frictions at the 'seams' may 
indicate the need for them to be redrawn, not merely assuaged. 
Air forces became separate Services from annies largely because of their determination 
and capacity to carry out strategic missions. Air operations seem likely to move up and 
out' 12 as both the Land and the Air components become more capable. Targets within 
range of surface systems are likely to be inefficient targets for air forces, unless there are 
other constraints in force. ' 13 
Indirect fire was introduced at the beginning of the 2e Century as a tactical method of 
self defence. Through further technical developments and unexpected applications, it led 
to the expansion of the battlefield and it transformed the way wars were fought and the 
relationships between elements of the armed forces. Airpower emerged as a 
complementary source of fire often at longer ranges, but it was a direct fire system with its 
inherent problems. By the end of the 201h Century airpower had many of the qualities of 
an indirect system and could deliver effects with precision. Land forces were slow to 
introduce precise capabilities, those which apply the desired effect at the exact time and 
location; but such capabilities will soon be fielded. 
The adoption of such precise systems both on land and in the air promises to transform 
warfare as profoundly as indirect fire did one hundred years ago. Precision matched with 
other emerging technologies such as information networks and robotics will expand the 
battlespace and the relationship between the arms and Services. Joint activities will 
become ever more integrated in the coming decades, to the extent that the term 'joint', 
which entails cooperation between separate entities, may come to seem an underestimation 
of the fundamental new relationships. The focus must be on how to optimize these new 
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relationships and the effects that they generate. This dynamic is not surprising, it is the 
historical norm 
The introduction of indirect fire changed much, but not the principles of war or the human 
dimension which lies at its heart. The challenge is to exploit today's technical 
opportunities to change the face of war without forgetting the more enduring 
characteristics of conflict, mindful of the options open to those who seek to circumvent 
the logic that others would to impose on them. 
1 For a British view of emerging strategic trends and the manner in which British forces expect to develop 
and operate is given in Strategic Trends and 77ie UK Joint Vision, both produced by the Joint Doctrine 
and Concepts Centre at Shrivenham. 
2 Military action will be more closely influenced by the rulings, and even the very existence of the 
International Criminal Court, and all will be subject to close external assessment of the proportionality of 
their actions. Military action in or near industrial areas may also arouse concern at its environmental 
costs; and some weapons themselves may come to be seen primarily in a moral and environmental context 
rather than a military one. This has already happened in the case of anti-personnel landmines, and could 
happen in the cases of submunitions, depleted uranium rounds, fuel-air explosives and weapons using 
4 rays'. The use of cluster bombs in the bombing of Afghanistan in 2001 was criticized by some on these 
r ounds. 9oted 
in Goure (2001), p. 25. 
4 Sir Michael Howard has pointed out that strictly speaking 'terrorism' is merely a means of waging war, 
not the 'enemy' itselE It is the weapon of the otherwise weak, who hope by 'propaganda of the deed' and 
a 'strategy of provocation', to lead the stronger into self-destructive acts. 14oward(2001). 
3 Bloch (1899). 
6 This idea is explored in Bellamy (1992). 
7 Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. Quoted in Gertz (2002), p. 16. 
1 See Howard (2001). 
9 In some operations of very low intensity, such as that of the United Nations Force in Cyprus, it has 
proved possible to sustain missions for decades. 
101bere have been many cases in history where taidemocraticstates at war can, over time, harness 
powerful forces of patriotism or religious ferveur to support %vars which might otherwise have become 
unpopular. The Soviet regime was probably strengthened by the Second World War; and the 
Governments of Iran and Iraq may well have been bo', stered by the emotions unleashed by their war of 
1980-88. On the other hand, the military regime in Argentina was undermined by the Falklands War of 
1982. 
11 The speech by President G. W. Bush to Congress on 20 September 2001 reflected the need to prepare 
his electorate for a long campaign against those who attacked the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon 
on I Ph September 2001. It was rich in allusions to the need to seize the 'temporal initiative', in both the 
current and historical senses. He warned Americans that they should, "... not expect one battle, but a 
lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have seen. " He asserted that, "this country will define our times, 
not be defined by them", in "a task that does not end"; and that they should be assured of "patient justice. " 
12 The tension between 'continental' warfighting and 'imperial/global policing' is not new. In 1815,1918 
and 1945 after long continental wars, the British Army was forced by events to concentrate on imperial 
policing operations. The maintenance of a full warfighting capability seemed by comparison to be 
wasteful; and merely an unimaginative hankering to refight the last war. This imperial bias left the 
British Army ill-placed to fight in 'continental' wars in 1914 and 1939. The necessity to mount 
expeditionary campaigns and to conduct internal security duties in Northern Ireland during the Cold War 
led some to suggest that the British Amy really only came to terms with 'continental' armoured warfare 
in the late 1980s, as the Cold War was ending. At the beginning of the 21" Century, the'North West 
Frontier' once again has a strategic immediacy, along with the need to confiont unconventional attacks. 
228 
The British Amy's experience in the latter part of the 201 Century suggests that it is desirable and 
possible to maintain competence in a broad spectrum of capabilities. 
13 The issue is analysed in Gompert, Kugler and Libicki (1999). 
14 The US has a Joint Munitions Effects Manual, the directory of what munition is required to have what 
effect on a given target. Some have suggested that itshould, be replaced by a Joint Weapons Effects 
Manual, including the effects of electronic warfare, lasers, microwaves and directed. energy weapons. 
Public discussions at 'Thinking out of the Box and into tfie Future', The Potomac Institute, Washington 
DC, on 26h June 2000. .11 '' 15 These issues and 'asymmetric operations' are analy§C4 in Metz and Johnson (200 1). 
16 Fuel-air explosives were not widely discussed during the , 
Cold War despite their development in many 
countries. One of the first articles explaining their, 'iignij can , to a wider public was Geisenheyner 
(1987), pp. 280-292. They were first used by US forces duTjngthe Vietnam War, packaged as the CBU- 
55, primarily to clear landing zones. The development of computers in the 1970s permitted better 
modelling of their effects and spurred further, devel(? pmev, i. -Such munitions were then used for mine- 
clearing. Only since the 1980s has their potential in urban operations been widely appreciated. Their 
effects were demonstrated by the Russians in their Chechen Wars. The Russian "Smerch BM 9A52 
multiple rocket system is reported to have a fuel-air munition, the 9M55S, with a 100kg warhead and a 
range of 70km. 
17 In the First World War commanders frequently attacked with fire from 'below', in the form of large 
mines. The British success at Messines (Th June 1917) was due largely to the detonation of mines 
containing one million pounds of high explosive under the critical sector of the German front. There was 
also a reciprocal need to engage targets 'below' to counter such mines. The only foreseeable need to 
attack 'below' on land will be fire against enemy assets sheltering deep underground, or, as in the first 
attack on the WT`C in February 1993, as a means of asymmetric attack. 
'a In the British Army these terms are increasingly seen in conceptual terms. Thus, deep operations are 
those which expand the battlespace in time and space, help to shape close operations, prevent the enemy 
from concentrating his combat power and diminish his coherence and tempo. Rear operations help to 
establish and maintain the freedom of action of friendly forces to conduct close and deep operations. 
19 Brig Gen D. L. Grange called for the US Army to create an air mechanized capability. Grange (200 1), 
rp. 46-7 
0 Sweetman (2002) p. 45 In the Gulf War, 600,000 people deployed in theatre shared 80Mb1s of 
communications bandwidth. For Operation ALLIED STORM, 100,000 personnel used twice that, and in 
2001-2002 in Afghanistan, 10,000 US troops used 50OWS. 
21 The role of space in the delivery of future fires is. described by LTG E. G. Anderson, commanding 
general of the US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, in Anderson (1998), pp. 9-12. 
22 'Transformation' requires one brigade to be ready to fight within ninety-six hours, one division within 
120 hours and five divisions within thirty days. Before the Future Combat System (FCS) is fielded, the 
Initial Brigade Combat Team brings the lethal capabilities of a heavier force, while being transportable by 
C-130 aircraft. 
23 This enduring need for balance between fire and manoeuvre in new circumstances is described in Scales 
(1999) and Scales (1999a). 
24 Baxter (1998), pp. 1-6. 
23 See, for example, Lambeth (2000), pp. 42-50. 
26 The dispute is typiried by the exchanges in the Am, ed Forces Jowml International of October 2000 
and March 2001 between Brig Gen H. Wass de Czega, and Dr B. M. Blechman and Z. Lum. 
27 The contrasting views of the air and land forces is explained in Woods (1998), pp. 8-13. 
211 Quoted in Strawson (1985), p. 44. 
29 Gray (2002), p. 25. 
30 See Gray (2002), pp. 25-27. 
31 Overkill on damaged targets, or failure to continue firing at those that survive, may be avoided if BDA 
is accurate. Making such assessments is an inherent part of the targeting process, but the physical means 
to observe damage may be limited. Armies often employ statistical models to predict damage for want of 
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other evidence. This modelling is described in Hodgkins (1997). pp. I 1- 13. BDA will increasingly be 
assisted by technology inside the attacking munition itself, or munitions fired subsequently. 
32 ASCA seeks to achieve a common interface between the artillery systems of the USA, UK, Germany, 
France and Italy. The aim is to link AFATDS, BATES, ADLER, ATLAS and SII; 4 accommodating the 
different C2 procedures, hardware and software of each nation, securely. 
33 The British Army also has a battery consisting Alholly of amphibious observers to support NFS. and a 
battery of specialist STA patrols to direct fire onto high-value targets in depth. These are in addition to 
special forces who can also undertake these tasks. 
34 C. Dunlap, 'Technology and the 21 st Century Battlefield: Recomplicating Moral Life for the Statesman 
and the Soldier, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College (Carlisle, 15'b January 1999), p. 28. 
33 A survey of international locating equipment is given in Gander (200 1), pp. 8-1 8. 
36 The debate about the uses of UAVs and unmanncd land vehicless, and a record of technical programmes 
is contained in the journal, UV, published by Sheph3r&- of London. 
37 The US Army is procuring the Shadow 200 tacticzI UAV (TUAV) and a number of other models will 
enter US service. The UK will acquire a new family of TUAVs collectively named Watchkeeper. Most 
other nations have or aspire to similar programmes. 
39 Some of the munition loads currently under consideration in the USA are described in Unmanned 
. 4erial Vehicles Roadmap 2000-2025. Office of the Secretary of Defense (Washington DC, April 2001), 
p. 3 1. The first combat UAV was probably the US Army's Kettering Aerial Torpedo or 'Bug' of 1915. It 
had a range of forty miles, flew on a pre-set course at 55mph and carried a warhead of 180lbs. A radio. 
controlled, bomb-carrying UAV was developed in the USA in 1928 but abandoned in 1932. Ime first 
reusable, returnable UAV was probably the British 'Queen Bee' of 1933. In 1938 a GB-I glide bomb, was 
developed in the USA, and 108 were dropped in 1943 during a raid on Cologne by fii fty-four B- 17 
bombers. The AZON surface-to-surface 'Bat' was also developed in the 1930s. Cairns (1987). The 
German VI was an early attack UAV, as are the cruise missiles which are derived from it. More than 
3,000 UAV missions were flown in Vietnam by the US Firebee. 
39 The British Army's Phoenix UAV was operated in the Balkans in 1999 along with the Franco-German 
CL289, the French Army's Crecerelle and the US Hunter and Predator UAVs, which were used primarily 
to identify targets for aircraft to attack. 
40 The Gun-Launched Aerial UAV (GLUAV) could be produced with aI 55mm calibre to carry out 
reconnaissance, target acquisition and BDA. It would be expendable and cheap. It could carry a variety 
of sensors, including chemical and biological agent detectors and conduct EW tasks. It could be 
controlled in flight by direct link or satellite. 'Gun-launched Expendable UAV has Multiple 
Applications', Jane's International Defense Review, February 2002, p. 15. 
41 The early Compact Aerial Vehicle - Shooter Linker (CAV-SL) illustrates the potential of this concept. 
It has a range of Skm to match the range of direct firing armoured vehicles. 
42 The US Army's divisional artillery Firefmder Block II Q-37 radar increases range and accuracy to 
60km, and can acquire Theatre Ballistic Missiles (TBM) at 2501an. It can cover zones not covered by the 
Q-36 Version 8. The AN/TPQ radar should etart to replace the AN/TPQ-37 in 2004. It will double 
detection range to 60kra for cannon projectiles, I OOkm for rockets and 300kin for short-range ballistic 
missiles. 
The UK hopes to have the ASTOR airborne ground surveil lance radar in service by 2005 with a range of 
about 3001an. 'ASTOR Programme Enters the Home Straight', Jane's International Defense Review, 
9/1998, p. 5. It is a sensor to decision-maker to shooter' capability. It can be used to locate targets 
providing near real-time data for artillery systems. It can also cue other sensors such as UAVs and the 
COBRA radar, whose range of about 40krn will greatly enhance the CB/CF capability of British and other 
European artillery. 
43 These will include a wider range of non-lethal warheads such as stunning and EW devices. 
44 As many as 15,000 unexploded bomblets may have been left in Kosovo at the end of NATO's bombing 
operation in 1999. Such a high dud-rate restricts the likelihood of a future artillery weapon system being 
permitted to fire bomblets or other submunitions, particularly if it is inaccurate and might scatter them 
away from the intended target area. 
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43 The MLRS launcher is too heavy to match the deployment requirements of many nations, and lighter 
launchers such as HIMARS are being developed to fill this gap in capability. HIMARS can fire the 
MLRS family of munitions. Some other light rocket munitions such as TRIFOK which has a range of up 
to 601an, will be guided by fibre optics and be able to conduct their own BDA. 
46 The ATACMS Blocks I and IA are fired by the M270 MLRS. The Block I reaches 1651an and the 
Block IA with GPS enhancement fielded in 1998 reaches 3001an, but with a lesser load of anti-personnel 
and anti-material (APAM) submunitions. Block 11 curies'thirtecn fire-and-forget Brilliant Anti-Tank 
(BAT) anti-armour submunitions 140km, and Block IIA has six BAT submunitions, ranging out to 
300km, depending upon the warhead. BAT uses acoustic sensors to detect moving vehicles. Other 
ATACMS variants with unitary warheads and penetrating capability will also be available. 
47 It is due to be fielded by the USA, UK, France, Italy and Germany. GMIRS munitions can be air-burst, 
point-detonated or delay-detonated to penetrate buildings and bunkers. The unitary warhead will give 
GMLRS a precision-strike capability, reducing the risk of collateral damage. 
42 It carr ies 'fire-and-forget' munitions to 60km, and its anti-armour sub-munitions have a search area of 
4km. It would use the basic GMLRS rocket, but not the DPICM grenade-dispensing warhead. 
49 See Brown, Cook and Sirak (2001), pp. 23-27. 
so Neffires is intended to deliver five to ten times the '10 per ton' capability of cther artillery systems, 
reducing personnel and vehicles by fifty pc. Tccnt. It ccnsists of fifteen vertical-launch missile tubes with a 
computer and communication system, providing power, and data on location and orientation . It weighs less than 1,600kg fully loaded, and comes in a shipping container of eight Container/Launcher Units 
(CILUs). The Loitering Attack Munition (LAM) fired from the C/LU would be able to loiter for fifteen 
minutes at a range of more than 100km. It would engage targets located by the A160 rotor unmanned 
aircraft, and Internetted Unattended Ground Sensors (IUGS), using seismic and acoustic technology. The 
system would distinguish between friendly and enemy vehicles by passive, electronic tags. Such systems 
are likely to be in service with the US forces befora 20 10. 
51 In 2000, countries such as Iran were reported to have ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 1,5001an. 
E. Blanche, Janes Defence Weekly, l2d'July 2000, p. 16. In May 2002, it was reported that fran had test- 
fired the Shahab 3 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) to a range of about 1,0001an and that Pakistan 
had test-fired a series of similar missiles. 
32 See Pengelley (2002). 
53 The XM982 will be the first extended-range guided projectile in US service, replacing the M864 
extended-range projectile, increasing the range of the MI 09A6, M 198 and M777 from 28km to 371an, 
and the XM2001 from 40kni to about 47km. It has on-board GPS and an inertial measurement unit that 
acts as a back-up in the event of GPS being jammed. The DPICM version has sixty-four XM85 grenades 
and the SADARM model has two submunitions. The unitary HE variant would be capable of penetrating 
200mm of reinforced concrete. The Silent Eyes 155mm RAP may also be produced. This carries an 
imaging sensor to send video data for BDA. The XM982 is expected into service between 2005-2010. 54 The French Army is considering the Pelican family of long-range, guided cargo-rounds which contain 
either four Bonus submunitions, or ninety Ogre bomblets, with a range of 65km. A Bonus shell ejects two 
anti-armour submunitions descending on wings. It detects targets which have already been destroyed and 
it has a self-destruct mechanism. Other French 155mm shells incorporate the SAMPRASS and 
SPACIDO systems to increase accuracy. 
33 Russia's KBP and France's Giat have coope-rated in developing the KBP Krasnopol 152mm laser- 
homing precision shell. Krasnopol is claimed to have a range of 221an and can be fitted with a larger 
driving band to fire from 155mm pieces. Krasnopol laser seekers can be programmed to suit NATO 
codes. The round was demonstrated successfully in India iii 1999, fired by a Swedish FH-77B. KBP are 
also reported to be working with Germany's Dichl on a RAP lascr-beam-riding round. The Ukraine has 
produced Kvitnyk to compete with Krasnopol. As at 2002, Krasnopol was reported to have been sold to 
twelve countries, with many more likely custemers. See Wiffiams and Holthus (2002), pp. 31-32. 16 South Africa continues to be a significant producer of nev artillery munitions, such as the 'Assegai' 
family, building on its reputation for innovation from the days of its cooperation with Dr Gerald Bull. For 
example, Denel makes long-range 155mm PRO-RAM projectiles which can reach 701an. It is engaged in 
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numerous collaborative international projects, for example with Diehl of Germany, and has been 
particularly successful in marketing its charge systems in NATO countries. 
57 For example, QuickLook is a US 155mm munition with tail-control, wings and a propeller, equipped 
with GPS. Data from its imagery would be integrated with other material by AFATDS. Numerous others 
are underdevelopment. See 'US Forces Study Sensor-Equipped Munitions', Jane's International Defense 
Review (September 200 1), p. 10. 
58 The 120mm. Bofors 'Abraham', which delivers aI Okg warhead I Okm, is said to cost one tenth that of a 
missile with the same function. 
59 The US XM935 120mm Precision Guided Mortar Munition (PGMM) has a range of 12-15km. It glides 
at about twenty degrees below the horizontal until it reaches a 500m x 500m 'footprint' when its locks 
onto a laser marker spot. Equally, it could fly to a pre-determined point using GPS, It could be used by 
the USMC with the Dragonfire mortar system, which could also be used by other US 'early entry' forces. 
Catto (2002), pp. 3843. It is thought that automation could achieve a rate of fire 500 percent greater than 
that of a conventional 105mm gun. An extcnded-range mortar round, the XM984, could enter service by 
2009 carrying a payload of filly-four M80 grenades out to a range of 12km. 'US Pursues Comprehensive 
Mortar Improvements', Jane's International Defense Review, 9/1998, p. 22. Other developments include 
a range of 'smart' mortar bombs, such as the Israeli Military Industries (IMI) 120mm M971 with bomblet, 
HEAT and various 'top-attack' warheads. Russia's KBP has produced the 120mm Gran and 240mm 
Smelchak laser-homing mortar bombs. 
60 Rail guns were also seen as a revolutionary alternative to conventional propellant charge systems but 
have come to little, at least in the short-term. It is, however, quite likely that such systems with ranges of 
hundreds of kilometres will be in service by 2025, but on warships, given the weight of the power source. 
A gun is a thermo-dynamic engine, whose muzzle velocity is limited by the Second Law, in effect to I- 
1.51an per second. A rail gun has no limits to its potential velocity, and hence range and penetrating 
power. A kinetic projectile hitting armour at a speed of 3kms per second is devastating. An Abrams tank 
gun produces eighteen to twenty megaJoules. The power source to produce a similar capability would 
probably have to. deliver forty megajoules and be extremely heavy. Current experimental rail guns are 
typically of 90mm, powered by thirteen megajoules. The rails suffer severely and survive only a few 
firings. The US Navy employs coil guns as catapults for carrier aircraft, but these weigh tons. Public 
briefing at, 'Thinking out of the Box and into the Future', The Potomac Institute, Washington DC, 26'h 
June 2000. 
61 The packaging for solid propellant is heavy and bulky. For comparison, the equivalent of thirty-four 
charges for an M109 SP gun could be carried in a single fifty-five gallon drum of liquid propellant. It has 
been estimated that during the Yom Kippur War of 1973 most vehicles that were destroyed were destroyed 
by the secondary explosions of their own ammunition. The components of liquid propellant could 
probably be transported separately, improving vehicle survivability. One method tested involved injecting 
a specified quantity of propellant into the gun chamber and igniting it. The problem was that chamber 
pressures and the MVs of projectiles varied because of hydrodynamic instability. Another technique tried 
was 'regenerative injection', whereby a piston forced a jet or spray into the chamber during the 
combustion. It was hoped that this would improve control and achieve exact metering and consistent 
MVs. This also proved unsuccessful. 
62 Laser ignition is also likely to be used in future sysunns. Its advantage is that it has no expendable 
components, allows a simpler breech design, sustaining greater chamber pressures; and it generates 
potentially higher rates of fire. 
`3 The target-locating SADARM, uses three different locating systems: active Millimetre Wave (MMW), 
passive MMW and Infra-Red (IR). The sensors search an area of I 50m diameter. 
" Range-correcting ftises use 'drag-brakes', plates pushed out from the side of the fuse. This solution to a 
ballistic problem was tried unsuccessfully by the French Army prior to 1914 to make the otherwise flat 
trajectory of its '75' gun dip and hit German guns behind cover. 
' Fuses for the US Army's defunct Crusader must be set inductively in 1.5 seconds. During the Second 
World War, the British Royal Navy experimented with setting fuses electrically after a round had been 
loaded in the chamber. The fuses were, however, mechanical; and it was difficult to achieve physical 
movement with an electrical impulse. 
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66 For example, in urban operations a delay ftise must survive the 'burster' effect of roofs, and hit targets 
in basements or on the ground floor. This requires a reliable post-impact delay function. 
67 During the Gulf War of 199 1, the Iraqis deployed an SPR- I ftise-jamming system capable of protecting 
a 750m oval area. A survey of fuses is given in Pengelley (2001), pp. 39-45. 
" Denel have produced the LEO 105mm 52-calibres piece weighing 3,8001g, with a range of 241an, and 
30krn with BB shells. The characteristics of modem 105nim pieces are described in Pengelley (2002a). 
69 GPS has transformed the problem of knowing where launchers and observers are located, but it cannot 
be guaranteed to survive during hostilities. Back-ups to GPS are increasingly being built into systems. 
The most important is the ring-lased giro. Such giros are found in the British Army's Laser Inertial 
Automatic Pointing System (LINAPS or APS), fitted to its 105mm Ll 18 light guns. Combining data 
about the location of the platform with that for orientating and elevating the barrel achieves much of the 
autonomy that artillery requires. C. Foss, 'UK is First to Deploy Pointing System', Jane's Defence 
Weekly, Yd March 1999, p. 35. 
70 The 13AE Systems M777 has a trunnion-height ofjust 00mm. Future barrels will contain steel liners 
bound in carbon fibres. By reducing the thickness* of ajbwaiýrel wall by sixty percent, the net weight saving 
could be as much as forty percent. Pengelley (2000) po. 
71 The M777 weighs about 9,000lbs and has a rangeý6jfA It has 
, an emplacem*ent time of less than 
three minutes and a displacement time of less than two m1nutes. Jt will use the Towed Artillery 
Digitisation (TAD) package with inertial navigation, ballistic computer and MV measuring device. The 
Gun Laying and Positioning System (GLPS) provides prientation and survey data. BAE Systems are 
likely to produce similar models with barrels ranging from 26-calibres to 52-calibres, with a range of 
40km. 
72 Caesar has a range of 40km. It weighs 17.7 tons and can be deployed in a C-130. Wheeled SP 155mm 
Veces are also made by companies in Sweden, South Africa, Singapore, Slovakia and Spain. 
Long-range guns with high rates of fire are susceptible to extreme barrel heating. Ibis can only be 
alleviated by active cooling. It is harder to incorporate this in a light gun. 
74 In 2001 it was estimated that there were still 6,000 M1099 in service around the world. The M109A4 
with improved NBC protection, and the MI 09AS with a new cannon, were introduced in the mid 1990s. 
A 52-calibres version of the M109A6, the M109-2000, is likely to be the last major upgrade. Itoffers 
autonomous operation and a range of 40km. 
75 The AUR has a crew of four, automatic loading and a magazine of forty-two rounds. It can fire four 
rounds in twenty-five seconds, and six rounds in forty seconds to a maximum range of 23.5km. Delivery 
of the 1988 T model delivery was complete by 1996. It had on-board navigation and a rate of fire of three 
rounds in fifteen seconds, and seventy-two in sixty minutes. 
76 The AUF2 has a range of 42km. It has a temperature measuring device embedded in the barrel to 
inform the on-board computation system. It has the same rate of fire as the AUFI T, but can fire ten 
rounds in sixty seconds. It has a multiple-round simultaneous-impact (NMI) capability of eight to ten, in 
fourteen seconds at 10-25km. 
" One AS90 variant of this stows thirty-two projectiles in four powered magazine modules which position 
themselves for loading. 'Me highest rate of firing during a US Army trial was three rounds in eight 
seconds and eighteen rounds in two minutes. 120 rounds in sixty minutes was demonstrated during a trial 
in Saudi Arabia. Forty-eight rounds can be stowed in 6.5 minutes. it has on-board navigation and 
pointing. It can come into action in under thirty seconds, and out of action in under fifteen seconds. It 
has no azimuth firing restrictions. It has a device for measuring barrel erosion in microns, in the grooves 
as well as the rifling lands. 
78 The Bundeswehr has ordered 185 PzH2000, of which 120 had been delivered by 200 1. It will be the 
first army to deploy a 155mm 52-calibres system. It can achieve more than 40km, firing the South 
African Naschetn M200OBB Assegai projectile, using the Rheinmetall DM72 modular charge system. It 
can fire 341an with a standard L 15 round. 
PzH 2000 carries sixty rounds on-board, a large number compared to the lightened Crusader; but it faces 
formidable constraints on deployment at its weight of 55,300kg. There have been thoughts of producing 
a lightweight version at forty-one tonnes to alloy! it to fly in a C-5A Galaxy. It has on-board navigation, 
and a pointing system, plus muzzle velocity measurement. It has a semi-automatic loading system. The 
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fuse on the projectile is normally set by an inductive setter, programmed by the on-board fire control 
system. The magazine can be reloaded by two men in about eleven minutes. It has a laser range-finder 
for direct fire. It can use 'shoot and scoot' tactics, and fire eight rounds per minute, but can achieve ten in 
less than that. It can fire 120 rounds in under fifty-two minutes. It can come into action in less than 
thirty seconds, fire ten rounds and come out of action in less than twenty seconds. At Meppen in 1997 it 
fired five rounds at 171an with MRSI, but cculd achieve more. It has a five-man detachment. 
" The 2S19M has a range of 29km, an on-board ballistic computer and navigation. It can come into 
action in three minutes and fire after thirty seconds. The 2S 19M I has a NATO standard 155mm 52- 
calibres barrel firing 301an, and 40km with BB projectiles. 
so The XM2001 has a 56-calibres barrel and a range of 40km, 50km with RAP: and it can fire up to eight 
rounds with MRSI. It has a first-round resporise of between fifteen and twenty seconds, and can fire ten to 
twelve rounds per minute, sustainable for five minutes. On 4'h November 2000, at Yurna it fired fifteen 
rounds in 10.4 minutes. The supply vehicle (XM2002) has an automatic ammunition handling system 
which can transfer sixty rounds of ammuniflon and fucl in twelve minutes. It has a modular charge 
system known as MACS, although originally it W33 I! Crid that it would use the regenerative liquid 
propellant system. The XM2001 incorporates many rizvtl features. It has active, mid-wall barrel-cooling, 
integrated electronics and autoniated armamcnt and forriunition handling. It is manned byjust three 
soldiers in a cockpit, with 'drive by wire' technology and flat-panel, touch-screen displays. For the first 
time in an SP piece there are no personnel in the turrctfliring compartment or in direct contact with the 
ammunition. This represents a major improvement in ergonomics and crew fatigue when working in 
difficult cHmates or a hazardous NBC environment. The crew have continuous tactical situational 
awareness provided through AFATDS, which will be integrated with on-board navigation and pointing 
systems. 
a' Quoted in Defense News 9th-15'h July 2001, p. 18. 
32 Although the XM200 I's weight was reduced, it had the same engine designed for the heavier version. 
The result was an extraordinary power-to-weight ratio of 36hp/t, about twice the average for an SP gun, 
and much greater than that for main battle tanks, enabling Crusader to out-run the Abrams tanks that it 
was to support. 
83 See Sullivan (2002) and McCaffery (2002). The cancellation of Crusader has to be seen in the context 
of a wider debate about the Transformation of the US Army. Many of the issues are outlined in Boyer 
(2002). Operation ANACONDA in Afghanistan in February 2002 became part of the 'Crusader debate'. 
It was reported that at the Senate Armed Services hearing on 16'h May 2002, General E. Shinseki testified 
that, "In the first two days of ANACONDA, twenty-eight of our forty-six casualties were due to indirect 
fire from mortars. And it would have been in our interests to put together the capabilities to have turned 
those guns off, turn those mortars off, found them and be able to lift the burden of fire falling on our 
troops. We could have used and would have used cannon artillery at ANACONDA ... Crusader would have been capable of doing all of these. " General T. Franks was reported to have disagreed, saying that 
Crusader would have been too heavy for such operations. See Novak (2002). 
84 McDaniel (2002). McDaniel favoured containcrized inissile platforms, with similarities to the 'rocket 
in a box' concept. Some believed that the sarne logic that led to the demise of Crusader might well be 
applied to other systems such as submarines and the F-72. 
35 Sherman (2002), p. 4 
86 The OAV will create situatictrial awarene-. 3 over a %ndc area. It %rill be fully autonomous and require 
little operator intervention. It will take off and land verlically. The USAF has a concept of persistent area 
denial in which loitering robotic system3 rrovide contiauous coverage over a battlefield for extended 
periods. 
87 It is hoped that new propellant will increase the energy of Ruch a gun by thirteen percent, with a fifty 
percent decrease in volurne. A new recoil sýstem will be needed, and may involve active movement 
forward by the gun prior to firing. The FCSs cargo round could have a range of 50kin. The intent is to 
get 155mm lethality from a 105mm munition, and greater range without RAP. The objective is to achieve 
sixty to seventy percent of the round as payload, compared to the present fifty percent of a typical 155mm 
cargo round today. Smart structures will be used to enhance volume and improve aerodynamic 
performance. It may be possible to achieve greater ranges by making the flight of the shell more efficient 
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and at a higher maximurn altitude. This might involve changing the b ody-shape of the shell in flight. 
More efficient surfaces will help, as may so-called 'unsteady aerodynamics'. These technologies are 
discussed in Jane's Defense Review, July 200 1, p. 10. 28 The German 120mm Wiesel 2 is a light SP mortar which has high strategic deployability. It weighs 
4,100kg, has a crew of three and can fire sixty seconds after arriving in its firing position. The Russians 
have produced the 120mm 2S31 SP mortar. It is capable of autonomous operation and can fire directly 
and indirectly to a maximum range of 13km. The Chinese have developed a wheeled SP mortar, the 
120mm WZ 551. 
19 The Russians have also upgraded their 122mm BM-21 and heavier rocket systems; and the Chinese 
have produced the 300m A100 rocket system, comparable to the Russian Smerch. 90 HIMARS can fire all MLRS munitions, but carries just one pod rather than two. Prototypes were 
delivered to the US Army in 1998. Production is due to begin in 2004, and the system could be 
operational with the USMC by 2008. It would weigh 13,170kg. 91 NetFires is described in Durham and Cunningham (2002), pp. 5-9. 92 It will be harder to distinguish between such air-launched weapons, combat UAVs and loitering 
surface-launched munitions. For example, the AIM- 120 AMILkAM is essentially a small robotic 
kamikaze fighter, or air-launched combat UAV, with an air-to-air role. 93 Boeing's developmental UCAV, the X45, could be in service by 20 10 and seems likely to carry a 
1,000-3,0001b payload for SEAD and other missions. It can be lifted into theatre, with six per C-17, or 
twelve per C-5. 'Me Low-Cost Autonomous Attack System (LOCASS) is a small, loitering robot aircraft 
with a decision-making capability about which targcts to attack. UAVs such as the General Atomics RQ- 
IA can fire ground-attack missiles and, Re many others, could fire air-to-air missiles, transforming air 
defence and the equations upon which AH missions are based. Combat UAVs could also carry directed 
energy weapons. 
94 The USAF A/OA- 10 Thunderbolt ground-attack aircraft is nevertheless likely to remain in US service 
until 2028, primarily in the interdiction role, although it will remain capable of CAS when required. It 
has also been suggested that the A- 10 be made robotic. Sherman (2000), pp. 14-16. 93 Aircraft are achieving greater survivability. During the Battle of Cambrai in November 1917, British 
Royal Flying Corps losses on ground attack missions never fell below thirty percent per sortie. In the 
Second World War, the US Army Air Forces lost 10.3 aircraft per 1,000 sorties. Over North Vietnam, US 
losses were 2.04 per 1,000 sorties. In Operation DESERT STORM 1990-91, they were 0.37 per 1,000 
sorties, and in Operation ALLIED FORCE in 1999 they were 0.18 per 1,000 sorties. In Operation 
ENDURING FREEDOM in 2001-02, the USAF lost no aircraft. Stealth, EW and SEAD work. 96 In air operations prior to Operation DESERT STORK nine percent of munitions dropped by aircraft 
were precision munitions; on Operation ALLIED FORCE, precision munitions represented sixty percent 
of the total; and in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, that figure rose to seventy percent. Observations 
made at the conference 'Future Offensive Air Capability', held at the Royal United Services Institute, 
London, 29'h May 2002. Despite the increasing importance of precision munitions, it was reported that 
French studies showed that only fourteen Yugoslav military vehicles were hit during NATO's air 
operation of 14,000 sorties over Kosovo. Pengelley (2002), p. 58. Precision without precise intelligence has little value. 
97 B-2 bombers dropped 656 JDAMs during Operation ALLIED FORCE in 1999, putting ninety percent 
of them within twelve metres of their target. A B-2 can deploy up to sixteen 2,0001b JDAMs, targeting 
sixteen different aim points. Goodman (2000b), p. 26. Precision increases effect, and for that reason 
munitions can become smaller. The lighter the bomb, the more that can be carried per sortie. For 
example, a B-2 might be able to carry 300 2501b bombs, potentially attacking 300 targets in one sortie, 
whereas in 1945, it might have taken 1,700 sorties to attack one bridge. The Airpower Conference at the Royal United Services Institute, London, 29h May 2002. 
98 The B-52, built as a strategic bomber for the Co! d War, played a major role flying CAS missions at 35,000 feet against the Taliban, in support of US specizi forces and the Northern Alliance during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in 2001-02. Goodman (2002), pp. 54-57. " More attention will have to be paid to Joint traininS if the potential of CAS is to be fully exploited for, in most armies, training and procedures remain similar to those of the Second World War. The 
235 
deficiencies are described in Brown (2002), pp-20-22. There was criticism in 2002 that CAS was not 
being used well at the NTC. For example, commanders were not used to tasking CAS, airspace 
coordination was insufficiently developed, SEAD planning was inadequate, combined-arms fire 
coordination did not rehearse CAS adequately, too much time was taken to brief aircrew and CAS 
sometimes conflicted with indirect fires. Pengelley (2002), p. 59. 
100 GPS-guided bombs can go astray if the guidance system is defective or damaged, if the GPS 
coordinates are incorrectý if the incorrect coordinates are entered into the bomb, if there is interference to 
the GPS signal, perhaps by mountainous terrain, buildings, flares or deliberate signal jamming. 
101 Grange et al (2002), p. 14. 
1c)2 Grange et al (2002), p. IS. 
103 Quoted in Pengelley (2002), p. 58. 
104 Fallows (2002). 
105 For example, in the case of the USA, Task Force HAWK in Albania in 1999 was comprised of Apache 
AK MLRS, ATACMS, infantry to defend them and a small headquarters; but it was commanded by the 
US V Corps Commander. 
106 There was a debate in the USA over whether standing, Joint task forces at high readiness would be 
more efficient and effective than ones tailored specifically for particular missions. See, Burger and Koch 
(200 1), p. 19. 
107 Many armies around the world continue to build large forces of field guns. For example, the Indian 
Army was reported to require a future force of between 3,000 and 4,000 155mm field guns. Bedi (2002), 
p. 4 
108 If the US Army's Objective Force achieves the massing of precise effects without entailing the massing 
of equipment, 'fire manoeuvre', it will have attained the conceptually orthodox aspiration of artillerymen, 
achieved by the Prussians in 18 iO by increased range, but more substantially at the beginning of the 201h 
Century with the introduction of indirect fire. 
109 In the British Army, 'legacy nomenclature' masks the actual functions of the arms. For example the 
Royal Artillery has proponency on behalf of the Land component for: The coordination of Joint effects, 
GBAD, remote surveillance and target acquisition, and battlespace management. 
110 CBICF does not merely involve attacking the weapon platform, but the whole system, which should be 
taken to include the munition in flight. 
111 'Laser Testbed Shoots Down Artillery Shells in Demonstration', Janes International Defense Review, 
February 2003, p. 3. 
112 Dr R. Hallion argues that long-range Joint strike will increasingly be mounted from space-based 
systems, interconnected via systems such as JSTARS and UAVs. The USAF refers in its PUIon 2020 to 
the 'aerospace continuum'. The role of a Space Force or Space Corps will receive close attention. Hallion 
(2001). Lieutenant General J. Costello, commanding the US Army's Space and Missile Defence 
Command, observed in August 2000 that Directed-Energy Weapons (DEW) are, "A potentially 
revolutionary addition to the battlefield of the future". The synergy between space and fires is described 
in Costello (1999), pp. 12-15. Such weapons may, however, be located anywhere in battlespace, from a 
truck to space. See M. Hewish, 'Beam Weapons Revolution', Janes International Defense Review, 
8/2000, pp. 3441. 
113 For example, during the air operation against Yugoslavia in 1999, Macedonia consented to KFOR's 
presence on its territory provided no hostile actions were mounted from it. Surface fire from Albania was 
not undertaken for a variety of reasons, among them the dangers of collateral damage that might have 
been caused by imprecise, long-range artillery munitions. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
6.1 CONCLUSIONS 
From earliest times the 'geometry' of warfare was essentially one of two dimensional 
linear encounter. Bodies of men fought each other along the line where two forces met, in 
the field or in a siege. This was a consequence of the short range of weapons and the need 
to see the target. That line could be irregular, for there might be penetrations or 
envelopments, but it was along that line that combat occurred. 
The critical issues pertaining to the application of mliffery have remained remarkably 
constant throughout its history, although the outcomes have been very different as 
circumstances have changed. The advent of field artillery potentially permitted the enemy 
to be engaged at longer ranges, but the need to see the target remained and the particular 
characteristics of the most effective munition, solid shot, ensured that this model of 
warfare did not change, rather it was assured. 
A cannonball could be effective throughout the length of its trajectory, provided targets 
lay in its path. Even a small increase in elevation would cause a greater proportion of its 
trajectory to be above head-height and harmless. When a ball fired at higher elevation hit 
the ground, its angle of descent would be such that few of the enemy were in danger of 
being hit by it, and its effect was probably limited to that of a single terminal strike. Too 
low an elevation would also reduce the effectiveness of a ball, causing it to plough into the 
ground at a relatively short range. 
The optimal elevation in terms of range and effect was found to be one that achieved fire 
parallel to the ground, a flat trajectory, for although this might appear to reduce the 
potential range, the ball could be made to ricochet off the ground and, most important, it 
remained below hcad-height and lethal throughout the course of its trajectory. This may 
have been the most effective trajectory, but it limited the range at which effects could 
theoretically be achieved. Since it was frequently hard to identify an enemy at a greater 
range than that which could be achieved with flat trajectory fire, and smoke compounded 
the problem of target acquisition, this did not seem too severe a handicap. Fire was 
therefore habitually direct, that is against targets which could be seen from the gun itself 
The essence of the tactical system, sensor, commander and gun were combined and 
controlled in a single location - the gun platform itself Communications within this 
system were readily achieved. 
The effectiveness of field artillery depended not merely upon the physical characteristics of 
the gun and munition, but also upon how it was deployed; and such decisions had 
generally to be made prior to battle, oflen ky the overall commander himself. The 
potential lethality of a platform was; greatest when the greatest number of high-payoff 
targets lay within the 'tunnel of destruction' through which balls would fly. Firing in 
enfilade along the ranks of an opponent, rather than at right-angles to those ranks, 
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increased effectiveness. Achieving this required astute decisions by a high-level 
commander who had anticipated events aýd shapýd bis, battle accordingly. The artillery 
system was more than merely the firing platform. A successful deployment of necessity 
entailed the strategic ability to move artillery to the battlefield and to sustain it. Poor 
communications between a commander and his artillery once battle commenced was a 
general and serious deficiency and it ensured that command usually devolved to the lowest 
level after the initial deployment. Without effective links to the overall commander, there 
was no meaningful artillery network. 
There were times when artillery did fire munitions in a higher trajectory and achieve 
greater ranges. Shells are generally designed to explode at or near the terminal point of 
their trajectory. It is unlikely that a shell will be lethal along its flight-path, but it is able to 
achieve effects at or around the terminal point, at whatever range can be attained and with 
whatever accuracy can be achieved, given the problems of target acquisition at longer 
ranges. It proved difficult to make shells explode at the desired point on their trajectory, 
and they were generally judged to be less effective and flexible as a munition than ball, 
which remained the most conunon projectile. 
For these reasons, warfare remained a matter of two-dimensional linear encounter for the 
first 650 years of field gunnery. Artillery was typically deployed in the front line and 
engaged targets that could be acquired from the firing platform itself As a consequence 
fire could only be concentrated by conýentrating guns themselves close to the target, and 
there were limits to the numbers that could be positioned in one place, let alone have their 
fire coordinated effectively given the noise, smoke and vagaries of combat. Ile difficulty 
in deploying large numbers of guns close to the most lucrative targets before and during a 
fast-moving battle severely limited the potential impact of field artillery on the outcome of 
battles. Yet, when by luck or judgement guns were well deployed the effectiveness of 
artillery could be devastating. 
Large concentrations of guns, the 'grande batterie', while a primitive network of sensors, 
commanders and guns designed to increase decisive effects, failed for the most part 
because the capabilities of none of these three elements was significantly improved by their 
physical propinquity, and the communications and fire control within that grouping 
remained problematic. Until these were improved, such concentrations were unlikely to 
deliver synergy, and the whole was often significantly less flexible than a dispersed 
deployment, or a more mobile force of guns, which offered a greater spread of fire against 
a variety of unpredictable targets in an uncertain battle. 
Yet the notion that artillery's untapped potential lay in developing an integrated system 
capable of concentrating fire was widely recognized to have merit. The means of realizing 
it, however, proved elusive. There was little incentive to make field guns with a longer 
range than the available means of target acquisition; and the demonstrable advantages of 
firing in a flat trajectory militated against aspirations for greater range until a munition was 
developed which was effective when fired at higher elevations. Such a development 
would also permit the possibility of concentrating fire on targets from a number of 
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dispersed guns, using fire mobility instead of platform mobility. It would create a wide 
network of fire obviatLig the disadvantages of forming a concentrated 1grande batteriel, 
while realizing the latter's olýect. See. Secdoa'2.1. 
Innovations such as rifling, brcech-loading and recoil mechanisms showed that technology 
could be developed to achieve longer ranges; but the shortcomings of merely firing at 
longer range were revealed in the American Civil War. By 1870 it was clear that an 
improved shell could indeed make fire mobility a substitute for equipment mobility; but the 
system still lacked adequate means to acquire targets at longer range, let alone with the 
required accuracy. Artillery remained very much a lesser arm. 
By the end of the 19'hCentury, the principles of indirect fire were widely accepted in 
theory and demonstrated in practice. Indirect fire entails separation between the gun and 
the observer who orders the fire. The problem was that communications between the two 
relied on semaphore, voice or telephone fine and so in practice the distance of their 
separation could not be great. By the beginning of the 20h Century indirect fire was 
regarded as a useful means of tactical protection for guns, enabling them to shelter in 
covered terrain from lethal new infantry weapons, not so much a method of improving the 
fire that resulted per se. See Section 2.2. 
Soon after the outbreak of the First World War, it bccame clear not only that indirect fire 
was essential if guns were to survive, but also that the technology and techniques to enable 
indirect fire could be readily improved. As a result, new revolutionary possibilities rapidly 
became apparent. Concentrations of fire could be switched across the front from guns 
dispersed to the rear. Improvements in target acquisition, primarfly by aircraft, but also 
using other devices, meant that these concentrations could be created at any range that a 
gun could achieve. This transformed w. -afare. 
Warfare was no longer a matter of two dimensional linear encounter, but one of combat 
across and throughout the two dimensional plane of the battlefield, by firing in higher 
elevations through the third dimension. Artillery anywhere in the area of operations of 
one side could now engage any target anywhere in the area of operations of its opponent - 
if it was within range. These targets could be of higher value than front-line troops and 
could include the enemy commander, artillery, logistics and reserves; and all could be 
engaged simultaneously or in some subtle sequence in conjunction with the scheme of 
manoeuvre. The static nature of much of the combat in the First World War enabled a 
network of sensors, commanders and guns to be constructed, in which the identity and 
affiliation of particular assets was of little relevance compared to their availability and 
ability to engage. The role of the commander lay increasingly not merely in marshalling 
artillery resources for a given battle; but in constructing the network of fire to support his 
plan. It was artillery that came to detern-dne the scale of the battle that he could 
countenance. In that sense, artillery was not so much supporting manoeuvre as enabling 
it, and manoeuvre was seen to be the means of exploiting fire superiority. Artillery was 
recognized to be the arm whose characteristics now deter mined the 'geometry' of battle 
and regulated the scope and pace of manoeuvre. 
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The system, however, still had limitations. The advantages of commanding artillery at the 
highest level were evident, but how to control fire at the lowest, where it needed to be 
most responsive to unforeseen developmentsý was not clear. Equally, while guns could 
indeed in theory engage any target within range, that advantage was moderated by the 
inaccuracy inherent in any ballistic system, and that inaccuracy increases with range. 
This sophisticated network of artillery did not merely fire through the third dimension, it 
was soon meshed with other airborne capabilities. Besides target acquisition and battle 
damage assessment, aircraft increasingly delivered fire in conjunction with ground 
manoeuvre. See Section 2.3. 
The development of radio between the World Wars meant that an artillery network could 
be created in which the distance between sensors, guns and commanders could be greatly 
increased and the responsiveness of fire to low-level control by observers could be 
achieved, integrating that fire with the scheme of manoeuvre and reacting to the 
unexpected. Radio also improved the Unkages: between guns themselves, making their 
deployment more flexible and cohesive. Above all, these improvements could be achieved 
in mobile operations; but the problem remained as to how to achieve accuracy at long 
range. See Section 2.4. Aircraft were seen to provide an answer, and during the Second 
World War the Germans tended to use them as a substitute for precise artillery support. 
The Allies increasingly used aircraft in place of heavy artillery for deep attack, either in 
fighter ground attack or as a 'grande batterie' of bombers, making up for their imprecision 
with a massive weight of fire at ranges that artillery could not reach. Both sides created 
radio networks to enhance the responsiveness of this air-land system. 
By the end of the Second World War the network of fire was a truly three-dimensional 
one. It was conmmded at high level and control enabled at low level. There was a wide 
variety of ground and airborne sensors linked to aircraft firing directly, and a complex web 
of artillery equipments firing indirectly, altIv. )ugh many of these were also used to fire 
directly at airborne platforms, and in extrernis at close arnioured targets. See Section 2.5. 
Artillery theory and practice evolved in different ways on either side of the Iron Curtain 
during the forty-five years of the Cold Wz: with profound implications for operations in 
the strategic environment that emerged after 1990. By the end of the Second World War 
the Soviets were convinced that overwhelming firepower was the decisive factor in 
warfare and that this was generated prinwily by artillery. Their method of achieving this 
was the deployment of masses of guns, rockets and ammunition. Their C3 was relatively 
primitive yet highly effective. The US Army and the British Army had tended to rely more 
on an increasingly sophisticated C3 system to maximize the firepower generated from 
fewer resources. They were eager to reduce the size of their forces after 1945 and were 
reassured by the massive firepower of nuclear weapons which was deemed to insure 
against any conventional deficiency. 
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The use of nuclear weapons to avert conventional defeat grew less plausible during the 
1970s and while NATO sought ways to make its conventional forces more capable, so too 
the VVT sought ways to win more quickly, without resort to its own nuclear weapons and 
before NATO could use its own. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the WP deployed 
more mobile systems and ever greater numbers of heavier and longer range artillery pieces, 
far outnumbering those of NATO. Soviet artillery retained its importance in all-arms 
planning for offensive operations; but in NATO the relative value of field artillery waned 
as airpower grew and new infantry guided anti-armour weapons were introduced. 
In some respects the 'geometry' of operations in North West Europe had again become 
linear, and artillery was unable to attack targets throughout the depth of the WP area of 
operations. The deep echeloning of WP forces meant that the most important targets, 
other than those on the front line, were often at too great a range to be reached or to be 
engaged accurately. At the same time accuracy had become even more important because 
the highest pay-off targets were now annoured and mobile. NATO lacked the means of 
acquiring these precisely enough for them to be attacked effectively by guns with a slow 
rate of fire and simple high explosive shells. Rockets were designed to attack area targets, 
but were still wanting in range, accuracy and terminal effect. 
In the meantime, airpower seemed the best answer to NATO's problem and along with 
ground manoeuvre was the key to the concept, AirLand Battle. The viability of CAS 
close to the front-line became dubious given the density of WP air defences, but air 
interdiction of WP echelons beyond the range of artillery became a vital element in 
NATO's planning. The difficulty in carrying out effective CAS marked out artillery's 
primary area of operations even more clearly, but artillery still lacked effect against 
moving annoured targets, even at relatively close range. Artillery was consigned primarily 
to fighting the close battle, which on an extcnded battlefield now stretched out to 30km, 
and it was airpower which took on the role which artillery had played, relative to overall 
battlefield 'geometry', when indirect fire was first introduced seventy years earlier. The 
importance of airpower was ftirther enhanced by the introduction of ever more 
sophisticated precise munitions although, ironically, aircraft stiff delivered these directly 
and therefore often at great risk. 
If artillery was to regain its importance on the battlefield it would need to be a part of a 
system that could achieve better target acquisition, greater accuracy and improved 
terminal effects against the most demanding targets. In the final years of the Cold War 
these improved capabilities were close to being fielded by NATO nations. New radars, 
UAVs and stand-off aerial sensors like JSTARS were developed for the acquisition of 
deep targets for Joint attack. Longer-range missiles such as ATACMS were to be 
introduced and a series of new field guns capable of firing smart munitions were due into 
service. The end of the Cold War caused the cost and relevance of many of these artillery 
systems to be questioned4 given that the massive armoured threat had apparently 
diminished. Plans for many smart munitions for guns and rockets were abandoned, even 
though many of the new target acquisition systems were not. See Chapter 3. 
241 
After the Cold War artillery still lacked effect against targets which could now be acquired 
at long range. These targets were increasingly_ allocated to aircraft for attack. Their 
success in doing so led to a virtuous spiral of technical and tactical development which 
came to include stand-off munitions, allowing j6praft, at last, to engage targets indirectly 
and therefore at less risk. Equally, they could also now attack from the safety of a higher 
altitude, the equivalent on land to out-ranging their opponents. 
The environment in which artillery was applied after the Cold War was shaped not only by 
the Cold War itself, but also by the other operations which had been running concurrently 
with it. The value of massive firepower was appreciated and applied in the Korean War 
even more than it had been in the Second World War. In America's war in Vietnam, the 
same preference for firepower was evident, but so too was its price. It was seen to be too 
indiscriminate against an elusive enemy who did not present a target for which the artillery 
arm developed during the World Wars had been designed. The political costs of massive 
firepower, whether from the air or artillery, came to seem excessive. See Sections 4.3 and 
4.4. 
The importance of applying artillery in limited, precise ways against clearly identified 
targets avoiding unnecessary collateral damage became evident in a series of small wars 
around the world. See Sections 4.2,4.5.4.6 and 4.7. These lessons were learned in the 
West, but the Soviets and their Russian successors seemed not to acknowledge them in 
Afghanistan and Chechnya. See Sections 4.8 and 4.13. Meanwhile in the Middle East 
new insights into how artillery might be applied were emerging. See Sections 4.10 and 
4.11. Artillery was used by Arab armies ' 
in the manner in which they had been taught by 
the USSR, but with increasing guile; and Israel learned the difficulties of applying artillery 
fire in operations against irregular forces in the Lebanon and against her own Palestinian 
Intaffida, in a complex and sensitive political environment. II". 
The American and British Armies which were designed to fight the WP on the North 
Gemian Plain were well equipped in 199 Ito fight 
' 
an Iraqi Army that in many respects, 
other than ability, replicated that of the USSR. See Section 4.12. The value of artillery in 
close battle, even without smart munitions was clear, but it was increasingly evident that 
airpower using precise munitions now played the role once undertaken by field artillery in 
deeper operations; and there was little prospect of artillery being equipped with precise 
munitions of its own in the near future. 
There had been numerous examples of light artillery demonstrating strategic deployability, 
for example to retake the Falklands Islands in 1982, see Section 4.9; but the Gulf War also 
caused some to suggest that the majority of field artillery might be too heavy to deploy in 
the timeframes required to meet anticipated crises. Tracked and armoured pieces were 
heavy, consumed large quantities of fuel and potentially huge quantities of ammunition. It 
was doubted by many that they were light enough to deploy fast enough, and whether they 
could generate sufficient combat power when they did arrive in theatre. These 
considerations caused a revival in the design and acquisition of lighter pieces which has 
continued to the present. 
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Even though the value of ordinary munitions was repeatedly demonstrated, albeit at 
relatively short range in a greatly expanded battlespace, the need for precision became 
increasingly evident as the dynamics of the strategic environment evolved in the 1990s. It 
also became clear that the manner in which fire should best be applied would, in many 
cases, have to be very much more sophisticated than in many previous conflicts. 
The disadvantages of massive firepower in complex political situations had been apparent 
since the Vietnam War and in Israel's attempts to deal with insurgency. These became 
even more obvious in a series of Peace Support Operations especially in the Balkans in the 
1990s. See Sections 4.14 and 4.15. The moral authority, legality and thus even the 
viability of an operation could be threatened by the careless application of fire, whether by 
air or artillery. The presence of the media made matters even more sensitive. Precise 
target acquisition, compliance with ROE and accuracy within the system of fire became 
crucial in many complex operations. The need to deploy rapidly, see Section 5.1, also 
determined that the focus for artillery development would be on fight guns and rockets 
with as small a logistic footprint as possible, using fewer more expensive precision 
munitions. Effect rather than firepower per se became the measure used by the military to 
assess its performance. See Section 5.2. This employment of artillery would therefore be 
very different to that envisaged in Cold War Europe, even though much of this new 
technology had its origins in the Cold War. See Section 5.3. 
Precision technology became the critical element in the new munitions and had the 
potential to solve the problem that hobbled fircpower, especially given the increasing 
sensitivities to its misapplication. Accuracy had always becn a function of range; and 
while indirect fire had enabled effects to be concentrated from dispersed firing points at 
any theoretical range, it was the correlation between range and accuracy in a ballistic 
system that prevented that being a practical proposition. Precision, whether achieved by 
designating a target remotely for the munition, cr by the munition's own on-board sensor 
meant that accuracy need no longer be a function of range. In both theory and practice a 
target could be attacked accurately at any acEevable range throughout the area of 
operations. This promises to be as revolutionary in its consequences as was the 
introduction of indirect fire at the beginning of the 2& Century, for given the ranges 
attainable at that time and the nature of the targets, that was also what was achieved, but 
subsequently lost. Yet by 2003, precision munitions were still not available for use by 
artillery, although they were the mainstay of operations by aircraft. 
Despite the lack of precise munitions, the artillery system developed rapidly after the Cold 
War and it will be substantially upgraded in coming years in most Western forces but 
especially those of the USA. The intention is to create a network linking sensors, 
'deciders' and 'shooters' seamlessly, so that the prescribed effect may be achieved at the 
precise time and place using the optimal assets available. See Sections 5.4 and 5.5. 
Precision therefore offers the possibility of perpetuating a one hundred year old model of 
warfare which was eroding as accuracy failed to keep pace with the increases in range 
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inherent in an expanding battlespace. This model of warfare, whereby effects can be 
created using the third dimension anywhere in the two-dimensional area of land operations 
from any range, simultaneously or sequentially according to the tactical or Operational 
plan, can be rejuvenated by the technology of precision linked to the method of indirect 
fire which gave birth to it. This model will also incorporate a shrinking fourth dimension 
as time 'contracts' and the need for effects to be applied more rapidly grows 
commensurately. Meanwhile the fifth dimension of cyber-space grows in a manner and 
within boundaries which are uncharted. All these dimensions will be seen and assessed 
through the distorting lens of perceptions. See Section 5.5. 
This model will also lead to another more complex paradigm so far as the three physical 
dimensions are concerned. Airspace has long been used for airforces to fight each other, 
to support operations on the ground; and by forces on the ground attacking airforces. The 
third dimension wa however, become an increasingly vital dimension of operations, and 
the terms 'land' and 'air' will become less useful in describing the nature and totality of 
operations conducted in the volume of battlespace. Forces will manoeuvre in it, and fire at 
other objects in it and many of these will be unmanned, and the differences between 
platforms and munitions will themselves become less distinct. Whether those forces or 
their targets are on the ground or airborne will be of lesser significance as also will be their 
Service affliation. In that sense the pattern of warfare will move on again. One hundred 
years after the indirect fire revolution created today's familiar model, warfare will become 
fully three dimensional and may require organizational change to match. This is not 
surprising it is the historical norm. 
6.2 RECOMNIENDAnONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Historical Themes 
There is much work to be done before we understand early artillery practice adequately, 
especially outside Europe, even though many Asian armies employed large quantities of 
guns. We still do not know who invented the gun or gunpowder. Convincing evidence 
has yet to be found of any gun from Asia that pre-dates those that exist in Europe. We do 
not know how knowledge of these inventions and their use travelled around the world. 
The technology survives in the guns themselves, but little trace remains of the doctrine. 
We know something of the use of artillery ha siege operations, but far less about field 
artillery. We know little of how the hundreds of guns in the inventory of Calicut in the 
15'h Century would have been used, or of the artillery practice of the Sultan of Acheh in 
the early 17'h Century. What of Chinese field artillery doctrine, and that of the Sikhs? 
Technology 
Many of the old debates about guns versus mortars and rockets, and tracks versus wheels 
remain unresolved and take on new meaning with every technological advance. Where are 
these debates heading? 
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If 'reach' is the sum of platform mobility and munition range, more work is required on 
how both might be increased and the effects of reach be achieved more rapidly. What 
strategic lift is required for what force packages; and what new materials will lighten the 
system sufficiently to achieve growing aspirations for rapid deployment? Research is 
required into new materials and ideas which might offer artillery greater protection and 
survivability. Equally, investigation would be valuable into new propulsion, projection or 
other forms of attack which might substitute for traditional methods. 
Further research is required before we can judge whether rail-guns and liquid propellant 
were 'dead-ends' of 1990's thinking and technology, or whether other approaches will 
enable them to realize their once obvious appeal. The potential of Directed Energy 
Weapons (DEW) is unquantified; and if thcir primary disadvantage is that they are direct 
fire weapons, can they be mounted effectively on indirectly fired platforms? More work is 
required on thermobaric weapons to see whether they can be made more precise in their 
effect and acceptable in ethical and legal perceptions. What new munitions might be 
developed to tackle new forms of annour? The future of non-lethal artillery systems and 
even 'virtual fire' in cyberspace have received relatively little attention; and there has been 
little rigorous thinking on how their planning and application differ conceptually from 
current practice. 
Robotics have great potential to be incorporated in fire systems; and little has been done 
to assess the scope for 'intelligent' techniques to alter and optimize the aerodynamics of 
munitions in flight, either by modifying their shape or the qualities of their surfaces. 
Effects 
The effects of conventional indirect fire have always been difficult to assess. Work needs 
to be done on how better to measure and assess the effects of fire, not just the physical 
damage but also the psychological effects of shock. Shock has generally been regarded as 
the most important effect of artillery, more so even than destruction, if only because it is 
easier to achieve at lqss cost. In the early years of artillery, the relative lack of physical 
effect made shock even more important. As we enter the age of precise artillery 
i ions, it may be that very limited but precise destruction will fail to create the shock 
effects which have been more potent in the past. How should we approach this problem, 
let alone solve it? 
Precision is not merely a matter of accuracy at a point. Area attack and suppressive 
effects must be made more precise. Techniques of achieving all the desired effects in 
complex terrain such as mountains, jungles, but especially urban areas, should be analysed. 
The relative cost-effectiveness of various types of effect deserve detailed measurement. 
For example, how can we know whether, in a given situation, assuming all systems are or 
could be moved into range in the critical time, an effect is best achieved by strategic air, 
maritime air, maritime surface-to-surfitce attack, field artillery rockets, guns, mortars or 
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helicopters? What are the real costs and opportunity-costs of achieving effects, and how 
should this guide procurement policy? 
Tactics 
Work is required on how best to identify and attack targets in an increasingly complex and 
crowded battlespace, where non-combatants are becoming an increasingly controversial 
part of that complexity. The means to avoid fratricide, and improved situational 
awareness can accelerate our decision-action cycle to exploit manoeuvre and our capacity 
to create effects with fire throughout the many dimensions of battlespace. This 
'knowledge superiority' and tempo remain mere aspirations without greater thought and 
competence. 
C3 
Field artillery introduced the first electronic sensor-decider-shooter network during the 
First World War. What should be the characteristics of the future network of fires, given 
that it will be increasingly joint and part of a broader and deeper network? How will 
command of resources and the formulation of intent be matched with technology to 
enhance the responsive control of the application of effects? Will a change in command 
philosophy be required? Space will play an increasingly important part in the architecture 
of C3. The extent to which space will be militarized, and the legal and ethical issues 
arising from this debate, deserve closer scnitiny. 
Structures 
As direct and indirect fire become harder to differentiate, as platforms and munitions 
become increasingly indistinct, as the definitions of, for example, counter-fire and GBAD 
merge, and as operations are conducted increasingly in three rather than two dimensions, 
what will, or should be, the consequences for the structures that deliver capability?. Will 
the structures of Arms have to be adjusted? The better integration of ground fires with 
those of other components needs further study, and one consequence of that night be the 
fundamental reassessment of current inter-Service boundaries and distinctions. 
Training 
Further work is required on how the ever more diverse effects of indirect fire, lethal and 
non-lethal, may be better simulated in the full range of novel training environments. 
International Developments 
Globalization and the end of the Cold War make it increasingly easy to track international 
developments in artillery in open sources. There remain, however, some areas where little 
is known. The Korean peninsula is a likely location for major conflict in the future; and 
field artillery, could be the most potent conventional element in it. The equipment and 
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doctrine of the North Koreans, and the threat that these constitute relative to other 
capabilities, deserves much greater attention than has been afforded in this thesis. 
The emerging capabilities of the Chinese Army and its possible adoption of novel 
approaches to warfare also deserve greater public investigation. 
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